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No. 82-492-CFH
SOLEM (warden)

Cert to CA 8
(Lay [CJ], Bright, Ross)

v.

Federal/~

HELM

1.

SUMMARY:

Whether a

~atutori{y

Timely

authorized sentence of

./

life-without-parole, imposed on a nonviolent offender for his seventh
felony--all committed under the influence of alcohol--constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment.
2.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

in state court to a

Resp entered a guilty plea

- 2 $100.

~
Against the advice of counsel, he also admitted to stx prior

felony convictions.

These included three convictions for third degree

V burglary, and one conviction each for a third offense for driving
V'
while intoxicated, ~rand larceny, and obtaining money under false

----

The record indicates that resp is an alcoholic, and that

pretenses.

alcohol contributed to his actions leading to each of his prior
convictions.

Asked by the TC to describe the events of his last

crime, resp said:

"I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that day,
was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid City with more
money than I had when I started. I knew I'd done something
I didn't know exactly what. If I would have known this, I
would have picked the check up. I was drinking and didn't
remember, stopped several places." Pet. App., at A-3.
Resp waived his right to a presentence report and requested immediate

v

sentencing.

The TC agreed, and sentenced him under the state habitual

offender statute to life imprisonment.

That statute provided that

-

resp would never be "eligible
for parole
,.....,.,_,
,_..
.., ...,. by the board of pardons and
paroles."

S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §24-15-4 (1979).

As petr, the

State of South Dakota, explains it, "by imposing a life sentence, the
sentencing judge committed [resp] to the state penitentiary for the
remainder of his natural life, barring a pardon or commutation of his
sentence" by the governor.
Resp appealed his sentence to the South Dakota Supreme Court.
With two justices dissenting (Morgan, Henderson), that court affirmed
the sentence.

Resp then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the

D.S.D. (Bogue [CJ]).
~

Appendix.

The DC denied the petn.

See Supplemental

Resp's argument that the sentence violated due process

- 3 -

because it was done without a presentence report was unavailing
because resp had waived a report.

Resp's argument that the sentence

violated the Eighth Amendment was unavailing because governed by this
Court's decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445
3.

DECISION BELOW:

u.s.

263 (1980).

Resp appealed to the CAS, urging only that

the sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.

The

~8

reversed and remanded to the DC with instructions

that the writ issue unless within 60 days the State resentenced resp.
The court first held that Rummel was QOt dispositive.

There, this

Court rejected an Eighth Amendment disproportionality challenge to a
life sentence with the possibility of parole under the Texas habitual
offender statute.

But the Rummel Court did not reject entirely the

idea that a term of imprisonment might be so disproportionate to the
~

offense as to be unconstitutional.

In extreme cases, the Court

indicated, where a legislature made relatively innocuous behavior
felonious, a proportionality principle might come into play.

u.s.,

at 274 n. 11.

445

But more importantly, this Court distinguished

the life sentence at issue there from a life sentence without parole.
This Court noted that Texas had:

"a relatively liberal policy of granting good time credits
to its prisoners, a policy that historically has allowed a
prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for
parole in as little as 12 years •••• [A] proper assessment
of Texas' treatment of Rummel could hardly ignore the
possibility that he will not actually be imprisoned for the
rest of his life. If nothing else, the possibility of
parole, however slim, serves to distinguish Rummel from a
person sentenced under a recidivist statute like
Mississippi's, which provides for a sentence of life without
parole upon conviction of three felonies including at least
one violent felony." 445 u.s., at 280-281.

I

- 4 Contrary to the State's assertion, Hutto v. Davis,

s.

u.s.

' 102

Ct. 703 (per curiam), does not stand for the proposition that

disproportionality analysis is inapposite except in capital cases.
Hutto said only that Rummel stands for the proposition that federal
courts should be "reluctant to review legislatively mandated terms of
imprisonment," and that successful challenges in such contexts should
be "exceedingly rare."

102

s.

Ct. at 705.

And Davis was sentenced to

a definite term of years and so, like Rummel, had the prospect of
parole or otherwise of release.
The CAB held that a life sentence without parole differs in
quality -from a term of years or a life sentence with the prospect of
parole.

"As with the death penalty, the State totally rejects

rehabilitation as a basic goal of our criminal justice system."
~

App., at A-14.

Pet.

Compare Rummel, at 272 (death penalty differs from

other forms of criminal punishment, inter alia, in rejecting
possibility of rehabilitation) • 1
Identifying "objective factors" in making its proportionality
inquiry, as mandated in Coker v. Georgia, 433

u.s.

5B4, 592 (1977),

the CAB noted that in only one other State, Nevada, could a nonviolent
1The CAB rejected the State's contention that the possibility
that the sentence could be commuted by the governor brings the
case within Rummel.
Pet. App., at A-12 n. 6.
Although
commutations were fairly common in South Dakota before 1975,
since that time the governor had denied all 25 requests for
commutation, including resp's. The CAB noted this Court's recent
decision in Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 u.s.
45B, 464 (19Bl), which held that decisions to commute life
sentences did not and need not depend--as parole decisions must-upon objective fact-finding but may rest instead on purely
subjective evaluations entrusted unreviewably to the denominated
decisionmaker.
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habitual offender receive a life sentence
parole.

~ithout

the possibility of

Moreover, the circumstances surrounding resp's crimes

demonstrated that life without parole was "grossly disproportionate."
In each, alcohol was a factor.

Although not excusing the offenses,

alcoholism "is nonetheless a condition amenable to treatment."
App., at A-19.

Pet.

To forsake rehabilitation for such an offender

violates "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society."
4.

CONTENTIONS:

Trop v. Dulles, 356

u.s.

B6, 101 (l95B).

Petr contends that this case is controlled by

Rummel and Hutto and should be summarily reversed.

The CAB's

distinction between life sentences with and without parole does not
square with Rummel's stateme.nt that "a sentence of death differs in
kind from any sentence of imprisonment, no matter how long," 445
~

u.s.,

at 390, and Hutto's statement that Rummel distinguished between
"punishments--such as death--which by their very nature differ from
all other forms of conventionally accepted punishment, and punishments
which differ from others only in duration."

The State accepts the

Hutto dissenters' conclusion that the majority there held
proportionality analysis inapplicable to non-capital punishment cases.
The "objective factors" relied on by the CAB were rejected in
Rummel.

For example, the fact that South Dakota is more severe in

this respect than any other State save one was considered irrelevant
since "some states will always bear the distinction of treating
particular offenders more severely than in any other state."

u.s.,

at 2B2.

445

Resp's seven felonies and incarceration for most of his

adult life distinguish this case from the hypothetical posed in Rummel
where the plurality indicated it might apply a proportionality

- 6 -

approach--"life imprisonment for overtime parking."
The possibility of parole, although noted in Rummel, was only one
example posed by the Court of the complexities involved in Rummel's
attempt to portray Texas as the most severe State in the nation.
Moreover, Rummel emphasizes the strong state interest in imposing what
"might otherwise constitute a disproportionate prison sentence on an
individual determined under state law to be a habitual offender."
Hutto v. Davis, supra.

The State also emphasizes the possibility that

the governor might commute resp's sentence.
If summary reversal is not appropriate, the State urges that the
Court grant this case.

It submits that the CAB's distinction between

life with and life without parole conflicts with Britton v. Rogers,
631 F.2d 572, 57( (CAB 19BO), Terrebonne v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 997
(CAS 19Bl), United States v. Valenzuela, 646 F.2d 352 (CA9 19BO),
Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 592 F.2d 192 (CA3 1979), and Moore
v. Corvan, 560 F.2d 129B, 1303 (CA6 1977), cert. denied, 435

u.s.

929

(197B).
Resp repeats the CAB's argument that life without parole is
qualitatively different from life with parole.

It notes that South

Dakota is free under the CAB's approach to sentence resp to 99 years
imprisonment, which would make him ineligible for parole for 3B years,
24 more than Rummel was.
Resp also argues that because only Nevada and South Dakota have
laws like this one, a decision by this court would have very little
impact.
He concludes by distinguishing the cases the State claims
conflict with this one.

In Britton, the governor regularly commuted

- 7 -

t

life sentences (and the underlying crime w's rape).

In Terrebonne the

majority equated dealing in heroin, the crime at issue, with violent
crime.

In Valenzuela, a major drug ring was at issue.

Gereau dealt

with a conviction on eight counts of First Degree Murder, and in Moore
the defendant had been convicted on three counts of rape.
5.

DISCUSSION:

Although the CAS's decision is inconsistent with

the implications of certain passages in Rummel, which suggest that
terms of imprisonment, no matter how severe, may be immune from
proportionality analysis in most cases, on its face neither Rummel nor
Hutto forecloses the result reached below.

As the CAS noted, life

without parole shares with the death penalty a rejection of the
possibility of rehabilitation.

Although the Court may ultimately

decide that this is a difference in degree, and not a difference in
kind, from life with parole, that question is not answered by Rummel
or Hutto and seems more appropriately addressed after plenary review.
Moreover, if certain passages in Rummel suggest that the distinction
made is without constitutional significance, it is true as well that
the Court in Rummel took care to distinguish Mississippi's lifewithout-parole statute (which, incidentally,
one prior offense be a violent crime) •

~equired

that at least

This Court has held in other

contexts that the difference between the possibility of parole and the
possibility of a pardon is of constitutional magnitude.
Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 451

u.s.,

Connecticut

at 464-465.

Moreover, the fact, apparently known to the sentencing judge at
the time of sentencing, that each of resp's offenses were committed
under the influence of alcohol, also may distinguish this case
Rummel.

f~om

The Rummel Court emphasized that recidivist statutes

---

·- --· ···--··------·-- -----~~-

.

·--·-~·-

----
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punishing comparatively minor crimes with severe sentences were
supported by a strong state interest "in dealing in a harsher manner
with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are
simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society as established
by its criminal law •••• [T]he State of Texas ••• has a valid interest
in so dealing with that class of persons."

445

u.s.,

at 276.

The CAS

held that a State could not validly treat an individual who committed
each of his minor crimes under the influence of alcohol as one of that
class, given the fact that alcoholism is treatable.

Again, although

the Court may ultimately reject that position, it is worthy of plenary
review.
6.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend that the petn be granted.

There is a response.

October 25, 1982
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
No. 82-492
Solem v. Helm
Michael F. Sturley

March 25, 1983

Question Presented
Does a life sentence without possibility of parole for a
seventh

non-violent~ a~ felony violate the Eighth

Amendment proscription of cruel and unusual punishments?
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I.
A.

Background

The State Statutes
South Dakota,

in common with many other States,

has a

-

recidivist statute that can be applied to a defendant's fourth 1
..:

felony conviction:
When a defendant has been convicted of at least three
prior convict ions [sic] in addition to the principal
felony, the sentence for the principal felony shall be
enhanced to the sentence for a Class 1 felony.
S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §22-7-8 (1979) . 2

-

The maximum penalty for

a "Class 1 felony" is "life imprisonment in the state penitentiary"

and

a

$25,000

fine. 3

codified at §22-6-1(2)

§22-6-1(3)

(1979)).

(Supp.

1982)

(previously

There is added bite to a life

sentence in South Dakota, for state law explicitly provides that

1 south Dakota has a separate recidivist statute that can be
applied to a defendant's second or third felony conviction.
Under S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §22-7-7 (1979), the subsequent felony sentence is enhanced by increasing the felony classification
to the next highest class. See note 3, infra.
2 This is the version in force when Helm was convicted.
The
statute now requires "at least three prior felony convictions,"
S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §22-7-8 (Supp. 1982), rather than simply
"three prior convictions."
As H~ ' s previous convictions were
for felonies, the change would not have affecrte a hi m.
'"'
3 There are two more serious felony classes. A "Class A" felony carries the death penalty or mandatory life imprisonment.
S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §22-6-1(1) (Supp. 1982).
A "Class B"
felony carries mandatory life imprisonment.
§22-6-1(2).
South
Dakota has a total of eight felony classes.
The lower classes
and the maximum punishments provided are:
Class 2
25 years and $25,000
§22-6-1(4)
Class 3
15 years and $15,000
§22-6-1(5)
Class 4
10 years and $10,000
§22-6-1(6)
Class 5
5 years and $5,000
§22-6-1(7)
Class 6
2 years and $2,000
§22-6-1(4)

parole is unavailable:
A person sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible
for parole by the board of pardons and paroles.
§24-15-4

( 1979) .

or commute

The Governor,

his sentence.

The

however, may pardon a defendant
board o f. :g,a rdons and paroles is

- --,

authorized to make _ recommendations to the Governor on this subject, §24-14-5; S.D. Executive Order 82-04

(Apr. 12, 1982), but

the Governor is not bound by the recommendation, §24-14-5.

B.

.Facts
By 1979,

He had

~e

resp Helm had been convicted of six felonies.
I(

convictions for third

d~~r: e

bur i~ ary,

one convic-

tion for third offense driving while intoxicated, one conviction
for grand larceny, and one conviction for obtaining money under
-.:....-._...-.

false pretenses.
about

these

The record is essentially devoid of any details

prior

convictions,

except

that

they were

all non-

violent and alcohol was a contributing factor to Helm's actions
in each case.
It is unclear when Helm committed his previous felonies,
but under the present law thi_; d degree burgla r.y , a "Class 4 felony,"

is defined as

-----

structure,
(1979). 4

with

.

....

"enter [ ing]

intent

or remain [ ing]

in an unoccupied

to commit any crime therein."

§22-32-8

Third offense driving while intoxicated is a "Class 6

4 The Rummel majority asserts "that for crimes concededly
classified and classifiable as felonies ..• , the length of the
sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative
.Footnote continued on next page.

felony."

§32-23-4

(Supp. 1982}.

There is no "grand larceny" in

grace."
445 U.S., at 274 (footnote omitted}.
I see no legal
basis for this assertion. But to the extent one might accept it,
it is worth noting that the South Dakota burglary statute-particularly third degree burglary--might not satisfy the constraint of "concededly ... classifiable as [a] felon[y] ."
Common law burglary is clearly classifiable as a felony, but
that crime was defined as breaking and entering the dwelling
house of another in the nighttime with intent to commit a felony.
The South Dakota statute applies to any presence (even lawful
presence} in any structure (even one open to the public} at any
time (even the middle of the day} with the intent to commit any
crime (even a petty misdemeanor}.
In State v. Blair, 273 N.W.2d 187, (S.D 1979}, for example, the
court upheld a third degree burgla
'ndictment charging the defendants with attempting to steal money from the coin boxes in a
laundromat's washing machines.
The amount of money involved in
the theft ordinarily would have made the crime "petty theft," a
class 2 misdemeanor punishable by 30 days in the county jail
and/or a $100 fine.
The laundromat was open to the public, so
there was no unlawful entry.
But the laundromat was a "structure," so the statutory elements of third degree burglary were
_p atisfied.
Blair's implications are broad indeed.
It means that shoplifting, which is ordinarily a class 2 misdemeanor, is automatically
third degree burglary, a class 4 felony punishable by 10 years in
the state penitentiary and/or a $10,000 fine.
In fact, if a
South Dakota college student in his own dormitory room intends to
take a dime from his roommate's desk some night, he already has
committed first degree burglary, a class 2 felony punishable by
25 years in the state penitentiary and/or a $25,000 fine.
§2232-1(3}.
/
The South Dakota burglary statute has been criticized along
these lines by others. See, e.g., State v. Blair, 273 N.W.2d, at
188 (Zastrow, J., dissenting}: Note, "Steal the Cb~t the
Henhouse Door:" The South Dakota BurgJ ::o ..... ,;:::; _
~J D.
L.
Rev. 158 ( 1980} .
I~
It is possible, of course, that Hel1
mately
could have been classified as felonies, t
icular
reason to believe that this is the casE
t happened in this case, it seems at least aE
>leaded
guilty to third degree burglary in retu .
entence
without much concern for the fact that it
conviction.
The laundromat thief in Blair, f
_ __ , uJ.timately
pleaded guilty to third degree burglary ana received a light sentence. See Note, supra, at 162. Perhaps it would be helpful if,
at oral argument, you asked for some of the details of Helm's
prior offenses.

r!]

v

L

£

~~

the current South Dakota law, 5 but it was previously defined,
relevant

part,

as

"the

-

taking

by

fraud
..........,

livestock 6 or property worth more than $50.
2 {1)

&

{ 3)

{19 6 7) .

It was punishable

or

stealth"

in
of

~

§§22-37-1 and 22-37-

"by imprisonment

in the

state penitentiary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in
the county jail not exceeding one year."

§22-37-3 {1967).

There

is also no "obtaining money under false pretenses" in the current
law, 7 but Helm may have been convicted under §22-41-4 {1967):
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any
false token or writing, or other false pretense,
obtains from any person any money or property . . . is
punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary
not exceeding three years or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding three
times the value of the money or property so obtained,
or by both such fine and imprisonment."
This is comparable to a present "Class 6" felony.

In any event,

it appears that Helm's conviction for obtaining money under false

5 under the curr.ent §22-30A-15, "theft" includes "the separate
offens[e] committed or charged before the effective date of [the
current law] and known as larceny."
"Grand theft," a "Class 4
felony," is defined, in relevant part, as the theft of property
worth more than $200, any livestock, or a firearm. §22-30A-17.
6I find it interesting that a ~ itic of the South Dakota burglary statute would advise potential chicken thieves to "Steal
the Chicken at the Henhouse Door" to avoid committing burglary.
See Note, supra n. 4.
Under South Dakota law, however, a chicken
thief commits a serious felony {previously grand larceny~ now
grand theft) ins ide or outs ide the henhouse.
Once again, we do
not know the details of Helm's grand larceny.
He may have been
no more than a chicken thj.ef.
Clarification
at
oral argument
1
might be useful.
7 current law includes "false pretense" within the theft definition. §22-30A-15.

pretenses began with a charge of uttering a "no account" check.
See Helm's Brief in Supreme Court of South Dakota, No. 12789, at
5.

(This is the most information we have about any of his prior

convict ions.)
In sum, it is impossible to be certain about Helm's previous offenses on the record now before the Court.

It appears

that prior to 1979 he had been convicted of four "Class 4" felonies and two "Class 6"

felonies,

but the statutory definitions

leave room for some very minor behavior.

-

We do know that none of

the -...offenses was a crime against a ....person, and all six involved
~..-,.....__..,.

alcohol.

As a

~

result of the convictions,

the 36-year-old Helm

had spent much of his adult life in the South Dakota State Penitentiary.
In 1979, Helm pleaded guilty to uttering a "no account"
~

check for $100, a "Class 5 felony."

§22-41-1.2.

It appears that

the offense was committed after Helm had been drinking to such an
extent that he was unable to remember what had happened.

c.

Decisions Below
The state TC

sentenced him to life
that

because

his

prior

(Parker)

accepted Helm's guilty plea and

imprisonment under §22-7-8.
imprisonments had

been

motivate Helm to correct his drinking problem,
pose

in giving him another chance.

It reasoned

insufficient

ther~ was

to

no pur-

Since he was "beyond reha-

bilitation," the TC "lock[ed]

[him] up for the rest of [his] nat-

ural

not

life,

crimes."

so

[there

would

be]

further

victims

of

[his]

/

The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed

a~.
D~d

287 N.W.2d 497

(1980).

sentence by

The majority, per Justice

the sentence "severe," but "it

conscience of the court."

th~

Id., at 498.

[did]

not shock the

Chief Justice Wollman,

concurring specially, noted the availability of executive clemency.

Id., at 499.

Justices Morgan and Henderson filed dissenting

opinions in which they argued that Helm's sentence was disproportionate.

Justice Morgan would reserve life sentences for crimes

against persons.

Justice Henderson, applying the analysis adopt-

ed by CA4 in Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136
415

u.s.

983

(1973), cert. denied,

(1974), concluded that Helm's sentence violated the

Eighth Amendment.

At the very least, he would give Helm "an op-

portunity to obtain parole during his lifetime."

287 N.W.2d, at

502.
Helm then sought federal habeas.
denied

the

writ,

relying

on Rummel

v.

The DC
Estelle

(S.D.; Bogue)
to

dispose

of

Helm's Eighth Amendment claim.
On

appeal,~A8

(Lay, Bright, Ross)

reversed.

The court

distinguished Rummel v. Estelle on the grouno that Helm had been
sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole.

~ Hutto

v. Davis, 454

u.s.

a possibility of parole.

370 (1982)

In

(per curiam), there was also

There is a qualitative difference, be-

cause the State has rejected the possibility of rehabilitation.
Examining the crimes Helm had committed and the sentence he had
{'A,('
received, the c66 rt concluded that the sentence was grossly disproportionate.
~

Accordingly it granted habeas relief.

II.
In view of your
the

principles

very

Discussion

familiarity with this area,
The

briefly.

main

purpose of

I

discuss

this

bench

memo, as I see it, is to fill in some of the gaps that the briefs
have left.

A.

The Relevant Precedents
Two

significance
curiam),
sented

recent decisions of
here:

Hutto

and Rummel v.

from JUSTICE

v.

this

Davis,

Estelle,

REHNQUIST's

445

Court are of particular

454

U.S.

U.S.

263

opinion

370

(1982)

(1980).

in Rummel,

(~

You diswriting

an

opinion in which JUSTICES BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS joined.
In Davis, a summary reversal of CA4, you declined to join JUSTICE
REHNQUIST's per curiam opinion, but concurred in the judgment on
the authority of Rummel.
Since you wrote in both of these cases, I will only summar ize their

facts

briefly to refresh your memory.

Rummel was

convicted in 1964 of presenting a credit card with intent to defraud,

obtaining

forged check for

$80.

In

$28. 36.

1969 he was convicted of passing
In 1973 he was convicted of a

felony: obtaining $120.75 under false pretenses. 8
conviction,

a

third

After the 1973

the state TC sentenced Rummel to life imprisonment

under Texas's habitual criminal statute.

Relying in part on the

8 These were the only convictions specifically at issue, but
it appears thatvRummel had a total of 13 con yic tions. See Amicus
Brief of the Criminal District Attorney of Bexai: County, Texas,
in Rummel, No. 78-6386, at 3, n. 2.

u.s.,

possibility of parole, see 445
this Court upheld the sentence

at · 280-281; cf.. id., at 268,

in a 5-4 decision.

~ xas freed

after the decision was announced.
Davis was convicted of selling marijuana and with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.

A total of nine

ounces of marijuana, with a value of approximately $200, was at
issue.

Davis had at least one prior conviction involving LSD.

In addition,
other drugs
marijuana

there was evidence
{including LSD)

charges.

circumstances:

There

that he had been distributing

at the time he was arrested on the
were

two

other

possible

aggravating

sale of marijuana for use by a prisoner, and for

the use of an inmate's wife left alone with an infant child.

Da-

vis was sentenced to 20 years and fined $10,000 on each of the
~

two marijuana charges,
spite a

letter

from

the sentences to run consecutively.

the State's prosecutor admitting

sentence was grossly disproportionate,

De-

that the

this Court summarily re-

versed an en bane CA4 decision granting habeas relief on Eighth
Amendment grounds.

B.

The Applicable Principles
In

Rummel,

the

Court

recognized

that

some

sentences

short of death still may be so disproportionate that they violate
the Eighth Amendment, regardless of whether they are "different
in kind"
cases

from other penalties.

such

as

Weems

v.

Although the Court deemphasized

United

States,

217

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977)
Trop v.

Dulles,

356

u.s.

86, 100

(1958)

u.s.

349

{1910),

(your opinion), and

(plurality opinion),

it

admits their statement of this principle.
272.

.u.s.,

See 445

at 271-

And it concedes "that a proportionality principle would •••

come into play in [an] extreme [case]."

_!_Sh_, at

.,..,A

the Court does not identify this proportionality
Rummel holds, therefore,

is that the appropriate

principle--whatever it might be--was not violated
that case.
Under these circumstances,

I

think you should continue

to apply the principles that you announced in your Rummel dissent.

You identified three factors

ture of the offense ... :

in particular:

"(i)

the na-

(ii) the sentence imposed for commission ~~.~

--

of the same crime in other jurisdictions

. . . .,

and (iii) the sen-

tence imposed upon . other criminals in the same jurisdiction •.•• "
~

Id., at 295

(POWELL, J., dissenting).

ples, Rummel serves as a benchmark.

In applying these princi-

If a sentence is more gross-

ly disproportionate than that in Rummel,
Amendment.

it violates the Eighth

But if the sentence is less grossly disproportionate

(or equally disproportionate), then Rummel controls.

You already

have

appropriate

recognized

circumstances.

Rummel's
Hutto v.

controlling
Davis,

454

authority
U.S.,

in

at 375

(POWELL,

J.,

concurring in the judgment).

c.

The Application of the Principles
Here the sentence is more grossly disyroportionate than
~

that in Rummel.

'--

......,...-;w.

~

It therefore violates the Eighth Amendment, and

the decision below should be affirmed.

On
(uttering a

its

face,

the nature of

$100 no account check)

felony in Rummel

the principal

is very like the principal

(obtaining $120.75 under false pretenses).

prior criminal records are also similar.
:rwz

non-violent property crimes. 9

ference is that all of Helm's
of ~ sm.

c ~ imes

were

The principal dif- ~

c~

is a condition that can be treated.

[is]

But it

Petn. app. A-19.

In Rummel the Court reasoned

"the interest of the State of Texas ••• ,

recidivist statutes,

~t~/

as a result

As CAS properly recognized, this does not by

any means serve to excuse the crimes.

that

The

Both consist of rela-

~------

tively minor,

felony here

in dealing

in a

expressed in all

~

~~
a~

~~

~~

harsher manner with

those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply

incapable of conforming to the norms of society as estab-

lished by its criminal law."

445 U.S., at 276.

Here Helm's "re-s

peated criminal acts" do not show that he is "incapable of conforming to the norms of society."

He may well be able to conform

if

Thus

his

alcoholism

is

treated.

/~~~~
Helm's

record

does

not

present so serious a case as Rummel's, while his sentence is more
severe, see infra.
Turning to the second factor you identified

("the sen-

9 Helm had six prior felony convict ions, while only two of
Rummel's prior felony convictions were in the record. The Court
had been informed, however, of Rummel's full criminal record,
which consisted of 13 convictions. See Amicus Brief of the Criminal District Attorney of Bexar County, Texas, in Rummel, No. 786386, at 3, n. 2.
Included on this list were "unlawfully carrying a deadly weapon" and "aggravated assault on a female." According to your Conference notes, the existence of these 13 convictions was one of the three principal factors on which THE
CHIEF JUSTICE based his decision.

7

?

tence imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions"),

there is not a

Rummel.
favor.

large difference between this case and

But to the extent there is a difference, it is in Helm's
In Rummel, you noted that only two other States necessar-

ily would have punished Rummel's conduct so severely.
,--

at 296.

445

------..

,.._.,..._.....

~

u.s.,

Here, only
one
other State
could match
South Dakota's
--...
~ ......
~~
,....-.
.-

,...-

sentence.

is greater than this state-~

The distinction, however,

ment suggests.

~-

v ,_..,.,.,

In Rummel, the comparison was made between

Texas ~

and other States that had mandatory life sentences for habitual
criminals like Rummel.
have permitted a

At

least three additional States would

life sentence for

someone in Rummel's circum-

stances.

See 445 U.S., at 280, and n. 21.

one other

St ~ e- ~ ~ven

'""--=

~

-....-~

--~

-

Here, however, only

authorized to sentence a
.....,...._..

~.....

person ~ ike

to life imprisonment without possibility of parole.

-

Helm

Thus there

is a real distinction in Helm's favor.

-----

In my view, the most telling distinction between Rummel

f/

and

this

case

is

the

nature

of

the

-·

sentence

imposed.

While

Rummel involved life imprisonment, here it is life imprisonment

w ~ut possibJJ i ~~ ar~le.lO

The State implicitly

(and the

10 This Court often has recognized that there is a difference
in kind between capital punishment and all other forms of punishment. That difference is relevant when applying a proportionality analysis, but I do not thipk it is relevant in deciding whether to apply proportionality analysis.
Even the Rummel Court
would apply propor.tionali ty analysis to a life sentence for a
traffic offense.
·
In any event, I think there is a difference in kind between '
life imprisonment without possibility of parole and other forms
of imprisonment.
It is not nearly so great as the difference
between capital punishment and all other forms of punishment.
I
would not even put it in the same order of magnitude. But given
Footnote continued on next page.

1

TC explicitly)
system.
life.

rejected

rehabilitation as a goal of

the penal

The prisoner has no prospect of ever resuming a normal
It is also significant that the Rummel Court relied on the

possibility of parole in reaching its result.

445

u.s.,

at 280-

281; cf. id., at 268.11
Here the State suggests that the possibility of executive clemency is comparable to parole.12

I see no basis for that

in fact, and there is certainly no basis for it in law.
necticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452

u.s.

458

In Con-

(1981), the

legal distinction between pardon and parole was made explicit.
Even Rummel

implicitly

recognized

the

distinction.

The Court

stressed that Rummel was better off than a person sentenced to
life without parole under Mississippi's recidivist statute.
U.S., at 281.

445

But the Mississippi Constitution empowers the Gov-

ernor to grant powers "[i]n all criminal and penal cases, except-

the State's rejection of rehabilitation as a goal, there is a
qualitative difference.
However great the qualitative difference may be in the capital
punishment context, the Court clearly has recognized that other
qualitative differences exist.
In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972), for example, the Court distingusihed between punishments involving imprisonment and other punishments. Only the
former involved a loss of liberty, and thus only the former required the appointment of counsel.
11According to your Conference notes, the possibility of parole was one of the three principal factors on which THE CHIEF
JUSTICE based his decision.
It is the only point that JUSTICE
WHITE mentions.
12 Executive clemency, of course, is also available in capital
cases.
That fact has never prevented the Court from finding a
death penalty to be a disproportionate punishment.

ing those of treason and impeachment." · Section 124.

The Missis-

sippi Supreme Court has long recognized that the power to pardon
includes

the

power

Wh i t t in g ton v .
139-140 (1954).

to

commute

S t evens ,

~

21 Mi s s .

a

convict's

5 98 ,

sentence.

See

6 0 3-6 0 4 , 7 3 So • 2d 13 7 ,

The Rummel Court must have recognized that the

possibility of executive clemency does not compensate for
unavailability of parole.

the

This is sensible, for executive clem-

ency is not the same "'established variation on imprisonment of
convicted

criminals,'"

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408

Rummel,

u.s.
III.

445

U.S.,

at

280

(quoting

471, 477 (1972)), that parole is.

Conclusion

The sentence imposed on Helm is more grossly disproportionate to his crimes than was the sentence imposed on Rummel.
Accordingly,

Rummel

is

not controlling.

Applying your Rummel

<;upreme Court of the United State8
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To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From:

Michael

Re:

Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492

I have examined the records of commutations of life sentences contained at J.A. 22-29.
(pp.

22-26)

There are two charts.

The first

shows the inmates presently serving life sentences,

the dates on which they began serving those sentences, and the
dates on which commutation was denied.

The second (p. 29)

lists

the inmates whose life sentences have been commuted since 1964,
the dates on which commutation was granted,

the date on which

parole was granted (if any), and the date of discharge (if any).
Statistically the charts are not very helpful for a number of reasons.

(1)

of life prisoners.

Neither chart gives us the full population
We do not know,

for example, how many life

prisoners there have been since 1964 who are no longer serving in
the

state penitentiary

but

who were denied

commutation.

This

category would include life prisoners who died in prison, prisoners who have been transferred to a different prison (see, e.g.,
Olim v. Wakinekona, No. 81-1581), and escapees.

In other words,

the State has told us about all of the cases that support its
position,

but

left

open

the

possibility

cases contrary to its position.

that

there

are other

(2) Neither chart gives any de-

tails about either the crimes or the reasons for granting or denying commutation.

This omission could cut either way.

extent

prisoners

that

life

have

.,

..

committed

serious,

To the
violent

crimes, it is understandable whv commutation has been denied.

On

the other hand, death-bed commutations for terminally ill prisoners do little

to

support

the State's position.

State prepared these charts,
available,

and

(iii)

Helm

Since

(i)

the

(ii) the State has the full records

lacks access

to

the

full records,

I

(3) Since commu-

would construe the omission against the State.

tation is left to the Governor's discretion, past practice may be
a poor indicator of future performance.

While parole is usually

subject to fairly detailed guidelines, that does not seem to be
the case with commutations.

Even if commutations were frequently

granted, there is no reason to assume that they will continue to
be granted.
Even if we ignore these problems with the State's statistics,

there

is not much

support

for their position in them.

There has not been a commutation in South Dakota since March 7,
1975.

Since that date, over one hundred requests for commutation

have been denied.

Furthermore, the commutation that was granted

in 1975 is not very meaningful.

Although the prisoner's sentence

was

he

This

commuted

(after

demonstrates

38

that

years)

still has

commutation

not

is only the

prisoner must clear to be released.

been paroled.
first hurdle

a

The last time that a life

prisoner was paroled was in 1974.
It should also be noted that Helm was one of the those
whose commutation request was denied.
indication of his chances.

That seems to be the best

The governor has already refused to

commute his sentence to a fixed term of years.
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Con£. 4/1/83

No. ·- - - - - , - ·

The Chief Justice

/2W

~~t _bj ~~~6+6 ~~

~~

Justice Brennan ~ ~
.

--

~ ~ e;..£.-t'-"'.L.,~~f...AU.~e<.A:...L.f.A.r:.-t

~~c/!r

Justice White ~

-~~LJ

.-~

Justice Marshall

~ ·~

~/e:_~ ~~ ~ ~ ~.,. --~%.-9~~~-

Justice Blackmun

d..f-1. ~

·

~~~~

. Rehnquist
Justice

Justice Stevens

at-fAA-A'

~

----=~t~·
:._ tQ)''CConnor ~
41 - - .
Jus1ce

~ L F~

mfs 03/29/83

To:

JUSTICE POWELL

.From:

Michael

Re:

Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492

At oral argument, the South Dakota Attorney General informed the Court of the dates of Helm's prior convictions.
though we still do not know the details of his crimes,

Al-

it is at

least possible to find the statutory definitions .
.From 1964 to 1969, third degree burglary was defined in
at least two sections.
dwelling house

Under §22-32-8 (1967), "breaking into any

in the nighttime with

was third degree burglary.
any time

intent to commit a crime"

In addition, "breaking or entering at

.•. any building or part of any building, booth, tent,

railroad car, vessel, vehicle •.. , or any structure or erection
in which any property is kept, with intent to commit larceny or
any

felony,"

§22-32-9

(1967),

was

also

third degree

burglary.

Under §22-37-1 (1967), "[l]arceny is the taking of personal property accomplished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive
another

thereof."

"Larceny"

includes

petit

larceny,

which

is

otherwise punishable by 30 days in county jail and/or a $10-$100
fine.

Shoplifting

would

apparently

satisfy

the

definition of

third degree burglary.
The definitions for the other crimes are as noted in my
bench memo.
was $50.

In particular, the minimum amount for grand larceny

§22-37-2 (1967).
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To:

JUSTICE POWELL

.From:

Michael

Re:

Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492

I have examined the records of commutations of life sentences contained at J.A. 22-29.
(pp.

22-26)

There are two charts.

shows the inmates presently serving life sentences,

the dates on which

thev began serving those sentences, and the

dates on which commutation was denied.
the

The first

The second (p. 29)

lists

inmates whose life sentences have been commuted since 1964,

the dates on which commutation was granted,

the date on which

parole was granted (if any), and the date of discharge (if any).
Statistically the charts are not very helpful for a number of reasons.

(1)

of life prisoners.

Neither chart gives us the full population
We do not know,

for example,

how many life

prisoners there have been since 1964 who are no longer serving in
the

state penitentiary

but

who were

denied

commutation.

This

category would include life prisoners who died in prison, prisoners who have been transferred to a different prison (see, e.g.,
Olim v. Wakinekona, No. 81-1581), and escapees.

In other words,

the State has told us about all of the cases that support its
position,

but

left

open

the

possibility

cases contrary to its position.

that

there

are

other

(2) Neither chart gives any de-

tails about either the crimes or the reasons for granting or denying commutation.

This omission could cut either way.

extent

prisoners

that

life

have

committed

serious,

To the
violent

2.

crimes, it is understandable why commutation has been denied.

On

the other hand, death-bed commutations for terminally ill prisoners do little to

support the State's position.

State prepared these charts,
available,

and

(iii)

Helm

(ii)

Since

(i)

the

the State has the full records

lacks access

to the

would construe the omission against the State.

full records,

I

(3) Since commu-

tation is left to the Governor's discretion, past practice may be
a poor indicator of future performance.

While parole is usually

subject to fairly detailed guidelines, that does not seem to be
the case with commutations.

Even if commutations were frequently

granted, there is no reason to assume that they will continue to
be granted.
Even if we ignore these problems with the State's statistics,

there

is not much

support

for their position in them.

There has not been a commutation in South Dakota since March 7,
1975.

Since that date, over one hundred requests for commutation

have been denied.

the commutation that was granted

Furthermore,

in 1975 is not very meaningful.

Although the prisoner's sentence

was

he

This

commuted

(after

demonstrates

38

years)

still has

that commutation

not

is only the

prisoner must clear to be released.

been paroled.
first hurdle a

The last time that a life

prisoner was paroled was in 1974.
It should also be noted that Helm was one of the those
whose commutation request was denied.
indication of his chances.

That seems to be the best

The governor has already refused to

commute his sentence to a fixed term of years.

.§np-rmtt <!Jcurl cf t£rt~lt .§tates~ag~ ~.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w ...

J . BRENNAN, JR.

April 1, 1983

Re: · No. 82-492 --Solem v. Helm

Dear Chief,
Lewis has agreed to write the
opinion for the Court in the above.
S~ncerely,

?.

r~L_.c

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

/
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To:

JUSTICE POWELL

.From:

Michael

Re:

Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492

I

have begun working on a draft opinion in this case.

In the near future I will have to set it aside for a time to resume work on the April bench memos, but I wanted to at least get
a

start on

work.

it so that I

Before I

time, however,

could put the research 1 ibrar ians

invest inordinate amounts of

their

time or my

I would like to explain my strategy to you.

this is not what you have in mind,

to

If

I will take a different tack

before I go too far.
It seems to me that JUSTICE BLACKMUN will have to be our
focus.

There

is

a

real

risk

that he will concur only

in the

2

judgment, and if that happens we will have accomplished little.
I therefore propose to attempt a draft that he can join happily.
I see this as imposing several constraints on us.
(1)

We cannot rely on the Rummel

obviously cannot

rely on

it

for

binding

dissent at all.

think it would be wise to cite it even for persuasive
The

arguments

made

elaborated--rather

in

Rummel

than

being

will

have

I

authority.

to

be

We

do not

autho~ ~

repeated--even

------------~-----~

incorporated

by

reference.

The

points you made in dissent should be made in a majority opinion
in any event.
(2) We will have to cover all of the bases.

~

/I'view

this

as an important constitutional case in which we should cover all

2

of the bases anyway.

0

It's not like Lockheed, where the Govern-

ment made some frivolous arguments that didn't warrant response.
But the importance of JUSTICE BLACKMON's vote makes it particularly

important to do a thorough

job.

You may recall that he

~

even objected in Lockheed to our failure to respond to frivolous
arguments.
(3) We cannot cast doubt on the correctness of the judgment in Rummel.

This should not be a problem for you, since you

recognized Rummel as binding in Davis.
real

7

analysis

in Rummel

to reject.

provide an analytical framework,

Fortunately there is no

We should thus be able to

apply it to Helm's facts,

note that it is consistent with Rummel.

I should add,

that we cannot endorse the judgment in Rummel, either.
then

risk

losing

JUSTICES

BRENNAN,

MARSHALL,

and

though,
We would

and STEVENS,

who

would not follow Rummel in Davis.
I

probably will increase the average length of your opinions.
I

----'

am afraid that this looks like a large project.

It

/

But

am excited about this opportunity to establish some precedent

in an area where the Court has offered no guidance in 70 years.
There is a lot out there, including some good historical material.

(I hope to get at least one Magna Carta citation in here.
'-------------------~
That's real history!) And Rummel has sparked a fair bit of academic comment that should be useful.
lines?

Shall I proceed along these

61(
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To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From:

Michael

Re:

Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492

I have examined the records of commutations of life sentences contained at J.A. 22-29.
(pp.

2 2-26)

There are two charts.

The first

shows the inmates presently serving 1 i fe sentences,

the dates on which they began serving those sentences, and the
dates on which commutation was denied.
the

The second (p. 29)

lists

inmates whose life sentences have been commuted since 1964,

the dates on which commutation was granted,

the date on which

parole was granted (if any), and the date of discharge (if any).
Statistically the charts are not very helpful for a number of reasons.

(1)

of life prisoners.

Neither chart gives us the full population
We do not know,

for example, how many life

prisoners there have been since 1964 who are no longer serving in
the

state

penitentiary

but

who were

denied

commutation.

This

category would include life prisoners who died in prison, prisoners who have been transferred to a different prison (see, e.g.,
Olim v. Wakinekona, No. 81-1581), and escapees.

In other words,

the State has told us about all of the cases that support its
position,

but

left

open

the

possibility

cases contrary to its position.

that

there

are

other

(2) Neither chart gives any de-

tails about either the crimes or the reasons for granting or denying commutation.

This omission could cut either way.

extent

prisoners

that

life

have

committed

serious,

To the
violent

2.

crimes, it is understandable why commutation has been denied.

On

the other hand, death-bed commutations for terminally ill prisoners do little to

support the State's position.

State prepared these charts,
available,

and

(iii)

(ii)

Since

(i)

the

the State has the full records

Helm lacks access

to the

would construe the omission against the State.

full records,

I

(3) Since commu-

tation is left to the Governor's discretion, past practice may be
a poor indicator of future performance.

While parole is usually

subject to fairly detailed guidelines, that does not seem to be
the case with commutations.

Even if commutations were frequently

granted, there is no reason to assume that they will continue to
be granted.
Even if we ignore these problems with the State's statistics,

there is not much support

for their position in them.

There has not been a commutation in South Dakota since March 7,
1975.

Since that date, over one hundred requests for commutation

have been denied.

Furthermore, the commutation that was granted

in 1975 is not very meaningful.

Although the prisoner's sentence

was

he

commuted

(after

This demonstrates

38

years)

still has

that commutation

not been paroled.

is only the first hurdle

prisoner must clear to be released.

a

The last time that a life

prisoner was paroled was in 1974.
It should also be noted that Helm was one of the those
whose commutation request was denied.
indication of his chances.

That seems to be the best

The governor has already refused to

commute his sentence to a fixed term of years.

lfp/ss 05/21/83
MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Mike

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

May 21, 1983

82-492 Solem v. Helm
I have carefully reviewed your draft of 5/19 and
like it very much.
and

you

have

The organization is particularly good,
applied

the

relevant

factors

quite

persuasively - with an excellent use of the South Dakota
array

of

criminal

criminal code

penalties.

is painstaking.

Working

with

Your editor

a

state

should check

this with special care.
In
dictated

a

addition to customary type editing,
couple

of

riders.

I

do

have

some

I

have

general

comments.
1.

I

admire and envy your

English history and the common law.

knowledge of early
It also is evident

that you have gone to the ancient sources with your usual
care and insight.

Nevertheless, I would like for you to

eliminate some of the erudition now present in subpart IIA (p.

7-9).

Perhaps we could put the reference to King

Alfred's laws in a footnote, as well as the discussion of
"amercements" and what happened under the Tudors.

But to

2.

put this

in the text can be viewed as ostentatious, and

the sort of opinion writing by other Justices that I have
sometimes
torture,

criticized.

Moreover,

what went on

barbarisms,
attention

few
was

in

view

of

the

in the Tower of London and other

really
paid

Mike,

will

in

those

proportionality or due process.

believe
very

that
early

any

serious

centuries

to

As for what goes into the

text, I would start with the English Bill of Rights at the
bottom of p. 8.

This is the basic source for us.

Some of

what

in

can

you

have

the

first

summarized for a footnote.

three

paragraphs

be

Also, Mike, I made a speech in

the Great Hall of the Law Courts in 1965 when the English
were

celebrating

the

750th

anniversary

of

Magna Carta.

Take a look at this (published in the ABA Journal) , and if
I

said anything really relevant we might cite it.

Professor
Carta.

Dick Howard

Ask

the

at Virginia

library to find

has

this

Also

written on Magna
for

you.

I would

like to cite Dick if it is relevant.
Before

we

go

to

a

printed

Chambers

draft,

I

would like to see your revision of this subpart II-A, as
it is a fairly personal type of statement.
2.
emphasized

In
that

Rummel

and

legislatures

other
have

cases,

broad

we

authority

have
to

3.

determine the types and limits of punishments for crimes,
and normally this authority is not challenged by courts.
Moreover,

appellate

review

of

sentences

also

is

rarely

undertaken in view of the necessary deference that must be
accorded

sentencing

necessary,

Mike,

decisions

for

us

to

by

trial

recognize

It

courts.
and

repeat

is

these

principles loudly and clearly.
3.

Helms has paid his penalty for each of the

other six offenses.
offense.
that

You do focus only on the $100 check

It might be well at some point to say explicitly

this

sentence

is

the

and

is

only offense
before us,

that

triggered

as all other

the

life

sentences have

been served.
4.

The

discussion

of

parole and commutation is good.

the

difference

betwee

It occurs to me, however,

that it may be strengthened by emphasizing that parole is
expressly

authorized

by

statute ) that

hearings

process characteristics normally are required,
time

usually

is

allowed

authority to commute
pardon,
statute.

and

I

But

by statute,

etc.

with due
that good

A governor 1 s

is different from the authority to

suppose commutation also is authorized by
am

I

not

right

that

in

the

end

the

governor•s discretion is as absolute as his authority to

4.

pardon?

I

think we have said,

in a case decided within

the past two or three years, that there is a significant

~-i-~~

difference~ the

pardon.

parole system and a governor's authority to

The

case

came,

as

I

recall,

Connecticut or the Second Circuit.
cases

involving parole.

Are

either

from

There are due process

there

any with

respect

to

commutation?
5.
of

doubtful

The paragraph that commences on page 25 is
force

at

least

on

a

first

It

reading.

leaves me with the impression that we are "reaching"
make an argument that we really do not need.

to

Take a close

second look at the paragraph.
6.

Footnote

13

also

Apart from being longer than I
that

it

-

or

least

all

of

it

leaves
like,

me

rather

cool.

I am not persuaded

adds

strength

of

our

opinion.

* * *
If you accept the substance of my changes, and
meet the comments suggested above, I will not need to see
a

draft

until

your

editor

has

worked

it

over.

Then,

unless he make substantive suggestions, go directly to a
printed Chambers draft so we have it in print before the

50

mad rush at the end of May.

'1-t/

TheI\. remind me that I will

want to take a close final look at the Chambers draft.

ss

TO:

Mike

FROM:

LFP,JR.

SUBJECT:

Solem

Further thoughts about our opinion:
1.

We

should

make

clear

that

the

condemning all sentences without parole.

Court

is

not

Add a note along

the following lines:
1.

We

raise

no

question

as

to

the

generally of sentences without parole.

validity
The only

issue before us is whether, in the circumstances
of this case and in light of the principle of
proportionality,

the

sentence

authorized

and

imposed violates the Eighth Amendment.

2.

criminal"

The

dissent

argument.

will

emphasize

the

"habitual

We might anticipate this by a note

saying in substance:
"Peti tioiner, age
, is not a professional
criminal. The record indicates an addiction to
alcohol, and a consequent difficulty in holding
a job.
His record of relative minor crimes
involved no instance of violence of any kind.
Incarcerating petitioner for life is not likely
to serve in any substantial way the goals of our
criminal justice system. Neither petitioner nor
the state will have any incentive to persue
clearly
needed
treatment
for
his
alcohol
problem.

2.

3.
case}

We must bear in mind our opinion in Jones (Mark's

where the dissent will emphasize that Jones is no

danger

to

property.

society

because

his

only

crime

against

See our footnote to the effect that sometimes

property

crimes

persons.

Try to work out a note with Mark.

4.

was

result

in

threats

to

the

safety

of

I do not recall whether our draft refers to how

infrequently commutation has been granted by the Governor
of South Dakota.

Mention of this may be appropriate.

LFP, JR.

Solem v.
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I. Facts and Proceedings Below
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II. Eighth Amendment Requires Proportionality Analysis
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19-21

IV. Application of Proportionality Analysis Here

21-30

A. Application of the Three-Part Test
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1. Gravity of Helm's Crimes

21-23

2. Severity of Life Without Parole

23

3. Sentences for Other Crimes in South Dakota

23-26

4. Sentences for Crime in Nevada

26-27

B. The Effect of Commutation
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27-30

1. Parole Legally Different

27-28

2. Parole in Rummel Factually Different
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Conclusion
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/

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

May 31, 1983

No. 82-492

Solem v. Helm

Dear Lewis,
I am sorry to part company on this,
but I will await the dissent.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

~upuuu

Qt1tttrl1tf Ur~ ~uh ~btt~s
,ras!fittgfon. ~. Qt. 2ll.;t~~

CHAMBERS OF

JU S TICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 31, 1983

Re:

82-492 - Solem v. Helm

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
In the second sentence of footnote 14 on pages
10-11, I think you mean to refer only to a sentence
of imprisonment; surely some forms of torture would
be unconstitutional.
Respectfully,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

,ju:pttmt Qicu:ri cf flrt ~b j;tatts
'Jifuftingt~ ~. QI. 20~~~
CHAMBERS O F

.JUS T ICE WM . .J . BRENNAN, .JR.

June 1, 1983

No. 82-492

Solem v. Helm

Dear Lewis,
I agree.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

j

.inprtmt <ijtturi ttf tlft ~tb' .§bdt$'
~frin¢tttt. ~.<If. 20~~~
C HAMBER S OF

June 1, 1983

JUSTICE B Y RON R . WHITE

Re:

82-492 - Solem v. Helm

Dear Lewis,
I await the dissent.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
cpm

j;tqtrtmt Qfllu.rt llf tlrt ~ta j;taf:tg

11JagJrittgLtn. !9. <!f.

21lt?~~

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 1, 1983

Re:

No. 82-492-Solem v. Helm

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

rrc:uu_-

vr~

~nitt~ ~tattg ~ ~

.hJrrtm:t Qfottrl o-f t!rt
Jlaglthtgto-n. ~. "f. 20~,..;1

, 1113 .r

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

~v

June 6, 1983

No. 82-492 - Solem v. Helm

Dear Lewis:
I am certainly with you in the judgment in this case
and may well be able to join your opinion.
I write to inquire whether you could see your way clear
to omit the material concerning Ballew v. Georgia appearing
on page 15.
In fact, if you could omit the paragraph that
begins on page 15 and concludes after the first five lines
on page 16, and then mend the first sentence of the following paragraph on page 16, I think I could join your opinion
in full.
I may write a few words in separate concurrence,
but this may depend on what the forthcoming dissent has to
say.
Sincerely,

~~
Justice Powell

.iupuutt <qourl af Urt ~nittb ~taf:tg
..ulfi:n:gton. ~. <q. 2.llc?.Jt~
CHAMBERS OF

June 8, 1983

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 82-492 - Solem v. Helm

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

d~t
\....

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

j)n.pumt Qfourl cf tqt ~~ j)taftg

Jfu!pnghtn. ~. <!f. zo.;t~.;l
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 21, 1983

Re:

82-492 - Solem v. Helm

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Enclosed is a typescript early draft of my dissent in this case.
Given the date, I send what is essentially a "work draft" so you
can see the "direction."
Regards,

.§u.vrtmt ~ourt llf

tqt ~nUtlt $;tait.ll'

1lJagltington, ~.

~· 2!l.;t.Jf~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'cONNOR

June 21, 1983

No. 82-492

Solem v. Helm

Dear Chief,
Please join me in your dissenting opinion.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

Copies to the Conference

.:§u:p-rtmt ~ourl of tlrt ~tb .:§ta:ft.s-

~frhtgion, :!B. ~· 20bt~~
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 22,

Re:

82-492 - Solem v. Helm

Dear Chief,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
cc:
cpm

The Conference

1983~

;§u.prtmt Qflturl of tfrt 'J!ltt!ftb .$5tws-

~as-frington.

tB. <!f.

2ll?J!.;l

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

/
June 22, 1983

Re:

No. 82-492

Solem v. Helm

Dear Chief:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely~

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

lfp/ss 06/22/83

Rider A, p. 18 (Solem)

SOLM18 SALLY-POW
Note:

Justice Blackmun is concerned by the Chief's charge

that we are overruling Rummel and ignoring stare decisis.
We could add a fo9tnote along the following

s:

The disseht of the Chief Just· ce, arguing that
Rummel

controls

case,

the

"blithely
Post,

at

disagree

of
1,

--

as

to

and

stare
and

which

are

Court

with

decisis."

judges

often

"controlling".

But

contrary to repeated

in the dissent, we neither

ignore nor overrule

silento --- as is evident

from

our

to

it.

critical

be and apparently

distinction
was paroled promptly, Helm, at
life with

The

36, was sentenced to

ssibility of
Th

dissenting

itself

is

hardly

consistent ' ith precedent.

accept that "the

Eighth Amendment prohibits

'disproportionate

to the crime committed'".

Post,

at

- - and 14.

The Court repeatedly has expressed a contrary view.
addition

to

the

early

decision

in

Weems,

more

In

recent

2.

expressions

by

the

Court

have

recognized

that

proportionality principle may apply to imprisonment.
e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437
v. Wright,
445

u.s.,

430 U.S.
at

274, n.

651,
11

u.s.
667

See,

678, 685 (1978); Ingraham
(1977);

(1979);

U.S. 370, 374, n. 3 (1982).

the

Rummel v.

and Hutto v.

Estelle,

Davis,

454

mfs 06/24/83

To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From:

Michael

Re:

Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492

I have reviewed your comments on my proposed changes.
attach the master
riders

that

I

copy with changes marked;

gave

you

yesterday,

and

I

the copies of the

that

you

have

already

marked; and fresh copies of the riders that incorporate your suggestions.

On notes 13 and 30, I propose new language along the

lines of your suggestions.
current

copies

of

the

This new language is marked on the

riders.

(I

have

not

marked

technical

changes, or changes that you made.)
I also attach a copy of the revision of n. 15 that you
drafted.

The substance of the last sentence is incorporated in

my proposed n. 15.

I fear that we will get into trouble, howev-

er, if we use the first sentence without some explanation.

We do

say that all sentences are subject to appellate scrutiny to ensure that they are proportionate--just as all trials are subject
to

appellate

"speedy."

scrutiny

to

ensure

that

they

are

sufficiently

In most cases, of course, an appellate court can dis-

miss an Eighth Amendment claim summarily, for few sentences are
constitutionally disproportionate (even if they are very severe).
In the same way, an appellate court generally can dismiss a Sixth
Amendment speedy trial claim summarily,
layed by constitutional dimensions

for

few trials are de-

(even if they move slowly) •

The point we have to make, therefore, is that--although all sentences are subject to appellate scrutiny--few sentences will re-

page 2.

quire extended appellate scrutiny.

This is because the standard

is not, as the dissent seems to suggest, whether the sentence is
"correct."

Rather, the standard is whether the sentence is withIf this

in constitutional limits.

is not clear enough from my

proposed draft, perhaps we could add the following sentence:
Indeed, the limited scope of review suggests that few
prisoners will find it worthwhile to bring Eighth
Amendment challenges to the length of their sentences.
If you think it worthwhile, we could also add a cross-cite to the
"speedy trial" discussion I plan to draft.
I have reviewed the changes you marked on pages 10 and
11.

I agree wholeheartedly.

They should make the point of n. 15

even clearer.
I
On page 7,

will draft
n .10,

I

language covering

two additional points.

will propose an addition in support of our

view that the Framers incorporated the English principle of proportionality when they adopted the English language.
I

will

cases.

draft

a

paragraph

discussing

the

Speedy

On page 15,
Trial

Clause

As both of these points are fairly self-contained,

you

should be able to review them in isolation when I have finished
my research and drafting.
I have made a comment on page 8.
I would hope that we could have all of this in the Print
Shop by Monday morning,
draft by Tuesday.

so we could easily circulate a printed

mfs 06/24/83

To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From:

Michael

Re:

Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492

I
changes.

have

reviewed

your

latest

comments

on

my

proposed

I attach the master copy with changes marked and fresh

copies of the riders that incorporate your suggestions.

I also

attach proposed language for page 15 discussing the speedy trial
example.

I anticipate that I will finish the historical addition

by tomorrow afternoon.

~~

.

~

b;

~o,y.?_~~
~- ... _.

~ /rY

tJVV :..:...----- //

~P-L1.':fa~n~r
I

think

~ f~t~ote

.

t:/ ( )

for page 15, which is new, I

13 warrants your part cular attention.

At

the moment, it seems that there is either t o much or not enough
there.

I

think we

detail or cut

back

should either

argument

the footnote to

rejection

in more
f

the

Rummel/CJ-dissent argument.
We say that the Rummel dicta is meaningless as an Eighth
Amendment standard.
tion

is

~

the

But our only justification for this asser-

.

observation

that

there

classifications within "felonies."

is

a

wide

range

of

sub-

For this point to make sense

to the uninitiated reader, I think we have to continue the analysis.

The

idea

lurking

behind

the

observation

about

sub-

classifications is that a felony punishment at the lower end of
the

scale may be

justified for

a given crime

(i.e.,

the crime

could be classified as a class 6 felony), but a felony punishment

page 2.

at the higher end of the scale would be out of all proportion
(i.e., the crime is clearly not a class A felony).
a

crime may

fall

The fact that

within some sub-classification does not mean

that it may be placed in any sub-classification.

II
I

think

the

argument

can

be

made

even stronger

than

that, however, for the analysis does not depend on the existence
of explicit sub-classifications.
have

a

fragmented

definition,

would still apply.

The

Even

if South Dakota did not

~y

the

in the Rummel dicta

r

fact that a crime may fall within the

lower range of a broad definition does not mean that it therefore
may be placed in the higher range.
One of

the

reasons

particularly meaningless

is

that
the

the

felony

fact

that

classification

it

is \
is totally arbi~

trary.

There

is

nothing

that

crimes except their punishments.
but generally a "felony"

felonies

apart

from other

The definitions vary slightly,

is a crime that is punishable by more

than one or two years in prison.
U.S.C. App. §1202(c) (2).

sets

See, e.g., 18

u.s.c.

§1(1): 18

Historically the definition was differ-

ent, but even in the middle ages it was based solely on the authorized punishment.
English Law 467

See 2 Pollock

(2nd ed.

1909)

&

Maitland, The History of

("We thus define felony by its

legal effects: any definition that would turn on the quality of
the crime is unattainable").
In other words,

the Rummel dicta is entirely circular.

It uses the fact that a crime warrants punishment to justify the

page 3.

imposition of a punishment.

What is worse, it is boot-strapping.

It relies on the fact that a crime may warrant some lower level
of punishment to justify the imposition of a much higher level of
punishment.

If you break down the reasoning, this boot-strapping

becomes clear.
(i)

It is a simple three-step argument:

Crime X may be punished by one year in prison.

(ii) Crime X is, by definition, classifiable as a felony (at least under the most common definition).
(iii) Crime X may be punished by life
without possibility of parole.
Rummel tries to insert step (ii)

imprisonment

to disguise the real argument

that is being made: If (i) a crime may be punished by one year in
prison, then (iii) it may be punished by life imprisonment without possibility of parole.

III
There are, of course, other responses that we could make
to the Rummel/CJ-dissent argument.

The "without fear of contra-

diction" language is, in my view, simply silly.

The Third Amend-

ment is still an enforceable part of the Constitution, despite
the fact that this Court has not been called upon to enforce it
yet.
an

The "purely a matter of legislative prerogative" is simply
abdication

of

responsibility.

We

recognize

the

deference

properly due to legislatures, but in the final analysis it is
this Court that must determine what is constitutional.
If you would like me to develop any of these arguments,
I will be happy to do so.

page 4.

IV
Given the Chief's heavy reliance on this Rummel dicta, I
think it would be appropriate for us to expose it with some explanation, rather than to dismiss it summarily.

I do not think

we need to worry about frightening off JUSTICE BLACKMUN.

If he

thought the felony standard were correct, he obviously would not
have voted with us.

If he had thought it was correct when he

joined Rummel, JUSTICE REHNQUIST would have made it the rule of
the case, rather than putting it in the "one could argue" form.
Furthermore, I think JUSTICE BLACKMUN would prefer us to justify
our failure to follow the spirit of Rummel (so that he will not
have to justify his failure to do so}.

Pointing out that this

passage (the one on which the Chief relies most heavily} is meaningless dicta would be a big step in that direction.

H7R-MICHAL-POW 06/25/83

Helm: page 7 rider

I propose the following changes on page 15:

When

the

Framers

of

the

Eighth

Amendment

adopted

the

language of the English Bill of Rights,lO they also adopted the
English principle of proportionality.

-~fie-~ee~~e-wefe-~eafaft~eee

~fie-ff~fi~e-~fiey-fiae-~eeeeeeee-ae-Bft~~fefi-eeejee~e

Indeed, one of

the consistent themes of the era was that Americans had all the
rights of English subjects.
Rights,

1776-1791,

at

R. Rutland, The Birth of the Bill of
(1955).

Thus our Bill of Rights was

designed in part to ensure that these rights were preserved.

Al-

though the Framers may have intended the Eighth Amendment to go
beyond

the

scope of

its English counterpart,

their

use of

the

language of the English Bill of Rights is convincing proof that
they intended to provide at least the same protection--including
the right to be free from excessive punishments.

82-492 Solem v. Helm

lfp/ss 06/28/83

------

r-V-6.-vy
This case is here on writ of certiorari to the

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Under South Dakota's habitual offender law, respondent Helm was sentenced to life imprisonment without
possibility of parole.

This sentence was occasioned by his

issuing a $100 check without an account.
This is a felony in South Dakota, and was Helm's
aLL
seventh offense - over a period of 15 years - ee classified

~~e
1\

lent.

law.

The other six offenses also were nonvio-

They included third degree burglaries, obtaining mon-

ey under false pretenses, larceny as defined by the state,
and drunk driving.
Respondent was 36 years old when convicted of the
check offense.

He is not a professional criminal.

He is

addicted to alcohol, with consequent difficulty in holding a
job.
After exhausting state remedies, Helm sought habeas relief in federal court, contending that his sentence
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.

CAB agreed, and granted the writ.
Our prior cases establish that the Eighth Amend-

ment~rohibits , ~s~~orti~~ sentences~as

--

ments that are inherently barbaric.

well as punish-

In determining

disproportionality, j we examined a number of objective factors that are set forth fully in our opinion.
On the basis of these factors, we find that respondent's sentence to life imprisonment without possibility
of parole is grossly disproportionate to his crimes.

Ac-

cordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals.
Our opinion makes clear, however, that invalidating an imprisonment sentence ;fimposed under state law,J'is
action reserved only for the most exceptional cases.
The Chief Justice has filed a dissenting opinion
in which Justices White, Rehnquist and O'Connor join.

82-492#

Solem v. Helm
LFP for the
1st draft
2nd draft
3rd draft
4th draft
Joined
Copy to Mr.

(Mike)

Court
5/27/83
6/2/82
6/7/83
6/27/83
by WJB, TM, HAB, JPS
Lind 6/2/83

CJ dissent
typed draft 6/21/83
Printed copy 6/22/83
2nd draft 6/23/83
Joined by BRW, WHR, SOC
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October 17, 1983

The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D.C.
20543
Dear Justice Powell:
I thought you might like to know that I spoke at the Third
Circuit Judicial Conference recently and took as my text "In
Praise of Solem v. Helm." As you may remember, the proportionality
analysis which the Court undertook in that case is precisely the
kind of inquiry which I suggested at the time of the MullaneyPatterson controversy as the preferable focus of attention.
Thus,
it will hardly surprise you that I endorsed your views, and indeed stole shamelessly from arguments advanced in the Solem
opinion and in your dissent in Rummel v. Estelle (which I still
regard as one of the best and most thoughtful opinions ever to
issue from the Supreme Court).
In any event, the topic seemed to excite a lot of interest.
Some judges, as you would imagine, expressed concern over how
such an inquiry might be conducted, but in general I'd say the
reaction was favorable.
They seemed particularly receptive to
the argument, which I lifted from the Rummel dissent, that the
supposed impossibility of conducting a proportionality inquiry
is belied by the experience of the lower federal courts, most
notably the Fourth Circuit, in actually administering such an
approach.
On a different note, you will be pleased to hear that Paul
Stephan's spirits, which had seemed to drag a bit of late, have
entirely revived with the faculty's favorable decision on tenure.
He is his old cheerful self and very welcome.
And by this time you will perhaps have heard that the
faculty have acted favorably on David Martin.
David's case was
perceived here as uncomfortably close, but ultimately we were
persuaded to go forward.
My own view is that we have made no
mistake, and I am very pleased for David and Cyndy.

The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Page 2
October 17, 1983

Finally, I understand from Dick Merrill that I and others
will join Justice and Mrs. Rehnquist for dinner at Dick's house
in early November. As you know, I am an admirer of his and look
forward to the chance to meet him socially.
Well, that's the news from this front.
I shall keep in
mind your kind invitation to call you for lunch.
In the meantime, I am, with warm regards,
Sincerely,

John

JCJjr/ss

tJ:DC::ies,

Jr .

( :·
·~

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting •

.

.

~

.

The controlling law govern1ng th1s case is crystal clear, but
today the Court

? lithelY discards any concept of stare deci-

--

sis, trespasses gravely on the authority of the States, and dis-

-

torts the concept of proportionality of punishment by tearing it
f rom its moorings in capital cases.
Rummel v. Estelle, 445

u.s.

Only two Terms ago, we held in

263 (1980), that a life sentence im-

posed after a third nonviolent felony conviction did not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.

Today,

the Court ignores its recent precedent and holds that a life sentence imposed after a seventh felony conviction does constitute
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.

Moreover,

I reject the fiction that all Helm's crimes were innocuous or non-

.. .
,/

violent.

Among his felonies were three burglaries and a third con-

(

viction for drunk driving.

By comparison Ru mmel was a relatively

-

2 -

"model citizen." ' Although today' s holding cannot rationally be
reconciled with Rummel, the Court does not purport to overrule
Rummel.

I dissent.
I

A

The Court's starting premise is that the Eighth Amendment's
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause "prohibits not only barbaric
punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the
crime committed."

Ante, at 6.

What the Court means is that a sen- -

tence is unconstitutional if it is more severe than five justices

t::t
.

C;

think appropriate.

}l..f

In short, all sentences of

subject to appellate scrutiny

~he

ensure

;:;,~t

imp~ isonment

th;

are

are "proportion-

( al" to the crime committed •
The Court then sets forth three assertedly "objective" factors
to guide the determination of whether a given sentence of imprisonment is constitutionally excessive:

(1)

the "gravity of the offense

and the harshness of the penalty," id. , at 11;

( 2) a comparison of

the sentence imposed with "sentences imposed on other criminals in
the same jurisdiction," id., at 12 (emphasis added);

(3) and a com-

parison of "the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime
in other jurisdictions."

Ibid (emphasis added). In applying this

analysis, the Court determines that respondent
"has received the penultimate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has been treated more
harshly than other criminals in the State who have
committed more serious crimes. He has been treated
more harshly than he would have been in any other
jurisdiction, ••• " Id., at 23.
(Emphasis added).
Therefore, the Court concludes, respondent's sentence is "signifi-

- 3 -,

cantly disproportionate to his crime) and is ••• prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment." This analysis is completely at odds with the
reasoning of our recent holding in Rummel, in which, of course,
JUSTICE POWELL dissented.
B

The facts facing us in Rummel bear repeating.

William James

Rummel was convicted in 1964 of fraudulent use of a credit card; in
1969, he was convicted of passing a forged check.
offenses were felonies.

Both of these

In 1973, Rummel was charged with obtaining -

money by false pretenses, which is a felony under Texas law.
were indeed nonviolent crimes.

These

Under Texas' recidivist statute,

which provides for a mandatory life sentence upon conviction for a
third felony, the trial judge imposed a life sentence as he was

C·

obliged to do after the jury returned a verdict of guilty of felony
theft.
Rummel, in this Court, advanced precisely the same arguments
that respondent advances here; we rejected those arguments notwithstanding that his case was stronger than respondent's.

The test in

Rummel which we rejected would have required us to determine on an
abstract moral scale whether Rummel had received his "just deserts"
for his crimes.
cepts it.

We declined that invitation; today the Court ac-

Will the Court now recall Rummel's case so five justices

will not be parties to "disproportionate" criminal justice?
It is true, as we acknowledged in Rummel, that the "Court has
on occasion stated that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition
of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of a
crime."

445 U.S., at 271.

But even a cursory review of our cases

- 4 c~~.

VJ:jj

'

'

shows that this type of proportionality review has been carried out
only in a very limited category of cases, and never before in a
case involving solely a sentence of imprisonment.

In Rummel, we

said that the capital punishment cases were inapposite because of
the "unique nature of the death penalty •••• "

Id., at 272.

"Be-

cause a sentence of death differs in kind from any sentence of imprisonment, no matter how long, our decisions applying the ·prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments to capital cases are of limited assistance in deciding the constitutionality of the punishment meted out to Rummel."

Ibid.

The Rummel Court also rejected the claim that Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), required it to determine whether
Rummel's punishment was "disproportionate" to his crime.

In Weems,

the Court had struck down as cruel and unusual punishment a sentence of cadena temporal imposed by a Phillipine Court.

This bi-

zarre penalty, which was unknown to Anglo-Saxon law, entailed a
minumum of 12 years'

imprisonment chained day and night at the

wrists and ankles, hard and painful labor, and a number of "accessories" including lifetime civil disabilities.
carefully noted that "[Weems']

In Rummel the Court

finding of disproportionality cannot

be wrenched from the facts of that case."

445 U.S., at 273. 1

The lesson the Rummel Court drew from Weems and from the capital punishment cases was that the Eighth Amendment did not author-

·-·\:f.b_;....

1 other authorities have shared this interpretation of
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). E.g., Packer,
Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1071, 1075
( 19 6 4) •

- 5 -

ize courts to review sentences of imprisonment to determine whether
they were "proportional" to the crime.

In language quoted incom-

pletely by the majority, ante, at 9 n. 13, the Rummel Court stated:
"Given the unique nature of the punishments considered in Weems and in the death penalty cases, one
could argue without fear of contradiction by any
decision of this Court that for crimes concededly
classified and classifiable as felonies, that is, as
punishable by significant terms of imprisonment in a
state penitentiary, the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative
perogative." 445 u.s., at 274.
(Emphasis added).
In context it is clear that this Court was not merely summarizing
an argument, as the majority suggests, ante, at 9 n. 13, but was
stating affirmatively the rule of law laid down.

This passage from

Rummel is followed by an explanation of why it is permissible for
courts to review sentences of death or bizarre punishments as in
Weems, but not sentences of imprisonment.

Id., at 274-275.

The

Rummel Court emphasized, as has every opinion in capital cases in
the past decade, that it was possible to draw a "bright line" between "the punishment of death and the various other permutations
and commutations of punishment short of that ultimate sanction";
similarly, a line could be drawn between the punishment in Weems
and "more traditional forms of imprisonment imposed under the
Anglo-Saxon system."

Id., at 275.

How e ver, the Rummel Court em-

phasized that drawing lines between different sentences of imprisonment would thrust the Court inevitably "into the basic linedrawing process that is pre-eminently the province of the legislature" and produce judgments that were no more than the visceral
reactions of individual Justices.

Ibid.

The Rummel Court c a t e gorically rej e ct e d the very an a lysis

- 6 -

@.

'

adopted by the Court today.

'

Rummel had argued that various objec-

tive criteria existed by which the Court could determine whether
his life sentence was proportional to his crimes.

In rejecting

Rummel's contentions, the Court explained why each was insufficient
to allow it to determine in an objective manner whether a given
sentence of imprisonment is proportionate to the crime for which it
is imposed.
First, it rejected the distinctions Rummel tried to draw between violent and nonviolent offenses, noting that "the absence of
violence does not always affect the strength of society's interest
in deterring a particular crime or in punishing a particular individual."

Ibid.

Similarly, distinctions based on the amount of

money stolen are purely "subjective" matters of line drawing.

Id.,

at 275-276.
Second, the Court squarely rejected Rummel's attempt to compare his sentence with the sentence he would have received in other
States--an argument that the Court today accepts.

The Rummel Court

explained that such comparisons are flawed for several reasons.
For one, the recidivist laws of the various states vary widely.
"It is one thing for a court to compare those States that impose
capital punishment for a specific offense with those States that do
not.

It is quite another thing for a court to attempt to eval-

uate the position of any particular recidivist scheme within
Rummel's complex matrix."
omitted).
~~

(~~~
~~

445 U.S., at 280

(citation and footnote

Another reason why comparison between the recidivist

statutes of different States is inherently complex is that some
states provide for parole and others oo not.

Id., at 280-281.

Fi-

- 7 nally, and most importantly, such comparions trample on fundamental
concepts of federalism.

Different states surely may view particu-

lar crimes as more or less severe than other states.

Thus, even if

the punishment accorded Rummel in Texas were to exceed that which
he would have received in any other State,
"that severity would hardly render Rummel's punishment 'grossly disproportionate' to his offenses or
to the punishment he would have received in the other States •••• Absent a constitutionally imposed
uniformity inimical to traditional notions of federalism, some State will always bear the distinction
of treating particular offenders more severely than
any other State." 445 U.S., at 281-282. (Emphasis
added) •
Finally, we flatly rejected Rummel's suggestion that we measure his sentence against the sentences imposed by Texas for other
crimes:
"Other crimes, of course, implicate other societal
interests, making any such comparison inherently
speculative •••• Once the death penalty and other
punishments different in kind from fine or imprisonment have been put to one side, there remains little
in the way of objective standards for judging whether or not a life sentence imposed under a recidivist
statute for several separate felony convictions not
involving 'violence' violates the cruel-and-unusualpunishment of the Eighth Amendment." 445 U.S., at
282-283 n. 27.
Rather, we held that the severity of punishment to be accorded different crimes was peculiarly a matter of legislative policy.

Ibid.

In short, Rummel held that the length of a sentence of imprisonment is a matter of legislative discretion: this is so particularly for recidivist statutes.

I simply cannot understand how the

majority can square Rummel with its holding that "a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the def e ndant

~ ~~: ~~9- ~~~ ~

iu..~~ ~~<

I
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has been convicted."

Ante, at 11. 2

If there were any doubts as to the meaning of Rummel, they
were laid to rest last Term in Hutto v. Davis, 454
{per curiam).

u.s.

370 (1982)

There a United States District Court held that a 40-

year sentence for the possession of nine ounces of marijuana violated the Eighth Amendment.

The District Court applied almost ex-

actly the same analysis adopted today by the Court.

Specifically,

the District Court stated:
"After examining the nature of the offense, the legislative purpose behind the punishment, the punishment in the [sentencing jurisdiction] for other offenses, and the punishment actually imposed for the
same or similar offenses in Virginia, this court
must necessarily conclude that a sentence of forty
years and twenty thousand dollars in fines is so
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crimes as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the United States Constitution."
Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444, 453 (WD Va.
19 7 7) •

0

The Court of Appeals sitting en bane affirmed.
1981)

(per curiam).

646 F. 2d 123 (CA4

We reversed in a brief per curiam opinion,

holding that Rummel had disapproved each of the "objective" factors
on which the District Court and en bane Court of Appeals purported
to rely.

454

u.s.,

at 373.

It was therefore clear error for the

District Court to have been guided by these factors, which, paradoxically, the Court adopts today.

2 Although Rummel v. Estelle, 445 u.s. 263, 274 n. 11
(1980), conceded that "a proportionality principle [might] come
into play •• ~ if a legislature made overtime p a rking a felony
punishable by life imprisonment," the majority has not suggested
that respondent's crimes are comparable to overtime parking.
Indeed, re s pondent's seven felonies compare unfavorably with
Rummel's three.

-

9 -;

'

Contrary to the Court's interpretation of Hutto, see ante, at
11 and n. 16, the Hutto Court did not hold that the District Court
miscalculated in finding Davis' sentence disproportionate to his
crime.

It did not hold that the District Court improperly weighed

the relevant factors.

Rather, it held that the District Court

clearly erred in even attempting to determine whether the sentence
was "disproportionate" to the crime.

Hutto makes crystal clear

that under Rummel it is error for appellate courts to second-guess
legislatures as to whether a given sentence of imprisonment is ex- cessive in relation to the crime, 3 as the Court does today.

Ante,

at 16-23.
JUSTICE POWELL,

on ~ o,

stated that "the doctrine of

stare decisis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive on a constitutional question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a society
'

Akro~

governed by the rule of law."

City of

Reproductive Health, Inc.,

u.s. - - '

v. Akron Center for
(1983).

I agree.

While the doctrine of stare decisis does not absolutely bind a
court to its prior opinions, a decent regard for the orderly development of the law and the administration of justice requires that

{-- •. 1

3 Both Rummel and Hutto v. Davis, 454 u.s. 370 (1982) (per
curiam), leave open the possibility that in extraordinary cases-such as a life sentence for overtime parking--it might be
permissible for a court to decide whether the sentence is grossly
disproportionate to the crime.
I agree that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause might apply to those rare cases where
reason a ble men cannot differ as to the inappropriateness of a
/ punishment.
~ n a l l other cases, we must defer to the
legislature's line-drawing. However, the majority does not
contend that this is such an extraordinary case that reasonable
men could not differ about the appropriateness of this
punishment.

7

(7 ~

- 10 directly controlling cases be either followed or candidly overruled.4

Especially is this so with respect to two key holdings

less than three years old.

What the Court does today is purely and

simply visceral jurisprudence.
II
Although historians and scholars have disagreed about the
Framers' original intentions, the more common view seems to be that
the Framers viewed the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as prohibiting the kind of torture meted out during the reign of the Stu-arts. 5

7
I

~

Moreover, it is clear that until 1892, over 100 years after

+~~..-(~
4 I do not read the Court's opinion a
that
respondent's sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of
parole is so different from Rummel's sentence of I1te
i~sonment with the possibility of parole as to permit it to
apply the proportionality review used in the death penalty cases,
e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 u.s. 584 (1977), to the former
although not the latter. Nor would such an argume nt be tenable.
As was noted in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305
( 197 6} (opinion of Justice Stewart, JUSTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE
STEVENS),
"[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a
sentence of imprisonment.
Death, in its finality, differs more
from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from
one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative
difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for
reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate
punishment in a specific case."
The greater need for reliability in death penalty cases
cannot·support a distinction betw e en a sentence of life
i mprisonme nt with possibility of parole and a se nt e nce of life
imprisonme nt without possibility of parole, especially when an
execu5ive commutation is permitted as in South Dakota.
Compare, e.g., Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 Calif. L. Rev
839 (1969); Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis
and the Compelling Ca se of William Rummel, 71 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 378, 379 - 382 (1980); Katkin, Habitual Offe nder Laws:
A Reconsideration, · 21 Buffalo L. Rev. 99, 115 (1971), with, e.g.,
Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Ex a mination of
the Eighth Ame ndment, 24 Stan. L. Re v. 838, 853-855 (1972);
Footnote continu e d on next p a ge.
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the ratification of the Bill of Rights, not a single Justice of
this Court even asserted the doctrine adopted for the first time by
the Court today.

The prevailing view up to now has been that the

Eighth Amendment reaches only the mode of punishment and not the
length of of a sentence of imprisonment. 6

In light of this histo-

ry, it is disingenuous for the Court blandly to assert that "The
-

.......

"""'l:a.::--

........ ~- ..,._..,..,_.._.

-

.....

constitutional principle of proportionality has been recognized
explicitly in this Court for almost a century."

Ante, at 8.

That

statement seriously distorts history and our cases.
This Court has applied a proportionality test only in extraordinary cases, Weems being one example and the line of capital cases
another.

See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433

v. Florida, 458

u.s.

(1982).

u.s.

584 (1977); Enmund

The Court's reluctance to give

legislatures unlimited freedom in choosing which crimes to punish
by death rests on the uniqueness and finality of the death sen-

Comment, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment:
An Historical Justification for the Weems v. United States Exces~ive Punishment Doctrine, 24 Buffalo L. Rev. 783 (1975).
In 1892 , the dissent in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 u.s. 323,
339-340 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting), argued that the Eighth
Amendment "is directed ..• against all punishments which by their
excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the
offenses charged." Before and after O'Neil, most authorities
thought that the Eighth Amendment reached only the mode of
punishment and not the length of sentences .
See, e.g., Note , 24
Harv. L. Rev . 54, 55 (1910). Even after Weems was decided in
1910, it was thought unlikely that the Court would extend
proportionality analysis to cases involving solely sentences of
imprisonment. See Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime,
77 Harv. L. Rev. 1071, 1075 (1964). Until today, not a single
case of this Court applied the "excessive punishment" doctrine of
Weems to a punishment consisting solely of a sentence of
imprisonment, despite numerous opportunities to do so. E.g.,
Hutto v. Davis , 454 u.s. 370 (1982); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263 (1980); Badders v. United States; 240 U.S. 391 (1916); Graham
v. West Virginia, 224 u.s. 616 (1912).

. - 12 tence, which calls for exacting procedural limitations to ensure
that only those most deserving of the death penalty receive it.
Such scrutiny is not required where only a sentence of imprisonment
is at stake.
The Court's traditional abstention from reviewing sentences of
imprisonment to ensure that punishment is "proportionate" to the
crime has been well founded.

Today's claim by , five Justices that

they are able to say that one offense has less "gravity" than another is nothing other than a bald substitution of ,.......individual
sub...............
jective moral values for those of the legislature.

Nor, as this

case well illustrates, are we endowed with Solomonic wisdom that
permits us to draw principled distinctions between a sentence of X
years and a sentence of X + Y years for "repeaters" who have demon-

0

strated that they will not abide by the law.

The simple truth is

that "[nJo neutral principle of adjudication permits a federal
court to hold that in a given situtation individual crimes are too
trivial in relation to the punishment imposed."

Rummel v. Estelle,

S68 F. 2d 1193, 1201-1202 (CAS)

(Thornberry, J., dissenting), va-

cated, S87 F. 2d 6Sl (CAS 1978)

(en bane), affirmed, 44S

(1980).

u.s.

263

The apportionment of punishment entails, in Justice Frank-

furter's words, "peculiarly questions of legislative policy."
v. United States, 3S7

u.s.

386, 393 (l9S8).

Gore

Legislatures are far

better equipped than we are to balance the competing penal and publie interests and to draw the essentially arbitrary lines between
appropriate sentences for different crimes.
By asserting the power to review sentences of imprisonment for
excessiveness the Court launches itself into uncharted an d

- 13 unchartable waters.

Today it holds that a sentence of life impris-

onment, without the possibility of parole, is excessive punishment
for a seventh allegedly "nonviolent" felony.
"nonviolent" felony?

The ninth?

was a simple assault?
rape?

Or price-fixing?

How about the eighth

The twelth? Suppose one offense

Or selling liquor to a minor?

Or statutory

The permutations are endless ana the

Court's opinion is bankrupt of realistic guiding principles.

In-

stead, it casually lists several allegedly "objective factors" ana
arbitrarily asserts that they show respondent's sentence to be
"significantly disproportionate" to his crimes.

Ante, at 23.

Must

all these factors be present in order to hold a sentence excessive
under the Eighth Amendment?
each other?

How are they to be weighed against

Suppose several States punish severely a crime that

the Court views as trivial or petty?

Unfortunately, I can see no

limiting principle in the Court's opinion. ·
Moreover , the Court's decision will flood the appellate courts
with cases in which equally arbitrary lines must be drawn.

It is

·-

no answer to say that appellate courts must review criminal convictions in any event ; up to now, that review has been on the validity
of the judgment, not the sentence .

Moreover , the vast majority of

criminal cases are disposed of by pleas of guilty, 7 ana ordinarily
cases .

l

To require appellate

as the Court's opinion
cou

to the courts of appeal as

7 In 1972 , nearly 90% of the convictions in federal courts
followed pleas of guilty or nolo contedere . H. Friendly , Federal
Jurisdiction: A General View 36 (1973).
··~

~~~

- 14 know them."
(1973).

n.

Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A

This is judicial usur2ation with a

G~~

vengea~

III

Even if I

-=4:

agreed that the Eighth Amendment prohibits impriso

ment "disproportionate to the crime committed," ante, at 6, I reject the notion that respondent's sentence is disproportionate to
his crimes for,

if we are to have a system of laws, Rummel -is co

trolling.
The differences between this case ana Rummel are insubstan
tial.

First, Rummel committed three truly nonviolent

while respondent, as noted at the outset, committed seven felo
four of which cannot fairly be characterized as "nonviolent."

driving posed real risk of serious harm to others.

At

It is·

a no

fortuity that the places respondent burglarized were unoc
that he killed no pedestrians while behind the wheel; w at would
have happened if a guard hao been on duty during the
a matter of speculation, but the possibilities shatt

to bring his conduct into conformity with the m'
civilized society.

Clearly, this diff e rence

a

the notion

i mum standards of
sem-

blance of logic in the Court's conclusion tha

respondent's sen-

tence constitutes cruel ano unusual punishmen

although Rummel's

oio not.

'•

'

~hat

The Court's opinion necessarily reduces to the proposition
a s e ntence of life i mpri s onme nt with the pos sibility of c ornrn u-

- 15 tation, but without possibility of parole, is so much more severe

--------------------- -

than a life sentence with the possibility of parole that one is
excessive while the other is not.

This distinction does not with-

stand scrutiny: a well-behaved "lifer" in respondent's position is
most unlikely to serve for life.
It is inaccurate to say, as the Court does, ante, at 22, that
the Rummel holding relied on the fact that Texas had a relatively
liberal parole policy.

In context, it is clear that the Court's

discussion of parole merely illustrated the difficulty of comparing sentences between different jurisdictions.

445

u.s.,

at 280-281.

However, accepting the Court's characterization of Rummel as accurate, the Court today misses the point.

Parole was relevant to an

evaluation of Rummel's life sentence because in the "real world,"
he was unlikely to spend his entire life behind bars.

Only a frac-

tion of "lifers" are not released within a relatively few years.
In Texas, the historical evidence showed that a prisoner serving a
life sentence could become eligible for parole in as little as 12
years.

In South Dakota, the historical evidence--which the Court's

op~~ws

that

sinc~~22 ~ ife

requests for commutation were

commuted to terms of years, while
denied.

sentences have been

probability that respond-

In short , there is

experience .

ent will experience what so

Even assum-

ing that at the time of senten ing, respondent was likely to spend
more time in prison than Rumm 1, 8 that marginal difference is sure-

8 No one will ever know if r when Rummel would have been
released on parole since he was rel eased in connection with a
Footnote
ntinued ~ ext page .

1-

r·
1 ~

l)

-
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ly supported by respondent's greater . demonstrated propensity for
crime--and more serious crime at that.

I

find it nothing less than

bizarre for the Court to say that while Rummel's sentence was constitutional, respondent's is "significantly disproportionate to his
crime," and hence unconstitutional.

IV
It is indeed a curious business for this Court to so far intrude into the administration of criminal justice to say that a
state legislature is barred by the Constitution from identifying
its habitual criminals and removing them from the streets.

Surely

seven felony convictions warrant the conclusion that respondent is
incorrigible.

It is even more curious that the Court should brush

aside controlling precedents that are barely in the bound volumes

()

of United States Reports.

The Court would do well to heed the

-

words of Justice Black in condemning judges who usurp the policymaking powers of legislatures under the guise of constitutional
interpretation:
"Such unbounded authority in any group of politically appointed or elected judges would unquestionabl y
be sufficient to classify our Nation as a governmen t
of men , not the governme nt of laws of which we
boast.
With a 'shock the conscience ' test of constitutionality, citizens must guess what is the law,
guess what a majority of nine judges will believe
fair and reasonable .
Such a test wilfully throws
away the certainty and security that lies in a writ-

1..

separate federal habeas proceeding in 1980.
On October 3, 1980,
a federal District Court granted Rummel's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus on the grounds of ineffective assistance of
counsel .
Rummel v. Estelle , 498 F. Supp . 793 (WD Tex 1980) .
Rummel then plead guilty to theft by false pretenses and was
sentenced to time served under the terms of a plea bargaining
agreement .
Two-Bit Lifer Finally Freed--After Pleading Guilty,
Chicago Tribune, No v. 15, 1980 , at 2, col. 3.

- 17 ten co~stitution, one that. does not alter with a
judge's health, belief, or his politics." Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 u.s. 371, 393 (1971) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
I dissent.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-492

'

HERMAN SOLEM, WARDEN, PETITIONER v.
JERRY BUCKLEY HELM
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[June -

, 1983]

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom JUSTICE WHITE, JusTICE REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting.
The controlling law governing this case is crystal clear, but
today the Court blithely discards any concept of stare decisis,
trespasses gravely on the authority of the States, and distorts the concept of proportionality of punishment by tearing
it from its moorings in capital cases. Only two Terms ago,
we held in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 (1980), that a
life sentence "iinpo~ed after only a third nonviolent felony conviction did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment. Today, the Court i@ore0ts
re~n~~ceden! and holds that a life sentence impos~ after
a seven elony conviction constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, I reject
the fiction that all Helm's crimes were innocuous or nonviolent. Among his felonies were three burglaries and a third
conviction for drunk driving. By comparison Rummel was a
relatively "model citizen." Although today's holding cannot
rationally be reconciled with Rummel, the Court doesnot
purport to overrule Rummel. I therefore dissent.
I
A
The Court's starting premise is that the Eighth Amend-
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ment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause "prohibits not
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed." Ante, at 6. What
the Court means is that a sentence is unconstitutional if it is
more severe than five justices think appropriate. In short,
all sentences of imprisonment are sub· ect to a ellate scrut~t e n
e t a t ey are ' proportional" to t e cnme
committed.
The Court then sets fQrth three assertedly "objective" factors to guide the determination of whether a given sentence
of imprisonment is constitutionally excessive: (1) the "gravity
of the offense and the harshness ofthe penalty," id., at 11; (2)
a comparison of the sentence imposed with "sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction," id., at 12
(emphasis added); (3) and a comparison of "the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." Ibid (emphasis added). In applying this analysis, the
Court determines that respondent
''has received the penultimate sentence for relatively
minor criminal conduct. He has been treated more
harshly than other criminals in the State who have committed more serious crimes. He has been treated more
harshly than he would have been in any other jurisdiction, ... " !d., at 23. (Emphasis added).
Therefore, the Court concludes, respondent's sentence is
"significantly disproportionate to his crime, and is ... prohibited by the Eighth Amendment." This analysis is completely at odds with the reasoning of our recent holding in
Rummel, in which, of course, JUSTICE POWELL dissented.
B
The facts in Rummel bear repeating. Rummel was convicted in 1964 of fraudulent use of a credit card; in 1969, he
was convicted of passing a forged check; finally, in 1973
Rummel was charged with obtaining money by false pre-

I
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tenses, which is also a felony under Texas law. These three
offenses were indeed nonviolent. Under Texas' recidivist
statute, which provides for a mandatory life sentence upon
conviction for a third felony, the trial judge imposed a life
sentence as he was obliged to do after the jury returned a
verdict of guilty of felony theft.
Rummel, in this Court, advanced precisely the same arguments that respondent advances here; we rejected those arguments notwithstanding that his case was stronger than respondent's. The test in Rummel whi'ch we rejected would
have required us to determine on an abstract moral scale
whether Rummel had received his "just deserts" for his
crimes. We declined that invitation; today the Court accepts
it. Will the Court now recall Rummel's case so five justices
will not be parties to "disproportionate" criminal justice?
It is true, as we acknoyyled g~Q, ~rnel, that the "Court~
has on occasion statedthaf the Eighth Amendment prohibits
imposition of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to
the severity of a crime." 445 U.S., at 271. But even a cur
sory review of our cases shows that this type of proportionality review has been carried out only in a very limited category of cases, and never befo e · a case involvin solei a
se~en.s_e _gf i~i ~m~t.
In Rumme , we sru
he
proporii"''llaittY c~ of the capital punishment cases was
inapposite because of the "unique nature of the death penalty.... " I d., at 272. "Because a sentence of death differs
in kind from any sentence of imprisonment, no matter how
long, our decisions applying the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments to capital cases are of limited assistance in
deciding the constitutionality of the punishment meted out to
Rummel." Ibid.
The Rummel Court also rejected the claim that Weems v.
United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910), required it to determine
whether Rummel's punishment was "disproportionate" to his
crime. In Weems, the Court had struck down as cruel and
unusual punishment a sentence of cadena temporal imposed
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by a Phillipine Court. This bizarre penalty, which was unknown to Anglo-Saxon law, entailed a minumum of 12 years'
imprisonment chained day and night at the wrists and ankles,
hard and painful labor while so chained, and a number of "accessories" including lifetime civil disabilities. In Rummel
the Court carefully noted that "[Weems'] finding of
disproportionality cannot be wrenched from the facts of that
case." 445 U. S., at 273. 1
The lesson the Rummel Court drew from Weems and from
the capital punishment cases was that the Eighth Amendment did not authorize courts to review sentences of imprisonment to determine whether they were "proportional" to
the crime. In language quoted incompletely by the Court,
ante, at 9, n. 13, the Rummel Court stated:
"Given the unique nature of the punishments considered
in Weems and in the death penalty cases, one could arw e,...
without fear of contradiction by any decision of this
Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies, that is, as punishable by significant
terms of imprisonment in a state penitentiary, the length
of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of
legislative perogative." 445 U. S., at 274. (Emphasis
added).
Five Justices joined this clear an<lli!recis~limit~anguage.
In context it is clear that tllls Co~ Wisiiot ffiel!cly summarizing an argument, as the Court suggests, ante, at 9, n.
affirmative~h~ rule of law laid down.
13, but was statin~
This passage "fFFiii~mez isf'O~l)Yan e'X'Pfanati'o; of
why it is permissible for courts to review sentences of death
or bizarre physically cruel punishments as in Weems, but not
sentences of imprisonment. I d., at 274-275. The Rummel
'Other authorities have shared this interpretation of Weems v. United
States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910). E. g., Packer, Making the Punishment Fit
the Crime, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1071, 1075 (1964).

l
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Court emphasized, as has every opinion in capital cases in the
past decade, that it was possible to draw a "bright line" between "the punishment of death and the various other per. mutations and commutations of punishment short of that ultimate sanction"; similarly, a line could be drawn between the
punishment in Weems and "more traditional forms of imprisonment imposed under the Anglo-Saxon system." I d., at
275. However, the Rummel Court emphasized that drawing lines between different sentences of imprisonment would
thrust the Court inevitably "into the basic line-drawing process that is pre-eminently the province of the legislature" and
produce judgments that were no more than the visceral reactions of individual Justices. Ibid.
The Rummel Court categorically rejected the very analysis adopted by the Court today. Rummel had argued that
various objective criteria existed by which the Court could
determine whether his life sentence was proportional to his
crimes. In rejecting Rummel's contentions, the Court explained why each was insufficient to allow it to determine in
an objective manner whether a given sentence of imprisonment is proportionate to the crime for which it is imposed.
First, it rejected the distinctions Rummel tried to draw between violent and nonviolent offenses, noting that "the absence of violence does not always affect the strength of society's interest in deterring a particular crime or in punishing a
particular individual." Ibid. Similarly, distinctions based
on the amount of money stolen are purely "subjective" matters of line drawing. !d., at 275-276.
Second, the Court squarely rejected Rummel's attempt to
compare his sentence with the sentence he would have received in other States-an argument that the Court today accepts. The Rummel Court explained that such comparisons
are flawed for several reasons. For one, the recidivist laws
of the various states vary widely. "It is one thing for a court
to compare those States that impose capital punishment for a
specific offense with those States that do not. . . . It is quite
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another thing for a court to attempt to evaluate the position
of any particular recidivist scheme within Rummel's complex
matrix." 445 U. S., at 280 (citation and footnote omitted).
Another reason why comparison between the recidivist statutes of different States is inherently complex is that some
states have comprehensive provisions for parole and others
do not. I d., at 280-281. Perhaps most important, such
comparions trample on fundamental concepts of federalism.
Different states surely may view particular crimes as more or
less severe than other states. Stealing a horse in Texas may
have different consequences and warrant different punishment than stealing a horse in RAhode Island or Washington,
D. C. Thus, even if the punishment accorded Rummel in
Texas were to exceed that which he would have received in
any other State,
"that severity would hardly render Rummel's punishment 'grossly disproportionate' to his o{fenses or to the
punishment he would have received in the other States.
. . . Absent a constitutionally imposed uniformity inimical to traditional notions of federalism, some State
will always bear the distinction of treating particular offenders more severely than any other State." 445 U. S.,
at 281-282. (Emphasis added).
Finally, we flatly rejected Rummel's suggestion that we
measure his sentence against the sentences imposed by
Texas for other crimes:
"Other crimes, of course, implicate other societal interests, making any such comparison inherently speculative. . . . Once the death penalty and other punishments different in kind from fine or imprisonment have
been put to one side, there remains little in the way of
objective standards for judging whether or not a life sentence imposed under a recidivist statute for several separate felony convictions not involving 'violence' violates
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the cruel-and-unusual-punishment of the Eighth Arnendment.t• 445 U. S., at 282-283t n. 27. Rathert we held that the severity of punishment to be accorded different crimes was peculiarly a matter of legislative
policy. Ibid.
In short, Rummel held .that the length of a sentence of
imprisonmenf 1s a"iiiafter of legislative discretion; this is so
particularly for recidivist statutes. I simply cannot understand how the Court can square Rummel with its holding
that "a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime
for which the defendant has been convicted." Ante, at 11. 2
If there were any doubts as to the meaning of Rummelt
they were laid to rest last Term in J!.utto v. Dw;ist 454 U. S.
370 (1982) (per curiam). There a tJruTed States District
Court held that a 40-year sentence for the possession of nine
ounces of marijuana violated the Eighth Amendment. The
District Court applied almost exactly the same analysis
adopted today by the Court. Specifically, the District Court
stated:
"Mter examining the nature of the offense, the legislative purpose behind the punishment, the punishment in
the [sentencing jurisdiction] for other offenses, and the
punishment actually imposed for the same or similar offenses in Virginia, this court must necessarily conclude
that a sentence of forty years and twenty thousand dollars in fines is so grossly out of proportion to the severity
of the crimes as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the United States Constitution."
Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444t 453 (WD Va.
Although Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 274, n. 11 (1980), conceded that "a proportionality principle [might] come into play ... if a legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment,"
the majority has not suggested that respondent's crimes are comparable to
overtime parking. Respondent's seven felonies are far more severe than
Rummel's three.
2
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1977).

on

The Court of Appeals sitting en bane affinned. 646 F. 2d
123 (CA4 1981) (per curiam). We reversed in a brief per
curiam opinion, holding that Rummel had disapproved each
of the "objective" factors on which the District Court and en
bane Court of Appeals purported to rely. 454 U. S., at 373.
It was therefore clear error for the District Court to have
been guided by these factors, which, paradoxically, the Court
adopts today.
Contrary to the Court's interpretation of Hutto, see ante,
at 11 and, n. 16, the Hutto Court did not hold that the District Court miscalculated in finding Davis' sentence disproportionate to his crime. It did not hold that the District
Court improperly weighed the relevant factors. Rather, it
held that the District Court clearly erred in even embarking
cs•~a••••l8,... determination whether the sentence
was "disproportionate" to the crime. Hutto makes crystal
clear that under Rummel it is error for appellate courts to
second-guess legislatures ·as to whether a given sentence of
imprisonment is excessive in relation to the crime, 3 as the
Court does today, ante, at 16-23.
I agree with what the Court stated only days ago, that "the
doctrine of stare decisis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive on a constitutional question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the rule of law."
City of Akron v, Akron Center for Reproductive Health,

n..

3
Both Rummel and Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam),
leave open the possibility that in extraordinary cases--such as a life sentence for overtime parking-it might be permissible for a court to decide
whether the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime. I agree
that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause nlight apply to those rare
cases where reasonable men cannot differ as to the inappropriateness of a
punishment. In all other cases, we should defer to the legislature's linedrawing. However, the Court does not contend that this is such an extraordinary case that reasonable men could not differ about the appropriateness of this punishment.

..
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Inc., - - U. S. - - , - - (1983). While _the doctrine of
stare decisis does not absolutely bind the Court to its prior
opinions, a decent regard for the orderly development of the
law and the administration of justice requires that directly
controlling cases be either followed or candidly overruled. 4
Especially is this so with respect to two key holdings only
three years old.
II
Although historians and scholars have disagreed about the
Framers' original intentions, the more common view seems
to be that the Framers viewed the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as prohibiting the kind of torture meted out
during the reign of the Stuarts. 5 Moreover, it is clear that
• I do not read the Court's opinion as arguing that respondent's sentence
of life imprisonment without possibility of parole is so different from
Rummel's sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole as to
permit it to apply the proportionality review used
the death penalty
cases, e. g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584 (1977), to the former although
not the latter. Nor would such an argument be tenable. A£ was noted in
. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 305 (1976) (opinion of Justice
Stewart, JusTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE STEVENS ),
"[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of
imprisonment. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment
than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because
of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the
need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case."
The greater need for reliability in death penalty cases cannot support a
distinction between a sentence of life imprisonment with possibility of parole and a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole, especially when an executive commutation is permitted as in South Dakota.
5
Compare, e. g., Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 Calif. L. Rev. 839 (1969); Schwartz,

m

Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis and the Compelling Case of
William Rummel, 71 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 378, 379--382 (1980);
Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 Buffalo L. Rev.
99, 115 (1971), with, e. g., Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 Stan. L. Rev. 838,
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until 1892, over 100 years after the ratification of the Bill of
Rights, not a single Justice of this Court even asserted the
doctrine adopted for the first time by the Court today. The
prevailing view up to now has been that the Eighth Amendment reaches only the mode of punishment and not the length
of of a sentence of imprisonment. 6 In light of this history, it
is disingenuous for the Court blandly to assert that "[t]he
constitutional principle of proportionality has been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century." Ante, at
8. That statement seriously distorts history and our cases.
This Court has applied a proportionality test only in extraordinary cases, Weems being one exa:r:nple and the line of
capital cases another. See, e. g., Coker v. Georgia, 433
U. S. 584 (1977); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.- (1982).
To read the Eighth Amendment as restricting legislatures'
authority to choose which crimes to punish by death rests on
the finality of the death sentence. Such scrutiny is not required where a sentence of imprisonment is imposed after the
853--855 (1972); Comment, The Eighth Ameruiment, Beccaria, and the
Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for the Weems v. United
States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 Buffalo L. Rev. 783 (1975).
• In 1892, the dissent in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, 339-340
(1892) (Field, J., dissenting), argued that the Eighth Amendment ''is directed ... against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged." Before and
after O'Neil, most authorities thought that the Eighth Amendment
reached only the mode of ·punishment and not the length of sentences.
See, e. g., Note, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 54, 55 (1910). Even after Weems was
decided in 1910, it was thought unlikely that the Court would extend proportionality analysis to cases involving solely sentences of imprisonment.
See Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 Harv. L. Rev.
1071, 1075 (1964). Until today, not a single case of this Court applied the
"excessive punishment" doctrine of Weems to a punishment consisting
solely of a sentence of imprisonment, despite numerous opportunities to do
so. E. g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S. 370 (1982); Rummel v. Estelle, 445
U. S. 263 (1980); Badders v. United States, 240 U. S. 391 (1916); Graham
v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616 (1912).
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State has identified a criminal offender whose record shows
he will not conform to societal standards.
The Court's traditional abstention from reviewing sentences of imprisonment to ensure that punishment is "proportionate" to the crime is well founded in history, in p~rudentlal
considerations, and in traditions of comity. Today's conclusion by five Justices that they are able to say that one offense
has less "gravity'' than another is nothing other than a bald
substitution of individual subjective moral values for those of
the legislature. Nor, as this case well illustrates, are we endowed with Solomonic wisdom that permits us to draw principled distinctions between sentences of different length for a
chronic "repeater" who has demonstrated that will not
abide by the law.
A
The simple truth is that "[n]o neutral principle of adjudication permits a federal court to hold that in a given situtation
individual crimes are too trivial in relation to the punishment
imposed." Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F. 2d '1193, 1201-1202
(CA5) (Thornberry, J., dissenting), vacated,- 587 F. 2d 651
(CA51978) (en bane), aff'd, 445 U. S. 263 (1980). The apportionment of punishment entails, in Justice Frankfurter's
words, "peculiarly questions of legislative policy." Gore v.
United States, 357 U. S. 386, 393 (1958). Legislatures are
far better equipped than we are to balance the competing penal and public interests and to draw the essentially arbitrary
lines between appropriate sentences for different crimes.
By asserting the power to review sentences of imprisonment for excessiveness the Court launches into uncharted
and unchartable waters. Today it holds that a sentence of
life imprisonment, without the possibility of parole, is excessive punishment for a seventh allegedly "nonviolent" felony.
How about the eighth "nonviolent" felony? The ninth? The
twelth? Suppose one offense was a simple assault? Or selling liquor to a minor? Or statutory rape? Or price-fixing?
The permutations are endless and the Court's opinion is

he-
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bankrupt of realistic guiding principles. Instead, it casually
lists several allegedly "objective" factors and arbitrarily asserts that they show respondent's sentence to be "significantly disproportionate" to his crimes. Ante, at 23. Must
all these factors be present in order to hold a sentence excessive under the Eighth Amendment? How are they to be
weighed against each other? Suppose several States punish
severely a crime that the Court views as trivial or petty? I
can see no limiting principle in the Court's holding.
There is a real risk that this holding will flood the appellate
courts with cases in which equally arbitrary lines must be
drawn. It is no answer to say that appellate courts must review criminal convictions in any event; up to now, that review has been on the validity of the judgment, not the sentence. The vast majority of criminal cases are disposed of by
pleas of guilty, 7 and ordinarily there is no appellate review in
such cases. To require appellate review of all sentences of
imprisonment-as the Court's opinion does-Will "administer
the coup de grace to the courts of appeal as we know them."
H. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 36 (1973).
This is judicial usurpation with a vengeance; Congress has
pondered for decades the concept of appellate review of sentences and has hesitated to act.

III
Even if I agreed that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
imprisonment "disproportionate to the crime committed,"
ante, at 6, I reject the notion that respondent's sentence is
disproportionate to his crimes for, if we are to have a system
of laws, not men, Rummel is controlling.
The differences between this case and Rummel are insubstantial. First, Rummel committed three truly nonviolent
7
In 1972, nearly 90% of the convictions in federal courts followed pleas
of guilty or nolo contedere. H. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General
View 36 (1973).

1
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felonies, while respondent, as noted at the outset, committed
seven felonies, four of which cannot fairly be characterized as
"nonviolent." At the very least, respondent's burglaries and
his third-offense drunk driving posed real risk of serious
harm to others. It is sheer fortuity that the places respondent burglarized were unoccupied and that he killed no pedestrians while behind the whee\?)~hat would have happened if a
guard had been on duty during the burglaries is a matter of
speculation, but the possibilities shatter the notion that respondent'
·
were innocuous, inconsequential, minor, or
"nonviolent." Fo
I repeat, had harsh potentialities for violence. Respondent, far more than Rummel, has demonstrated his inability to bring his conduct into conformity with
the minimum standards of civilized society. Clearly, this difference demolishes any semblance of logic in the Court's conclusion that respondent's sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment although Rummel's did not.
The Court's opinion necessarily reduces to the proposition
that a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of
commutation, but without possibility of parole, is so much
more severe than a life sentence with the possibility of parole
that one is excessive while the other is not. This distinction
does not withstand scrutiny; a well-behaved ''lifer" in respondent's position is most unlikely to serve for life.
It is inaccurate to say, as 'the Court does, ante, at 22, that
the Rummel holding relied on the fact that Texas had a relatively liberal parole policy. In context, it is clear that the
Rummel Court's discussion of parole merely illustrated the
difficulty of comparing sentences between different jurisdictions. 445 U. S., at 280-281. However, accepting the
Court's characterization of Rummel as accurate, the Court
today misses the point. Parole was relevant to an evaluation
of Rummel's life sentence because in the "real world," he
was unlikely to spend his entire life behind bars. Only a
fraction of "lifers" are not released within a relatively few
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years. In Texas, the historical evidence showed that a prisoner serving a life sentence could become eligible for parole
in as little as 12 years. In South Dakota, the historical evidence--which the Court's opinion ignores-shows that since
1964, 22 life sentences have been commuted to terms of
years, while 25 requests for commutation were denied al-~
though they may be reopened.
In short, there is a significant probability that respondent
will experience what so many "lifers" experience. Even assuming that at the time of sentencing, respondent was likely
to spend more time in prison than Rummel, 8 that marginal
difference is surely supported by respondent's greater demonstrated propensity for crime--and for more serious crime
at that.

IV
It is indeed a curious business for this Court to so far intrude into the administration of criminal justice to say that a
state legislature is barred by the Constitution from identifying its habitual criminals and removing them from the
streets. Surely seven felony convictions warrant reasonable
minds to conclude that respondent is incorrigible. It is
even more curious that the Court should brush aside controlling precedents that are barely in the bound volumes of
United States Reports. The Court would do well to heed
Justice Black's comments on judges who usurp the policymaking powers of legislatures under the guise of constitutional interpretation:
No one will ever know if or when Rummel would have been released on
parole since he was released in connection with a separate federal habeas
proceeding in 1980. On October 3, 1980, a federal District Court granted
Rummel's petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Rummel v. Estelle, 498 F. Supp. 793 (WD Tex
1980). Rummel then plead guilty to theft by false pretenses and was sentenced to time served under the terms of a plea bargaining agreement.
Two-Bit Lifer Finally Freedr-After Pleading Guilty, Chicago Tribune,
Nov. 15, 1980, at 2, col. 3.
8

DV"hiSSton

J

'

•'

82--492--DISSENT
SOLEM v. HELM

15

"Such unbounded authority in any group ()f politically appointed or elected judges would unquestionably be sufficient to classify our Nation as a government of men, not
the government of laws of which we boast. With a
'shock the conscience' test of constitutionality, citizens
must guess what is the law, guess what a majority of
nine judges will believe fair and reasonable. Such a test
wilfully throws away the certainty and security that lies
in a written constitution, one that does not alter with a
judge's health, belief, or his politics." Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 393 (1971) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
I dissent.
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Normative Structure and Individual

Differences, 39 Am. Soc. Rev., 224, 237 (1974).

For

example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent
crimes are less serious than crimes marked by violence or
the threat of violence.

Indeed, the State concedes that

crimes against people generally are more serious than
crimes against property.

Note to Mike:

Tr. of Oral Arg., at 16.

Your subpart B (p. 16-18) is excellent.

have merely reframed the first two paragraphs.

Tell me

I

...

.
3.

about the Rossi article that you cite.

I generally avoid

citing even law review articles in the text.

lfp/ss 06/22/83

Rider A, p. 11 (Solem}

SOLEMll SALLY-POW
Suggested Revision of Footnote 15:

15.

Contrary to the repeated assertion in the

dissenting

opinion,

sentences

of

scrutiny
crime

we

neither

imprisonment

to ensu

that

committed."

{Post,

say nor

are

they

ect

ar

2!;

at

imply

1

7,

that

to

appellate

proportional 1
13}.

We

"all

do

to
say,

the
in

accord with decisions of tqJs Court, that the principle of
proportionality
[cites]

is

In view,

inherent
however,

in

of

the

Eighth

Amendment.

the substantial deference

that must be accorded legislatures and sentencing courts
we anticipate that there will be relatively few occasions
for appellate review -- as has been true in the past •

... '

HN15R-MICHAL-POW 06/23/83

Helm: n. 15 rider

I propose revising footnote 15, on page 11, as follows:

15 In view of the substantial deference properly due to legislatures and sentencin

courts,

will

not be required to eng

analysis to determine that
The dissent

thus exa

ellate courts will face

in a
late court
only

12.

if a

An a

el-

it need

sentence is within con titutional limits.

~-:JJU_~~
~ ~ 15",

f

~t~~t'

~~~~~

r~~-

Helm: new n. 12.5 rider

HN12.5R-MICHAL-POW 06/23/83

I propose adding a new footnote at the end of Part II.B,
on page 9, as follows:
~

~

~

the Court has continued to recognize that the Eighth Amend-

~~

ment proscribes grossly disproportionate punishments, even when
it

has

not

been

necessary

to

rely on

the

proscription.

See,

e.g., [citations] • 12 • 5

~(

~~-.

!JI<

J.A--

12.5The dissent charges that
concept of stare decisis."

"the Court blithely discards any

Post, at 1; cf.

id., at 2, 8-9, 14.

On the contrary,

with

this Court's

u.s.

263
""'~s
t.
Jf

(1980).

See n.

30,

infra.

o discard prior precedent.

It is rather

the dissent that

Its assertion that the Eighth

Amendment establishes only a narrow principle of proportionality
is contrary to the entire line of cases cited in the text.

These are fhe C<7/ ies
rrders fltat ft1U
an.d markeJ
~een

!'I<

;o·

,•'(;·

'l'

of

r

?

Helm: n. 13 rider

HN13R-MICHAL-POW 06/23/83

I propose revising footnote 13, on page 9, as follows:

13 According

to Rummel

v.

445-a .. s .. -~63--f~989t7- 11 one

Estelle,

could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this
Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as
felonies, that is, as punishable by significant terms of imprisonment in a state penitentiary,-...... the length of sentence actually

imposed

:te .. 445 u.s.,
the

is

purely

at 274

a

matter

of

legislative

(emphasis added}.

standard proposed,

prerogative. 11

The Court did not adopt

but merely recognized that the argument

was possible.
To the extent that the State--or the dissent, see post, at 4-makes
11

this

Cr imes

argument

here,

we

find

is invariabl

9

(:

u.s.c.

11 18

il
(

when a

The class of

concededly classified and classifiable as
less as an Ei hth Amendment

I

it meritless.

is

See, e ••

The effect of this standard would be absurd~
·
1

§1(1}.

State

-

based on its le al conse uences.

felonies 11

concededly may punish a crime by imprisonment for a

\ year, it could punish the crime by life imprisonment without>§

-

\ sibili ty
'\

~dt~t;/,.~,... ~ t:C.
c...,~

~
~

~~

,.c.

~

('

"'

I

-

HN15R-MICHAL-POW 06/23/83

Helm: n. 15 rider

I propose revising footnote 15, on page 11, as follows:
15 rn view of the substantial deference properly due to legislatures and sentencing courts, most reviewing courts normally will
not be required to engage in extended analysis to determine that
a sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate.

The dissent ,

thus exaggerates the difficulties that appellate courts will face
in applying the Eighth Amendment.

See post, at 2, 12.

late court need not decide if a sentence is

An appel-

"correct"~

it need

only decide if the sentence is within constitutional limits.

HN16R-MICHAL-POW 06/23/83

Helm: n. 16 rider

I

I propose revising footnote 16, on page 11, as follows:

16 The dissent concedes--as it must--that some sentences of imprisonment are so disproportionate that they are unconstitutional
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
3; cf. id., at 7, n. 2.

Post, at 8, n.

The dissent, however, offers no m&e~tr~~

guidance to enable courts to recognize these admittedly rare
cases.
cases

We

prefer

have

to

recognized.

584, 592 {1977)

reiterate

the objective

See,

Coker

e.g.,

{plurality opinion).

v.

factors
Georgia,

u.s.

370, 373-374 n. 2 {1982)

Estelle, 445 U.S., at 275-276.
al

system and

result

in

a

the

wide

need for

u.s.

433

As the Court has indicated,

no one factor will be dispositive in a given case.
Davis, 454

that our

See Hutto v.

{per curiam); Rummel v.

The inherent nature of our feder-

individualized sentencing decisions

range of constitutional sentences.

Thus

nNo

single criterion can identify when a sentence is so grossly disproportionate

that

it violates

the Eighth Amendment.

See Jef-

fries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in
the Criminal Law,

88 Yale L.J.

1325,

1376-1377

{1979).

But a

combination of objective factors can make such analysis possible.

?
l

HN27.5R-MICHAL-POW 06/23/83

Helm: new n. 27.5 rider

I propose adding a new footnote near the bottom of page 22 as
follows:

no life sentence has been commuted in over eight years,
while parole--where authorized--has been granted regularly during that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. 2 7.5

27

~ave

I
I

,

1~~

.Sd'~the--la-s- <' eight years, over 100 requests for commutation
been denied.

See app.

22-26.

Although 22 life sentences

were commuted to terms of years between 1964 and 1975, see app.
29; but see n. 28, infra, we do not have complete figures on the
number of requests that were denied during the same period.
know only that at least 35 requests were denied.
In any event,
practice of

~

we

We

See app. 22-26.

believe that past practice--particularly the

decade ago--is not a reasonable indicator of future

performance when the relevant decision is left to the Governor's

dirl..

unfettered discretibn.

~ t-L

.

,

Even/ if a particular Governor were to

comm.u..t.e ....ev.eu aen.t,ence, ther-e is no reason to believe that his
succesSO! would continue the practice.

Indeed, the best indica-

tion we have of Helm's chance for commutation is the fact that
his request [hasS

al~ad~ been

denied.

App. 26.

-

Helm: new n. 30 rider

HN30R-MICHAL-POW 06/23/83

I

propose adding a new footnote after the penultimate sentence,

on page 23, as follows:

We conclude that his
portionate

to

his

[Helm's]

crime,

sentence is significantly dispro-

and

is

therefore

prohibited

by

the

Eighth Amendment. 30

30

cont~ary to the suggestion in the dissent, post, at 2-9, our

conclusion today is not inconsistent with Rummel v. Estelle.

The

Rummel Court recognized--as does the dissent, see post, at 8, n.
3--that

some sentences of

imprisonment are

that they violate the Eighth Amendment.
Since

Rummel--like

the

~~~j1_J~

dissent

so disproportionate

445 U.S., at 274, n. 11.

today--offered

no

eaningfu~ ~

~·nen an Eighth Amendment violation he¥¥

gu~$'I'!il'ee~to

---

occurred, it is controlling only in a similar factual situation.

,....,....

• --------•
•
.-'! I s.
--rn.-"' t h 1s
case, Helm's cr 1mes
were about as ser 1ous
as Rummt!L

See supra, at 1-3, and 16-17.
than
is

~ot

Rummel's.

See

controlling.

His sentence, however, is far more {
supra,

at

17-18,

and

20-23.

Thu~

------..---·-·_ ..oJI

HN12.5R-MICHAL-POW 06/24/83

Helm: new n. 12.5 rider

I propose adding a new footnote at the end of Part II.B,
on page 9, as follows:

And the Court has continued to recognize that the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate punishments, even when
it

has

not

been

e.g., [citations]

necessary

to

rely on

the

proscription.

See,

.1 2 • 5

125 The dissent charges

that

concept of stare decisis."

"the Court blithely discards any

Post, at

1~

cf. id., at 2, 8-9, 14.

On the contrary, our decision is entirely consistent with this
Court's prior cases--including Rummel v.
(1980).

See n. 30, infra.

discard prior precedent.
establishes only a

Estelle,

Its assertion that the Eighth Amendment

narrow principle of proportionality is con-

(he

These are
copt'e > oFChcut-JeS oF
rrc&r5

263

It is rather the dissent that would

trary to the entire line of cases cited in the text.

hatUf'f.

445 U.S.

;c\

r~

~.

1he
a

FR~
t:Lre
!;;:,•·

Ct-trreat

·.1

rtc;lprs
<;tAb

!.f-a.h frc:t (

ye5 rer-dar {5
.
marke~ _

Helm: n. 13 rider

HN13R-MICHAL-POW 06/24/83

I propose revising footnote 13, on page 9, as follows:

13 According to Rummel v. Estelle, "one could argue without fear
of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for crimes
concededly classified and classifiable as felonies,

that is, as

punishable by significant terms of imprisonment in a state penitentiary,

the

length of sentence actually

matter of legislative prerogative."
added).

imposed

is purely a

445 U.S., at 274

(emphasis

The Court did not adopt the standard proposed, but mere-

ly recognized that the argument was possible.
To the extent that the State--or the dissent, see post, at 4-makes

this argument here,

"crimes

we

find

it meritless.

concededly classified and classifiable as

meaningless as an Eighth Amendment standard.

The class of
felonies"

is

Legislatures do not

simply define crimes and classify them as felonies or misdemean/11444 ,.aq~
ors.
Within the broad class of felonies, there ~ is a wi~ e range
I\

---------c~-----------~------------------~~=

Hl5R-MICHAL-POW 06/24/83

I

Helm: page 15 rider

propose adding the following paragraph on page 15.

To place

~

the new paragraph in context, I reprint the last two sentences of
the paragraph before and the first sentence of the paragraph that
follows.

Except as marked, I have made no changes in these para-

graphs.

Since the new paragraph is entirely new, I have left it

unmarked so

e

easier

to read.

It may be a bit

longer than you had anticipated, but I think it is justified for
First,

two reasons.
Although

there

is

it

good

is our

strongest line-drawing example.
--~--~~~~----'-~~~--~

language

in Baldwin

spec1 1cally about

sentencing, the Barker analysis is closer to our present inquiry.
Second, this section was a little light.

You will recall that in

the first two drafts we discussed Williams v. Florida, Apodaca v.
Oregon, Ballew v. Georgia, and Burch v. Louisiana at this point.
Since JUSTICE BLACKMUN was mentioned by name, he asked us to delete that paragraph.

The new paragraph is shorter than the one

we deleted.

Decisions of
this area.

this

kind,

although troubling,

are not unique

to

The courts are constantly called upon to draw similar

lines in a variety of contexts.
The Sixth Amendment offers two good examples.

speedy
right

trial
in

the

claim

necessitates

particular

context

a
of

functional
the

case

A State

analysis
II

of

Barker

the
v.

page 2.

Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972)
we

(unanimous opinion).

identified some of the objective factors

In Barker,

that courts should

consider in determining whether a particular delay was excessive.
Id.,

at

530.

None of these factors

is "either a necessary or

sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right
of speedy trial.

Rather,

they are related factors and must be

considered together with such other circumstances as may be releId. ,

vant."

at

533.

Thus

the

type

of

inquiry

that

a

court

~L~ ..L,"':... .. tJt1~~

should conduct to determine if a given sentence is disp~o~rt~
ate is

I\

j)<Y

similar to the type of inquiry required by the Speedy

Trial Clause.*
The
example.

s~~~fi -Ameru:lmefl~-

right

to a

jury trial

is

another

Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), in particular,

illustrates the line-drawing function of the judiciary, and offers guidance on the method by which some lines may be drawn.

*

[If you think it would be helpful,
explaining

a

further

parallel

I

could add a footnote

between

the

Speedy

Trial

Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause: all trials
e subject to appellate scrutiny to ensure that they are sufficiently "speedy," just as all sentences are subject to appellate

~ utiny

to ensure that they are proportionate, but in both cases

reviewing courts often can dismiss such claims summarily.
of course, would tie in with footnote 15.

This,

We might even say that

we are confident courts can handle proportionality claims because
they have

been

able

to handle

speedy trial

line-drawing is at least as difficult.]

claims,

where

the

HN27.5R-MICHAL-POW 06/24/83

~

Helm: new n.

rider

2~

New footnote near the bottom of page 22:

Our ing

these

eight

have been denied.

years,

See app.

over

100

22-26.

requests

for

commutation

Although 22 life sentences

were commuted to terms of years between 1964 and 1975, see app.
29; but see n.

__,

infra, we do not have complete figures on the

number of requests that were denied during the same period.
are told only that at least 35 requests were denied.
22-26.

We

See app.

In any event, past practice in this respect--particularly

the practice of a decade ago--is not a reliable indicator of future performance when the relevant decision is left to the unfettered discretion of each Governor.

Indeed, the best indication

we have of Helm's chance for commutation is the fact
request already has been denied.

App. 26.

that his

Helm: new n. iD rider

HN30R-MICHAL-POW 06/24/83

32

New footnote after the penultimate sentence on page 23:

Contrary to the suggestion in the dissent, post, at 2-9, our
conclusion today is not inconsistent with Rummel v. Estelle.

The

Rummel Court recognized--as does the dissent, see post, at 8, n.
3--that some sentences of

imprisonment are

that they violate the Eighth Amendment.
Indeed, Hutto v. Davis, 454

u.s.,

445

so disproportionate

u.s.,

at 274, n. 11.

at 374, and n. 3, makes clear

that Rummel should not be read to foreclose proportionality review of sentences of imprisonment.

since

the

Court--like the dissent today--offered no standards

for

tionality
Rummel

Rummel did reject a proper-

challenge

to

a

particular

sentence.

But

determining when an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred,
is controlling only

in a similar

factual

facts are clearly distinguishable.

situation.

it

Here the

Whereas Rummel was eligible

for a reasonably early parole, Helm, at age 36, was sentenced to
life with no possibility of parole.

See supra, at _ _ _ _, and

lfp/ss 06/24/83

Rider A, p. 11 (Solem)

SOLll SALLY-POW
Revise footnote 15 to read as follows:

15.

Contrary to the repeated assertions in the

dissenting opinion, post, at 2, 7, 13, we do not adopt or
imply approval of a general rule of appellate review of
sentences.

Absent statutory authority, is not the role of

an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of
the trial court as to the appropriateness of a particular
sentence~

rather, in applying the Eighth Amendment the

appellate court decides only whether the sentence under
review is within constitutional limits.

In view of the

substantial deference that must be accorded legislatures
and sentencing courts a reviewing court rarely will be

2.

required to engage in extended analysis to determine that
a sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate.

lfp/ss 06/24/83

Rider A, p. 11 (Solem)

SOLll SALLY-POW
Revise footnote 15 to read as follows:

15.

Contrary to the repeated assertions in the

dissenting opinion, post, at 2, 7, 13, we do not adopt or
imply approval of a general rule of appellate review of
sentences.

Absent statutory authority, is not the role of

an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of
the trial court as to the appropriateness of a particular
sentence; rather, in applying the Eighth Amendment the
appellate court decides only whether the sentence under
review is within constitutional limits.

In view of the

substantial deference that must be accorded legislatures
and sentencing courts a reviewing court rarely will be

2.

required to engage in extended analysis to determine that
a sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate.

HN16R-MICHAL-POW 06/24/83

Helm: n. 16 rider

I propose revising footnote 16, on page 11, as follows:

16 The dissent concedes--as it must--that some sentences of imprisonment are so disproportionate that they are unconstitutional
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.

Post, at 8, n.

guild ~

3: cf. id., at 7, n. 2.
·
.9foffers no
t2.4- -h, ~ ~~ ~ ~"7-:<.
"
te ~e CQI.ute, te :r.:Jieegnizs the~ adrni ttedly rare cases.

1\

We

~

~Qfer

t:e

reiterate

the objective

See,

Coker

recognized.
(1977)

e.g.,

(plurality opinion) .

v.

factors
Georgia,

u.s.

370,

373-374 n.

2

telle, 445 U.S., at 275-276.
system and the need for

433

u.s.

cases have
584,

592

As the Court has indicated, no one

factor will be dispositive in a given case.
454

that our

(1982)

See Hutto v. Davis,

(per curiam):

Rummel v.

Es-

The inherent nature of our federal

individualized sentencing decisions re-

sult in a wide range of constitutional sentences.

Thus no single

criterion can identify when a sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it violates the Eighth Amendment.

See Jeffries

&

Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 Yale L.J. 1325, 1376-1377 (1979).

But a combination

of objective factors can make such analysis possible.

HN27.5R-MlCHAL-POW 06/24/83

I

Helm: new n. 27.5 rider

propose adding a new footnote near

the bottom of page 22 as

follows:

In fact, no life sentence has been commuted in over eight years,
App.

29, while parole--where authorized--has been granted regu-

larly during that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. 27 5

275 nuring these eight years, over 100 requests for commutation
have been denied.

See app.

22-26.

Although 22 life sentences

were commuted to terms of years between 1964 and 1975, see app.
29: but see n. 28, .infra, we do not have complete figures on the
number of requests that were denied during the same period.

~

~ ~

" In

.fobl-

only that at least 35 requests were denied.

any event,

w~l ;t'll't!

t!h!M:

past

practice of a decade ago--is not a

We

See app. 22-26.

~~~

practice--particularly

~~dicator

the

of future

performance when the relevant decision is left to the unfettered
discretion of each Governor.
of Helm's chance

for

Indeed, the best indication we have

commutation

already has been denied.

App. 26.

is

the

fact

that his request

HN30R-MICHAL-POW 06/24/83

Helm: new n. 30 rider

I propose adding a new footnote after the penultimate sentence,
on page 23, as follows:

We conclude that his
portionate

to

his

[Helm's]

crime,

sentence is significantly dispro-

and

is

therefore

prohibited

by

the

Eighth Amendment.30

30 contrary to the suggestion in the dissent, post, at 2-9, our
conclusion today is not inconsistent with Rummel v. Estelle.

The

Rummel Court recognized--as does the dissent, see post, at 8, n.
3--that

some sentences of

imprisonment are

that they violate the Eighth Amendment.
Since Rummel--like

the dissent

so disproportionate

445 U.S., at 274, n. 11.

today--offered no standards

determining when an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred,
is

controlling

only

in a

similar

facts are clearly distinguishable.

factual

situation.

Here

for
it
the

Whereas Rummel was eli9ible

for a reasonably early parole, Helm, at age 36, was sentenced to
life with no possibility of parole.

-%A-~fifs-ease7-He~m~s-epfmes

wePe-aee~~-as-sePfe~s-as-R~mme~~s~--see-s~~P~,-a~-~-37-aAe-~6-~+~

Hfs- seA~eAee 7 - fiewe¥eP 7 - fs- £ap -mef'e- se¥ePe- ~A aft- R~mme~~s~- See
supra, at 17-18, and 20-23.

~fi~s-R~mme~-fs-Ae~-eeft~Pe~~fft~~

~ .; ~ ~~~ ~~}./~ .
4S''+ tL-.s. a.--f 3-11.1-,

~

~~4~~~
~

&-{

~~ ~ /.~~~_,....-..u-~

~~%~~.~~~

HN12.5R-MICHAL-POW 06/24/83

Helm: new n.

~

rider

13

New footnote at the end of Part II.B, on page 9:

The dissent charges that "the Court blithely discards any concept of stare decisis."
the

contrary,

our

Post, at 1; cf. id., at 2, 8-9, 14.

decision

is

entirely

Court's prior cases--including Rummel v.
(1980) •

See n. ___, infra.

discard prior precedent.
establishes only a

consistent
Estelle,

445

with

u.s.

On
this
263

It is rather the dissent that would

Its assertion that the Eighth Amendment

narrow principle of proportionality is con-

trary to the entire line of cases cited in the text.

HN13R-MICHAL-POW 06/25/83

Helm: n.

'J!t

rider

1'1

Revised footnote 13, on pages 9-10:

13 According to Rummel v. Estelle, "one could argue without fear
of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for crimes
concededly classified and classifiable as felonies,

that is, as

punishable by significant terms of imprisonment in a state penitentiary,

the

length

of sentence actually

matter of legislative prerogative."
added}.

imposed

is purely a

445 U.S., at 274

(emphasis

The Court did not adopt the standard proposed, but mere-

ly recognized that the argument was possible.
the State--or the dissent,
here, we find it meritless.

see post,

To the extent that

at 4--makes this argument

HN15R-MICHAL-POW 06/24/83

Helm: n.

~

rider

/h

Revised footnote 15, on page 11:

15 contrary to the dissent's suggestions, post, at 2, 12, we do
not adopt or imply approval of a general rule of appellate review
of sentences.

Absent statutory authority, it is not the role of

an appellate court

to substitute

its

judgment

for

that of the

sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence;

rather,

in

applying

court decides only whether
constitutional limits.

the

Eighth

Amendment

the sentence under

the

appellate

review is within

In view of the substantial deference that

must be accorded legislatures and sentencing courts, a reviewing
court rarely will be required to engage in extended analysis to
determine that a sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate.

HN16R-MICHAL-POW 06/24/83

Helm: n.

lr

rider

If-

Revised footnote 16, on page 11:

16 The dissent concedes--as it must--that some sentences of imprisonment are so disproportionate that they are unconstitutional
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
3; cf.

id., at 7, n.

2.

Post, at 8, n.

It offers no guidance, however, as to

how courts are to judge these admittedly rare cases.

We reiter-

ate the objective factors that our cases have recognized.

u.s.

e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433
ion).

2

276.

(plurality opin-

As the Court has indicated, no one factor will be disposi-

tive in a given case.
n.

584, 592 (1977)

See,

(1982)

See Hutto v. Davis, 454

(per curiam); Rummel v. Estelle,

u.s.
445

370, 373-374

u.s.,

at 275-

The inherent nature of our federal system and the need for

individualized sentencing decisions
constitutional sentences.

result

in

a

wide

range of

Thus no single criterion can identify

when a sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it violates
the Eighth Amendment.
tions,

See Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presump-

and Burden of Proof

1325, 1376-1377

(1979).

in the Crimina! Law,

88 Yale L .J.

But a combination of objective factors

can make such analysis possible.

Helm: page 7 rider

H7R-MICHAL-POW 06/25/83

Additional language on page 7:

Indeed, one of the consistent themes of the era was that Americans had all

the

rights of English subjects.

Continental Congress 83 (Ford ed. 1904)
Great Britain, Oct. 21, 1774)

See,

e.g.,

1 J.

(Address to the People of

("we claim all the benefits secured

to the subject by the English constitution"); 1 American Archives
700

(4th series 1837)

Majesty's

subjects

in

(Georgia Resolutions, Aug. 10, 1774)
America

are

entitled

to

the

("his
same

rights, privileges, and immunities with their fellow-subjects in
Great Britain").
ensure

that

these

Thus our Bill of Rights was designed in part to
rights were preserved.

Although the Framers

may have intended the Eighth Amendment to go beyond the scope of
its English counterpart, their use of the language of the English
Bill of Rights is convincing proof that they intended to provide
at least the same protection

Helm: page 15 rider

Hl5R-MICHAL-POW 06/25/83

Additional language on page 15:

offers two good examples.

A State is constitutionally required

to provide an accused with a speedy trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
be

u.s.

determined

speedy
right

trial
in

the

213 (1967), but the delay that is permissible must
on

a

case-by-case

basis.

claim

necessitates

a

particular

context

Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522
we

identified some of

(1972)

of

11

[A] ny

functional
the

inquiry
analysis

case

II

(unanimous opinion).

the objective factors

into a
of

Barker

the
v.

In Barker,

that courts should

consider in determining whether a particular delay was excessive.
Id.,

at

530.

None of these factors

is

11

ei ther

a necessary or

sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right
of speedy trial.

Rather,

they are related factors and must be

considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. 11

Id.,

at

533.

Thus

the

type

of

inquiry

that

a

court

should conduct to determine if a given sentence is constitutionally disproportionate is similar to the type of inquiry required
by the Speedy Trial Clause.
The

HNlOR-MICHAL-POW 06/26/83

Helm: n. 10 rider

Revised footnote 10, on page 7:

The Eighth Amendment was based directly on Art.
Virginia Declaration of Rights
He,

in turn,

had

Bill of Rights.

I, §9 of the

(1776), authored by George Mason.

adopted verbatim the

language of the English

There can be no doubt that the Declaration of

Rights guaranteed at least the liberties and privileges of Englishmen.

See A.

Nevins, The American States During and After

the Revolution 146

(1924)

(Declaration of Rights "was a restate-

ment of English principles--the principles of Magna Charta
and the Revolution of

1688")~

A. Howard, The Road from Runnymede:

Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in America 205-207 (1968).
Mason himself had explained:
&

Privileges of Englishmen,

[these

rights]

from

in

the

same Degree,

as

if we had

our

Ancestors,

and,

We have

with

Leave, we will transmit them, unimpaired to our Posterity."
ter

to

As

"We claim Nothing but the Liberties

still continued among our Bretheren in Great Britain ••.•
received

..•

"the Committee of Merchants

in London"

Let-

(June 6, 1766),

reprinted in 1 The Papers of George Mason 71 (Rutland ed.
cf. the Fairfax County Resolves (1774)

God's

1970)~

(colonists entitled to all

"Privileges, Immunities and Advantages" of the English Constitution), reprinted in 1 The Papers of George Mason 201.

HN13R-MICHAL-POW 06/25/83

Helm: new n. 13 rider

New footnote 13, on page 9:

The dissent charges that "the Court blithely discards any concept of stare decisis."
the

contrary,

Court's prior
(1980) .

our

Post, at 1; cf. id., at 2, 8-9, 14.

decision

is

entirely

cases--including Rummel v.

See n.

32, infra.

discard prior precedent.

consistent
Estelle,

with

445 U.S.

On
this
263

It is rather the dissent that would

Its assertion that the Eighth Amendment

establishes only a narrow principle of proportionality is contrary to the entire line of cases cited in the text.

HN14R-MICHAL-POW 06/25/83

Helm: new n. 14 rider

new footnote 14, on pages 9-10:

According to Rummel v. Estelle,

"one could argue without fear

of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for crimes
concededly classified and classifiable as felonies,

that is, as

punishable by significant terms of imprisonment in a state penitentiary,

the

length

of sentence actually

matter of legislative prerogative."
added).

imposed

is purely a

445 U.S., at 274

(emphasis

The Court did not adopt the standard proposed, but mere-

ly recognized that the argument was possible.
the State--or the dissent,
here, we find it meritless.

see post,

To the extent that

at 4--makes this argument

HN16R-MICHAL-POW 06/25/83

Helm: new n. 16 rider

new footnote 16, on page 11:

Contrary to the dissent's suggestions, post,

at 2, 12, we do

not adopt or imply approval of a general rule of appellate review
of sentences.

Absent statutory authority, it is not the role of

an appellate court

to substitute

its

judgment

for

that of the

sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence;

rather,

in

applying

court decides only whether
constitutional limits.

the Eighth Amendment
the sentence under

the

appellate

review is within

In view of the substantial deference that

must be accorded legislatures and sentencing courts, a reviewing
court rarely will be required to engage in extended analysis to
determine that a sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate.

HN17R-MICHAL-POW 06/25/83

Helm: new n. 17 rider

new footnote 17, on page 11:

The dissent concedes--as

it must--that some sentences of

im-

prisonment are so disproportionate that they are unconstitutional
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.

3: cf.

id., at 7, n.

2.

Post, at 8, n.

It offers no guidance, however, as to

how courts are to judge these admittedly rare cases.

We reiter-

ate the objective factors that our cases have recognized.
e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433
ion).

2

276.

584, 592 (1977)

(plurality opin-

As the Court has indicated, no one factor will be disposi-

tive in a given case.
n.

u.s.

See,

(1982)

See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 373-374

(per curiam): Rummel v. Estelle,

445 U.S., at 275-

The inherent nature of our federal system and the need for

individualized

sentencing decisions

constitutional sentences.

result

in

a

wide

range

of

Thus no single criterion can identify

when a sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it violates
the Eighth Amendment.

See Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presump-

tions,

Proof

and

Burden of

1325, 1376-13 77

(1979) .

in the Criminal Law,

88 Yale L. J.

But a combination of objective factors

can make such analysis possible.

HN29R-MICHAL-POW 06/26/83

Helm: new n. 29 rider

New footnote 29, on page 22:

The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Dakota
occurred in 1975.

App.

29.

During the eight years since then,

over 100 requests for commutation have been denied.
22-26.
years

Although

22

life

between 1964 and

sentences

197 5,

see

were
id. ,

See id., at

commuted

at

29:

to

but

terms

see

n.

of
30,

infra, we do not have complete figures on the number of requests
that were denied during the same period.
at least 35 requests were denied.
past

practice

decade

in

ago--is

this

not

a

We are told only that

See app. 22-26.

respect--particularly
reliable

indicator

of

the

In any event,
practice of

future

a

performance

when the relevant decision is left to the unfettered discretion
of each Governor.

Indeed, the best indication we have of Helm's

chance for commutation is the fact that his request already has
been denied.

Id., at 26.

HN30R-MICHAL-POW 06/25/83

Helm: new n. 30 rider

New footnote 30, on page 22:

The record indicates that the prisoner whose life sentence was
commuted in 1975, see n.
App. 29.

29, supra, still has not been paroled.

HN32R-MICHAL-POW 06/25/83

Helm: new n. 32 rider

New footnote 32, on page 23:

Contrary to the suggestion in the dissent, post, at 2-9, our
conclusion today is not inconsistent with Rummel v. Estelle.

The

Rummel Court recognized--as does the dissent, see post, at 8, n.
3--that

some sentences of

imprisonment are

that they violate the Eighth Amendment.

so disproportionate

445 U.S., at 274, n. 11.

Indeed, Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S., at 374, and n. 3, makes clear
that Rummel should not be read to foreclose proportionality review of sentences of imprisonment.
tionality
Rummel

challenge

Court--like

to

a

Rummel did reject a propor-

particular

the dissent

sentence.

But

since

the

today--offered no standards

for

determining when an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred,
is

controlling

facts

only

in a

similar

factual

are clearly distinguishable.

situation.

Here

it
the

Whereas Rummel was eligible

for a reasonably early parole, Helm, at age 36, was sentenced to
life with no possibility of parole.

See supra, at _ _ _ , and
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a sev~

enth nonviolent felony.

I

By 1975 the State of Sou

])o~0~&
e~ ~~. ~~ . ~

~~~~~o~~

Dakota had convicted

respond- ~~ ·

~

(/\

In 1964, 1966, and "1}- f~\
~ .
1969 Helm was convicted of --t hird-degree burglary • 1
In 1972 he

ent Jerry Helm of six ( nonviol~ felonies.

r

(r~-k

was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2

1 In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined
sections of the South Dakota criminal code:

in

at

In 1973

least

two

"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the
nighttime with intent to commit a crime but under such
circumstances as do not constitute burglary in the
first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third degree."
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-32-8 (1967) (repealed
1976).
"A person breaking or entering at any time any building within the curtilage of a dwelling house but not
forming a part thereof, or any building or part of any
building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as
defined in §32-14-1, or any structure or erection in
which any property is kept, with intent to commit larceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the third
degree."
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-32-9 (1967) (repealed 1976) •
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essentially the same. See S.D. Code §13.3703 (1939 ed., supp. 1960);
1965 S.D. Laws, ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by
"imprisonment in the state penitentiary for any term not exceeding fifteen years." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-32-10 (1967) (previously codified at S.D. Code §13.3705 (3)
(1939))
(repealed
1976) •
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages.

~~·I"
h,r~ tJ"

,.,-trttt •
p~to"i'~)
' ..
vl~~tf
t>-1AM~t
,f(Jpd 'f1(
~.~Jtsr-·T
l#ut\f (

~t

,wx

tM'- h.R

vroiiH-t
l~

,...,

IP '"'l?t\
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he was convicted of grand larceny. 3

And in 1975 he was convicted

of third-offense driving while intoxicated. 4

The record contains

no details about the circumstances of any of these offenses, ex-

2 In 1972 the relevant statute provided:
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any
false token or writing, or other false pretense,
obtains from any person any money or property • • • is
punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary
not exceeding three years or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding three
times the value of the money or property so obtained,
or by both such fine and imprisonment."
S.D. Comp.
Laws Ann. §22-41-4 (1967) (repealed 1976).
3 In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of
personal property accomplished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive another thereof." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-37-1
(1967) (repealed 1976).
Grand larceny and petit larceny were
distinguished as follows:
"Grand larceny
following cases:

is

larceny committed

in

any of

the

(1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding
fifty dollars:
(2) When such property, although not of a value exceeding fifty dollars, is taken from the person of another:

~ ~ (3) When such property is livestock.

~ ~t~arceny
dJZ-~ ~

~:L

L;

r .,

v.,

v>o

in other cases is petit larceny."
Laws Ann. §22-37-2 (1967) (repealed 1976).

S.D. Comp.

Grand larceny was then punishable by "imprisonment in the state
penitentiary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in the
county jail not exceeding one year."
37-3 (1967) (repealed 1976) •

S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-

4A third offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol is a felony in South Dakota.
S.D. Codified Laws §32-23-4
(1976).
See 1973 S.D. Laws, ch. 195, §7 (enacting version of
§32-23-4 in force in 1975).

page 3.
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cept that they were all nonviolent, none was a crime against a
person, and alcohol was a contributing factor in each case.
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a "no account"
check for $100. 5

The only details we have of the crime are those

given by Helm to the state trial court:
"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that
day, was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid City
with more money than I had when I started.
I knew I'd
done something I didn't know exactly what.
If I would
have known this, I would have picked the check up.
I
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several
places.'"
State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 501 (S.D.
1980) (Henderson, J., d1ssenting) (quoting Helm).
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty.
Ordinarily
account"

the

check would

have

state penitentiary and
Codified

Laws

(Supp. 1982)).

maximum

a

§22-6-1 (6)

punishment

been five
five

years

for

imprisonment

thousand dollar

(1979)

(now

uttering

codified

fine.
at

a

"no

in the

See S.D.
§22-6-1 (7)

As a result of his criminal record, however, Helm

was subject to South Dakota's recidivist statute:
"When a defendant has been convicted of at least three
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal
felony, the sentence-tor the principal felony shall be
enhanced to the sentence for a Class 1 felony."
S.D.
Codified Laws §22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981).
5The governing statute provides, in relevant part:
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another for present consideration with
intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a financial
institution knowing at the time of such passing that he
or his principal does not have an account with such
financial institution, is guilty of a Class 5 felony."
S.D. Codified Laws §22-41-1.2 (1979).

second draft: Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492
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-sti'
'
~·~

f':P {

j-t"

~'t

rt"'''~
The maximum penalty for a •class 1 felony• e

ife imprisonment

in

thousand

the

fine. 6

state

penitentiary

S.D. Comp. Laws Ann.

(now codified at S.D.
Moreover,

and

a

twenty-five

§22-6-1 (2)

Codified Laws

(1967 ed., supp.

S22-6-l (3)

South Dakota law explicitly provides

unavailable:

"A person sentenced

6when Helm was sentenced in
classified felonies as follows:

to life

April

dollar

(Supp.
that

South

1982)).

parole

imprisonment

1979,

1978)

is

is

not

Dakota

law

"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are
divided into the following seven classes which are distinguished from each other by the respective maximum
penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized
upon conviction:
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state
penitentiary. A lesser sentence may not be given for a Class A felony;
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state
penitentiary.
In addition, a fine of twentyfive thousand dollars may be imposed;
( 3) Class 2 felony: twenty-£ i ve years imprisonment
in the state penitentiary.
In addition, a fine
of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed;
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in
the state penitentiary.
In addition, a fine of
fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed;
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the
state penitentiary.
In addition, a fine of ten
thousand dollars may be imposed;
( 6) Class 5 felony: five years imprisonment in the
state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of five
thousand dollars may be imposed; and
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the
state penitentiary or a fine of two thousand
dollars, or both.
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sentences for habitual criminals ••••
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by
law, every offense declared to be a felony and not otherwise classified is a Class 6 felony."
S.D. Comp.
Laws Ann. §22-6-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979
and 1980).

~

- ,(tL&'f

I, "'

I

~{ ~ \
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.

<'(~~
.
~ ' .,,!tt1}

r
/LJ(~

eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles."
Codified Laws §24-15-4
pardon

prisoners,

or

(1979}.

S.D.

The Governor 1 is authorized to

to commute

their

sentences,

S.D.

Const.,

Art. IV, §3, but no other relief from sentence is available even
to a rehabilitated

risoner.

Immediately

after

accepting

Helm's

guilty

South Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life
under §22-7-8.

plea,

the

imprisonment

The court explained:

"'I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly proven that you're an habitual criminal and the
record would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation
and that the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up
for the rest of your natural life, so you won't have
further victims of your crimes, just be coming back
before Courts.
You' 11 have plenty of time to think
this one over.'"
State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d, at 500
(Henderson,
J.,
d1ssenting}
(quoting S.D. Circuit
Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Pennington County
(Parker, J.}} •
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, affirmed the
sentence

despite

Amendment.

Helm's

argument

that

it

violated

the

Eighth

State v. Helm, supra.

After Helm had served two years in the state penitentiary, he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a fixed
term of years.

Such a commutation would have had the effect of

making Helm eligible

to

be

considered

served three-fourths of his new sentence.

for

parole when he

had

See S.D. Codified Laws

7The board of pardons and paroles is authorized to make recommendations to the Governor, S.D. Codified Laws §24-14-1 (1979}:
§24-14-5: S.D. Executive Order 82-04 (Apr. 12, 1982) , but the
Governor is not bound by the recommendation, §24-14-5.

page 6.
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S24-15-5 (3)
1981.

(1979).

The Governor denied Helm's rE!quest in May

App. 26.
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the

~
~

..._/

\,

\

District Court for the District of South Dakota.

~A.
Helm

.........

argued, among other things, that his sentence constituted cruel
and

unusual

ments.
was

under

the Eighth

and Fourteenth Amend-

Although the District Court recognized that the sentence

harsh,

Rummel

punishment

v.

it

concluded

Estelle,

445

that
u.S.

this
263

Court's
(1980) ,

recent decision

was

dispositive.

in
It

therefore denied the writ.
The--un ited States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-

'j

/

cuit reversed.

684 F.2d 582 (1982).

The Court of Appeals noted

that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable.
life

without

parole

was

stJ::

qualitatively

Helm's sentence of

different

from

Rummel's J.s

~~

.rl~o

life sentence with the prospect of parole because South Dakota
has

rejected

system.
fenses,

rehabilitation

as a goal of

the criminal

justice

The Court of Appeals examined the nature of Helm's ofthe nature of his

sentence,

and

the sentence he could

have received in other States for the same offense.

It conclud-

ed, on the basis of this examination, that Helm's sentence was
"grossly disproportionate
F.2d, at 587.

to

the

nature of

684

It therefore directed the District Court to issue

the writ unless the State resentenced Helm.
{

the offense."

Ibid.

Recognizing the important Eighth Amendment question pre-

sented

~his

We now affirm.

case, we granted certiorari.

459 u.s.

(1982).
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II
The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted."
baric punishments,

The final clause prohibits not only bar-

but also sentences that are disproportionate

to the crime committed.

A

The principle that a punishment should be proportionate
to the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-

CJ~
;jll.V

~urisprudence.8

In

1215,~~~~am&±~,

three chapters of Mag-

~~v-

na Carta were devoted to the rule that "amercements" 9 may not be

~~

excessive. 10

Cf.A

v

Or'

~~

And the principle was repeated and extended in the

First Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw. I, ch. 6 (1275).

[if\'-\ f\
t.,
I 'l.)v
I
tl,

not hollow guarantees,

for

the

invalidate disproportionate punishments.

n~ue ~t'6

t1'l f,..
~~teA of
~~~~

is

9 An amercement ~ similar
'
ev ~ most common criminal sanction
,r l (1-, 2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland,
~

prVtl

See, e.g., Le Gras v.

8 The principle is by no means original to the common law.
It
was a recognized limitation on punishments in biblical times.
See Exodus 21:23-25; Leviticus 24:19-20; Deuteronomy 19:19, 21.

c,&~ri"'

l-z.:

relied on them to

~~eJ

wt

or 'D-'

royal courts

These were

~ (2d

ll\

~.

to a modern-day fine.
It was the
in thirteenth century England. See
The History of English Law 513-515

ed. 1909).

V..J! lOchapter 20 declared that "[a] freeman shall not be amerced
r for a small fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a

\'lJ'? great crime according to the heinousness of it." See 1 S.D. Codified Laws, p. 4 (1978) (translation of Magna Carta). According
to Maitland, "there was no clause in Magna Carta more grateful to
the mass of the people •••• " F. Maitland, Pleas of the Crown for
the County of Gloucester xxxiv (1884).
Chapter 21 granted the
same rights to the nobility, and chapter 22 granted the same
rights to the clergy.
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Bailiff of Bishop of Winchester,

Y .B. Mich.

10 Edw.

(C.P. 1316), reprinted in 52 Selden Society 3 (1934).

II,

pl.

4

When pris-

on sentences became the normal criminal sanctions, the common law
recognized
Hodges

that

v.

these,

Hum kin,

(K.B. 1615)

too,

2 Bulst.

(Croke, J.)

must

be

139,

140,

See,

proportional.
80 Eng.

Rep.

e.g. ,

1015,

1016

("imprisonment ought always to be accord-

ing to the quality of the offence").
The English Bill of

Rights

repeated

the

principle

of

proportionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth
Amendment:
sive

"excessive Baile ought not to be required nor exces-

Fines

inflicted."

imposed

nor

cruel!

and

unusual!

1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689).

Punishments

Although the pre-

cise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incorporated "the longstanding principle of English law that the punishment ••• should not be, by reason of its excessive length or severity,

greatly

disproportionate

to

the

offense

charged."

R.

Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 (1959): see 4 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries *16-19

(1769): see also id., at *16-17 (in condemn-

ing "punishments of unreasonable severity," uses "cruel" to mean
severe or excessive).

~~

~4r'Q
~

J.

of Rights was adopted, the House of Lords declared that a "fine
of thirty thousand pounds, imposed by the court of King's Bench
upon

the

earl

h1 \) ·'\
v'b ~~""'
magna charta,

of Devon,

law of the land."

c_y ~.r

(1689) •

·\4 ~,...,t'\"'

When

was excessive and exorbitant,

the common right of

~J~

_,/ r-i·

Indeed, barely three months after the Bill

the

against

the subject, and against the

Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Trials 133, 136

Framers of

the Eighth Amendment

adopted

the
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language of the English Bill of Rights, 11 they also adopted the
English principle of proportionality.

the rights they had

The people were guaranteed

pos~essed ~En~lish

The constitutional principle of proportionality has been
recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 12
the leading case of Weems v. United States, 217

u.s.

In

349 (1910},

the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public document
and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form of impris-

r-+ l- . ~

in chains and permanent civil

f J$/l '1 c.-

( , 9' 'Z ~.~

disabilities. -- The Court noted "that it is a precept of justice
A

that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to
offense,"

id., at 367, and held that the sentence violated the

Eighth Amendment.

The Court endorsed the principle of propor-

tionality as a constitutional standard, see, e.g., id., at 372-

11This language had earlier been incorporated in the Virginia
Declaration of Rights, Art. I, §9.
12 In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 u.s. 323 (1892}, the defendant had
been conv1cted of 307 counts of "selling intoxicating liquor
without authority," and sentenced to a term of over 54 years.
The majority did not reach O'Neil's contention that this sentence
was unconstitutional, for he did not include the point in his
assignment of errors or in his brief. Id., at 331. Furthermore,
the majority noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not apply to
the States." Id., at 332. Accordingly the Court dismissed the
writ of error for want of a federal question. Id., at 336-337.
The dissent, however, reached the Eighth Amendment question, ob~(~~ serving that it "is directed ••• against all punishments which by
J
4__ ~ their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to
~ Jo 1 the offences charged."
Id., at 339-340 (Field, J., dissenting).

c;-b ~~1'"1W" CnJ .

~
~ ~"''ll
wl!..?
'tT
Dffi'
..L.

(o./\tN\l-4-t~~

l

4

(\~

j

~ ~.

~--<>\ ~
t-:~ ..... ~U
Nl,

B

included hard labor

~~

A-rtc- ~~ ~:t
,<.---~ .f-1,.__~

~ .,j- ~

;/'~ ~

subjects--including the

right to be free from excessive punishments.

onment that

•

~0,
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373, and determined that the sentence before it was "cruel in its
excess of imprisonment," id., at 377.
The Court
criminal
(1962) • 13
crime of

sentence

next
in

applied
Robinson

the

principle

v.

California,

A 90-day sentence was found
being

"addicted to the

to

invalidate
370

u.s.

660

to be excessive for

use of narcotics."

a

the

The Court

explained that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual."
667.

Id., at

Thus there was no question of an inherently barbaric pun-

ishment.

"But the question cannot be considered in the abstract.

Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment
for the 'crime' of having a common cold."
Most

recently,

Ibid.

the Court has applied the principle of

proportionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain
circumstances.

Enmund

penalty excessive for

v.

Florida,

458

(1982)

(death

felony murder when defendant did not take

life, attempt to take life, or intend

-rz --t'take
.:--

force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433
rali ty opinion)

u.s.

~o

u.s.

(fi- ~

life or that lethal

584, 592 (1977)

(plu-

("sentence of death is grossly disproportionate

and excessive punishment

for

the crime of

rape");

id.,

at 601

(POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part)

("ordinarily death is disproportionate punishment for

crime of raping an adult woman").

the

And the Court has continued to

13Members of the Court continued to recognize the principle of
proportionality in the meantime. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356
u.s. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion); id., at 111 (BRENNAN,
J., concurring); id., at 125-126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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recognize that the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate punishments, even when it has not been necessary to rely
on the proscription.
685
v.

(1978) ;

See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 u.s.

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.

Georgia,

428

u.s.

153,

171-172

651, 667

(1976)

678,

(1977) ; Gregg

(opinion of Stewart,

POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374,
and n.

3

(1982)

(per curiam) . (recognizing that some prison sen-

tences may be constitutionally disproportionate); . Rummel v. Estelle, 445 u.s., at 274, n. 11 (same).

c
There
general

is

no

basis

principle

of

proportionality does

prison sentences. 14
no

exception

for

Eighth Amendment

for

the State's

assertion

not

apply

that
to

the

felony

The constitutional language itself suggests
imprisonment.

imposes

We

have

recognized

that

the

"parallel limitations" on bail, fines,

14 According to Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.s. 263 (1980), "one
could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of th1s
Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as
felonies ••• the length of sentence actually imposed is purely a
matter of legislative prerogative."
Id., at 274
(emphasis
added). The Court did not adopt the standard proposed, but merely recognized that the argument was possible.
To the extent that the State seeks to make this argument here,
we reject it. Although courts should be reluctant to invalidate
legislative judgments, we have a constitutional duty to ensure
that legislative judgments are consistent with the Eighth Amendment. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 u.s.
,
(1982).
The class of "crimes concededly classifieaiand classifiable as
felonies" is of little assistance as an Eighth Amendment standard. The definition of a felony is invariably based on its legal
consequences.
See, e.g., 18 u.s.c. Sl(l).
The effect of this
standard would be absurd: when a State concededly may punish a
crime by imprisonment for a year, it could punish the crime by
life imprisonment without possibility of parole.

page 12.
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and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430
the text

u.s.,

at 664, and

is explicit that bail and fines may not be excessive.

It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser punishment of a fine
and the greater punishment of death were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the intermediate punishment of imprisonment were not.
exception.

There is also no historical support for such an

The common-law principle incorporated into the Eighth

Amendment clearly applied to prison terms.
supra.

See Hodges v. Humkin,

And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that pris-

on sentences are subject to proportionality analysis.
Weems,

217

u.s.,

at 377: cf. Hutto v. Finney,

("Confinement in a prison

437

See, e.g.,

u.s.,

at 685

is a form of punishment subject to

scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards").
When we
capital cases,

have applied

we

the proportionality principle

have drawn no distinction h

in

h imprisonment.

See Gregg v. Georgia, 428

u.s.,

ELL,

It is true that the "penalty of death

and STEVENS, JJ.) •

at 176 (opinion of Stewart, POW-

differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind."

Furman v. Georgia, 408

(Stewart, J., concurring).

u.s.

238, 306

(1972)

As a result, "our decisions [in] cap-

ital cases are of limited assistance in deciding the consti tutionality of

the

Estelle,

u.s.,

445

"[o] utside

punishment"
at

272.

in a
All

noncapital case.

this means,

the context of capital punishment,

however,

v.

is that,

successful chal-

lenges to the proportionality of particular sentences
exceedingly rare," 15 ibid.

Rummel

[will be 1

(emphasis added): see Hutto v. Davis,

Footnote(s) 15 will appear on following pages.

f
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454

u.s.,

at 374.
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It does not mean that proportionality analysis

is entirely inapplicable in noncapital cases.
In sum, we hold that a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted.
As a matter of theory, therefore, every sentence is subject to
challenge

on

constitutional

grounds.

Reviewing

courts

should

grant considerable deference to the broad authority that legislatures possess in determining the types and limits of punishments
crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts posin sentencing convicted criminals.

Thus in most cases it

not require extended analysis to determine that a sentence
not constitutionally disproportionate.
States, 240

~~~~~~~~

u.s.

391, 394

(1916)

See, e.g., Badders v.
(seven concurrent five-

and $7,000 fine for seven counts of mail fraud).
is per se constitutional.
lnson v. California, 370

u.s.,

But

As the Court noted in Rob-

at 667, a single day in prison may

be unconstitutional in some circumstances.

III
A

In

reviewing

sentences

under

the

Eighth

Amendment,

courts should be guided by objective factors that our cases have
recognized.

First, we look to the gravity of the offense and the

15In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to
be excessive for felony murder in the circumstances of that case.
But clearly no sentence short of death would be unconstitutional
for Enmund's crime.
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harshness of the penalty.

In Enmund, for example, the Court ex-

amined the circumstances of the defendant's crime in great detail.

458

seriousness
crimes,

u.s.,

at

of

the

such

as

In Coker the Court considered the
crime
murder.

opinion);

id., at 603

part

dissenting

and

of

rape,

and

u.s.,

433

.. 4

~

~~

at

it

597-598

to

other

(plurality

(POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment in
in

In

part).

Robinson

placed on the nature of the "crime."

~~ tinheweems,

compared

the

u.s.,

370

emphasis

at 666-667.

was
And

the Court's opinion commented in two separate places on

pettiness of

the offense.

217

u.s.,

at 363 and

365.

Of

course, a court must consider the severity of the penalty in de-

~iding

~u.s.,

whether

it

is disproportionate.

See,

at 598 (plurality opinion); Weems, 217

~~~~

e.g .. Coker,

u.s.,

433

at 366-367.

Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences im-

~

posed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction.

-f>

ous crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious

If more seri-

.H ·

~ '(o~
~~

~ay be excessive.

vJIA0lt. ~
tA ("" -- .{

ap \(

penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at issue

other

Thus in Enmund the Court noted that all of the

felony murderers on death row in Florida were more culpable

{~ than the petitioner there.

458 U.S.,

at

•

The Weems Court

fh'~ f).il'
~p ~ ,~,
identified an impressive list of more serious crimes that were

~t ·f~ ~ubject
. .,nt• ~ rt ·

~"~

~'l\
~

to less serious penalties.

6'(1;\"-

Third,

courts may

find

217

u.s.,

at 380-381 •

it useful to compare the sen-

.
tences imposed for commission of the same crime in other JUrisdictions.

In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review of

capital punishment

statutes

and determined

third of American

jurisdictions would ever

that

"only about

permit

a

a

defendant
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[such

as

Enmund]

to

be

sentenced

to die."

458

u.s.,

at

Even in those jurisdictions, however, the death penalty was almost
~1

Jf

~t -h

never

imposed

under

similar

circumstances.

Id.,

at

The Court's review of foreign law also supported its conclusion.
Id.,

at __,

n.

22.

The analysis in Coker was essentially the

~---same. 43 3 U.S • , at 59 3-5 9 7 • And in Weems the Court relied on
~·~\, the fact that, under federal law, a similar crime was punishable
~...~~ by only two year's imprisonment and a fine. 217 u.s., at 380.

,..\'~
/

Cf. TroE v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-103 (1958)

(plurality opin-

ion).
In

sum,

a

court's

proportionality

analysis

under

the

Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including

(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the pen-

al ty;

( i i)

the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same

jurisdiction; and

(iii)

the sentences imposed for commission of

the same crime in other jurisdictions.

B

Application

of

these

factors

assumes

that

courts

are

competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative scale.

In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and

courts traditionally have made these judgments--just as legislatures must make them in the first instance.

Comparisons can be

made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or
society, and the culpability of the offender.

Thus in Enmund the

Court determined that the petitioner's conduct was not so serious
as

his

accomplices'

conduct.

Indeed,

there

are

widely

shared

second draft: Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492

views

as

to

the

relative

page 16.

seriousness

of

crimes.

See

Rossi,

Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure

and

(1974).

Individual

Differences,

39

Am.

Soc.

Rev.

224,

237

For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent

crimes are less serious
threat of violence.

than crimes marked

by violence or the

Cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 16

(State recognizes

that law protects people before property).
There are other widely held principles that courts may
apply in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the victim or
society.

The absolute magnitude of the crime may be relevant.

Stealing a million dollars is viewed as more serious than stealing

a

hundred dollars--a point

recognized

guishing petty theft from grand theft.
Laws S22-30A-17

(Supp. 1982).

in statutes

distin-

See, e.g., S.D. Codified

Other things being equal, murder-

ing two people is more serious than murdering one.
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 279, S69 (a) (8)

See, e.g.,

(West Supp. 1982).

Few

would dispute that a lesser included offense should not be punished more severely than the greater offense.

Thus a court is

justified in viewing assault with intent to murder as more serious than simple assault.

See Roberts v. Collins, 544 F.2d 168,

169-170

(CA4

curiam),

cert.

(1977).

Cf. Dembowski v.

State,

251 Ind.

1976)

815, 817 (1968)

(per

denied,

430

(armed robbery more serious than robbery)1 Cannon

serious than assault with

~

intent to commit

rape).

(rape more
It is also

widely recognized that attempts are less serious than completed
crimes.

See, e.g., S.D. Codified Laws §22-4-1 (1979)1 4 Black-

at~}_/ : ;y"7 .~ ~.
(lr

973

250, 252, 240 N.E. 2d

v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 632, 281 P.2d 233, 235 (1955)

~

u.s.

-rv~ -/u~~
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stone *15.

Similarly, an accessory after the fact should not be

subject to a higher penalty than the principal.

u.s.c.

See, e.g., 18

§3.
Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are

again clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply.
Enmund the Court . looked at

kill ~ determin~at
458

u.s.,

at

the petitioner's lack of intent to

he was less culpable than his accomplices.

Most would agree

less serious than intentional conduct.
ple,

ranks

In

criminal acts

that neglig-ent conduct is
South Dakota, for exam-

in ascending order of seriousness as

follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing acts, intentional
acts,

and

malicious

(Supp. 1982).

acts.

S.D.

Codified

Laws

§22-1-2 (1) (f)

A court is also entitled to look at a defendant's

motive in committing a crime.

As Blackstone observed, "theft, in

case of hunger, is far more worthy of compassion, than when committed through avarice, or to supply one in luxurious excesses."
4 Blackstone *15; cf.
(1974)

In re Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073

(furnishing heroin to fellow addict going through with-

drawal not so serious as sale for profit).
is more serious when

it

Similarly, a murder

is committed pursuant to a contract.

See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 279, §69 (a) (5)

(West Supp.

1982).
This list is by no means exhaustive.

It simply illus-

trates that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing
the severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the
difficulties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions between similar crimes.
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c
Application of the factors that we identify also assumes
that courts are able to compare different sentences.
sumption, too, is justified.

This as-

The easiest comparison, of course,

is between capital punishment and noncapital punishments, for the
death penalty is different from other punishments in kind rather
than degree. 1 6

For sentences of imprisonment, the problem is not

so much one of ordering, but one of line-drawing.

It is clear

that a 25-year sentence generally is more severe than a 15-year
sentence, 17 but in most cases it would be more difficult to decide whether the former violates the Eighth Amendment while the
latter does not.

Decisions of this kind, although troubling, are

not unique to this area.

The courts are constantly called upon

to draw similar lines in a variety of contexts.
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is an example.
In Williams v.

Florida, 399 u.s.

78

(1970), the Court upheld a

criminal conviction returned by a unanimous 6-member jury, and in
Apodaca v.

Oregon,

406 u.s.

404

(1972), we upheld a conviction

returned by ten members of a 12-member jury.
~,

435 U.s.

223

(1978) , however, we reversed a conviction re-

turned by a unanimous 5-member jury.
admit[ted]

In Ballew v. Geor-

JUSTICE BLACKMON "readily

that we d[id] not pretend to discern a clear line be-

16 There is also a clear line between sentences of imprisonment
and
sentences
involving
no
deprivation
of
liberty.
See
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 u.s. 25 (1972).
17 The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison,
depending upon the time and conditions of its availability.
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tween six members and five."
J.).
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Id., at 239

(opinion of BLACKMUN,

He nevertheless found a difference between them of "consti-

tutional significance."

Ibid.~

concurring in the judgment).
Louisiana, 441

u.s.

cf. id., at 245-246

(POWELL, J.,

And the following Term, in Burch v.

130 (1979), we reversed a conviction returned

by five members of a 6-member jury:
"[W)e do not pretend the ability to discern a priori a
bright line below which the number of jurors participating in the trial or in the verdict would not permit
the jury to function in the manner required by our prior cases.
But ••• it is inevitable that lines must be
drawn somewhere if the substance of the jury trial
right is to be preserved."
Id., at 137 (citations
omitted).
---

drawing

Another

Sixth

function

of

the

Amendment
judiciary,

case

u.s.

right

66

to

months

is

a

the

line-

and offers guidance on the

method by which some lines may be drawn.
399

illustrates

In Baldwin v. New York,

(1970), the Court determined that a defendant has a
jury

trial

authorized."

"where
Id.,

imprisonment
at

69

for

(plurality

more

than

six

opinion).

In

choosing the 6-month standard, the plurality relied almost exclusively on the fact that only New York City denied the right to a
jury trial for an offense punishable by more than six months.
JUSTICE WHITE explained:
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us
with the only objective criterion by which a line could
ever be drawn--on the basis of the possible penalty
alone--between offenses that are and that are not regarded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury."
Id., at 72-73.

As

page 20.
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In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly may
distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another.

It also

supports our holding that courts should look to the practices in
other

jurisdictions

in

deciding

where

lines

between

sentences

should be drawn.

IV
It remains to apply the analytical framework established
by our prior decisions to the case before us.

We first consider

the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
argument

that

the

possibility of

We then consider the State's
commutation

is

sufficient

to

save an otherwise unconstitutional sentence.

A

...--

P,~

~~tperson

Helm's

crime

was

"one of

the most passive

felonies

a

could commit.•

State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d, at 501 (Bender-

~~ son, J., dissenting).

It involved neither violence nor threat of

~ · violence

to any person.

~ount" check was not
~ ~tflr~'A o'ne hundred dollars
tt

v-·

The $100 face value of Helm • s •no ac-

trivial, but neither was it a large amount.
was less than half the amount South Dakota

required for a felonious theft. 1 8

It is easy to see why such a

18 If Helm had been convicted simply of taking $100 from a cash
register, S.D. Codified Laws §22-30A-l (1979), or defrauding
someone of $100, §22-30A-3, or obtaining $100 through extortion,
§22-30A-4(1), or blackmail, S22-30A-4(3), or using a false credit
card to obtain $100, S22-30A-8.1, or embezzling $100, S22-30A-10,
he would not be in prison today.
All of these offenses would
Footnote continued on next page.
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crime is viewed by society as among the less serious offenses.
See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev., at 229.
Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a
"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender • 19
And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more severely
than it punishes a first offender.

Helm's status, however, can-

not be considered in the abstract.

His prior offenses, although

classified as felonies, were all relatively minor. 20
nonviolent and none was a crime against a person.

All were

As the State

conceded at oral argument, the three third-degree burglary convictions could have been the result of stealing three loaves of

f

brea •

.r- ~ ~ ~ li::~· c.T+~ ~ a._fS.......::.~ R~·~~)
Tr. of Oral Arg. 16.

There was also no minimum amount in

the statute against obtaining money under false pretenses.
n. 2, supra.

See

Helm's "grand larceny" may have been no more than

have been petty theft, a misdemeanor. S22-30A-17 (amended 1982).
Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 check against insufficient
funds, rather than a nonexistent account, he would have been
guilty of a misdemeanor.
§§22-41-1.
Under South Dakota law
here is no distinction between writing a "no account" check for
large sum and writing a "no account" check for a small sum.
22-41-1.2.
19we must focus on the principal felony--the felony that triggers the life sentence--since Helm already has paid the penalty
for each of his prior offenses. But we recognize that Helm's
prior convictions are relevant to the sentencing decision.
20 Helm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a
professional criminal. The record indicates an addiction to alcohol, and a consequent difficulty in holding a job. His record
involves no instance of violence of any kind. Incarcerating him
for life without possibility of parole is unlikely to advance any
of the goals of our criminal justice system in any substantial
way. Neither Helm nor the State will have any incentive to pursue clearly needed treatment for his alcohol problem.

~
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the theft of a chicken.

See n.

3, supra.

On its face, Helm's

most serious crime was a felony . case of driving while intoxicated,

but he

served barely nine months for

Oral Arg. 17.

that offense, Tr. of

Such a short sentence 21 suggests that the particu-

lar circumstances of Helm's conduct were not considered to be so
serious by the South Dakota authorities.
Helm's

present

possibility of parole. 22

sentence

is

life

imprisonment

without

Barring executive clemency, see infra,

at ___, Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state penitentiary.

This sentence is far more severe than the life sen-

tence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle.

Rummel was likely to

have been eligible for parole within 12 years of his initial confinement, 23 a

u.s.,

at 280-281.

sentence
crime.

fact on which the Court relied heavily.

See 445

Helm's sentence is more severe than any other

the State could have
See note 6,

supra.

imposed on any crimina! for

Only capital punishment,

any

a penalty

not authorized in South Dakota when Helm was sentenced, exceeds
it.

21 The sentence was well below that authorized for even the
least serious felony in South Dakota. See note 6, supra. It was
also shorter than the sentences Helm served for other minor
crimes. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 14.
22we raise no question as to the general validity of sentences
without possibility of parole.
The only issue before us is
whether, in the circumstances of this case and in light of the
constitutional principle of proportionality, the sentence imposed
on this petitioner violates the Eighth Amendment.
23we note that Rummel was, in fact, released within eight (f0~
months of the Court's decision in his case. See L.A. Times, Nov.
16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3.
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We next consider the sentences that could be imposed on
other

criminals

in

the same

jurisdiction.

When Helm was sen-

tenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a life sentence

for

murder,

S.D.

Codified Laws §22-16-12

(1979)

(amended

1980), and was authorized to impose a life sentence for treason,
S22-8-l,

first degree manslaughter,

§22-16-15,

19-1, and first degree arson, 22-33-1.

and

degree

only Class
Class
1982),

Attempted murder, §22-

placing an explosive device on an aircraft,

first

3

rape,

2 felonies.

felony.

§22-22-1

34-20B-13 (7)

(1977),

and

§22-14A-5,

(amended 1980 and 1982), were

Aggravated

Distribution

§22-

No other crime was pun-

ishable so severely on the first offense.
4-1 (5),

kidnapping,

of

riot,

S22-10-5,

heroin,

aggravated

was only a

§§22-42-2
assault,

(amended
§22-18-1.1

(amended 1980 and 1981), were only Class 4 felonies.
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analysis, but relevant comparisons are still possible.
the

penalty

class.

for

a

second or

third

felony

is

Under §22-7-7,

increased

by one

Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or third

conviction was

for

treason,

first

degree manslaughter,

kidnap-

ping, or first degree arson, and a life sentence would have been
authorized when a second or third conviction was for such crimes
as attempted murder, placing an explosive device on an aircraft,
or

first

degree

rape.

Finally,

§22-7-8,

under which Helm was

sentenced, authorized life imprisonment after three prior convictions, regardless of the crimes.
In sum, there were a handful of crimes that were necessarily punished by life imprisonment: murder; and treason, first
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degree manslaughter, kidnapping, or first degree arson on a second or third offense.

There was a larger group for which life

imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of the sentencing
judge, including: treason, first degree manslaughter, kidnapping,
or first degree

arson~

attempted murder, placing an explosive

device on an aircraft, or first degree rape on a second or third
offense~

and any felony after three prior offenses.

Finally,

there was a large group of very serious offenses for which life
imprisonment was not authorized,

including a third offense of

heroin dealing or aggravated assault.
In any rational system, criminals committing these offenses would be thought more deserving of punishment than one
uttering a "no account" check--even when the bad-check writer had

., fl.:He ,,

already committed six

~iR& r

felonies.

Furthermore, there is no

indication in the record that any habitual offender other than
Helm has ever been given the maximum sentence on the basis of
comparable crimes.

It is more likely that the possibility of

life imprisonment under S22-7-8 generally is reserved for criminals such as fourth-time heroin dealers, while habitual bad-check
writers receive more lenient treatment. 24
24 The

We can only conclude

State contends that §22-7-8 is more lenient than the
Texas habitual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment
under S22-7-8 is discretionary rather than mandatory. Brief for
Petitioner 22. Helm, however, has challenged only his own sentence. No one suggests that §22-7-8 may not be applied constitutionally to fourth-time heroin dealers or other violent criminals. Thus we do not question the legislature's judgment. Unlik~ Rummel, a lesser sentence here could have been entirely
consistent w1 th both the statute and the Eighth Amendment. See
Note, Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum.
Footnote continued on next page.
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that Helm has been treated in the same manner as, or more severely than, criminals who have committed far more serious crimes.
Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission
of the same crime in other jurisdictions.

The Court of Appeals

found that "Helm could have received a life sentence without parole for his offense in only one other state, Nevada," 684 F.2d,
at 586, and we have no reason to doubt its finding.
Oral Arg.

21.

See Tr. of

At the very least, therefore, it is clear that

Helm could not have received such a severe sentence in 48 of the
50 States.

But even under Nevada law, a life sentence without

possibility of
stances.

parole

See Nev.

is

merely

authorized

Rev. Stat. §207. 010 ( 2)

in

these

(1981) •

circum-

We are not

advised that any defendant such as Helm, whose prior offenses
were so minor, actually has received the maximum penalty in Nevada. 25 It appears that Helm was treated more severely than he
would have been in any other State.

L. Rev. 1119, 1160 (1979).
25 under Nev. Rev. Stat. §207.010(2), a court is authorized to
impose a sentence of "imprisonment in the state prison for life
with or without possibility of parole. If the penalty fixed by
the court is life imprisonment with the possibility of parole,
eligibility for parole begins when a minimum of 10 years has been
served."
It
appears
that most
sentences
imposed under
§207.010(2) permit parole, even when the prior crimes are far
more serious than Helm's. See, e.g., Rusling v. State, 96 Nev.
778, 617 P.2d 1302 (1980) (possession of a firearm by an exfelon, two instances of driving an automobile without the owner's
consent, four first degree burglaries, two sales of marijuana,
two sales of a restricted dangerous drug, one sale of heroin, one
escape from state prison, and one second degree burglary).
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B

The State argues that the present case is essentially
the same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in
that case is matched by the possibility of executive clemency
here.

The State reasons that the Governor could commute Helm's

sentence to a term of years.

We conclude,

however,

that the

South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally different from
the parole system that was before us in Rummel.
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different
concepts, despite some surface similarities.
part of the rehabilitative process.

Parole is a regular

Assuming good behavior, it

is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases.

The law

generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to be considered for parole, and details the standards and procedures applicable at that time.
Inmates,

442

procedures)~

u.s.

See, e.g., Greenholz v. Nebraska Penal
1

(1979)

(detailing

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408

u.s.

Nebraska

471, 477 (1972)

parole
("the

practice of releasing prisoners on parole before the end of their
sentences

has

become

an

integral

system").

Thus it is possible to predict, at least to some ex-

tent, when parole might be granted.

part

of

the

penological

Commutation, on the other

hand, is an ad hoc exercise of executive clemency.

A Governor

may commute a sentence at any time for any reason without reference to any standards.
v. Dumschat, 452

u.s.

See, e.g., Connecticut Board of Pardons

458 (1981).

We explicitly have recognized the distinction between
parole and commutation in our prior cases. 26 Writing on behalf

Footnote(s) 26 will appear on following pages.
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of the Morrissey Court,

for

example, CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER con-

trasted the two possibilities: "Rather than being an ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals."

408

u.s.,

at 477.

In Dumschat,

THE CHIEF JUSTICE similarly explained that "there is a vast difference between a denial of parole ••• and a state's refusal to
commute a lawful sentence."
The Texas
very different.

and

452

u.s.,

South Dakota

at 466.
systems

in particular

are

In Rummel, the Court did not rely simply on the

existence of some system of parole.
visions of the system presented,

Rather it looked to the proincluding the fact that Texas

had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good time' credits
to its prisoners, a policy that historically has allowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for parole in as
little as 12 years."

445

u.s.,

at 280.

A Texas prisoner became

eligible for parole when his calendar time served plus "good conduct" time equaled one-third of the maximum sentence imposed or
20 years, whichever

is less.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art.

2 6In Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the
possibility of commutation is not equivalent to the possibility
of parole.
The Court carefully "distinguish [ed] Rummel from a
person sentenced under a recidivist statute like [Miss. Code Ann.
599-19-83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for a sentence of life
without parole." 445 u.s., at 281. But the Mississippi Constitution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal
and penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment."
Art. 5, §124. The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized
that the power to pardon includes the power to commute a
convict's sentence.
See Whittington v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598,
603-604, 73 So.2d 137, 139-140 (1954). The Rummel Court gave no
weight to the possibility of executive clemency.
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42.12, Sl5(b)
good-time

(Vernon 1979).

per

30

days

An entering prisoner earned 20 days

served,

Brief

for

Respondent

in Rummel,

O.T. 1979, No. 78-6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30
days good-time per

30 days

Art.

(Vernon Supp. 1982).

6181-1, §§2-3

served,

Tex.

Rev.

Civ. Stat. Ann.,

Thus Rummel could have

been eligible for parole in as few as 10 years, and could have
expected to become eligible,

in the normal course of events, in

only 12 years.
In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain
than parole.

For example,

the board of pardons and paroles is

authorized to make commutation recommendations to the Governor,
see n.

7,

supra,

but §24-13-4 provides that "no recommendation

for the commutation of ••• a life sentence, or for a pardon ••• ,
shall be made by less than the unanimous vote of all members of
the board."

In fact, no life sentence has been commuted in over
)

eight years,

App.

29,

~

o.....;-r

- ~~)~~~/

while parole has been granted

regularly

-1
during that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9.

Furthermore, even if

Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would be eligible to be
considered for parole.27

Not only is there no guarantee that he

would be paroled, but the South Dakota parole system is far more
stringent than the one before us in Rummel.

Helm would have to

serve three-fourths of his revised sentence before he would be
eligible for

parole,

§24-15-5,

and the provision for good-time

27 The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Dakota occurred in 1975.
The record indicates, however, that the
prisoner in question has still not been paroled. App. 29.
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credits is far less generous, §24-5-1. 2 8
The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a
hope for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency."
ent

from

the

It is little differ-

possibility of executive clemency that exists

in

every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence under the
Eighth Amendment.

Recognition of such a bare possibility would

make judicial review under the Eighth Amendment meaningless.

v
The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence
to determine if it is proportionate to his crime.

Applying ob-

jective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penultimate
sentence

for

relatively

minor

criminal

conduct.

He

has

been

treated more harshly than other criminals in the State who have
committed more serious crimes.

He has been treated more harshly

than he would have been in any other jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State.

We conclude that his sentence

is significantly disproportionate to his crime, and is therefore
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.

The judgment of the Court of

Appeals is accordingly
Affirmed.

28 Assume, for example, that Helm had been sentenced to a term
of 40 years--his approximate life expectancy in 1979.
Even if
Helm were a model prisoner, he would not have been eligible for
parole until he had served over 21 years.
This is more than
twice as long as the Rummel minimum. And this comparison is generous to South Dakota's position.
If Rummel had been sentenced
to 40 years rather than life, he could have been eligible for
parole in less than 7 years.

••
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a seventh nonviolent felony.

I

By 1975 the State of South Dakota had convicted respondent Jerry Helm of six nonviolent felonies.

In 1964, 1966, and

1969 Helm was convicted of third-degree burglary • 1

1 In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined
sections of the South Dakota criminal code:

in

In 1972 he

at

least

two

"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the
nighttime with intent to commit a crime but under such
circumstances as do not constitute burglary in the
first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third degree." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-32-8 (1967) (repealed
1976).
"A person breaking or entering at any time any building within the curtilage of a dwelling house but not
forming a part thereof, or any building or part of any
building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as
defined in §32-14-1, or any structure or erection in
which any property is kept, with intent to commit larceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the third
degree."
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-32-9 (1967) (repealed 1976).
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essentially the same. See S.D. Code §13.3703 (1939 ed., supp. 1960);
1965 S.D. Laws, ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by
"imprisonment in the state penitentiary for any term not exceeding fifteen years." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-32-10 (1967) (previously codified at S.D. Code §13.3705 (3)
(1939))
(repealed
1976).
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was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2

In 1973

he was convicted of grand larceny. 3

And in 1975 he was convicted

of third-offense driving while intoxicated. 4

The record contains

no details about the circumstances of any of these offenses, ex-

2 In 1972 the relevant statute provided:
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any
false token or writing, or other false pretense,
obtains from any person any money or property • • • is
punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary
not exceeding three years or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding three
times the value of the money or property so obtained,
or by both such fine and imprisonment."
S.D. Comp.
Laws Ann. §22-41-4 {1967) {repealed 1976).
3 In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of
personal property accomplished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive another thereof." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-37-1
{1967) {repealed 1976).
Grand larceny and petit larceny were
distinguished as follows:
"Grand larceny
following cases:

is

larceny committed

in any of

the

{1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding
fifty dollars;
{2) When such property, although not of a value exceeding fifty dollars, is taken from the person of another;
{3) When such property is livestock.
Larceny in other cases is petit larceny."
Laws Ann. §22-37-2 {1967) {repealed 1976).

S.D. Comp.

Grand larceny was then punishable by "imprisonment in the state
penitentiary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in the
county jail not exceeding one year." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §2237-3 {1967) {repealed 1976).
4A third offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol is a felony in South Dakota.
S.D. Codified Laws §32-23-4
{1976).
See 1973 S.D. Laws, ch. 195, §7 {enacting version of
§32-23-4 in force in 1975).
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cept that they were all nonviolent, none was a crime against a
person, and alcohol was a contributing factor in each case.
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a
check for $100. 5

"no account"

The only details we have of the crime are those

given by Helm to the state trial court:
"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that
day, was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid City
with more money than I had when I started.
I knew I'd
done something I didn't know exactly what.
If I would
have known this, I would have picked the check up.
I
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several
places.'"
State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 501 (S.D.
1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Helm).
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty.
Ordinarily
account"
state

the

check would

have

penitentiary and

Comp. Laws Ann.

maximum

a

§22-6-1 (6)

punishment

been five
five

years

for

uttering

imprisonment

thousand dollar

fine.

(1967 ed., supp. 1978)

at S.D. Codified Laws §22-6-1 (7)

(Supp. 1982)).

a

"no

in the

See S.D.

(now codified
As a result of

his criminal record, however, Helm was subject to South Dakota's
recidivist statute:
"When a defendant has been convicted of at least three
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal
felony, the sentence for the principal felony shall be
5The governing statute provides, in relevant part:
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another for present consideration with
intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a financial
institution knowing at the time of such passing that he
or his principal does not have an account with such
financial institution, is guilty of a Class 5 felony."
S.D. Codified Laws §22-41-1.2 (1979).
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enhanced to the sentence for a Class 1 felony."
Codified Laws §22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981).

S.D.

The maximum penalty for a "Class 1 felony" was life imprisonment
in

the

fine. 6

state

penitentiary

S.D. Comp.

(now codified

at

Laws Ann.
S.D.

and

a

twenty-five

§22-6-1(2)

Codified Laws

6when Helm was sentenced in
classified felonies as follows:

April

thousand

(1967 ed.,

§22-6-1 (3)

1979,

supp.

(Supp.

South

dollar
1978)

1982)).

Dakota

"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are
divided into the following seven classes which are distinguished from each other by the respective maximum
penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized
upon conviction:
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state
penitentiary. A lesser sentence may not be given for a Class A felony~
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state
penitentiary.
In addition, a fine of twentyfive thousand dollars may be imposed~
(3) Class 2 felony: twenty-five years imprisonment
in the state penitentiary.
In addition, a fine
of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed~
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in
the state penitentiary.
In addition, a fine of
fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed~
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the
state penitentiary.
In addition, a fine of ten
thousand dollars may be imposed~
(6) Class 5 felony: five years imprisonment in the
state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of five
thousand dollars may be imposed~ and
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the
state penitentiary or a fine of two thousand
dollars, or both.
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sentences for habitual criminals ••••
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by
law, every offense declared to be a felony and not otherwise classified is a Class 6 felony."
S.D. Comp.
Laws Ann. §22-6-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979
and 1980).

law
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Moreover,

South Dakota

unavailable:

"A person

law
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explicitly provides

sentenced

to

life

that

parole

imprisonment

is

eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles."
Codified Laws §24-15-4
pardon prisoners,

or

{1979).

is
not

S.D.

The Governor 7 is authorized to

to commute

their

sentences,

S.D.

Const.,

Art. IV, §3, but no other relief from sentence is available even
to a rehabilitated prisoner.
Immediately

after

accepting

Helm's

guilty

South Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life
under §22-7-8.

plea,

the

imprisonment

The court explained:

"'I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly proven that you're an habitual criminal and the
record would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation
and that the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up
for the rest of your natural life, so you won't have
further victims of your crimes, just be coming back
before Courts.
You' 11 have plenty of time to think
this one over."'
State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d, at 500
{Henderson,
J.,
dissenting)
{quoting S.D.
Circuit
Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Pennington County
{Parker, J.)) •
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, affirmed the
sentence

despite

Amendment.

Helm's

argument

that

it

violated

the

Eighth

State v. Helm, supra.

After Helm had served two years in the state penitentiary, he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a fixed
term of years.

7The board of
ommendations to
§24-14-5: S.D.
Governor is not

Such a commutation would have had the effect of

pardons and paroles is authorized to make recthe Governor, S.D. Codified Laws §24-14-1 {1979):
Executive Order 82-04 {Apr. 12, 1982), but the
bound by the recommendation, §24-14-5.
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making

Helm eligible

to

be

considered

for

served three-fourths of his new sentence.
§24-15-5 (3)
1981.

(1979).

The Governor

parole

when

he

had

See S.D. Codified Laws

denied Helm's request in May

App. 26.
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the Unit-

ed States District Court for the District of South Dakota.

Helm

argued, among other things, that his sentence constituted cruel
and

unusual punishment

ments.
was

under

the Eighth

and Fourteenth Amend-

Although the District Court recognized that the sentence

harsh,

Rummel

v.

it

concluded

Estelle,

445

that

u.s.

this
263

Court's
(1980),

recent decision

was

dispositive.

in
It

therefore denied the writ.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.

684 F.2d 582 (1982).

The Court of Appeals noted

that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable.
life

without

parole

was

qualitatively

Helm's sentence of

different

from

Rummel's

life sentence with the prospect of parole because South Dakota
has

rejected

system.
fenses,

rehabilitation

as

a goal of

the criminal

justice

The Court of Appeals examined the nature of Helm's ofthe nature of his

sentence,

and

the

sentence he could

have received in other States for the same offense.

It conclud-

ed, on the basis of this examination, that Helm's sentence was
"grossly disproportionate
F.2d, at 587.

to

the

nature of

the

offense."

684

It therefore directed the District Court to issue

the writ unless the State resentenced Helm.

Ibid.
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In view of the important Eighth Amendment question presented by this case, we granted certiorari.

459 U.S.

{1982).

We now affirm.

II
The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines
punishments inflicted."
baric punishments,

imposed, nor cruel and unusual

The final clause prohibits not only bar-

but also sentences that are disproportionate

to the crime committed.

A

The principle that a punishment should be proportionate
to the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in commonlaw jurisprudence.

In 1215 three chapters of Magna Carta were

devoted to the rule that "amercements" 8 may not be excessive. 9
And the principle was repeated and extended in the First Statute
of Westminster,

3 Edw.

I, ch.

6 {1275).

These were not hollow

8 An amercement was similar to a modern-day fine.
It was the
most common criminal sanction in thirteenth century England. See
2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 513-515
{2ded.l909).
9 chapter 20 declared that "[a] freeman shall not be amerced
for a small fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a
great crime according to the heinousness of it." See 1 S.D. Codified Laws, p. 4 {1978) {translation of Magna Carta). According
to Maitland, "there was no clause in Magna Carta more grateful to
the mass of the people •.•• " F. Maitland, Pleas of the Crown for
the County of Gloucester xxxiv {1884).
Chapter 21 granted the
same rights to the nobility, and chapter 22 granted the same
rights to the clergy.
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guarantees,

for

the

royal courts

disproportionate punishments.

relied on them

to

invalidate

See, e.g., Le Gras v. Bailiff of

Bishop of Winchester, Y.B. Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 (C.P. 1316},
reprinted in 52 Selden Society 3

(1934}.

When prison sentences

became the normal criminal sanctions, the common law recognized
that

these,

Humkin,

too,

2 Bulst.

(Croke, J.}

must

be

proportional.

See,

e.g.,

139, 140, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016

("imprisonment ought always

Hodges

v.

(K. B. 1615}

to be according to the

quality of the offence"}.
The English Bill of

Rights

repeated

the

principle of

proportionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth
Amendment:
sive

"excessive Baile ought not to be required nor exces-

Fines

inflicted."

imposed
1

w.

nor

cruell

and

unusuall

& M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689}.

Punishments

Although the pre-

cise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incorporated "the longstanding principle of English law that the punishment ••• should not be, by reason of its excessive length or severity,

greatly

disproportionate

to

the

offense

Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 (1959}; see 4
Commentaries *16-19

charged."

w.

R.

Blackstone,

(1769}; see also id., at *16-17 (in condemn-

ing "punishments of unreasonable severity," uses "cruel" to mean
severe or excessive}.

Indeed, barely three months after the Bill

of Rights was adopted, the House of Lords declared that a "fine
of thirty thousand pounds,
upon

the

earl

magna charta,

of Devon,

imposed by the court of King's Bench

was excessive and exorbitant,

against

the common right of the subject, and against the

page 9.
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law of the land."

Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Trials 133, 136

(1689}.

When

the

Framers of

the

Eighth Amendment

adopted

the

language of the English Bill of Rights, 10 they also adopted the
English principle of proportionality.

The people were guaranteed

the rights they had possessed as English subjects--including the
right to be free from excessive punishments.

B

The constitutional principle of proportionality has been
recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 11

In

the leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910},
the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public document
and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form of imprisonment

that

disabilities.

included

hard

labor

in chains

and permanent civil

The Court noted "that it is a precept of justice

that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to

10 This language had earlier been incorporated in the Virginia
Declaration of Rights, Art. I, §9, authored by George Mason.
11 In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 u.s. 323 (1892}, the defendant had
been conv1cted of 307 counts of "selling intoxicating liquor
without authority," and sentenced to a term of over 54 years.
The majority did not reach O'Neil's contention that this sentence
was unconstitutional, for he did not include the point in his
assignment of errors or in his brief. Id., at 331. Furthermore,
the majority noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not apply to
the States."
Id., at 332.
Accordingly the Court dismissed the
writ of error for want of a federal question.
Id., at 336-337.
The dissent, however, reached the Eighth Amendment question, observing that it "is directed ..• against all punishments which by
their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to
the offences charged." Id., at 339-340 (Field, J., dissenting}.
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offense,"

id.,

at 367,

Eighth Amendment.
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and held that the sentence violated the

The Court endorsed the principle of propor-

tionality as a constitutional standard, see, e.g., id., at 372373, and determined that the sentence before it was "cruel in its
excess of imprisonment," id., at 377.
The Court
criminal
(1962) • 12

sentence

next
in

applied
Robinson

A 90-day sentence was

crime of being

"addicted to the

the
v.

principle
California,

to

invalidate
370

U.S.

a

660

found to be excessive for the
use of narcotics."

The Court

explained that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual."
667.

Id., at

Thus there was no question of an inherently barbaric pun-

ishment.

"But the question cannot be considered in the abstract.

Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment
for the 'crime' of having a common cold."
Most

recently,

Ibid.

the Court has applied the principle of

proportionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain
circumstances.

Enmund

penalty excessive for
life,

v.

Florida,

458

u.S.

(1982)

(death

felony murder when defendant did not take

attempt to take life, or

intend that a life be taken or

that lethal force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592
(1977)

(plurality opinion)

("sentence of death is grossly dispro-

portionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape"); id.,

12Members of the Court continued to recognize the principle of
proportionality in the meantime. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356
u.s. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion); id., at 111 (BRENNAN,
J., concurring); id., at 125-126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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"

at 601

(POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-

senting in part)

("ordinarily death is disproportionate punish-

ment for the crime of raping an adult woman").
continued

to

recognize

that

the

Eighth

And the Court has

Amendment

proscribes

grossly disproportionate punishments, even when it has not been
necessary
Finney,
651,

667

to

rely

437 U.S.

on

the

proscription.

678,

685

(1978);

See,

e.g.,

Hutto

Ingraham v. Wright,

v.

430 U.S.

(1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171-172

(1976)

(opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374, and n. 3 (1982)

(per curiam)

(recognizing

that some prison sentences may be constitutionally disproportionate); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S., at 274, n. 11 (same).

c
There
general

is

no

principle of

prison sentences. 13
no

exception

for

Eighth Amendment

basis

for

the State's assertion that

proportionality does

not

apply

to

the

felony

The constitutional language itself suggests
imprisonment.

imposes

We

have

recognized

that

the

"parallel limitations" on bail, fines,

and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S., at 664, and
the text

is explicit that bail and fines may not be excessive.

13 According to Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.s. 263 (1980), "one
could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this
Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as
felonies ••. the length of sentence actually imposed is purely a
matter of legislative prerogative."
Id., at 274
(emphasis
added). The Court did not adopt the standard proposed, but merely recognized that the argument was possible. To the extent that
the State makes this argument here, we find it meritless.
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It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser punishment of a fine
and the greater punishment of death were both subject to propertionality analysis, but the intermediate punishment of imprisonment were not.
exception.

There is also no historical support for such an

The common-law principle incorporated into the Eighth

Amendment clearly applied to prison terms.
supra.

See Hodges v. Humkin,

And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that pris-

on sentences are subject to proportionality analysis.
Weems,

217

u.s.,

at 377; cf. Hutto v. Finney,

("Confinement in a prison

See, e.g.,

437 U.S., at 685

is a form of punishment subject to

scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards").
When
capital cases,

we have
we

applied

the proportionality principle

in

have drawn no distinction with imprisonment.

See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S., at 176 (opinion of Stewart, POWELL,

and STEVENS, JJ.).

It is true that the "penalty of death

differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind."

Furman v. Georgia, 408

(Stewart, J., concurring).

u.s.

238, 306

(1972)

As a result, "our decisions [in] cap-

i tal cases are of limited assistance in deciding the consti tutionality of
Estelle,

the

445 U.S.,

"[o] utside

punishment"
at

272.

in a
All

noncapital case.

this means,

the context of capital punishment,

however,

is that,

successful chal-

lenges to the proportionality of particular sentences
exceedingly rare," 14 ibid.

Rummel v.

[will be]

(emphasis added); see Hutto v. Davis,

14 In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to
be excessive for felony murder in the circumstances of that case.
Footnote continued on next page.
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454

u.s.,

at 374.

It does not mean that proportionality analysis

is entirely inapplicable in noncapital cases.
In sum, we hold that a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted.
Reviewing courts, of course, should grant substantial deference
to the broad authority that legislatures possess in determining
the types and limits of punishments for crimes, as well as to the
discretion

that

criminals. 15

trial

courts

possess

in

sentencing

convicted

But no penalty is per se constitutional.

Court noted in Robinson v. California, 370

u.s.,

As the

at 667, a single

day in prison may be unconstitutional in some circumstances.

III
A
In

reviewing

sentences

under

the

Eighth

Amendment,

courts should be guided by objective factors that our cases have
recognized. 16

First, we look to the gravity of the offense and

But clearly no sentence short of death would be unconstitutional
for Enmund's crime.
15 In view of the substantial deference properly due to legislatures and sentencing courts, most reviewing courts normally
will not be required to engage in extended analysis to determine
that a sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate.
16 As the Court has indicated, no one factor will be dispositive. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 u.s. 370, 373-374 n. 2 (1982) (~
curiam)~ Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S., at 275-276.
The inherent
nature of our federal system and the need for individualized sentencing decisions result in a wide range of constitutional sentences. No single criterion can identify when a sentence is so
grossly disproportionate that it violates the Eighth Amendment.
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the harshness of the penalty.
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In Enmund, for example, the Court

examined the circumstances of the defendant's crime in great detail.

458 U.S., at

seriousness
crimes,

of

such

In Coker the Court considered the

the
as

crime
murder.

opinion);

id., at 603

part

dissenting

and

of

rape,

433

and

u.S.,

compared
at

it

to

597-598

other

(plurality

(POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment in
in

part).

In

Robinson

placed on the nature of the "crime."

the

emphasis

370 u.s., at 666-667.

was
And

in Weems, the Court's opinion commented in two separate places on
the

pettiness of

the

offense.

217 U.S.,

at

363 and

365.

Of

course, a court must consider the severity of the penalty in deciding

whether

it

is disproportionate.

See,

e.g.,

Coker,

433

U.S., at 598 (plurality opinion); Weems, 217 u.s., at 366-367.
Second,

it may be helpful to compare the sentences im-

posed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction.

If more seri-

ous crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious
penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at issue
may be excessive.

Thus in Enmund the Court noted that all of the

other felony murderers on death row in Florida were more culpable
than the petitioner there.

458 U.S.,

at

The Weems Court

identified an impressive list of more serious crimes that were
subject to less serious penalties.
Third,

courts may

find

217 u.s., at 380-381.
it

useful

to compare

the sen-

tences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
capital
third

In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review of

punishment

of American

statutes

and

determined

jurisdictions would

ever

that

"only

permit

a

about

a

defendant

page 15.
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[such

as

Enmund]

to

be

sentenced

to die."

458 U.S.,

at

Even in those jurisdictions, however, the death penalty was almost

never

imposed

under

similar

circumstances.

Id.,

at

The Court's review of foreign law also supported its conclusion.
Id.,

at ___,

same.

n.

433 U.S.,

22.

The analysis in Coker was essentially the

at 593-597.

And in Weems the Court relied on

the fact that, under federal law, a similar crime was punishable
by only two year's imprisonment and a fine.
Cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356

u.s.

217 U.S., at 380.

86, 102-103 (1958)

(plurality opin-

ion).
In

sum,

a

court's

proportionality

analysis

under

the

Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including

(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the pen-

alty:

( i i)

the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same

jurisdiction: and

(iii)

the sentences imposed for commission of

the same crime in other jurisdictions.

B

Application

of

these

factors

assumes

that

courts

are

competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative scale.

In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and

courts traditionally have made these judgments--just as legislatures must make them in the first instance.

Comparisons can be

made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or
society, and the culpability of the offender.

Thus in Enmund the

Court determined that the petitioner's conduct was not so serious
as

his

accomplices'

conduct.

Indeed,

there

are

widely

shared

page 16.
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views

as

to

the

relative

seriousness

of

See

crimes.

Rossi,

Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure

and

(1974).

Individual

Differences,

Soc.

Rev.

224,

237

For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent

crimes are less serious
threat of violence.
nizes

Am.

39

that

than crimes marked

by violence or the

Cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 16

the criminal law

(the State recog-

is more protective of people than

property) .
There are other widely accepted principles that courts
may apply in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society.
vant.

The absolute magnitude of the crime may be rele-

Stealing a million dollars is viewed as more serious than

stealing a hundred dollars--a point recognized in statutes distinguishing petty theft from grand theft.
fied

Laws

§22-30A-17

(Supp.

1982).

See, e.g., S.D. Codi-

Few would

dispute

that

a

lesser included offense should not be punished more severely than
the greater offense.

Thus a court is justified in viewing as-

sault with intent to murder as more serious than simple assault.
See Roberts v.

Collins,

curiam),

denied,

cert.

544 F. 2d 168,
430

u.s.

973

169-170

(1977).

(CA4 1976)
Cf.

(~

Dembowski

State, 251 Ind. 250, 252, 240 N. E. 2d 815, 817 (1968)

v.

(armed rob-

bery more serious than robbery); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629,
632,

281 P.2d

233,

235

(1955)

with intent to commit rape) •

(rape more serious than assault
It is also widely re.c ogni zed that

attempts are less serious than completed crimes.
Codified Laws §22-4-1

(1979);

4 Blackstone *15.

See, e.g., S.D.
Similarly,

an
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accessory after the fact should not be subject to a higher penalty than the principal.
Turning

to

See, e.g., 18

u.s.c.

§3.

the culpability of the offender,

there are

again clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply.
Enmund
kill

the Court

looked

in determining

plices.

458

u.s.,

at

the petitioner's

that he was

at

lack of

less culpable

In

intent to

than his accom-

Most would agree that negligent con-

duct is less serious than intentional conduct.

South Dakota, for

example, ranks criminal acts in ascending order of seriousness as
follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing acts, intentional
acts,

and

malicious

(Supp. 1982).
motive

acts.

S.D.

Codified

Laws

§22-1-2(1) (f)

A court is also entitled to look at a defendant's

in committing a

crime.

Thus a murder may be viewed as

more serious when committed pursuant to a contract.
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 279, §69(a) (5)

See, e.g.,

(West Supp. 1982); cf. 4

Blackstone *15; In re Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073 (1974).
This list is by no means exhaustive.

It simply illus-

trates that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing
the severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the
difficulties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions between similar crimes.

c
Application of the factors that we identify also assumes
that courts are able to compare different sentences.
sumption, too, is justified.

This as-

The easiest comparison, of course,

is between capital punishment and noncapital punishments, for the
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death penalty is different from other punishments in kind rather
than degree. 17

For sentences of imprisonment, the problem is not

so much one of ordering, but one of line-drawing.

It is clear

that a 25-year sentence generally is more severe than a 15-year
sentence, 18 but

in most cases

it would

be difficult to decide

that the former violates the Eighth Amendment while the latter
does not.

Decisions of this kind,

unique to this area.

although troubling,

are not

The courts are constantly called upon to

draw similar lines in a variety of contexts.
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is an example.
In Williams v.

Florida, 399 U.S.

78

{1970}, the Court upheld a

criminal conviction returned by a unanimous 6-member jury, and in
Apodaca v.

Oregon,

406 u.s.

404

{1972}, we upheld a conviction

returned by ten members of a 12-member jury.
~,

435 U.s.

223

{1978}, however, we reversed a conviction re-

turned by a unanimous 5-member jury.
admit[ted]

JUSTICE BLACKMUN "readily

that we d[id] not pretend to discern a clear line be-

tween six members and five."
J.}.

In Ballew v. Geor-

Id., at 239

{opinion of BLACKMUN,

He nevertheless found a difference between them of "consti-

tutional significance."

Ibid d

concurring in the judgment}.

cf.

id. , at 245-246 {POWELL, J. ,

And the following Term, in Burch v.

Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 {1979}, we reversed a conviction returned

17 There is also a clear line between sentences of imprisonment
and
sentences
involving
no
deprivation
of
liberty.
See
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 {1972}.
18 The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison,
depending upon the time and conditions of its availability.
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by five members of a 6-member jury:
"[W]e do not pretend the ability to discern a priori a
bright line below which the number of jurors participating in the trial or in the verdict would not permit
the jury to function in the manner required by our prior cases. But ••• it is inevitable that lines must be
drawn somewhere if the substance of the jury trial
right is to be preserved."
Id., at 13 7 {citations
omitted).
--

drawing

Another

Sixth

function

of

the

Amendment
judiciary,

case

right

66

to

months

is

a

the

line-

and offers guidance on the

method by which some lines may be drawn.
399 U.S.

illustrates

In Baldwin v. New York,

{197 0) , the Court determined that a defendant has a
jury

trial

authorized."

"where
Id.,

imprisonment
at

69

for

{plurality

more

than

six

opinion).

In

choosing the 6-month standard, the plurality relied almost exclusively on the fact that only New York City denied the right to a
jury trial for an offense punishable by more than six months.

As

JUSTICE WHITE explained:
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us
with the only objective criterion by which a line could
ever be drawn--on the basis of the possible penalty
alone--between offenses that are and that are not regarded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury."
Id., at 72-73.
In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly may
distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another.

It also

supports our holding that courts properly may look to the practices in other jurisdictions in deciding where lines between sentences should be drawn.
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IV
It remains to apply the analytical framework established
by our prior decisions to the case before us.

We first consider

the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
argument

that

We then consider the State's

the possibility of commutation is sufficient to

save an otherwise unconstitutional sentence.

A

Helm's crime was

"one of the most passive felonies

a

person could commit."

State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d, at 501 {Hender-

son, J., dissenting).

It involved neither violence nor threat of

violence to any person.

The $100 face value of Helm's "no ac-

count" check was not trivial, but neither was it a large amount.
One hundred dollars was less than half the amount South Dakota
required for a felonious theft. 19

It is easy to see why such a

crime is viewed by society as among the less serious offenses.
See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev., at 229.

19 If Helm had been convicted simply of taking $100 from a cash
register, S.D. Codified Laws §22-30A-l {1979), or defrauding
someone of $100, §22-30A-3, or obtaining $100 through extortion,
§22-30A-4{1), or blackmail, §22-30A-4{3), or using a false credit
card to obtain $100, §22-30A-8.1, or embezzling $100, §22-30A-10,
he would not be in prison today.
All of these offenses would
have been petty theft, a misdemeanor. §22-30A-17 {amended 1982).
Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 check against insufficient
funds, rather than a nonexistent account, he would have been
guilty of a misdemeanor. §§22-41-1. Curiously, under South Dakota law there is no distinction between writing a "no account"
check for a large sum and writing a "no account" check for a
small sum. §22-41-1.2.
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Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a
"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender. 20
And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more severely
than it punishes a first offender.

Helm's status, however, can-

not be considered in the abstract.

His prior offenses, although

classified as

felonies,

were all relatively minor. 21

nonviolent and none was a crime against a person.

All were

Indeed, there

was no minimum amount in either the burglary or the false pretenses statutes, see nn. 1 and 2, supra, and the minimum amount
covered

-w

byA grand

larceny statute was

fairly

small,

see

n.

3,

supra. 22
Helm's

present

possibility of parole. 23

sentence

is

life

imprisonment

without

Barring executive clemency, see infra,

felon~a~ •:ri~e

20 we must focus on the principal felony--the
gers the life sentence--since Helm already has paid
penalty
for each of his prior offenses.
But we recognize
t Helm's
prior convictions are relevant to the sentencing decision.

21 Helm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a
professional criminal.
The record indicates an addiction to alcohol, and a consequent difficulty in holding a job. His record
involves no instance of violence of any kind.
Incarcerating him
for life without possibility of parole is unlikely to advance the
goals of our crimina! justice system in any substantial way.
Neither Helm nor the State will have any incentive to pursue
clearly needed treatment for his alcohol problem.
22 As suggested at oral argument, the third-degree burglary
statute covered entering a building with the intent to steal a
loaf of bread.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-16.
It appears that the
grand larceny statute would have covered the theft of a chicken.
23 Every life sentence in South Dakot
is without
possibility of parole. See supra, at ____ • We raise no question
as to the general validity of sentences without possibility of
parole.
The only issue before us is whether, in the circumstances of this case and in light of the constitutional principle
Footnote continued on next page.

1
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at ___ , Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state penitentiary.

This sentence is far more severe than the life sen-

tence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle.

Rummel was likely to

have been eligible for parole within 12 years of his initial confinement, 24 a fact on which the Court relied heavily.

u.s.,

at 280-281.

Helm's sentence is more severe than any other

sentence the State could have
crime.

See 445

See note 6,

supra.

imposed on any crimina! for

Only capital punishment,

any

a penalty

not authorized in South Dakota when Helm was sentenced, exceeds
it.
We next consider the sentences that could be imposed on
other

criminals

in

the

same

jurisdiction.

When Helm was sen-

tenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a life sentence

for murder,

S.D.

Codified Laws §22-16-12

(1979)

(amended

1980), and was authorized to impose a life sentence for treason,
§22-8-1,
son,

first degree manslaughter, §22-16-15, first degree ar-

§22-33-1,

and

kidnapping,

(1967 ed., supp. 1978)

S.D.

Comp.

(amended 1979).

ishable so severely on the first offense.
Codified Laws §22-4-1 (5)

Laws

Ann.

§22-19-1

No other crime was punAttempted murder, S.D.

(1979), placing an explosive device on

an aircraft, §22-14A-5, and first degree rape, §22-22-1 (amended
1980

and

1982) ,

were only Class

2 felonies.

Aggravated

riot,

of proportionality, the sentence imposed on this petitioner violates the Eighth Amendment.
24 we note that Rummel was, in fact, released within eight
months of the Court's decision in his case. See L.A. Times, Nov.
16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3.
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§22-10-5,
§§22-42-2
assault,

was

only

a Class

{amended

1982),

§22-18-1.1

3 felony.

Distribution of heroin,

34-20B-13{7)

{1977),

and

aggravated

{amended 1980 and 1981), were only Class 4

felonies.
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analysis, but relevant comparisons are still possible.
the

penalty

class.

for

a

second or

third

felony

is

Under §22-7-7,

increased by one

Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or third

conviction was

for

treason,

first

degree manslaughter,

kidnap-

ping, or first degree arson, and a life sentence would have been
authorized when a second or third conviction was for such crimes
as attempted murder, placing an explosive device on an aircraft,
or

first

degree

rape.

Finally,

§22-7-8,

under which Helm was

sentenced, authorized life imprisonment after three prior convictions, regardless of the crimes.
In sum, there were a handful of crimes that were necessarily punished by life imprisonment: murder; and treason, first
degree manslaughter, kidnapping, or first degree arson on a second or third offense.

There was a larger group for which life

imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of the sentencing
judge, including: treason, first degree manslaughter, kidnapping,
or

first

degree

arson;

attempted murder,

placing

an

explosive

device on an aircraft, or first degree rape on a second or third
offense;

and

any

felony

after

three

prior

offenses.

Finally,

there was a large group of very serious offenses for which life
imprisonment

was

not

authorized,

including

heroin dealing or aggravated assault.

a

third

offense

of

page 24.
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Criminals

committing

any of

these

offenses

ordinarily

would be thought more deserving of punishment than one uttering a
"no account"

check--even when

committed six minor felonies.

the bad-check writer had already
Furthermore, there is no indica-

tion in the record that any habitual offender other than Helm has
ever been given the maximum sentence on the basis of comparable
crimes.

It is more likely that the possibility of life imprison-

ment under §22-7-8 generally is reserved for criminals such as
fourth-time heroin dealers, while habitual bad-check writers recei ve

more

lenient

treatment. 25

In

any

event,

Helm has

been

treated in the same manner as, or more severely than, criminals
who have committed far more serious crimes.
Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission
of the same crime in other jurisdictions.

The Court of Appeals

found that "Helm could have received a life sentence without parole for his offense in only one other state, Nevada," 684 F.2d,
at 586, and we have no reason to doubt this finding.
Oral Arg.

21.

At

the very least,

therefore,

See Tr. of

it is clear that

Helm could not have received such a severe sentence in 48 of the

25 The State contends that §22-7-8 is more lenient than the
Texas habitual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment
under §22-7-8 is discretionary rather than mandatory. Brief for
Petitioner 22.
Helm, however, has challenged only his own sentence. No one suggests that §22-7-8 may not be applied constitutionally to fourth-time heroin dealers or other violent criminals.
Thus we do not question the legislature's judgment. Unlike in Rummel, a lesser sentence here could have been entirely
consistent with both the statute and the Eighth Amendment.
See
Note, Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum.
L. Rev. 1119, 1160 (1979) •
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50 States.

But even under Nevada law, a life sentence without

possibility

of

stances.
advised

parole

See Nev.
that

is

Rev.

merely

Stat.

any defendant

authorized

§207. 010 ( 2)

such as Helm,

in

these

(1981) .

We

whose prior

circumare

not

offenses

were so minor, actually has received the maximum penalty in Nevada. 26

It appears

that Helm was

treated more severely than he

would have been in any other State.

B

The State argues

that

the present case is essentially

the same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in
that
here.

case

is matched

by the possibility of executive clemency

The State reasons that the Governor could commute Helm's

sentence

to

a

term of

years.

We

conclude,

however,

that

the

South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally different from
the parole system that was before us in Rummel.
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different
concepts, despite some surface similarities.

Parole is a regular

26 under §207.010(2), a Nevada court is authorized to impose a
sentence of "imprisonment in the state prison for life with or
without possibility of parole. If the penalty fixed by the court
is life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, eligibility
for parole beg ins when a minimum of 10 years has been served."
It appears that most sentences imposed under §207.010(2} permit
parole, even when the prior crimes are far more serious than
Helm's.
See, e.g., Rusling v. State, 96 Nev. 778, 617 P.2d 1302
(1980) (possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, two instances of
driving an automobile without the owner's consent, four first
degree burglaries, two sales of marijuana, two sales of a restr icted dangerous drug, one sale of heroin,
state prison, and one second degree burglary).

one

escape

from

page 26.
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part of the rehabilitative process.

Assuming good behavior,

is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases.

it

The law

generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to be considered for parole, and details the standards and procedures applicable at that time.
Inmates,

442

u.s.

See, e.g., Greenholz v.
(1979)

1

Nebraska Penal
parole

Nebraska

(detailing

procedures): Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972)

("the

practice of releasing prisoners on parole before the end of their
sentences

has

become

an

integral

system").

Thus it is possible to predict, at least to some ex-

tent, when parole might be granted.
hand,

part

of

the

penological

Commutation, on the other

is an ad hoc exercise of executive clemency.

A Governor

may commute a sentence at any time for any reason without reference to any standards.

See, e.g., Connecticut Board of Pardons

v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981).
We

explicitly have

recognized

the

parole and commutation in our prior cases. 27
of the Morrissey Court,

distinction

between

Writing on behalf

for example, CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER con-

trasted the two possibilities: "Rather than being an ad hoc exer-

27 In Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the
possibility of commutation is not equivalent to the possibility
of parole.
The Court carefully "distinguish [ ed] Rummel from a
person sentenced under a recidivist statute like [Miss. Code Ann.
§99-19-83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for a sentence of life
without parole."
445 u.s., at 281. But the Mississippi Constitution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal
and penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment."
Art. 5, §124. The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized
that the power to pardon includes the power to commute a
convict's sentence.
See Whittington v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598,
603-604, 73 So.2d 137, 139-140 (1954).

page 27.
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cise of clemency, parole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals."

408 U.S.,

at 477.

In Dum..3_9hat,

THE CHIEF JUSTICE similarly explained that "there is a vast difference between a denial of parole ••• and a state's refusal to
commute a lawful sentence."
The Texas
very different.

and

452 U.S., at 466.

South Dakota

systems

in particular

are

In _Rummel, the Court did not rely simply on the

existence of some system of parole.
visions of the system presented,

Rather it looked to the proincluding the fact

that Texas

had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good time' credits
to its prisoners, a policy that historically has allowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for parole in as
little as 12 years."

445 U.S., at 280.

A Texas prisoner became

eligible for parole when his calendar time served plus "good conduct" time equaled one-third of the maximum sentence imposed or
20 years, whichever
42.12, §15(b)
good-time

per

is less.

(Vernon 1979).
30

days

Tex. Code Cr im. Proc. Ann. , Art.
An entering prisoner earned 20 days

served,

Brief

for

Respondent

in _B._!;lmmel,

O.T. 1979, No. 78-6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30
days good-time per

30 days

Art.

(Vernon Supp. 1982).

6181-1, §§2-3

served,

Tex.

Rev.

Civ.

Stat. Ann.,

Thus Rummel could have

been eligible for parole in as few as 10 years, and could have
expected to become eligible,

in the normal course of events, in

only 12 years.
In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain
than parole.

For example,

the board of pardons and paroles is

authorized to make commutation recommendations to the Governor,
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see n.

7,

supra,
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but §24-13-4 provides that

"no recommendation

for the commutation of ••• a life sentence, or for a pardon ••. ,
shall be made by less than the unanimous vote of all members of
the board."
eight years,

In fact, no life sentence has been commuted in over
App.

29,

while parole--where authorized--has

granted regularly during that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9.

been
Fur-

thermore, even if Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would
be eligible to be considered for parole. 28

Not only is there no

guarantee that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota parole
system is far more stringent than the one before us in Rummel.
Helm would have to serve three-fourths of his revised sentence
before he would be eligible for parole, §24-15-5, and the provision for good-time credits is far less generous, §24-5-1. 29
The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a
hope for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency."
ent

from

the

It is little differ-

possibility of executive clemency that exists

in

every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence under the
Eighth Amendment.

Recognition of such a bare possibility would

make judicial review under the Eighth Amendment meaningless.

28 The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Dakota occurred in 1975.
The record indicates, however, that the
prisoner in question has still not been paroled. App. 29.
2 9Assume, for example, that in 1979 the Governor had commuted
Helm's sentence to a term of 40 years (his approximate life expectancy). Even if Helm were a model prisoner, he would not have
been eligible for parole until he had served over 21 years--more
than twice the Bummel minimum.
And this comparison is generous
to South Dakota's position.
If Rummel had been sentenced to 40
years rather than life, he could have been eligible for parole in
less than 7 years.
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v
The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence
to determine if it is proportionate to his crime.

Applying ob-

jective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penultimate
sentence

for

relatively

minor

criminal

conduct.

He

has

been

treated more harshly than other criminals in the State who have
committed more serious crimes.

He has been treated more harshly

than he would have been in any other jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State.

We conclude that his sentence

is significantly disproportionate to his crime, and is therefore
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.

The judgment of the Court of

Appeals is accordingly
Affirmed.

mfs 05/25/83
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a seventh nonviolent felony.

I

By 1975 the State of South Dakota had convicted respondent Jerry Helm of six nonviolent felonies.

In 1964, 1966, and

1969 Helm was convicted of third-degree burglary • 1

In 1972 he

was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2

1 In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined
sections of the South Dakota criminal code:

in

at

In 1973

least

two

"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the
nighttime with intent to commit a crime but under such
circumstances as do not constitute burglary in the
first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third degree." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-32-8 (1967) (repealed
1976).
"A person breaking or entering at any time any building within the curtilage of a dwelling house but not
forming a part thereof, or any building or part of any
building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as
defined in §32-14-1, or any structure or erection in
which any property is kept, with intent to commit larceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the third
degree."
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-32-9 (1967) (repealed 1976).
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essentially the same. See S.D. Code §13.3703 (1939 ed., supp. 1960);
1965 S.D. Laws, ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by
"imprisonment in the state penitentiary for any term not exceeding fifteen years." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-32-10 (1967) (previously codified at S.D. Code §13.3705 (3)
(1939))
(repealed
1976).
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages.
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he was convicted of grand larceny. 3

page 2.

And in 1975 he was convicted

of third-offense driving while intoxicated. 4

The record contains

no details about the circumstances of any of these offenses, ex-

2 In 1972 the relevant statute provided:
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any
false token or writing, or other false pretense,
obtains from any person any money or property . • • is
punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary
not exceeding three years or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding three
times the value of the money or property so obtained,
or by both such fine and imprisonment."
S.D. Comp.
Laws Ann. §22-41-4 (1967) (repealed 1976).
3 In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of
personal property accomplished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive another thereof." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-37-1
(1967) (repealed 1976).
Grand larceny and petit larceny were
distinguished as follows:
"Grand larceny
following cases:

is

larceny committed

in

any of

the

(1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding
fifty dollars;
(2) When such property, although not of a value exceeding fifty dollars, is taken from the person of another;
(3) When such property is livestock.
Larceny in other cases is petit larceny."
Laws Ann. §22-37-2 (1967) (repealed 1976).

S.D. Comp.

Grand larceny was then punishable by "imprisonment in the state
penitentiary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in the
county jail not exceeding one year."
37-3 (1967) (repealed 1976).

S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-

4A third offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol is a felony in South Dakota.
S.D. Codified Laws §32-23-4
(1976).
See 1973 S.D. Laws, ch. 195, §7 (enacting version of
§32-23-4 in force in 1975).
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cept that they were all nonviolent, none was a crime against a
person, and alcohol was a contributing factor in each case.
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a
check for $100. 5

"no account"

The only details we have of the crime are those

given by Helm to the state trial court:
"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that
day, was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid City
with more money than I had when I started.
I knew I'd
done something I didn't know exactly what.
If I would
have known this, I would have picked the check up.
I
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several
places.'"
State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 501 (S.D.
1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Helm).
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty.
Ordinarily
account"
state

the

check would

punishment

have been five

penitentiary and

eee~~~ee-Comp.

maximum

a

Laws Ann.

five

years

for

imprisonment

thousand dollar

§22-6-1 (6)

(3:9~91967

(now codified at S.D. Codified Laws §22-6-1 (7)
a

result of

his crimina!

record,

however,

uttering

fine.
ed.,

a

"no

in the
S.D.

See

supp.

1978)

(Supp. 1982)).

As

Helm was subject to

South Dakota's recidivist statute:
"When a defendant has been convicted of at least three
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal
felony, the sentence for the principal felony shall be
5The governing statute provides, in relevant part:
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another for present consideration with
intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a financial
institution knowing at the time of such passing that he
or his principal does not have an account with such
financial institution, is guilty of a Class 5 felony."
S.D. Codified Laws §22-41-1.2 (1979).
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enhanced to the sentence for a Class 1 felony."
Codified Laws §22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981).

S.D.

The maximum penalty for a "Class 1 felony" was life imprisonment
in

the

fine. 6

state

penitentiary

S.D. Comp.

(now codified

Laws Ann.

at S.D.

and

a

twenty-five

§22-6-1 (2)

Codified Laws

6when Helm was sentenced in
classified felonies as follows:

April

thousand

(1967 ed.,

§22-6-1 (3)

1979,

supp.

(Supp.

South

dollar
1978)

1982)).

Dakota

"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are
divided into the following seven classes which are distinguished from each other by the respective maximum
penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized
upon conviction:
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state
penitentiary. A lesser sentence may not be given for a Class A felony;
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state
penitentiary.
In addition, a fine of twentyfive thousand dollars may be imposed;
(3) Class 2 felony: twenty-five years imprisonment
in the state penitentiary.
In addition, a fine
of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed;
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in
the state penitentiary.
In addition, a fine of
fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed;
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the
state penitentiary.
In addition, a fine of ten
thousand dollars may be imposed;
(6) Class 5 felony: five years imprisonment in the
state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of five
thousand dollars may be imposed; and
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the
state penitentiary or a fine of two thousand
dollars, or both.
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sentences for habitual criminals •.••
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by
law, every offense declared to be a felony and not otherwise classified is a Class 6 felony."
S.D. Comp.
Laws Ann. §22-6-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979
and 1980).

law
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Moreover,

South Dakota

unavailable:

"A person

page 5.

law explicitly provides
sentenced

to

life

that

parole

imprisonment

is

eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles."
Codified Laws §24-15-4
pardon prisoners,

or

(1979}.

is
not

S.D.

The Governor 7 is authorized to

to commute

their

sentences,

S.D.

Const.,

Art. IV, §3, but no other relief from sentence is available even
to a rehabilitated prisoner.
Immediately

after

accepting

Helm's

guilty

plea,

the

South Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life imprisonment
under §22-7-8.

The court explained:

"'I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly proven that you're an habitual criminal and the
record would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation
and that the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up
for the rest of your natural life, so you won't have
further victims of your crimes, just be coming back
before Courts.
You' 11 have plenty of time to think
this one over."'
State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d, at 500
(Henderson,
J.,
dissenting}
(quoting S.D. Circuit
Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Pennington County
(Parker, J.}} •
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, affirmed the
sentence

despite

Amendment.

Helm's

argument

that

it

violated

the

Eighth

State v. Helm, supra.

After Helm had served two years in the state penitentiary, he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a fixed
term of years.

7The board of
ommendations to
§ 24-14-5; S.D.
Governor is not

Such a commutation would have had the effect of

pardons and paroles is authorized to make recthe Governor, S.D. Codified Laws §24-14-1 (1979};
Executive Order 82-04 (Apr. 12, 1982} , but the
bound by the recommendation, §24-14-5.

page 6.

third draft: Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492
(marked to show changes from second draft)

making

Helm eligible

to

be

considered

for

served three-fourths of his new sentence.
§24-15-5 (3)
1981.

(1979).

parole when

he

had

See S.D. Codified Laws

The Governor denied Helm's request

in May

App. 26.
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the Unit-

ed States District Court for the District of South Dakota.
argued, among other things,
and

unusual

ments.
was

punishment

Helm

that his sentence constituted cruel

under

the Eighth

and Fourteenth Amend-

Although the District Court recognized that the sentence

harsh,

Rummel

v.

it

concluded

Estelle,

445

that
U.S.

this
263

Court's
(1980),

recent

was

decision

dispositive.

in
It

therefore denied the writ.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.

684 F.2d 582 (1982).

The Court of Appeals noted

that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable.
life

without

parole

was

qualitatively

Helm's sentence of

different

from

Rummel's

1 i fe sentence with the prospect of parole because South Dakota
has

rejected

system.
fenses,

rehabilitation

as

a goal of

the criminal

justice

The Court of Appeals examined the nature of Helm's ofthe

nature of his sentence,

and

the sentence he could

have received in other States for the same offense.

It conclud-

ed, on the basis of this examination, that Helm's sentence was
"grossly disproportionate
F.2d, at 587.

to

the

nature

of

the

offense."

684

It therefore directed the District Court to issue

the writ unless the State resentenced Helm.

Ibid.
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Reee~Ai:2i:fH~-

In view of

the

page 7.

important Eighth Amendment

question presented i:A-by this case, we granted certiorari.

u.s. ___

{1982).

459

We now affirm.

II
The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines
punishments inflicted."
baric punishments,

imposed, nor cruel and unusual

The final clause prohibits not only bar-

but also sentences that are disproportionate

to the crime committed.

A

The principle that a punishment should be proportionate
to the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in commonlaw jurisprudence.§

In 1215 7 fe~-eMam~~e 7 -three chapters of Mag-

na Carta were devoted to the rule that "amercements" 9 may not be
excessive. 10

And the principle was repeated and extended in the

a~fie-~~i:Aei:~~e-i:s-ey-Ae-meaftS-e~i:~i:fta~-~e-~fie-eemmeA-~aW7--%~
was- a- ~eee~Ai:2ea- ~i:mi:~a~i:eA- eft- ~I:!Ai:shmeA~s- i:A- ei:e~i:ea~- ~i:mes7
See-BMeal:!s-~~~~3-~5~-be¥i:~i:el:!s-~4~~9-~9~-Bel:!~e~eAemy-~9~~97-~~7

9 An amercement was similar to a modern-day fine.
It was the
most common criminal sanction in thirteenth century England. See
2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 513-515
{2d ed. 1909).
10 chapter 20 declared that "[a] freeman shall not be amerced
for a small fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a
great crime according to the heinousness of it." See 1 S.D. Codified Laws, p. 4 {1978) {translation of Magna Carta). According
to Maitland, "there was no clause in Magna Carta more grateful to
the mass of the people •••• " F. Maitland, Pleas of the Crown for
the County of Gloucester xxxiv {1884).
Chapter 21 granted the
Footnote continued on next page.
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First Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw. I, ch. 6 {1275).
not hollow guarantees,

for

the

royal courts

invalidate disproportionate punishments.

These were

relied on them to

See, e.g., Le Gras v.

Bailiff of Bishop of Winchester, Y .B. Mich.

10 Edw.

{C.P. 1316), reprinted in 52 Selden Society 3 {1934).

II,

pl.

4

When pris-

on sentences became the normal criminal sanctions, the common law
recognized
Hodges

v.

that

these,

Humkin,

{K.B. 1615)

too,

2 Bulst.

{Croke, J.)

must

be

139,

140,

See,

proportional.
80 Eng.

Rep.

e.g. ,

1015,

1016

{"imprisonment ought always to be accord-

ing to the quality of the offence").
The English Bill of

Rights

repeated

the

principle of

proportionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth
Amendment:
sive

"excessive Baile ought not to be required nor exces-

Fines

inflicted."

imposed
1

w.

nor

cruel!

and

unusual!

& M., sess. 2, ch. 2 {1689).

Punishments

Although the pre-

cise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incorporated "the longstanding principle of English law that the punishment ••• should not be, by reason of its excessive length or severity,

greatly

disproportionate

to

the

offense

charged."

R.

Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 {1959); see 4 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries *16-19

{1769); see also id., at *16-17 {in condemn-

ing "punishments of unreasonable severity," uses "cruel" to mean
severe or excessive).

Indeed, barely three months after the Bill

of Rights was adopted, the House of Lords declared that a "fine

same rights to the nobility,
rights to the clergy.

and

chapter

22

granted

the

same

page 9.
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of thirty thousand pounds,
upon

the

earl

magna charta,

of Devon,

imposed by the court of King's Bench

was excessive and exorbitant,

against

the common right of the subject, and against the

law of the land."

Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Trials 133, 136

(1689).
When

the

Framers of

the Eighth Amendment

adopted

the

language of the English Bill of Rights, 11 they also adopted the
English principle of proportionality.

The people were guaranteed

the rights they had possessed as English subjects--including the
right to be free from excessive punishments.

B

The constitutional principle of proportionality has been
recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 12

In

the leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910),
the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public document
and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form of impris-

11 This language had earlier been incorporated in the Virginia
Declaration of Rights, Art. I, §9_, ~~41'~~~
12 In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 u.s. 323 (1892), the defendant had
been convicted of 307 counts of "selling intoxicating liquor
without authority," and sentenced to a term of over 54 years.
The majority did not reach O'Neil's contention that this sentence
was unconstitutional, for he did not include the point in his
assignment of errors or in his brief. Id., at 331. Furthermore,
the majority noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not apply to
the States."
Id., at 332.
Accordingly the Court dismissed the
writ of error for want of a federal question.
Id., at 336-337.
The dissent, however, reached the Eighth Amendment question, observing that it "is directed .•• against all punishments which by
their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to
the offences charged." Id., at 339-340 (Field, J., dissenting).
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onment

that

included

disabilities.

hard

labor

in chains and permanent civil

The Court noted "that it is a precept of justice

that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to
offense,"

id.,

at 367,

Eighth Amendment.

and held that the sentence violated the

The Court endorsed the principle of proper-

tionality as a constitutional standard, see, e.g., id., at 372373, and determined that the sentence before it was "cruel in its
excess of imprisonment," id., at 377.
The Court
criminal
(1962) • 13

sentence

next
in

applied
Robinson

the
v.

principle

to

California,

invalidate
370

U.S.

A 90-day sentence was found to be excessive for

crime of being

"addicted to the

use of narcotics."

a

660
the

The Court

explained that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual."
667.

Id., at

Thus there was no question of an inherently barbaric pun-

ishment.

"But the question cannot be considered in the abstract.

Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment
for the 'crime' of having a common cold."
Most

recently,

Ibid.

the Court has applied the principle of

proportionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain
circumstances.

Enmund

penalty excessive for

v.

Florida,

458

U.S.

(1982)

(death

felony murder when defendant did not take

life, attempt to take life, or intend

~e-~a~e-that

a life be tak-

13 Members of the Court continued to recognize the principle of
proportionality in the meantime. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356
u.s. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion); id., at 111 (BRENNAN,
J., concurring); id., at 125-126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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en or that lethal force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,

=

592

(plurality opinion)

(1977)

disproportionate
rape");

and

id., at 601

("sentence of death

excessive

punishment

for

is grossly

the

crime

of

(POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment in

part and dissenting in part)

("ordinarily death is disproportion-

ate punishment for the crime of raping an adult woman").

And the

Court has continued to recognize that the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate punishments, even when it has
not been necessary to rely on the proscription.
v. Finney, 437
651,

667

u.s.

(1977);

See, e.g., Hutto

678, 685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430

Gregg v. Georgia, 428

u.s.

153, 171-172

u.s.

(1976)

(opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374, and n. 3 (1982)

(per curiam)

(recognizing

that some prison sentences may be constitutionally disproportionate); Rummel v. Estelle, 445

u.s.,

at 274, n. 11 (same).

c
There

is no basis for

the State's assertion that the

general principle of proportionality does not apply to felony
prison sentences. 14

The constitutional language itself suggests

14According

to Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) , "one
could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of th1s
Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as
felonies ..• the length of sentence actually imposed is purely a
matter of legislative prerogative."
Id., at 274 (emphasis
added). The Court did not adopt the standard proposed, but merely recognized that the argument was possible.
----~To the extent that the State ~ek~ to make~this argument
,

't •

~~~1:--1

A

,

i tutional duty to ensur
on next page.
~~ LA.A-~

~~~~
¢

~~---

9'J
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no

exception

for

imprisonment.

We

have

recognized

that

the

Eighth Amendment imposes "parallel limitations" on bail, fines,
and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430
the text

u.s.,

at 664, and

is explicit that bail and fines may not be excessive.

It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser punishment of a fine
and the greater punishment of death were both subject to propertionality analysis, but the intermediate punishment of imprisonment were not.
exception.

There is also no historical support for such an

The common-law principle incorporated into the Eighth

Amendment clearly applied to prison terms.
supra.

See Hodges v. Humkin,

And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that pris-

on sentences are subject to proportionality analysis.
Weems,

217

u.s.,

at 377; cf. Hutto v. Finney,

{"Confinement in a prison

See, e.g.,

437 U.S., at 685

is a form of punishment subject to

scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards"}.
When we

have applied

the proportionality principle

in

capital cases, we have drawn no distinction with imprisonment.
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428

u.s.,

ELL,

It is true that the "penalty of death

and STEVENS,

JJ.} •

at 176 {opinion of Stewart, POW-

differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind."

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306

'

}

{1972}

.

The class of "crimes
classified and classifiable as
felonies" is of little assist
as an Eighth Amendment standard.
Since !Fthe definition o
a felony is invariably based on
its legal consequences,';"- Sse,
18 U.S.C. §1{1} ,';"- 'Pth
effect of this standara-woul([
: when a State concedeal
punish a crime by imprisonment for a year, it could punis
crime by life imprisonment without possibility of parole.

~.· w~ ~ t~t-A&s- ~. J~-<. ~ ~
~4Av.~ ~7~ ~~~4-tll ~d

~· kh-~~~~..-1---~
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(Stewart, J., concurring).

As a result, "our decisions [in] cap-

i tal cases are of limited assistance in deciding the consti tutionali ty of the punishment"
Estelle,

445

u.s., at 272.

Rummel v.

in a noncapi tal case.
All this means, however,

is that,

"[o] utside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [will be]
exceedingly rare," 15 ibid.
454 U.S., at 374.

(emphasis added); see Hutto v. Davis,

It does not mean that proportionality analysis

is entirely inapplicable in noncapital cases.
In sum, we hold that a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted.

enall9~ ~ti-tui!~nal

grant

~4+c-h...f<_
~&igeraele

grouftds.

Reviewing

~~

courts~should

deference to the broad authority that legisla-

tures possess in determining the types and limits of punishments
for crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in sentencing convicted criminals. 16 --~hee-~ft-mee~-eeeee-~~
15 In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to

be excess1ve for felony murder in the circumstances of that case.
But clearly no sentence short of death would be unconstitutional
for Enmund's crime.
~~
e to le is-

\
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Bft~~ee-S~a~eeT-~49-a~s~-39~ 7 -394-f~9~6t-fee¥eft-eefte~rreft~-r~¥e-

no penalty is per se constitutional.
inson v. California, 370

u.s.,

As the Court noted in Rob-

at 667, a single day in prison may

be unconstitutional in some circumstances.

III
A

In

reviewing

sentences

under

the

Eighth

Amendment,

courts should be guided by objective factors that our cases have
recognized. 17

.......

First, we look to the gravity of the offense and

the harshness of the penalty.

In Enmund, for example, the Court

examined the circumstances of the defendant's crime in great detail.

458

seriousness
crimes,

u.s.,

at

of

the

such

as

In Coker the Court considered the
crime
murder.

opinion);

id., at 603

part

dissenting

and

of

rape,
433

u.s.,

compared
at

it

597-598

to

other

(plurality

(POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment in
in

part) •

In

placed on the nature of the "crime."

Amendment.

and

Robinson
370

u.s.,

the

emphasis

at 666-667.

was
And
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in Weems, the Court's opinion commented in two separate places on
the

pettiness of

the

217

offense.

u.s.,

at

363 and

Of

365.

course, a court must consider the severity of the penalty in deciding

u.s.,

whether

it

is

disproportionate.

See,

at 598 (plurality opinion}; Weems, 217
Second,

e.g.,

u.s.,

Coker,

433

at 366-367.

it may be helpful to compare the sentences im-

posed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction.

If more seri-

ous crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious
penalties,

that is some indication that the punishment at issue

may be excessive.

Thus in Enmund the Court noted that all of the

other felony murderers on death row in Florida were more culpable
than the petitioner there.

458

u.s.,

at

The Weems Court

identified an impressive list of more serious crimes that were
subject to less serious penalties.
Third,

courts may

find

217
it

u.s.,

useful

at 380-381.
to compare

the sen-

tences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
capital

In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review of

punishment

third

of American

[such

as

Enmund]

statutes

and

determined

jurisdictions would
to

be

sentenced

ever

to die."

that

"only

permit
458

a

about

a

defendant

u.s.,

at

Even in those jurisdictions, however, the death penalty was almost

never

imposed

under

similar

circumstances.

Id.,

at

The Court's review of foreign law also supported its conclusion.
Id.,
same.

at ___,

n.

433 U.S.,

22.

The analysis in Coker was essentially the

at 593-597.

And in Weems the Court relied on

the fact that, under federal law, a similar crime was punishable
by only two year's imprisonment and a fine.

217

u.s.,

at 380.
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Cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-103 (1958)

(plurality opin-

ion).
In

sum,

a

court's

proportionality

analysis

under

the

Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including

(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the pen-

al ty;

( i i)

the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same

jurisdiction; and

(iii)

the sentences imposed for commission of

the same crime in other jurisdictions.

B

Application

of

these

factors

assumes

that

courts

are

competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative scale.

In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and

courts traditionally have made these judgments--just as legislatures must make them in the first instance.

Comparisons can be

made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or
society, and the culpability of the offender.

Thus in Enmund the

Court determined that the petitioner's conduct was not so serious
as

his

views

accomplices'
as

to

the

conduct.

relative

Indeed,

seriousness

there
of

are

widely

shared

See

Rossi,

crimes.

Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure

and

(1974).

Individual

Differences,

39

Am.

Soc.

Rev.

224,

237

For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent

crimes are

less serious

threat of violence.

than crimes mar ked by violence or the

Cf. Tr.

~

of Oral Arg.

la~~::P; lo~property).

16

(State recognizes
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The absolute magnitude of the crime may be relevant.

Laws §22-30A-17

(Supp. 1982).

dispute that a lesser included offense should not be punmore severely than the greater offense.

Thus a court is

justified in viewing assault with intent to murder as more serious than simple assault.

See Roberts v. Collins, 544 F.2d 168,

169-170

(CA4

curiam) ,

cert.

denied,

{1977) •

Cf.

State,

251 Ind.

250,

1976)

(per

Dembowski v.

815, 817 {1968)

430
252,

973

240 N.E. 2d

{armed robbery more serious than robbery); Cannon

v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 632, 281 P.2d 233, 235 {1955)
serious

U.S.

than assault with

intent

to commit

rape) .

{rape more
It

is also

widely recognized that attempts are less serious than completed
crimes.

See, e.g., S.D. Codified Laws §22-4-1

stone *15.

Similarly, an accessory after the fact should not be

subject to a higher penalty than the principal.

u.s.c.

(1979); 4 Black-

See, e.g., 18

§3.
Turning

to

the culpability of the offender,

there are

again clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply.
Enmund
kill

the Court looked at

~e-in

the petitioner's

lack of

In

intent to

determineing that he was less culpable than his accom-
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plices.

458

u.s.,

at

page 18.

Most would agree that negligent con-

duct is less serious than intentional conduct.

South Dakota, for

example, ranks criminal acts in ascending order of seriousness as
follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing acts, intentional
acts,

and

malicious

(Supp. 1982).

acts.

S.D.

Codified

Laws

§22-1-2 {1) {f)

A court is also entitled to look at a defendant's

4-B~ae~s~efte-z~5~-e~.-rft-fe-Pess 7 -~9-€a~.36-9~9 7 -5~9-P.~e-~9~3

·H:9~4t- -f~t!fft:'i:sh:'i:ft~- Aefe:'i:ft- ~e- €e~~ew- aee:'i:e~ -~e:'i:ft~- ~Afei::!~A -w:'i:~h-

efawai -ftee- se- sef:'i:el::!s- as- sale- ~ef
~ ~ t-44-VI...Il ~

murder 1\~ more serious when
tract.

i~

-~fe€:'i:et•- -S:'i::fft:'i:iaf~y,

-Thus a

committed pursuant to a con-

See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 279, §69(a) (5)

(West

Supp. 1982): cf. 4 Blackstone *15: In re Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 519
p. 2d 10 7 3 (19 7 4) •
This list is by no means exhaustive.

It simply illus-

trates that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing
the severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the
difficulties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions between similar crimes.

c
Application of the factors that we identify also assumes
that courts are able to compare different sentences.
sumption, too, is justified.

This as-

The easiest comparison, of course,

is between capital punishment and noncapital punishments, for the

third draft: Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492
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death penalty is different from other punishments in kind rather
than degree. 18

For sentences of imprisonment, the problem is not

so much one of ordering, but one of line-drawing.

It is clear

that a 25-year sentence generally is more severe than a 15-year

2

senten~but in most cases it would be

difficult to de-

cide whether the former violates the Eighth Amendment while the
latter does not.

Decisions of this kind, although troubling, are

not unique to this area.

The courts are constantly called upon

to draw similar lines in a variety of contexts.
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is an example.
In Williams v.

Florida,

399 U.S.

78

(1970) , the Court upheld a

criminal conviction returned by a unanimous 6-member jury, and in
Apodaca v.

Oregon,

406 U.S.

404

(1972), we upheld a conviction

returned by ten members of a 12-member jury.
~,

435 U.S.

223

(1978), however, we reversed a conviction re-

turned by a unanimous 5-member jury.
admit[ted]

JUSTICE BLACKMON "readily

that we d[id] not pretend to discern a clear line be-

tween six members and five."
J.).

In Ballew v. Geor-

Id., at 239

(opinion of BLACKMON,

He nevertheless found a difference between them of "consti-

tutional significance."

Ibid.~

concurring in the judgment).

cf.

id., at 245-246

(POWELL, J.,

And the following Term, in Burch v.

Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979), we reversed a conviction returned

18 There is also a clear line between sentences of imprisonment
and
sentences
involving
no
deprivation
of
liberty.
See
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
19 The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison,
depending upon the time and conditions of its availability.
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by five members of a 6-member jury:
"[W]e do not pretend the ability to discern a priori a
bright line below which the number of jurors participating in the trial or in the verdict would not permit
the jury to function in the manner required by our prior cases. But .•• it is inevitable that lines must be
drawn somewhere if the substance of the jury trial
right is to be preserved."
Id. , at 13 7 (citations
omitted).
---

drawing

Another

Sixth

function

of

Amendment

the

case

judiciary,

u.s.

right

66

to

months

is

a

the

line-

and offers guidance on the

method by which some lines may be drawn.
399

illustrates

In Baldwin v. New York,

(1970), the Court determined that a defendant has a
jury

trial

"where

authorized."

Id.,

imprisonment
at

69

for

(plurality

more

than

six

opinion).

In

choosing the 6-month standard, the plurality relied almost exclusively on the fact that only New York City denied the right to a
jury trial for an offense punishable by more than six months.

As

JUSTICE WHITE explained:
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us
with the only objective criterion by which a line could
ever be drawn--on the basis of the possible penalty
alone--between offenses that are and that are not regarded as 1 serious 1 for purposes of trial by jury."
Id., at 72-73.
In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly may
distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another.
supports our holding that
other

jurisdictions

should be drawn.

in

courts~k~e

deciding

where

lines

It also

practices in

between

sentences
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IV
It remains to apply the analytical framework established
by our prior decisions to the case before us.

We first consider

the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
argument

that

the

possibility of

We then consider the State's
commutation

is

sufficient

to

save an otherwise unconstitutional sentence.

A

Helm's

crime

was

"one of

the most passive

felonies

a

person could commit."

State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d, at 501 (Hender-

son, J., dissenting).

It involved neither violence nor threat of

violence to any person.

The $100 face value of Helm's "no ac-

count" check was not trivial, but neither was it a large amount.
One hundred dollars was less than half the amount South Dakota
required for a felonious theft. 20

It is easy to see why such a

crime is viewed by society as among the less serious offenses.
See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev., at 229.

~I
2 0If Helm had been convicted simply of t king $100 from a cash
register, S.D. Codified Laws §22-30A-l (1979), or defrauding
someone of $100, §22-30A-3, or obtaining 100 through extortion,
§22-30A-4(1), or blackmail, §22-30A-4{3), r using a false credit
card to obtain $100, §22-30A-8.1, or embez ling $100, §22-30A-10,
he would not be in prison today.
All
f these offenses would
have been petty theft, a misdemeanor. §2 -30A-17 (amended 1982).
Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 che k against insufficient
funds, rather than a nonexistent accou t, he would have been
guilty of a misdemeanor.
§§22-41-1.
nder South Dakota law
there is no distinction between writing a "no account" check for
a large sum and writing a "no account" check for a small sum.
§22-41-1.2.
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Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a
"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender. 21
And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more severely
than it punishes a first offender.

Helm's status, however, can-

not be considered in the abstract.

His prior offenses, although

classified as

felonies,

were all relatively minor. 22

nonviolent and none was a crime against a person.

All were

As the State

conceded at oral argument, the three third-degree burglary convictions could have been the result of stealing three loaves of
bread.

Tr. of Oral Arg. 16.

There was also no minimum amount in

the statute against obtaining money under false pretenses.
n.

2, supra.

See

Helm's "grand larceny" may have been no more than

the theft of a chicken.

See n.

3,

~~·

face, Helm's

ost serious crime was a felony case of driving while intoxicated,
~/

¥.vvu
-~. JV
~

tt/
~~

~:f·

but he

served
2.1

17.

barely nine months for

Such a short

that offense, Tr.

of

suggests that the particu

~

21 we must focus on the principal felony--the felonf:ft
gers the life sentence--since Helm already has paid the penalty
for each of his prior offenses.
But we recognize that Helm's
prior convictions are relevant to the sentencing decision.

22 Helm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a
professional criminal.
The record indicates an addiction to alcohol, and a consequent difficulty in holding a job. His record
involves no instance of violence of any kind.
Incarcerating him
for life without possibility of parole is unlikely to advance afty
e~-the goals of our criminal justice system in any substantial
way.
Neither Helm nor the State will have any incentive to pursu23clearly needed treatment for his alcohol problem.
The sentence was well below that authorized for even the
least serious felony in South Dakota. See note 6, supra. It was
also shorter than the sentences Helm served for other minor
crimes. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 14.

J
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outh D kota aut
Helm's

present

possibility of parole. 24
~~at

sentence

is

life

imprisonment

without

Barring executive clemency, see infra,

___ , Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state peni-

~ ,::::::::~ c:~g:;bel::::::::::::~:~h:::~:;~::~Ru:;::is:::i::::l::::

~nement, 25
~~

~ ~·
I

~

u.s.,

at 280-281.

sentence

crime.

?~ ~ot

a fact on which the Court d-".:.ied

heavi~y.

Helm's sentence is t more l severe lthanJ any

the State could have

See note 6 , s u12r a.

other'~

imposed on any criminal for

any )

Only capital punishment, a penalty

authorized in South Dakota when Helm was sentenced, exceeds

v~v""'. 1 t.

~~r
~r"
~
.'

~
';t1'

()AI'.

~A~fi/

9fJ.,L
, ~1)/

~j(
~rL

. ..h

40~r.~

1 ~~-

~,....!II)
,1<)

-

We next consider the sentences that could be imposed

other criminals in the same

jurisdictio~.

When Helm was

tenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a life
tence

for

murder,

S.D.

Codified Laws §22-16-12

{1979)

~:

See 445

~

~·t

~

it:!;

on~~

sen~'-:t;_·'1
sen-~?

{amended

1980), and was authorized to impose a life sentence for treason,

§22-8-1, first degree manslaughter, §22-16-15, first degree ar-

~

·

~

~-;j
~
~

24we raise no question as to the general validity of sentences ~'
without possibility of parole.
The only issue before us is
whether, in the circumstances of this case and in light of the ~
constitutional principle of proportionality, the sentence imposed
on this petitioner violates the Eighth Amendment.

25we

note

that

Rummel was,

in

fact,

months of the Court's decision in his case.
16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3.

released

within

eight

See L.A. Times, Nov.
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son,

§22-33-1,

(1967 ed.,

and

supp.

kidnapping,

1978)

S.D.

Comp.

Laws

Ann.

§22-19-1

(amended 1979) 7 -eu•te-fi:f's~-ee~f'ee-af'seAT

~~-33-~.

No other crime was punishable so severely on the first

offense.

Attempted murder, S.D. Codified Laws §22-4-1(5)

(1979),

placing an explosive device on an aircraft, §22-14A-5, and first
degree rape, §22-22-1 (amended 1980 and 1982), were only Class 2
felonies.

Aggravated riot, §22-10-5, was only a Class 3 felony.

Distribution of
(1977),

and

heroin,

aggravated

§§ 22-4 2-2

(amended

assault,

1982) ,

§22-18-1.1

34-20B-13 ( 7)

(amended

1980

and

1981), were only Class 4 felonies.
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analysis, but relevant comparisons are still possible.
the

penalty

class.

for

a

second or

third

felony

is

Under §22-7-7,

increased by one

Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or third

conviction was

for

treason,

first

degree manslaughter,

kidnap-

ping, or first degree arson, and a life sentence would have been
authorized when a second or third conviction was for such crimes
as attempted murder, placing an explosive device on an aircraft,
or

first

degree

rape.

Finally,

§22-7-8,

under which Helm was

sentenced, authorized life imprisonment after three prior convictions, regardless of the crimes.
In sum, there were a handful of crimes that were necessarily punished by life imprisonment:

murder~

and treason, first

degree manslaughter, kidnapping, or first degree arson on a second or

third offense.

There was a larger group for which life

imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of the sentencing
judge, including: treason, first degree manslaughter, kidnapping,
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or

first

degree

arson~

attempted murder,

page 25.

placing an explosive

device on an aircraft, or first degree rape on a second or third
offense~

and any felony after

three prior offenses.

Finally,

there was a large group of very serious offenses for which life
imprisonment was not authorized,

including a third offense of

heroin dealing or aggravated assault.
rft- afty- f"a~oiefta3:- syseem7- eCr iminals

committing

any of

these offenses ordinarily would be thought more deserving of punishment than one uttering a "no account" check--even when the
bad-check writer had already committed six minor felonies.

Fur-

thermore, there is no indication in the record that any habitual

w-/o

)1 ~~~ ?

offender other than Helm has ever been given the maximum sentence
on the basis of comparable crimes.

It is more likely that the

possibility of life imprisonment under §22-7-8 generally is reserved for criminals such as fourth-time heroin dealers, while
habitual bad-check writers receive more lenient treatment. 2 6
eaft-eft3:y-eefte3:~ee-~ha~-In

We

any event, Helm has been treated in the

same manner as, or more severely than, criminals who have committed far more serious crimes.
26 The

State contends that §22-7-8 is more lenient than the
Texas habitual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment
under §22-7-8 is discretionary rather than mandatory. Brief for
Petitioner 22. Helm, however, has challenged only his own sentence. No one suggests that §22-7-8 may not be applied constitutionally to fourth-time heroin dealers or other violent cr iminals. Thus we do not question the legislature's judgment. Unlike in Rummel, a lesser sentence here could have been entirely
consistent with both the statute and the Eighth Amendment. See
Note, Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum.
L. Rev. 1119, 1160 (1979).

'
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Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission
of the same crime in other jurisdictions.

The Court of Appeals

found that "Helm could have received a life sentence without parole for his offense in only one other state, Nevada," 684 F.2d,
at 586, and we have no reason to doubt
of Oral Arg. 21.

~~s-this

finding.

See Tr.

At the very least, therefore, it is clear that

Helm could not have received such a severe sentence in 48 of the
50 States.

But even under Nevada law, a life sentence without

possibility

of

stances.
advised

parole

See Nev.
that

is

Rev.

merely

Stat.

authorized

§207.010(2}

any defendant such as Helm,

in

these

(1981}.

circum-

We are not

whose prior offenses

were so minor, actually has received the maximum penalty in Nevada.27

It

appears

that Helm was

treated more severely than he

would have been in any other State.

B

The State argues

that

the present case

is essentially

the same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in

27 under Ne¥.-Re¥.-S~a~.-§207.010(2), a Nevada court is authorized to impose a sentence of "imprisonment 1n the state prison
for life with or without possibility of parole.
If the penalty
fixed by the court is life imprisonment with the possibility of
parole, eligibility for parole begins when a minimum of 10 years
has been served."
It appears that most sentences imposed under
§ 207.010 ( 2) permit parole, even when the prior crimes are far
more serious than Helm's.
See, e.g., Rusling v. State, 96 Nev.
778, 617 P. 2d 1302 (1980) (possession of a firearm by an exfelon, two instances of driving an automobile without the owner's
consent, four first degree burglaries, two sales of marijuana,
two sales of a restricted dangerous drug, one sale of heroin, one
escape from state prison, and one second degree burglary).
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that
here.

case

is

matched by the

possibility of executive clemency

The State reasons that the Governor could commute Helm's

sentence

to

a

term of

years.

We

conclude,

however,

that

the

South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally different from
the parole system that was before us in Rummel.
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different
concepts, despite some surface similarities.
part of the rehabilitative process.

Parole is a regular

Assuming good behavior,

is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases.

it

The law

generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to be considered for parole, and details the standards and procedures applicable at that time.
Inmates,

442

u.s.

See,

e.g., Greenholz v.

(1979)

1

(detailing

Nebraska Penal
parole

Nebraska

procedures): Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477

(1972)

("the

practice of releasing prisoners on parole before the end of their
sentences

has

become

an

integral

system").

Thus it is possible to predict, at least to some ex-

tent, when parole might be granted.
hand,

part

of

the

penological

Commutation, on the other

is an ad hoc exercise of executive clemency.

A Governor

may commute a sentence at any time for any reason without reference to any standards.
v. Dumschat, 452
We

u.s.

See, e.g., Connecticut Board of Pardons

458 (1981).

explicitly

have

recognized

the

parole and commutation in our prior cases. 28

distinction

between

Writing on behalf

28 rn Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the
possibil1ty of commutation is not equivalent to the possibility
Footnote continued on next page.
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of the Morrissey Court,

for example, CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER con-

trasted the two possibilities: "Rather than being an ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals."

408 U.S.,

at

4 77.

In Dumscha t,

THE CHIEF JUSTICE similarly explained that "there is a vast difference between a denial of parole ••• and a state's refusal to
commute a lawful sentence."
The

Texas

very different.

and

452

u.s.,

South Dakota

at 466.
systems

in

particular

are

In Rummel, the Court did not rely simply on the

existence of some system of parole.
visions of the system presented,

Rather it looked to the proincluding the fact

that Texas

had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good time' credits
to its prisoners, a policy that historically has allowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for parole in as
little as 12 years."

445

u.s.,

at 280.

A Texas prisoner became

eligible for parole when his calendar time served plus "good conduct" time equaled one-third of the maximum sentence imposed or
20 years, whichever
42.12, §l5(b)

is less.

(Vernon 1979).

Tex.

Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art.

An entering prisoner earned 20 days

of parole.
The Court carefully "distinguish [ed] Rummel from a
person sentenced under a recidivist statute like [Miss. Code Ann.
§99-19-83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for a sentence of life
without parole."
445 u.s., at 281. But the Mississippi Constitution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal
and penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment."
Art. 5, §124. The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized
that the power to pardon includes the power to commute a
convict's sentence.
See Whittington v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598,
603-604, 73 So.2d 137, 139-140 (1954) .--~~e-R~mmel-ee~~e-~a¥e-Re
we~~~e-ee-e~e-~eee~e~l~ey-e~-eMee~e~¥e-elemeRey~
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good-time

per

30

days

served,

Brief

for

Respondent

in Rummel,

O.T. 1979, No. 78-6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30
days good-time per

30 days

Art.

(Vernon Supp. 1982).

6181-1, §§2-3

served,

Tex.

Rev.

Ci v.

Stat. Ann. ,

Thus Rummel could have

been eligible for parole in as few as 10 years, and could have
expected to become eligible,

in the normal course of events, in

only 12 years.
In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain
than parole.

For example,

the board of pardons and paroles is

authorized to make commutation recommendations to the Governor,
see n.

7,

supra,

but §24-13-4 provides that

"no recommendation

for the commutation of ••• a life sentence, or for a pardon ••• ,
shall be made by less than the unanimous vote of all members of
the board."
eight

years,

In fact, no life sentence has been commuted in over
App.

29,

while

parole--where authorized--has

granted regularly during that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9.

been
Fur-

thermore, even if Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would
be eligible to be considered for parole. 2 9

Not only is there no

guarantee that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota parole
system is far more stringent than the one before us in Rummel.
Helm would have to serve three-fourths of his revised sentence
before he would be eligible for parole, §24-15-5, and the provision for good-time credits is far less generous, §24-5-1. 30

29 The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Dakota occurred in 1975.
The record indicates, however, that the
prisoner in question has still not been paroled. App. 29.
Footnote(s) 30 will appear on following pages.
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The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a
hope for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency."
ent

from

the

possibility of

It is little differ-

executive clemency that exists

in

every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence under the
Eighth Amendment.

Recognition of such a bare possibility would

make judicial review under the Eighth Amendment meaningless.

v
The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence
to determine if it is proportionate to his crime.

Applying ob-

jective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penultimate
sentence

for

relatively

minor

criminal

conduct.

He

has

been

treated more harshly than other criminals in the State who have
committed more serious crimes.

He has been treated more harshly

than he would have been in any other jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State.

We conclude that his sentence

is significantly disproportionate to his crime, and is therefore
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.

The judgment of the Court of

Appeals is accordingly
Affirmed.

30 Assume, for example, that in 1979 the Governor had commuted
Helm's hae-eeeH-sentencea to a term of 4o years --(H1s approxlmate~ife expectancy).-~H-l9~9.
Even if Helm weire ai model prisoner' he would not nave been eligible for parole until he had
served over 21 years--.--~h~s-~s-more than twice as-leH~-as-the
Rummel minimum.
Anar this comparison is generous to South
Dakota's position.
If Rummel had been sentenced to 40 years
rather than life, he could have been eligible for parole in less
than 7 years.
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No. 82-492
HERMAN SOLEM, WARDEN, PETITIONER v. JERRY
BUCKLEY HELM

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[June - , 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment
proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a
seventh nonviolent felony.
I
By 1975 the State of South Dakota had convicted respondent Jerry Helm of six nonviolent felonies. In 1964, 1966, and
1969 Helm was convicted of third-degree burglary.• In 1972
' In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined in at least two sections of
the South Dakota criminal code:
"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the nighttime with intent
to commit a crime but under such circumstances as do not constitute burglary in the first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third degree." S.D.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22--32--8 (1967) (repealed 1976).
"A person breaking or entering at any time any building within the curtilage of a dwelling house but not forming a part thereof, or any building or
part of any building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as defined in
§ 32-14-1, or any structure or erection in which any property is kept, with
intent to commit larceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the third
degree." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-9 (1967) (repealed 1976).
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essentially the
same. See S.D. Code § 13.3703 (1939 ed., supp. 1960); 1965 S.D. Laws,
ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by "imprisonment in the
state penitentiary for any term not exceeding fifteen years." S.D. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 22-32-10 (1967) .(previously codified at S.D. Code § 13.3705(3)
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he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2
In 1973 he was convicted of grand larceny. 3 And in 1975 he
was convicted of third-offense driving while intoxicated. •
The record contains no details about the circumstances of any
of these offenses, except that they were all nonviolent, none
was a crime against a person, and alcohol was a contributing
factor in each case.
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a "no account"
check for $100. 5 The only details we have of the crime are
those given by Helm to the state trial court:
(1939)) (repealed 1976).
z In 1972 the relevant statute provided:
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any false token or writing, or other false pretense, ... obtains from any person any money or
property . . . is punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not
exceeding three years or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a
fine not exceeding three times the value of the money or property so obtained, or by both such fine and imprisonment." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 22-41-4 (1967) (repealed 1976).
a In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of personal property accomplished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive another
thereof." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22--37-1 (1967) (repealed 1976).
Grand larceny and petit larceny were distinguished as follows:
"Grand larceny is larceny committed in any of the following cases:
(1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding fifty dollars;
(2) When such property, although not of a value exceeding fifty dollars,
is taken from the person of another;
(3) When such property is livestock.
Larceny in other cases is petit larceny." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22--37-2
(1967) (repealed 1976).
Grand larceny was then punishable by "imprisonment in the state penitentiary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22--37-3 (1967) (repealed
1976).
• A third offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol is a felony
in South Dakota. S.D. Codified Laws § 32-23-4 (1976). See 1973 S.D.
Laws, ch. 195, § 7 (enacting version of § 32-23-4 in force in 1975).
6
The governing statute provides, in relevant part:
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"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that
day, was drinking and I ended .up here in Rapid City
with more money than I had when I started. I knew I'd
done something I didn't know exactly what. If I would
have known this, I would have picked the check up. I
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several
places."' State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d 497, 501 (S.D.
1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Helm).
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty.
Ordinarily the maximum punishment for uttering a "no account" check would have been five years imprisonment in the
state penitentiary and a five thousand dollar fine. See S.D.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1(6) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now
codified at S.D. Codified Laws § 22-6-1(7) (Supp. 1982)). As
a result of his criminal record, however, Helm was subject to
South Dakota's recidivist statute:
''When a defendant has been convicted of at least three
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal felony,
the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to
the sentence for a Class 1 felony." S.D. Codified Laws
§22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981).
The maximum penalty for a "Class 1 felony'' was life imprisonment in the state penitentiary and a twenty-five thousand
dollar fine. 6 S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-6-1(2) (1967 ed.,
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another
for present consideration with intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a
financial institution knowing at the time of such passing that he or his principal does not have an account with such financial institution, is guilty of a
Class 5 felony." S.D. Codified Laws § 22-41-1.2 (1979).
6
When Helm was sentenced in April 1979, South Dakota law classified
felonies as follows:
"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are divided into the following seven classes which are distinguished from each other by the respective maximum penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized
upon conviction:

82-492-0PINION
4

SOLEM v. HELM

supp. 1978) (now codified at S.D. Codified Laws § 22-6-1(3)
(Supp. 1982)). Moreover, South Dakota law explicitly provides that parole is unavailable: "A person sentenced to life
imprisonment is not eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles." S.D. Codified Laws §24-1f>.-.4 (1979).
The Governor 7 is authorized to pardon prisoners, or to commute their sentences, S.D. Const., Art. IV, § 3, but no other
relief from sentence is available even to a rehabilitated
prisoner.
Immediately after accepting Helm's guilty plea, the South
Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life imprisonment
under §22-7-8. The court explained:
" 'I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly
proven that you're an habitual criminal and the record
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. A less.e r
sentence may not be given for a Class A felony;
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed; ·
(3) Class 2 felony: twenty-five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed;
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary.
In addition, a fine of fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed;
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In
addition, a fine of ten thousand dollars may be imposed;
(6) Class 5 felony: five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In
addition, a fine of five thousand dollars may be imposed; and
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the state penitentiary or a
fine of two thousand dollars, or both.
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sentences for habitual criminals ....
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by law, every offense
declared to be a felony and not otherwise classified is a Class 6 felony."
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22--6-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979 and
1980).
7
The board of pardons and paroles is authorized to make recommendations to the Governor, S.D. Codified Laws § 24-14-1 (1979); § 24-14-5; S.D.
Executive Order 82-&1 (Apr. 12, 1982), but the Governor is not bound by
the recommendation, § 24-14-5.
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would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation and that
the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up for the rest
of your natural life, so you won't have further victims of
your crimes, just be coming back before Courts. You'll
have plenty of time to think this one over."' State v.
Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 500 (Henderson, J., dissenting)
(quoting S.D. Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit,
Pennington County (Parker, J.)).
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a ~2 decision, affirmed
the sentence despite Helm's argument that it violated the
Eighth Amendment. State v. Helm, supra.
After Helm had served two years in the state penitentiary,
he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a
fixed term of years. Such a commutation would have had
the effect of making Helm eligible to be considered for parole
when he had served three-fourths of his new sentence. See
S.D. Codified Laws § 24-15-5(3) (1979). The Governor denied Helm's request in May 1981. App. 26.
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the
United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. Helm argued, among other things, that his sentence
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the District Court
recognized that the sentence was harsh, it concluded that this
Court's recent decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263
(1980), was dispositive. It therefore denied the writ.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed. 684 F. 2d 582 (1982). The Court of Appeals
noted that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable. Helm's
sentence of life without parole was qualitatively different
from Rummel's life sentence with the prospect of parole because South Dakota has rejected rehabilitation as a goal of
the criminal justice system. The Court of Appeals examined
the nature of Helm's offenses, the nature of his sentence, and
the sentence he could have received in other States for the

82-492--0PINION
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same offense. It concluded, on the basis of this examination,
that Helm's sentence was "grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offense." 684 F. 2d, at 587. It therefore directed the District Court to issue the writ unless the State
resentenced Helm. Ibid.
In view of the important Eighth Amendment question presented by this case, we granted certiorari. 459 U. S. - (1982). We now affinn.
II
The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." The final clause prohibits not
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.
A
The principle that a punishment should be proportionate to
the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence. In 1215 three chapters of Magna
Carta were devoted to the rule that "amercements" 8 may not
be excessive. 9 And the principle was repeated and extended in the First Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw. I, ch. 6
(1275). These were not hollow guarantees, for the royal
courts relied on them to invalidate disproportionate punishments. See, e. g., Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop of Winches8

An amercement was similar to a modem-day fine. It was the most
common criminal sanction in thirteenth century England. See 2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 513-515 (2d ed. 1909).
1
Chapter 20 declared that "[a] freeman shall not be amerced for a small
fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great crime according to
the heinousness of it." See 1 S.D. Codified Laws, p. 4 (1978) (translation
of Magna Carta). According to Maitland, "there was no clause in Magna
Carta more grateful to the mass of the people .... " F. Maitland, Pleas of
the Crown for the County of Gloucester xxxiv (1884). Chapter 21 granted
the same rights to the nobility, and chapter 22 granted the same rights to
the clergy.
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ter, Y.B. Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 (C.P. 1316), reprinted in 52
Selden Society 3 (1934). When prison sentences became the
normal criminal sanctions, the common law recognized that
these, too, must be proportional. See, e. g., Hodges v.
Humkin, 2 Buist. 139, 140, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K.B.
1615) (Croke, J.) ("imprisonment ought always to be according to the quality of the offence").
The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of proportionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth
Amendment: "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor
excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments
inflicted." 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). Although the
precise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incorporated "the longstanding principle of English law that the punishment ... should not be, by reason of its excessive length
or severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged."
R. Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 (1959); see 4 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries *16-19 (1769); see also id., at
*16-17 (in condemning "punishments of unreasonable severity," uses "cruel" to mean severe or excessive). Indeed,
barely three months after the Bill of Rights was adopted, the
House of Lords declared that a "fine of thirty thousand
pounds, imposed by the court of King's Bench upon the earl
of Devon, was excessive and exorbitant, against magna
charta, the common right of the subject, and against the law
of the land." Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Trials 133, 136
(1689).
When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the
language of the English Bill of Rights, 10 they also adopted the
English principle of proportionality. The people were guaranteed the rights they had possessed as English subjectsincluding the right to be free from excessive punishments.
This language had earlier been incorporated in the Virginia Declaration
of Rights, Art. I, § 9, authored by George Mason.
10
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B
The constitutional principle of proportionality has been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 11 In the
leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910),
the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public document and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form
of imprisonment that included hard labor in chains and permanent civil disabilities. The Court noted "that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to offense," id., at 367, and held that the
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court endorsed the principle of proportionality as a constitutional
standard, see, e. g., id., at 372-373, and determined that the
sentence before it was "cruel in its excess of imprisonment,"
id., at 377.
The Court next applied the principle to invalidate a criminal sentence in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660
(1962). 12 A 90-day sentence was found to be excessive for
the crime of being "addicted to the use of narcotics." The
Court explained that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in
the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual."
11
In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323 (1892), the defendant had been
convicted of 307 counts of "selling intoxicating liquor without authority,"
and sentenced to a tenn of over 54 years. The majority did not reach
O'Neil's contention that this sentence was unconstitutional, for he did not
include the point in his assignment of errors or in his brief. /d., at 331.
Furthennore, the majority noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not
apply to the States." /d., at 332. Accordingly the Court dismissed the
writ of error for want of a federal question. /d., at 33&-337. The dissent,
however, reached the Eighth Amendment question, observing that it "is
directed . . . against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged." /d., at
339-340 (Field, J., dissenting).
12
Members of the Court continued to recognize the principle of proportionality in the meantime. See, e. g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100
(1958) (plurality opinion); id., at 111 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at
125-126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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I d., at 667. Thus there was no question of an inherently barbaric punishment. "But the question cannot be considered
in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and
unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."
Ibid.
Most recently, the Court has applied the principle of proportionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain
circumstances. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. - - (1982)
(death penalty excessive for felony murder when defendant
did not take life, attempt to take life, or intend that a life. be
taken or that lethal force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U. S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("sentence of death is
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the
crime of rape"); id., at 601 (POWELL, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("ordinarily death is
disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult
. woman"). And the Court has continued to recognize that
the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate
punishments, even when it has not been necessary to rely on
the proscription. See, e. g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678,
685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667 (1977);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 171-172 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Davis,
454 U. S. 370, 374, and n. 3 (1982) (per curiam) (recognizing
that some prison sentences may be constitutionally disproportionate); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11
(same).

c

There is no basis for the State's assertion that the general
principle of proportionality does not apply to felony prison
sentences. 13 The constitutional language itself suggests no
18

According to Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 (1980), "one could

argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for

crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies . . . the length of
sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative."
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exception for imprisonment. We have recognized that the
Eighth Amendment imposes "parallel limitations" on bail,
fines, and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U. S., at 664, and the text is explicit that bail and fines may
not be excessive. It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser
punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death
were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the intermediate punishment of imprisonment were not. There is
also no historical support for such an exception. The common-law principle incorporated into the Eighth Amendment
clearly applied to prison terms. See Hodges v. Humkin,
supra. And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that
prison sentences are subject to proportionality analysis.
See, e. g., Weems, 217 U. S., at 377; cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437
U. S., at 685 ("Confinement in a prison . . . is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment
standards").
When we have applied the proportionality principle in capital cases, we have drawn no distinction with imprisonment.
See .Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 176 (opinion of Stewart,
POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). It is true that the "penalty of
death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not
in degree but in kind." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238,
306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). As a result, "our decisions [in] capital cases are of limited assistance in deciding
the constitutionality of the punishment" in a noncapital case.
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 272. All this means, however, is that, "[o]utside the context of capital punishment,
successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [will be] exceedingly rare," 14 ibid. (emphasis added);
ld., at 274 (emphasis added). The Court did not adopt the standard proposed, but merely recognized that the argument was possible. To the extent that the State makes this argument here, we find it meritless.
•• In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to be excessive for felony murder in the circumstances of that case. But clearly no
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see Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S., at 374. It does not mean that
proportionality analysis is entirely inapplicable in noncapital
cases.
In sum, we hold that a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted. Reviewing courts, of course, should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures possess
in determining the types and limits of punishments for
crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in
sentencing convicted criminals. 15 But no penalty is per se
constitutional. As the Court noted in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S., at 667, a single day in prison may be unconstitutional in some circumstances.

III
A
In reviewing sentences under the Eighth Amendment,
courts should be guided by objective factors that our cases
have recognized. 16 First, we look to the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty. In Enmund, for example, the Court examined the circumstances of the defendant's crime in great detail. 458 U. S., a t - - - - - . In
Coker the Court considered the seriousness of the crime of
rape, and compared it to other crimes, such as murder. 433
sentence short of death would be unconstitutional for Enmund's crime.
5
' In view of the substantial deference properly due to legislatures and
sentencing courts, most reviewing courts normally will not be required to
engage in extended analysis to determine that a sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate.
11
As the Court has indicated, no one factor will be dispositive. See
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S. 370, 373--374 n. 2 (1982) (per curiam); Rummel
v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 27~276. The inherent nature of our federal
system and the need for individualized sentencing decisions result in a wide
range of constitutional sentences. No single criterion can identify when a
sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it violates the Eighth
Amendment.
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U. S., at 597-598 (plurality opinion); id., at 603 (POWELL, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
In Robinson the emphasis was placed on the nature of the
"crime." 370 U. S., at 666-667. And in Weems, the Court's
opinion commented in two separate places on the pettiness of
the offense. 217 U. S., at 363 and 365. Of course, a court
must consider the severity of the penalty in deciding whether
it is disproportionate. See, e. g., Coker, 433 U. S., at 598
(plurality .opinion); Weems, 217 U. S., at 36fh367.
Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more
serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at
issue may be excessive. Thus in Enmund the Court noted
that all of the other felony murderers on death row in Florida
were more culpable than the petitioner there. 458 U. S., at
The Weems Court identified an impressive list of
more serious crimes that were subject to less serious penalties. 217 U. S., at 380-381.
Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review
of capital punishment statutes and determined that "only
about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a
defendant [such as Enmund] to be sentenced to die." 458
U. S., at--. Even in those jurisdictions, however, the
death penalty was almost never imposed under similar circumstances. ld., at--. The Court's review of foreign
law also supported its conclusion. I d., at - - , n. 22. The
analysis in Coker was essentially the same. 433 U. S., at
59!>-597. And in Weems the Court relied on the fact that,
under federal law, a similar crime was punishable by only two
year's imprisonment and a fine. 217 U. S., at 380. Cf. Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 102-103 (1958) (plurality opinion).
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including

82-492-0PINION
SOLEM v. HELM

13

(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty;
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of
the same crime in other jurisdictions.
B

Application of these factors assumes that courts are competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative
scale. In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and
courts traditionally have made these judgments-just as legislatures must make them in the first instance. Comparisons
can be made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the
victim or society, and the culpability of the offender. Thus
in Enmund the Court determined that the petitioner's conduct was not }fJ serious as his accomplices' conduct. Indeed,
there are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness
of crimes. See Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness
of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences,
39 Am. Soc. Rev. 224, 237 (1974). For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent crimes are less serious than
crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence. Cf. Tr.
of Oral Arg. 16 (the State recognizes that the criminal law is
more protective of people than property).
There are other widely accepted principles that courts may
apply in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society. The absolute magnitude of the crime may be
relevant. Stealing a million dollars is viewed as more serious than stealing a hundred dollars-a point recognized in
statutes distinguishing petty theft from grand theft. See,
e. g., S.D. Codified Laws §22-30A-17 (Supp. 1982). Few
would dispute that a lesser included offense should not be
punished more severely than the greater offense. Thus a
court is justified in viewing assault with intent to murder as
more serious than simple assault. See Roberts v. Collins,
544 F. 2d 168, 16~170 (CA4 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied,
430 U. S. 973 (1977). Cf. Dembowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250,
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252, 240 N. E. 2d 815, 817 (1968) (armed robbery more serious than robbery); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 632, 281
P. 2d 233, 235 (1955) (rape more serious than assault with intent to commit rape). It is also widely recognized that attempts are less serious than completed crimes. See, e. g.,
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-4-1 (1979); 4 Blackstone *15. Similarly, an accessory after the fact should not be subject to a
higher penalty than the principal. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3.
Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are again
clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply. In
Enmund the Court looked at the petitioner's lack of intent to
kill in determining that he was less culpable than his accomplices. 458 U. S., at--. Most would agree that negligent
conduct is less serious than intentional conduct. South Dakota, for example, ranks criminal acts in ascending order of
seriousness as follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing
acts, intentional acts, and malicious acts. S.D. Codified
Laws § 22-1-2(1)(f) (Supp. 1982). A court is also entitled to
look at a defendant's motive in committing a crime. Thus a
murder may be viewed as more serious when committed pursuant to a contract. See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch.
279, §69(a)(5) (West Supp. 1982); cf. 4 Blackstone *15; In re
Foss , 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 P. 2d 1073 (1974).
This list is by no means exhaustive. It simply illustrates
that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing the
severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the difficulties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions between
similar crimes.

c

Application of the factors that we identify also assumes
that courts are able to compare different sentences. This assumption, too, is justified. The easiest comparison, of
course, is between capital punishment and noncapital punish-
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ments, for the death penalty is different from other punishments in kind rather than degree. 17 For sentences of imprisonment, the problem is not so much one of ordering, but one
of line-drawing. It is clear that a 25-year sentence generally
is more severe than a 15-year sentence, 18 but in most cases it
would be difficult to decide that the former violates the
Eighth Amendment while the latter does not. Decisions of
this kind, although troubling, are not unique to this area.
The courts are constantly called upon to draw similar line's in
a variety of contexts.
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is an example.
In Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78 (1970), the Court upheld
a criminal conviction returned by a unanimous 6-member
jury, and in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (1972), we upheld a conviction returned by ten members of a 12-member
jury. In Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U. S. 223 (1978), however,
we reversed a conviction returned by a unanimous 5-member
jury. JUSTICE BLACKMUN "readily admit(ted] that we d(id]
not pretend to discern a clear line between six members and
five." I d., at 239 (opinion of BLACKMUN, J. ). He nevertheless found a difference between them of "constitutional significance." Ibid.; cf. id., at 24&-246 (POWELL, J., concurring
in the judgment). And the following Term, in Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U. S. 130 (1979), we reversed a conviction returned by five members of a 6-member jury:
"[W]e do not pretend the ability to discern a priori a
bright line below which the number of jurors participating in the trial or in the verdict would not permit the
jury to function in the manner required by our prior
cases. But . . . it is inevitable that lines must be drawn
There is also a clear line between sentences of imprisonment and sentences involving no deprivation of liberty. See Argersinger v. Hamlin,
17

407

u. s. 25 (1972).

The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison, depending
upon the time and conditions of its availability.
11
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somewhere if the substance of the jury trial right is to be
preserved." Id., at 137 (citations omitted).
Another Sixth Amendment case illustrates the line-drawing function of the judiciary, and offers guidance on the
method by which some lines may be drawn. In Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), the Court determined that a
defendant has a right to a jury trial "where imprisonment for
more than six months is authorized." I d., at 69 (plurality
opinion). In choosing the 6-month standard, the plurality relied almost exclusively on the fact that only New York City
denied the right to a jury trial for an offense punishable by
more than six months. As JUSTICE WHITE explained:
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us
with the only objective criterion by which a line could
ever be drawn-on the basis of the possible penalty
alone-between offenses that are and that are not regarded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury." I d., at
72-73.
In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly
may distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another.
It also supports our holding that courts properly may look to
the practices in other jurisdictions in deciding where lines between sentences should be drawn.
IV
It remains to apply the analytical framework established
by our prior decisions to the case before us. We first consider the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life
imprisonment without possibility of parole. We then consider the State's argument that the possibility of commutation is sufficient to save an otherwise unconstitutional
sentence.
A
Helm's crime was "one of the most passive felonies a person could commit." State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 501
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(Henderson, J., dissenting). It involved neither violence nor
threat of violence to any person. The $100 face value of
Helm's "no account" check was not trivial, but neither was it
a large amount. One hundred dollars was less than half the
amount South Dakota required for a felonious theft. 19 It is
easy to see why such a crime is viewed by society as among
the less serious offenses. See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev.,
at 229.
Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a
"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender.~
And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more severely than it punishes a first offender. Helm's status, however, cannot be considered in the abstract. His prior offenses, although classified as felonies, were all relatively
minor. 21 All were nonviolent and none was a crime against a
person. Indeed, there was no minimum amount in either the
burglary or the false pretenses statutes, see nn. 1 and 2,
"If Helm had been convicted simply of taking $100 from a cash register,
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-1 (1979), or defrauding someone of $100,
§ 22-30A-3, or obtaining $100 through extortion, § 22-30A-4(1), or blackmail, § 22-30A-4(3), or using a false credit card to obtain $100,
§ 22-30A-8.1, or embezzling $100, § 22-30A-10, he would not be in prison
today. All of these offenses would have been petty theft, a misdemeanor.
§ 22-30A-17 (amended 1982). Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 check
against insufficient funds, rather than a nonexistent account, he would
have been guilty of a misdemeanor. §§ 22-41-1. Curiously, under South
Dakota law there is no distinction between writing a ''no account" check for
a large sum and writing a "no account" check for a small sum. § 22-41-1.2.
111
We must focus on the principal felony-the felony that triggers the life
sentence-since Helm already has paid the penalty for each of his prior offenses. But we recognize, of course, that Helm's prior convictions are relevant to the sentencing decision.
21
Helm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a professional criminal. The record indicates an addiction to alcohol, and a consequent difficulty in holding a job. His record involves no instance of violence of any kind. Incarcerating him for life without possibility of parole is
unlikely to advance the goals of our criminal justice system in any substantial way. Neither Helm nor the State will have any incentive to pursue
clearly needed treatment for his alcohol problem.

-1

-
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supra, and the minimum amount covered by grand larceny
statute was fairly small, see n. 3, supra. 22
Helm's present sentence is life imprisonment without possibility of parole. 23 Barring executive clemency, see infra, at
- - , Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state penitentiary. This sentence is far more severe than the life sentence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel was
likely to have been eligible for parole within 12 years of his
initial confinement, 24 a fact on which the Court relied heavily.
See 445 U. S., at 280-281. Helm's sentence is more severe
than any._ sentence the State could have imposed on any
criminal for any crime. See note 6, supra. Only capital
punishment, a penalty not authorized in South Dakota when
Helm was sentenced, exceeds it.
We next consider the sentences that could be imposed on
other criminals in the same jurisdiction. When Helm was
sentenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a
life sentence for murder, S.D. Codified Laws § 22-16-12
(1979) (amended 1980), .and was authorized to impose a life
sentence for treason, § 22-8-1, first degree manslaughter,
§ 22-16-15, first degree arson, § 22-33-1, and kidnapping,
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-19-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978)
(amended 1979). No other crime was punishable so severely
on the first offense. Attempted murder, S.D. Codified Laws
a As suggested at oral argument, the third-degree burglary statute covered entering a building with the intent to steal a loaf of bread. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 14-16. It appears that the grand larceny statute would have covered
the theft of a chicken.
11
Every life sentence in South Dakota is without possibility of parole.
See supra, a t - . We raise no question as to the general validity of sentences without possibility of parole. The only issue before us is whether,
in the circumstances of this case and in light of the constitutional principle
of proportionality, the sentence imposed on this petitioner violates the
Eighth Amendment.
"'We note that Rummel was, in fact, released within eight months of the
Court's decision in his case. See L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3.

other than life
imprisonment without possibility
of parole that
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§ 22-4-1(5) (1979), placing an explosive device on an aircraft,
§ 22-14A-5, and first degree rape, § 22-22-1 (amended 1980
and 1982), were only Class 2 felonies. Aggravated riot,
§ 22-10-5, was only a Class 3 felony. Distribution of heroin,
§§ 22-42-2 (amended 1982), 34-20B-13(7) (1977), and aggravated assault, § 22-1&-1.1 (amended 1980 and 1981), were

only Class 4 felonies.
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analysis,
but relevant comparisons are still possible. Under §22-7-7,
the penalty for a second or third felony is increased by one
class. Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or
third conviction was for treason, first degree manslaughter,
kidnapping, or first degree arson, and a life sentence would
have been authorized when a second or third conviction was
for such crimes as attempted murder, placing an explosive
device on an aircraft, or first degree rape. Finally, § 22-7-8,
under which Helm was sentenced, authorized life imprisonment after three prior convictions, regardless of the crimes.
In sum, there were a handful of crimes that were necessarily punished by life imprisonment: murder; and treason, first
degree manslaughter, kidnapping, or first degree arson on a
second or third offense. There was a larger group for which
life imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of the sentencing judge, including: treason, first degree manslaughter,
kidnapping, or first degree arson; attempted murder, placing
an explosive device on an aircraft, or first degree rape on a
second or third offense; and any felony after three prior offenses. Finally, there was a large group of very serious offenses for which life imprisonment was not authorized, including a third offense of heroin dealing or aggravated
assault.
Criminals committing any of these offenses ordinarily
would be thought more deserving of punishment than one uttering a "no account" check-even when the bad-check writer
had already committed six minor felonies. Furthermore,
there is no indication in the record that any habitual offender
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other than Helm has ever been given the maximum sentence
on the basis of comparable crimes. It is more likely that the
possibility of life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 generally is
reserved for criminals such as fourth-time heroin dealers,
while habitual bad-check writers receive more lenient treatment. 25 In any event, Helm has been treated in the same
manner as, or more severely than, criminals who have committed far more serious crimes.
Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission
of the same crime in other jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals found that "Helm could have received a life sentence
without parole for his offense in only one other state, Nevada," 684 F. 2d, at 586, and we have no reason to doubt this
finding. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. At the very least, therefore, it is clear that Helm could not have received such a severe sentence in 48 of the 50 States. But even under Nevada law, a life sentence without possibility of parole is
merely authorized in these circumstances. See Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 207.010(2) (1981). We are not advised that any defendant such as Helm, whose prior offenses were so minor,
actually has received the maximum penalty in Nevada. 26 It
• The State contends that § 22-7~ is more lenient than the Texas habitual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment under § 22-7~ is
discretionary rather than mandatory. Brief for Petitioner 22. Helm,
however, has challenged only his own sentence. No one suggests that
§ 22-7~ may not be applied constitutionally to fourth-time heroin dealers
or other violent criminals. Thus we do not question the legislature's judgment. Unlike in Rummel, a lesser sentence here could have been entirely
consistent with both the statute and the Eighth Amendment. See Note,
Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1119,
1160 (1979).
• Under§ 207.010(2), a Nevada court is authorized to impose a sentence
of ''imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without possibility of
parole. If the penalty fixed by the court is life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, eligibility for parole begins when a minimum of 10 years
has been served." It appears that most sentences imposed under
§ 207.010(2) permit parole, even when the prior crimes are far more serious
than Helm's. See, e. g., Rusling v. State, 96 Nev. 778, 617 P. 2d 1302
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appears that Helm was treated more severely than he would
have been in any other State.
B
The State argues that the present case is essentially the
same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in
that case is matched by the possibility of executive clemency
here. The State reasons that the Governor could commute
Helm's sentence to a term of years. We conclude, however,
that the South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally
different from the parole system that was before us in
Rummel.
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different
concepts, despite some surface similarities. Parole is a regular part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behavior, it is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases.
The law generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to
be considered for parole, and details the standards and procedures applicable at that time. See, e. g., Greenholz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979) (detailing Nebraska parole procedures); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S.
471, 477 (1972) (''the practice of releasing prisoners on parole
before the end of their sentences has become an integral part
of the penological system"). Thus it is possible to predict, at
least to some extent, when parole might be granted. Commutation, on the other hand, is an ad hoc exercise of executive clemency. A Governor may commute a sentence at any
time for any reason without reference to any standards.
See, e. g., Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452
u. s. 458 (1981).
We explicitly have recognized the distinction between parole and commutation in our prior cases. 27 Writing on behalf
(1980) (possession of a fireann by an ex-felon, two instances of driving an
automobile without the owner's consent, four first degree burgl_aries, two
sales of marijuana, two sales of a restricted dangerous drug, one sale of
heroin, one escape from state prison, and one second degree burglary).
rr In Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the possibility of
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of the Morrissey Court, for example, CHIEF JUSTICE BuRGER contrasted the two possibilities: "Rather than being an
ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals." 408 U. S., at
477. In Dumsckat, THE CHIEF JUSTICE similarly explained
that ''there is a vast difference between a denial of parole . . .
and a state's refusal to commute a lawful sentence." 452
U. S., at 466.
The Texas and South Dakota systems in particular are
very different. In Rummel, the Court did not rely simply
on the existence of some system of parole. Rather it looked
to the provisions of the system presented, including the fact
that Texas had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good
time' credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has allowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for
parole in as little as 12 years." 445 U. S., at 280. A Texas
prisoner became eligible for parole when his calendar time
served plus "good conduct" time equaled one-third of the
maximum sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 42.12, § 15(b) (Vernon
1979). An entering prisoner earned 20 days good-time per
30 days served, Brief for Respondent in Rummel, 0. T.
1979, No. 78-6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30
days good-time per 30 days served, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann., Art. 6181-1, §§2--3 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Thus
Rummel could have been eligible for parole in as few as 10
years, and could have expected to become eligible, in the normal course of events, in only 12 years.
commutation is not equivalent to the possibility of parole. The Court carefully "distinguish[ed] Rummel from a person sentenced under a recidivist
statute like [Miss. Code Ann. § ~19-83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for
a sentence of life without parole." 445 U. S., at 281. But the Mississippi
Constitution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal and
penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment." Art. 5, § 124.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized that the power to pardon includes the power to commute a convict's sentence. See Whittington
v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 603-604, 73 So. 2d 137, 139-140 (1954).
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In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain
than parole. For example, the board of pardons and paroles
is authorized to make commutation recommendations to the
Governor, see n. 7, supra, but § 24-13-4 provides that "no
recommendation for the commutation of ... a life sentence,
or for a pardon . . . , shall be made by less than the unanimous vote of all members of the board." In fact, no life sentence has been commuted in over eight years, App. 29, while
parole-where authorized-has been granted regularly during that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. ~9. Furthermore, even if
Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would be eligible
to be considered for parole. 28 Not only is there no guarantee
that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota parole
system is far more stringent than the one before us in
Rummel. Helm would have to serve three-fourths of his revised sentence before he would be ~ligible for parole. ~
§ 24-15-5, and the provision for good-time credits is ~--c/
generous, § 24-5-1. 29
The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a hope
for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency." It is little different
from the possibility of executive clemency that exists in
every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence
under the Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a bare
possibility would make judicial review under the Eighth
Amendment meaningless.

v

The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence
21

The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Dakota occurred in 1975. The record indicates, however, that the prisoner in question has still not been paroled. App. 29.
11
Assume, for example, that in 1979 the Governor had commuted Helm's
sentence to a term of 40 years (his approximate life expectancy). Even if
Helm were a model prisoner, he would not have been eligible for parole
until he had served over 21 years-more than twice the Rummel minimum. And this comparison is generous to South Dakota's position. If
Rummel had been sentenced to 40 years rather than life, he could have
been eligible for parole in less than 7 years.
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to detennine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying objective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penultimate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has
been treated more harshly than other criminals in the State
who have committed more serious crimes. He has been
treated more harshly than he would have been in any other
jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State.
We conclude that his sentence is significantly disproportionate to his crime, and is therefore prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
is accordingly
Affirmed.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment
proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a
seventh nonviolent felony.
I
By 1975 the State of South Dakota had convicted respondent Jerry Helm of six nonviolent felonies. In 1964, 1966, and
1969 Helm was convicted of third-degree burglary. 1 In 1972
In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined in at least two sections of
the South Dakota criminal code:
"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the nighttime with intent
to commit a crime but under such circumstances as do not constitute burglary in the first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third degree. " S.D.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-8 (1967) (repealed 1976).
"A person breaking or entering at any time any building within the curtilage of a dwelling house but not forming a part thereof, or any building or
part of any building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as defined in
§ 32-14--1, or any structure or erection in which any property is kept, with
intent to commit larceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the third
degree. " S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-9 (1967) (repealed 1976).
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essentially the
same. See S.D. Code § 13.3703 (1939 ed. , supp. 1960); 1965 S.D. Laws,
ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by "imprisonment in the
state penitentiary for any term not exceeding fifteen years." S.D. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 22-32-10 (1967) (previously codified at S.D. Code § 13.3705(3)
1
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he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2
In 1973 he was convicted of grand larceny. 3 And in 1975 he
was convicted of third-offense driving while intoxicated. 4
The record contains no details about the circumstances of any
of these offenses, except that they were all nonviolent, none
was a crime against a person, and alcohol was a contributing
factor in each case.
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a "no account"
check for $100. 5 The only details we have of the crime are
those given by Helm to the state trial court:
(1939)) (repealed 1976).
2
In 1972 the relevant statute provided:
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any false token or writing, or other false pretense, ... obtains from any person any money or
property ... is punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not
exceeding three years or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a
fine not exceeding three times the value of the money or property so obtained, or by both such fine and imprisonment." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 22-41-4 (1967) (repealed 1976).
8
In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of personal property accomplished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive another
thereof." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-1 (1967) (repealed 1976).
Grand larceny and petit larceny were distinguished as follows:
"Grand larceny is larceny committed in any of the following cases:
(1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding fifty dollars;
(2) When such property, although not of a value exceeding fifty dollars,
is taken from the person of another;
(3) When such property is livestock.
Larceny in other cases is petit larceny." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-2
(1967) (repealed 1976).
Grand larceny was then punishable by "imprisonment in the state penitentiary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-3 (1967) (repealed
1976).
• A third offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol is a felony
in South Dakota. S.D. Codified Laws § 32-23-4 (1976). See 1973 S.D.
Laws, ch. 195, § 7 (enacting version of § 32-23-4 in force in 1975).
5
The governing statute provides, in relevant part:
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"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that
day, was drinking and I ended .up here in Rapid City
with more money than I had when I started. I knew I'd
done something I didn't know exactly what. If I would
have known this, I would have picked the check up. I
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several
places."' State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d 497, 501 (S.D.
1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Helm).
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty.
Ordinarily the maximum punishment for uttering a "no account" check would have been five years imprisonment in the
state penitentiary and a five thousand dollar fine. See S.D.
Comp. Laws Ann. §22-6-1(6) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now
codified at S.D. Codified Laws § 22-6-1(7) (Supp. 1982)). As
a result of his criminal record, however, Helm was subject to
South Dakota's recidivist statute:
"When a defendant has been convicted of at least three
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal felony,
the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to
the sentence for a Class 1 felony." S.D. Codified Laws
§ 22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981).
The maximum penalty for a "Class 1 felony" was life imprisonment in the state penitentiary and a twenty-five thousand
dollar fine. 6 S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-6-1(2) (1967 ed.,
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another
for present consideration with intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a
financial institution knowing at the time of such passing that he or his principal does not have an account with such financial institution, is guilty of a
Class 5 felony." S.D. Codified Laws § 22-41-1.2 (1979).
6
When Helm was sentenced in April1979, South Dakota law classified
felonies as follows:
"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are divided into the following seven classes which are distinguished from each other by the respective maximum penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized
upon conviction:
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supp. 1978) (now codified at S.D. Codified Laws § 22-6-1(3)
(Supp. 1982)). Moreover, South Dakota law explicitly provides that parole is unavailable: "A person sentenced to life
imprisonment is not eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles." S.D. Codified Laws §24-15-4 (1979).
The Governor 7 is authorized to pardon prisoners, or to commute their sentences, S.D. Const., Art. IV, §3, but no other
relief from sentence is available even to a rehabilitated
prisoner.
Immediately after accepting Helm's guilty plea, the South
Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life imprisonment
under§ 22-7-8. The court explained:
" 'I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly
proven that you're an habitual criminal and the record
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. A lesser
sentence may not be given for a Class A felony;
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed;
(3) Class 2 felony: twenty-five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed;
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary.
In addition, a fine of fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed;
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In
addition, a fine of ten thousand dollars may be imposed;
(6) Class 5 felony: five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In
addition, a fine of five thousand dollars may be imposed; and
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the state penitentiary or a
fine of two thousand dollars, or both.
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sentences for habitual criminals ....
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by law, every offense
declared to be a felony and not otherwise classified is a Class 6 felony."
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979 and
1980).

The board of pardons and paroles is authorized to make recommendations to the Governor, S.D. Codified Laws§ 24-14-1 (1979); § 24-14-5; S.D.
Executive Order 82-04 (Apr. 12, 1982), but the Governor is not bound by
the recommendation, § 24-14-5.
7
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would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation and that
the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up for the rest
of your natural life, so you won't have further victims of
your crimes, just be coming back before Courts. You'll
have plenty of time to think this one over."' State v.
Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 500 (Henderson, J., dissenting)
(quoting S.D. Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit,
Pennington County (Parker, J.)).
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, affirmed
the sentence despite Helm's argument that it violated the
Eighth Amendment. State v. Helm, supra.
After Helm had served two years in the state penitentiary,
he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a
fixed term of years. Such a commutation would have had
the effect of making Helm eligible to be considered for parole
when he had served three-fourths of his new sentence. See
S.D. Codified Laws § 24--15-5(3) (1979). The Governor denied Helm's request in May 1981. App. 26.
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the
United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. Helm argued, among other things, that his sentence
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the District Court
recognized that the sentence was harsh, it concluded that this
Court's recent decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263
(1980), was dispositive. It therefore denied the writ.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed. 684 F. 2d 582 (1982). The Court of Appeals
noted that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable. Helm's
sentence of life without parole was qualitatively different
from Rummel's life sentence with the prospect of parole because South Dakota has rejected rehabilitation as a goal of
the criminal justice system. The Court of Appeals examined
the nature of Helm's offenses, the nature of his sentence, and
the sentence he could have received in other States for the
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same offense.
oncluded, on the basis of this examination,
that Helm's sentenc as "grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offense." 84 F. 2d, at 587. It therefore directed the District Cou to issue the writ unless the State
resentenced Helm. Ibid.
ighth Amendment question preW@o~~~~te
· !fiMii. 459 u.s.II

The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." The final clause prohibits not
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.
A

The principle that a punishment should be proportionate to
the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence. In 1215 three. chapters of Magna
Carta were devoted to the rule that "amercements" 8 may not
be excessive. 9 And the principle was repeated and extended in the First Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw. I, ch. 6
(1275). These were not hollow guarantees, for the royal
courts relied on them to invalidate disproportionate punishments. See, e. g., Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop of Winches8
An amercement was similar to a modern-day fine. It was the most
common criminal sanction in thirteenth century England. See 2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 513-515 (2d ed. 1909).
• Chapter 20 declared that "[a] freeman shall not be amerced for a small
fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great crime according to
the heinousness of it." See 1 S.D. Codified Laws, p. 4 (1978) (translati
of Magna Carta). According to Maitland, "there
c ause in Magna
Carta more grateful to the mass of the peopl .... " F. Maitland, Pleas of
the Crown for the County of Gloucester xxxiv (1884). Chapter 21 granted
the same rights to the nobility, and chapter 22 granted the same rights to
the clergy.
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ter, Y.B. Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 (C.P. 1316), reprinted in 52
Selden Society 3 (1934). When prison sentences became the
normal criminal sanctions, the common law recognized that
these, too, must be proportional. See, e. g., Hodges v.
Humkin, 2 Bulst. 139, 140, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K.B.
1615) (Croke, J.) ("imprisonment ought always to be according to the quality of the offence").
The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of proportionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth
Amendment: "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor
excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments
inflicted." 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). Although the
precise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incorporated "the longstanding principle of English law that the punishment ... should not be, by reason of its excessive length
or severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged."
R. Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 (1959); see 4 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries *16-19 (1769); see also id., at
*16-17 (in condemning "punishments of unreasonable severity," uses "cruel" to mean severe or excessive). Indeed,
barely three months after the Bill of Rights was adopted, the
House of Lords declared that a "fine of thirty thousand
pounds, imposed by the court of King's Bench upon the earl
of Devon, was excessive and exorbitant, against magna
charta, the common right of the subject, and against the law
of the land." Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Trials 133, 136
(1689).
When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the
language of the English Bill of Rights, 10 they also adopted the
English principle of proportionality. The people were guaranteed the rights they had possessed as English subjectsincluding the right to be free from excessive punishments.
This language had earlier been incorporated in the Virginia Declaration
of Rights, Art. I, § 9, authored by George Mason.
10
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B
The constitutional principle of proportionality has been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 11 In the
leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910),
the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public document and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form
of imprisonment that included hard labor in chains and permanent civil disabilities. The Court noted "that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to offense," id., at 367, and held that the
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court endorsed the principle of proportionality as a constitutional
standard, see, e. g., id., at 372-373, and determined that the
sentence before it was "cruel in its excess of imprisonment,"
id., at 377.
The Court next applied the principle to invalidate a criminal sentence in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660
(1962). 12 A 90-day sentence was found to be excessive for
the crime of being "addicted to the use of narcotics." The
Cburt explained that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in
the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual."
"In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323 (1892), the defendant had been
convicted of 307 counts of "selling intoxicating liquor without authority,"
and sentenced to a tenn of over 54 years. The majority did not reach
O'Neil's contention that this sentence was unconstitutional, for he did not
include the point in his assignment of errors or in his brief. I d., at 331.
Furthennore, the majority noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not
apply to the States." Id., at 332. Accordingly the Court dismissed the
writ of error for want of a federal question. I d., at 336--337. The dissent,
however, reached the Eighth Amendment question, observing that it "is
directed . . . against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged." ld., at
339-340 (Field, J., dissenting).
12
Members of the Court continued to recognize the principle of proportionality in the meantime. See, e. g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100
(1958) (plurality opinion); id., at 111 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at
125-126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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I d., at 667. Thus there was no question of an inherently barbaric punishment. "But the question cannot be considered
in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and
unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."
Ibid.
Most recently, the Court has applied the principle of proportionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain
circumstances. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. - - (1982)
(death penalty excessive for felony murder when defendant
did not take life, attempt to take life, or intend that a life be
taken or that lethal force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U. S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("sentence of death is
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the
crime of rape"); id., at 601 (POWELL, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("ordinarily death is
disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult
woman"). And the Court has continued to recognize that
the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate
punishments, even when it has not been necessary to rely on
the proscription. See, e. g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678,
685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667 (1977);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 171-172 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Davis,
454 U. S. 370, 374, and n. 3 (1982) (per curiam) (recognizing
that some prison sentences may be constitutionally disproportionate); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11
(same).

c

There is no basis for the State's assertion that the general
principle of proportionality does not apply to felony prison
sentences. 13 The constitutional language itself suggests no
According to Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 (1980), "one could
argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for
crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies ... the length of
sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative."
13
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exception for imprisonment. We have recognized that the
Eighth Amendment imposes "parallel limitations" on bail,
· fines, and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U. S., at 664, and the text is explicit that bail and fines may
not be excessive. It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser
punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death
were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the intermediate punishment of imprisonment were not. There is
also no historical support for such an exception. The common-law principle incorporated into the Eighth Amendment
clearly applied to prison terms. See Hodges v. Humkin,
supra. And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that
prison sentences are subject to proportionality analysis.
See, e. g., Weems, 217 U. S., at 377; cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437
U. S., at 685 ("Confinement in a prison ... is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment
standards").
When we have applied the proportionality principle in capital cases, we have drawn no distinction with imprisonment.
See .Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 176 (opinion of Stewart,
POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). It is true that the "penalty of
death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not
in degree but in kind." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238,
306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). As a result, "our decisions [in] capital cases are of limited assistance in deciding
the constitutionality of the punishment" in a noncapital case.
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 272. All this means, however, is that, "[o]utside the context of capital punishment,
successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [will be] exceedingly rare," 14 ibid. (emphasis added);
!d., at 274 (emphasis added). The Court did not adopt the standard proposed, but merely recognized that the argument was possible. To the extent that the State makes this argument here, we find it meritless.
14
In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to be excessive for felony murder in the circumstances of that case. But clearly no
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see Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S., at 374. It does not mean that
proportionality analysis is entirely inapplicable in noncapital
cases.
In sum, we hold that a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted. Reviewing courts, of course, should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures possess
in determining the types and limits of punishments for
crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in
sentencing convicted criminals. 15 But no penalty is per se
constitutional. As the Court noted in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S., at 667, a single day in prison may be unconstitutional in some circumstances.

III
A
In reviewing sentences under the Eighth Amendment,
courts should be guided by objective factors that our cases
have recognized. 16 First, we look to the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty. In Enmund, for example, the Court examined the circumstances of the defendant's crime in great detail. 458 U. S., a t - - - - - . In
Coker the Court considered the seriousness of the crime of
rape, and compared it to other crimes, such as murder. 433
J. i$(r.fltlr1r,.lt .. te

sentence short of death would be •
""n f ;' for Enmund's crime.
16
In view of the substantial deference properly due to legislatures and
sentencing courts, most reviewing courts normally will not be required to
engage in extended analysis to determine that a sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate.
16
As the Court has indicated, no one factor will be dispositive. See
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S. 370, 373-374 n. 2 (1982) (per curiam); Rummel
v. Estelle, 445 U. S. , at 275-276. The inherent nature of our federal
system and the need for individualized sentencing decisions result in a wide
range of constitutional sentences. No single criterion can identify when a
sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it violates the Eighth
Amendment.
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U. S., at 597-598 (plurality opinion); id., at 603 (POWELL, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
In Robinson the emphasis was placed on the nature of the
"crime." 370 U. S., at 666--667. And in Weems, the Court's
opinion commented in two separate places on the pettiness of
the offense. 217 U. S., at 363 and 365. Of course, a court
must consider the severity of the penalty in deciding whether
it is disproportionate. See, e. g., Coker, 433 U. S., at 598
(pluralityopinion); Weems, 217 U. S., at 366-367.
Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more
serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at
issue may be excessive. Thus in Enmund the Court noted
that all of the other felony murderers on death row in Florida
were more culpable than the petitioner there. 458 U. S., at
The Weems Court identified an impressive list of
more serious crimes that were subject to less serious penalties. 217 U. S., at 380-381.
Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review
of capital punishment statutes and determined that "only
about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a
defendant [such as Enmund] to be sentenced to die." 458
U. S., at - - . Even in those jurisdictions, however, the
death penalty was almost never imposed under similar circumstances. Id., at--. The Court's review of foreign
law also supported its conclusion. I d., at - - , n. 22. The
analysis in Coker was essentially the same. 433 U. S., at
593--597. And in Weems the Court relied on the fact that,
under federal law, a similar crime was punishable by only two
year's imprisonment and a fine. 217 U. S., at 380. Cf. Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 102-103 (1958) (plurality opinion).
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including
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(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty;
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of
the same crime in other jurisdictions.
B
Application of these factors assumes that courts are competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative
scale. In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and
courts traditionally have made these judgments-just as legislatures must make them in the first instance. Comparisons
can be made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the
victim or society, and the culpability of the offender. Thus
in Enmund the Court determined that the petitioner's conduct was not lid' serious as his accomplices' conduct. Indeed,
there are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness
of crimes. See Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness
of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences,
39 Am. Soc. Rev. 224, 237 (1974). For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent crimes are less serious than
crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence. Cf. Tr.
of Oral Arg. 16 (the State recognizes that the criminal law is
more protective of people than property).
There are other J.IA8e-ly accepted principles that courts may
apply in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society. The absolute magnitude of the crime may be
relevant. Stealing a million dollars is viewed as more serious than stealing a hundred dollars-a point recognized in
statutes distinguishing petty theft from grand theft. See,
e. g., S.D. Codified Laws §22-30A-17 (Supp. 1982). Few
would dispute that a lesser included offense should not be
punished more severely than the greater offense. Thus a
court is justified in viewing assault with intent to murder as
more serious than simple assault. See Roberts v. Collins,
544 F. 2d 168, 169-170 (CA4 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied,
430 U. S. 973 (1977). Cf. Dembowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250,

82-492-0PINION

14

SOLEM v. HELM

252, 240 N. E. 2d 815, 817 (1968) (armed robbery more serious than robbery); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 632, 281
P. 2d 233, 235 (1955) (rape more serious thha~n~
as~s!a~
ul~t~WI
~'Q
th~
in~--r-;::~::;:;:-;::::2~
'..l.J.c c;:;;
-::1L JA- ~~L.
. rape ). I t _,
;.,. a1so VJ'ictety
t ent t o comimt
;of ~cogruze d t hat att7
_
tempts are less serious than completed crimes. See, e. g.,
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-4-1 (1979); 4 Blackstone *15. Similarly, an accessory after the fact should not be subject to a
higherpenaltythantheprincipal. See, e. g., 18U. S.C. §3.
Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are again
clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply. In
Enmund the Court looked at the petitioner's lack of intent to
kill in determining that he was less culpable than his accomplices. 458 U. S., at--. Most would agree that negligent
conduct is less serious than intentional conduct. South Dakota, for example, ranks criminal acts in ascending order of .~.~--- l'lA ,. _ L ,. _
seriousness as follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing <::
I'~
acts, intentional acts, and malicious acts. S.D. Codified
~A;
Laws § 22-1-2(1)(f) (Supp. 1982). A courws ~ entitled to
/.J-~
look at a defendant's motive in committing a crime. Thus a
~ ~ ~ _~. ~-· ~~
murder may be viewed as more serious when committed pur~
suant to a contract. See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch.
w~
279, § 69(a)(5) (West Supp. 1982); cf. 4 Blackstone *15; In re
11
Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 P. 2d 1073 (1974).
~
~ . 1~ '' 'IJ"""
_L
This list is by no means exhaustive. It simply illustrates
~
that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing the
,) J,AA.,~
severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the diffi~ 1 _ ,, .'7.
culties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions between
~
similar crimes.
I

w

,tA.~I
-r

c

Application of the factors that we identify also assumes
that courts are able to compare different sentences. This assumption, too, is justified. The easiest comparison, of
course, is between capital punishment and noncapital punish-
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ments, for the death penalty is different from other punishments in kind rather than degree. 17 For sentences of imprisonment, the problem is not so much one of ordering, but one
of line-drawing. It is clear that a 25-year sentence generally
is more severe than a 15-year sentence, 18 but in most cases it
would be difficult to decide that the former violates the
Eighth Amendment while the latter does not. Decisions of
this kind, although troubling, are not unique to this area.
The courts are constantly called upon to draw similar lines in
a variety of contexts.
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is an example.
In Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78 (1970), the Court upheld
a criminal conviction returned by a unanimous 6-member
jury, and in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (1972), we upheld a conviction returned by ten members of a 12-member
jury. In Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U. S. 223 (1978), however,
we reversed a conviction returned by a unanimous 5-member
jury. JUSTICE BLACKMUN "readily admit(ted] that we d(id],
not pretend to discern a clear line between six members and
five." Id., at 239 (opinion ofBLACKMUN, J.). He nevertheless found a difference between them of "constitutional significance." Ibid.; cf. id., at 245-246 (POWELL, J., concurring
in the judgment). And the following Term, in Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U. S. 130 (1979), we reversed a conviction returned by five members of a 6-member jury:
"(W]e do not pretend the ability to discern a priori a
bright line below which the number of jurors participating in the trial or in the verdict would not permit the
jury to function in the manner required by our prior
cases. But ... it is inevitable that lines must be drawn
There is also a clear line between sentences of imprisonment and sentences involving no deprivation of liberty. See Argersinger v. Hamlin,
17

407

u. s. 25 (1972).

The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison, depending
upon the time and conditions of its availability.
18
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somewhere if the substance of the jury trial right is to be
preserved." Id., at 137 (citations omitted).
Another Sixth Amendment case illustrates the line-drawing function of the judiciary, and offers guidance on the
method by which some lines may be drawn. In Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), the Court determined that a
defendant has a right to a jury trial "where imprisonment for
more than six months is authorized." Id., at 69 (plurality
opinion). In choosing the 6-month standard, the plurality relied almost exclusively on the fact that only New York City
denied the right to a jury trial for an offense punishable by
more than six months. As JusTICE WHITE explained:
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us
with the only objective criterion by which a line could
ever be drawn-on the basis of the possible penalty
alone--between offenses that are and that are not regarded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury." I d., at
72-73.
In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly
may distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another.
It also supports our holding that courts properly may look to
the practices in other jurisdictions in deciding where lines between sentences should be drawn.

IV
It remains to apply the analytical framework established
by our prior decisions to the case before us. We first consider the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life
imprisonment without possibility of parole. We then consider the State's argument that the possibility of commutation is sufficient to save an otherwise unconstitutional
sentence.
A
Helm's crime was "one of the most passive felonies a person could commit." State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 501
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(Henderson, J., dissenting). It involved neither violence nor
threat of violence to any person. The $100 face value of
Helm's "no account" check was not trivial, but neither was it
a large amount. One hundred dollars was less than half the
amount South Dakota required for a felonious theft. 19 It is
easy to see why such a crime is viewed by society as among
the less serious offenses. See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev.,
at 229.
Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a
"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender. 20
And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more severely than it punishes a first offender. Helm's status, however, cannot be considered in the abstract. His prior offenses, although classified as felonies, were all relatively
minor. 21 All were nonviolent and none was a crime against a
person. Indeed, there was no minimum amount in either the
burglary or the false pretenses statutes, see nn. 1 and 2,
19
If Helm had been convicted simply of taking $100 from a cash register,
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-1 (1979), or defrauding someone of $100,
§ 22-30A-3, or obtaining $100 through extortion, § 22-30A-4(1), or blackmail, § 22-30A-4(3), or using a false credit card to obtain $100,
§ 22-30A--8.1, or embezzling $100, § 22-30A-10, he would not be in prison
today. All of these offenses would have been petty theft, a misdemeanor.
§ 22-30A-17 (amended 1982). Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 check
against insufficient funds, rather than a nonexistent account, he would
have been guilty of a misdemeanor. §§ 22-41-1. Curiously, under South
Dakota law there is no distinction between writing a "no account" check for
a large sum and writing a "no account" check for a small sum. § 22-41-1.2.
00
We must focus on the principal felony-the felony that triggers the life
sentence-since Helm already has paid the penalty for each of his prior offenses. But we recognize, of course, that Helm's prior convictions are relevant to the sentencing decision.
21
Helm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a professional criminal. The record indicates an addiction to alcohol, and a consequent difficulty in holding a job. His record involves no instance of violence of any kind. Incarcerating him for life without possibility of parole is
unlikely to advance the goals of our criminal justice system in any substantial way. Neither Helm nor the State will have any incentive to pursue
clearly needed treatment for his alcohol problem.
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supra, and the minimum amount covered by,.tgrand larceny
statute was fairly small, see n. 3, supra. 22
Helm's present sentence is life imprisonment without possibility ofparole. 23 Barring executive clemency, see infra, at
- - , Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state penitentiary. This sentence is far more severe than the life sentence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel was
likely to have been eligible for parole within 12 years of his
initial confinement, 24 a fact on which the Court relied heavily.
See 445 U. S., at 280-281. /1Ielm's sentence is more severe
than any other sentence the S tate could have imposed on any
criminal for any crime. See note 6, supriJ Only capital
punishment, a penalty not authorized in South Dakota when
Helm was sentenced, exceeds it.
jk l*f
1\ ~ ReMit coti,Sjd er tl:~fil seft~enees that could be imposed on
~ •~ _ . ~ f:-:': ~otber criminals in the same jurisdiction. When Helm was
~ -~entenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a
/~~ --1
life sentence for murder, S.D. Codified Laws § 22-16-12
/~$ ~~1979) (amended 1980), and was authorized to impose a life
~
sentence for treason, § 22--8-1, first degree manslaughter,
~ 4G-<~
§ 22-16-15, first degree arson, § 22-3~1, and kidnapping,
~
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-19-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978)
(amended 1979). No other crime was punishable so severely
on the first offense. Attempted murder, S.D. Codified Laws

..ta.,

22
As suggested at oral argument, the third-degree burglary statute covered entering a building with the intent to steal a loaf of bread. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 14-16. It appears that the grand larceny statute would have covered
the theft of a chicken.
23
Every life sentence in South Dakota is without possibility of parole.
See supra, a t - . We raise no question as to the general validity of sentences without possibility of parole. The only issue before us is whether,
in the circumstances of this case and in light of the constitutional principle
of proportionality, the sentence imposed on this petitioner violates the
Eighth Amendment.
24
We note that Rummel was, in fact, released within eight months of the
Court's decision in his case. See L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3.
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explosive vice on an aircraft,
14A-5, and first degree
e, § 2 22-1 (amended 1980
and 1982), ere only Class 2 fe ni . Aggravated rio~
22-10
as only a Class 3 felony. Distribution of heroin,
§§ 22-42-2 (amended 1982), 34-208-13(7) (1977), and aggravated assault, § 22-18-1.1 (amended 1980 and 1981), were
only Class 4 felonies.
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analysis,
but relevant comparisons are still possible. Under§ 22-7-7,
the penalty for a second or third felony is increased by one
class. Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or
t · d con~as for treason, first degree manslaughter,
kidna in ordkSt degree ars"Olt;>and a life sentence would
have been authorized when a second or third conviction was
for such crimes as attempted murder, placing an explosive
device on an aircraft, or first degree rape. Finally, §22-7-8,
under which Helm was sentenced, authorized life imprisonment after three prior convictions, regardless of the crimes.
In sum, there were a handful of crimes that were necessarily{puni'Shed by life im risonment·
der· and treason first
degree manslaughter, ki na m or st de ee arso !On a
second or third offens£:1 There was a larger group for which
life imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of the sentencin 'ud~ including: treason, first degree manslaughter,
dna m orHifst degree ars~ attempted murder, placing
an explosive device on an aircraft, or first degree rape on a
second or third offense; and any felony after three prior offenses. Finally, there was a large group of very serious offenses for which life imprisonment was not authorized, including a third offense of heroin dealing or aggravated
assault.
Criminals committing any of these offenses ordinarily
would be thought more deserving of punishment than one uttering a "no account" check-even when the bad-check writer
l1.~. _ .... ~. _ A.
had already committed six minor felonies. FYf't}term~rr,- '~,·
there is no indication in the record that any habitual offender
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other than Helm has ever been given the maximum sentence
on the basis of comparable crimes. It is more likely that the
possibility of life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 generally is
reserved for criminals such as fourth-time heroin dealers,
while habitual bad-check writers receive more lenient treatment. 26 In any event, Helm has been treated in the same
manner as, or more severely than, criminals who have committed far more serious crimes.
Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission
of the same crime in other jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals found that "Helm could have received a life sentence
without parole for his offense in only one other state, N evada," 684 F. 2d, at 586, and we have no reason to doubt this
finding. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. At the very least, therefore, it is clear that Helm could not have received such a severe sentence in 48 of the 50 States. But even under N evada law, a life sentence without possibility of parole is
merely authorized in these circumstances. See Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 207.010(2) (1981). We are not advised that any defendant such as Helm, whose prior offenses were so minor,
actually has received the maximum penalty in Nevada. 211 It
25
The State contends that §22-7-8 is more lenient than the Texas habitual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 is
discretionary rather than mandatory. Brief for Petitioner 22. Helm,
however, has challenged only his own sentence. No one suggests that
§ 22-7-8 may not be applied constitutionally to fourth-time heroin dealers
or other violent criminals. Thus we do not question the legislature's judgment. Unlike in Rummel, a lesser sentence here could have been entirely
consistent with both the statute and the Eighth Amendment. See Note,
Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1119,
1160 (1979).
'"Under§ 207.010(2), a Nevada court is authorized to impose a sentence
of "imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without possibility of
parole. If the penalty fixed by the court is life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, eligibility for parole begins when a minimum of 10 years
has been served." It appears that most sentences imposed under
§ 207.010(2) permit parole, even when the prior crimes are far more serious
than Helm's. See, e. g., Rusting v. State, 96 Nev. 778, 617 P. 2d 1302
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appears that Helm was treated more severely than he would
have been in any other State.
B

The State argues that the present case is essentially the
same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in
that case is matched by the possibility of executive clemency
here. The State reasons that the Governor could commute
Helm's sentence to a term of years. We conclude, however,
that the South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally
different from the parole system that was before us in
Rummel.
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different
concepts, despite some surface similarities. Parole is a regular part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behavior, it is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases.
The law generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to
be considered for parole, and details the standards and procedures applicable at that time. See, e. g., Greenholz v. Nebras~a Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979) (detailing Nebraska parole procedures); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S.
471, 477 (1972) ("the practice of releasing prisoners on parole
before the end of their sentences has become an integral part
of the penological system"). Thus it is possible to predict, at
least to some extent, when parole might be granted. Commutation, on the other hand, is an ad hoc exercise of executive clemency. A Governor may commute a sentence at any
time for any reason without reference to any standards.
See, e. g., Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452
u. s. 458 (1981).
We explicitly have recognized the distinction between parole and commutation in our prior cases. 27 Writing on behalf
(1980) (possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, two instances of driving an
automobile without the owner's consent, four first degree burglaries, two
sales of marijuana, two sales of a restricted dangerous drug, one sale of
heroin, one escape from state prison, and one second degree burglary).
Z1 In Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the possibility of
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of the Morrissey Court, for example, CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER contrasted the two possibilities: "Rather than being an
ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals." 408 U. S., at
477. In Dumschat, THE CHIEF JUSTICE similarly explained
that "there is a vast difference between a denial of parole . . .
and a state's refusal to commute a lawful sentence." 452
U. S., at 466.
The Texas and South Dakota systems in particular are
very different. In Rummel, the Court did not rely simply
on the existence of some system of parole. Rather it looked
to the provisions of the system presented, including the fact
that Texas had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good
time' credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has allowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for
parole in as little as 12 years." 445 U. S., at 280. A Texas
prisoner became eligible for parole when his calendar time
served plus "good conduct" time equaled one-third of the
maximum sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 42.12, § 15(b) (Vernon
1979). An entering prisoner earned 20 days good-time per
30 days served, Brief for Respondent in Rummel, 0. T.
1979, No. 78-6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30
days good-time per 30 days served, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann., Art. 6181-1, §§ 2-3 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Thus
Rummel could have been eligible for parole in as few as 10
years, and could have expected to become eligible, in the normal course of events, in only 12 years.
commutation is not equivalent to the possibility of parole. The Court carefully "distinguish[ed] Rummel from a person sentenced under a recidivist
statute like [Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19--83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for
a sentence of life without parole." 445 U. S., at 281. But the Mississippi
Constitution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal and
penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment." Art. 5, § 124.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized that the power to pardon includes the power to commute a convict's sentence. See Whittington
v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 603-604, 73 So. 2d 137, 139-140 (1954).
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In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain
than parole. For example, the board of pardons and paroles
is authorized to make commutation recommendations to the
Governor, see n. 7, supra, but § 24-13-4 provides that "no
recommendation for the commutation of ... a life sentence,
or for a pardon ... , shall be made by less than the unanimous vote of all members of the board." In fact, no life sentence has been commuted in over eight years, App. 29, while
parole-where authorized-has been granted regularly during that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. Furthermore, even if
Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would be eligible
to be considered for parole. 28 Not only is there no guarantee
that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota parole
system is far more stringent than the one before us in
Rummel. Helm would have to serve three-fourths of his revised sentence before he would be eligible for parole,
§ 24-lfH>, and the provision for good-time credits is far less
generous, § 24-5-1. 29
The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a hope
for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency." It is little different
from the possibility of executive clemency that exists in
every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence
under the Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a bare
possibility would make judicial review under the Eighth
Amendment meaningless.

v

The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence
28
The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Dakota occurred in 1975. The record indicates, however, that the prisoner in question ~not been paroled. App. 29.
29
Assume, for example, that in 1979 the Governor had commuted Helm's
sentence to a term of 40 years (his approximate life expectancy). Even if
Helm were a model prisoner, he would not have been eligible for parole
until he had served over 21 years-more than twice the Rummel minimum. And this comparison is generous to South Dakota's position. If
Rummel had been sentenced to 40 years rather than life, he could have
been eligible for parole in less than 7 years.

82-492-0PINION

24

SOLEM v. HELM

to determine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying objective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penultimate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has
been treated more harshly than other criminals in the State
who have committed more serious crimes. He has been
treated more harshly than he would have been in any other
jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State.
We conclude that his sentence is significantly disproportionate to his crime, and is therefore prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
is accordingly
Affirmed.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment
proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a
seventh nonviolent felony.

I
By 1975 the State of South Dakota had convicted respondent Jerry Helm of six nonviolent felonies. In 1964, 1966, and
1969 Helm was convicted of third-degree burglary. 1 In 1972
'In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined in at least two sections of
the South Dakota criminal code:
"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the nighttime with intent
to commit a crime but under such circumstances as do not constitute burglary in the first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third degree." S.D.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22--32-8 (1967) (repealed 1976).
"A person breaking or entering at any time any building within the curtilage of a dwelling house but not forming a part thereof, or any building or
part of any building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as defined in
§ 32-14-1, or any structure or erection in which any property is kept, with
intent to commit larceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the third
degree." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22--32-9 (1967) (repealed 1976).
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essentially the
same. See S.D. Code § 13.3703 (1939 ed., supp. 1960); 1965 S.D. Laws,
ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by "imprisonment in the
state penitentiary for any term not exceeding fifteen years." S.D. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 22--32-10 (1967) (previously codified at S.D. Code§ 13.3705(3)

(
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he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2
In 1973 he was convicted of grand larceny. 3 And in 1975 he
was convicted of third-offense driving while intoxicated. 4
The record contains no details about the circumstances of any
of these offenses, except that they were all nonviolent, none
was a crime against a person, and alcohol was a contributing
factor in each case.
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a "no account"
check for $100. 5 The only details we have of the crime are
those given by Helm to the state trial court:
(1939)) (repealed 1976).
2
In 1972 the relevant statute provided:
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any false token or writing, or other false pretense, . .. obtains from any person any money or
property ... is punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not
exceeding three years or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a
fine not exceeding three times the value of the money or property so obtained, or by both such fine and imprisonment. " S.D. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 22-41-4 (1967) (repealed 1976).
3
In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of personal property accomplished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive another
thereof." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-1 (1967) (repealed 1976).
Grand larceny and petit larceny were distinguished as follows:
"Grand larceny is larceny committed in any of the following cases:
(1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding fifty dollars;
(2) When such property, although not of a value exceeding fifty dollars,
is taken from the person of another;
(3) When such property is livestock.
Larceny in other cases is petit larceny." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-2
(1967) (repealed 1976).
Grand larceny was then punishable by "imprisonment in the state penitentiary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-3 (1967) (repealed
1976).
' A third offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol is .a felony
in South Dakota. S.D. Codified Laws § 32-23-4 (1976). See 1973 S.D.
Laws, ch. 195, § 7 (enacting version of§ 32-23-4 in force in 1975).
5
The governing statute provides, in relevant part:
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"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that
day, was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid City
with more money than I had when I started. I knew I'd
done something I didn't know exactly what. If I would
have known this, I would have picked the check up. I
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several
places."' State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d 497, 501 (S.D.
1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Helm).
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty.
Ordinarily the maximum punishment for uttering a "no account" check would have been five years imprisonment in the
state penitentiary and a five thousand dollar fine. See S.D.
Comp. Laws Ann. §22-6-1(6) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now
codified at S.D. Codified Laws§ 22-6-1(7) (Supp. 1982)). As
a result of his criminal record, however, Helm was subject to
South Dakota's recidivist statute:
"When a defendant has been convicted of at least three
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal felony,
the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to
the sentence for a Class 1 felony." S.D. Codified Laws
§ 22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981).
The maximum penalty for a "Class 1 felony" was life imprisonment in the state penitentiary and a twenty-five thousand
dollar fine. 6 S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1(2) (1967 ed.,
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another
for present consideration with intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a
financial institution knowing at the time of such passing that he or his principal does not have an account with such financial institution, is guilty of a
Class 5 felony." S.D. Codified Laws § 22-41-1.2 (1979).
6
When Helm was sentenced in April 1979, South Dakota law classified
felonies as follows:
"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are divided into the following seven classes which are distinguished from each other by the respective maximum penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized
upon conviction:
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supp. 1978) (now codified at S.D. Codified Laws § 22--6-1(3)
(Supp. 1982)). Moreover, South Dakota law explicitly provides that parole is unavailable: "A person sentenced to life
imprisonment is not eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles." S.D. Codified Laws § 24-15-4 (1979).
The Governor 7 is authorized to pardon prisoners, or to commute their sentences, S.D. Const., Art. IV, §3, but no other
relief from sentence is available even to a rehabilitated
prisoner.
Immediately after accepting Helm's guilty plea, the South
Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life imprisonment
under§ 22-7-8. The court explained:
" 'I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly
proven that you're an habitual criminal and the record
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. A lesser
sentence may not be given for a Class A felony;
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed;
(3) Class 2 felony: twenty-five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed;
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary.
In addition, a fine of fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed;
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In
addition, a fine of ten thousand dollars may be imposed;
(6) Class 5 felony: five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In
addition, a fine of five thousand dollars may be imposed; and
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the state penitentiary or a
fine of two thousand dollars, or both.
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sentences for habitual criminals ....
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by law, every offense
declared to be a felony and not otherwise classified is a Class 6 felony."
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-6-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979 and
1980).
7
The board of pardons and paroles is authorized to make recommendations to the Governor, S.D. Codified Laws§ 24-14-1 (1979); § 24-14-5; S.D.
Executive Order 82-04 (Apr. 12, 1982), but the Governor is not bound by
the recommendation, § 24-14-5.
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would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation and that
the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up for the rest
of your natural life, so you won't have further victims of
your crimes, just be coming back before Courts. You'll
have plenty of time to think this one over."' State v.
Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 500 (Henderson, J., dissenting)
(quoting S.D. Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit,
Pennington County (Parker, J.)).
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a 3--2 decision, affirmed
the sentence despite Helm's argument that it violated the
Eighth Amendment. State v. Helm, supra.
After Helm had served two years in the state penitentiary,
he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a
fixed term of years. Such a commutation would have had
the effect of making Helm eligible to be considered for parole
when he had served three-fourths of his new sentence. See
S.D. Codified Laws § 24--15-5(3) (1979). The Governor denied Helm's request in May 1981. App. 26.
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the
United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. Helm argued, among other things, that his sentence
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the District Court
recognized that the sentence was harsh, it concluded that this
Court's recent decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263
(1980), was dispositive. It therefore denied the writ.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed. 684 F. 2d 582 (1982). The Court of Appeals
noted that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable. Helm's
sentence of life without parole was qualitatively different
from Rummel's life sentence with the prospect of parole because South Dakota has rejected rehabilitation as a goal of
the criminal justice system. The Court of Appeals examined
the nature of Helm's offenses, the nature of his sentence, and
the sentence he could have received in other States for the

82-492-0PINION
6

lQ

We

~ r~11te&

c,erttor~n·

CoV\Sidrr

fo
t11f

SOLEM v. HELM

same offense. It concluded, on the basis of this examination,
that Helm's sentence was "grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offense." 684 F. 2d, at 587. It therefore directed the District Court to issue the writ unless the State
resentenced Helm. Ibid.
"ii__
lllli Eighth Amendment question presented by this case_.ts d nnsi 1f1!t> 459 U. S. - (1982). We now affirm.

_....._illlii....

II

The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." The final clause prohibits not
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.
A

The principle that a punishment should be proportionate to
the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence. In 1215 three chapters of Magna
Carta were devoted to the rule that "amercements" 8 may not
be excessive. 9 And the principle was repeated and extended in the First Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw. I, ch. 6
(1275). These were not hollow guarantees, for the royal
courts relied on them to invalidate disproportionate punishments. See, e. g., Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop ofWinches8
An amercement was similar to a modern-day fine. It was the most
common criminal sanction in thirteenth century England. See 2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 513-515 (2d ed. 1909).
9
Chapter 20 declared that "[a] freeman shall not be amerced for a small
fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great crime according to
the heinousness of it." See 1 S.D. Codified Laws, p. 4 (1978) (translation
of Magna Carta). According to Maitland, "th~no clause in Magna
Carta more grateful to the mass of the peoplE(;.~,.:·:, F; Maitland, Pleas of
the Crown for the County of Gloucester xxxiv (1884). Chapter 21 granted
the same rights to the nobility, and chapter 22 granted the same rights to
the clergy.

--(!_)
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ter, Y.B. Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 (C.P. 1316), reprinted in 52
Selden Society 3 (1934). When prison sentences became the
normal criminal sanctions, the common law recognized that
these, too, must be proportional. See, e. g., Hodges v.
Humkin, 2 Buist. 139, 140, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K.B.
1615) (Croke, J.) ("imprisonment ought always to be according to the quality of the offence").
The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of proportionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth
Amendment: "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor
excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments
inflicted." 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). Although the
precise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incorporated "the longstanding principle of English law that the punishment ... should not be, by reason of its excessive length
or severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged."
R. Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 (1959); see 4 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries *16-19 (1769); see also id., at
*16-17 (in condemning "punishments of unreasonable severity," uses "cruel" to mean severe or excessive). Indeed,
barely three months after the Bill of Rights was adopted, the
House of Lords declared that a "fine of thirty thousand
pounds, imposed by the court of King's Bench upon the earl
of Devon, was excessive and exorbitant, against magna
charta, the common right of the subject, and against the law
of the land." Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Trials 133, 136
(1689).
When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the
language of the English Bill of Rights, 10 they also adopted the
English principle of proportionality. The people were guaranteed the rights they had possessed as English subjectsincluding the right to be free from excessive punishments.
This language had earlier been incorporated in the Virginia Declaration
of Rights, Art. I, § 9, authored by George Mason.
10
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B
The constitutional principle of proportionality has been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 11 In the
leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910),
the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public document and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form
of imprisonment that included hard labor in chains and permanent civil disabilities. The Court noted "that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to offense," id., at 367, and held that the
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court endorsed the principle of proportionality as a constitutional
standard, see, e. g., id., at 372-373, and determined that the
sentence before it was "cruel in its excess of imprisonment,"
id., at 377.
The Court next applied the principle to invalidate a criminal sentence in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660
(1962). 12 A 90-day sentence was found to be excessive for
the crime of being "addicted to the use of narcotics." The
Cburt explained that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in
the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual."
"In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323 (1892), the defendant had been
convicted of 307 counts of "selling intoxicating liquor without authority,"
and sentenced to a term of over 54 years. The majority did not reach
O'Neil's contention that this sentence was unconstitutional, for he did not
include the point in his assignment of errors or in his brief. Id., at 331.
Furthermore, the majority noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not
apply to the States." Id., at 332. Accordingly the Court dismissed the
writ of error for want of a federal question. I d., at 336-337. The dissent,
however, reached the Eighth Amendment question, observing that it "is
directed ... against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged." Id., at
339-340 (Field, J., dissenting).
12
Members of the Court continued to recognize the principle of proportionality in the meantime. See, e. g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100
(1958) (plurality opinion); id., at 111 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at
125-126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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I d., at 667. Thus there was no question of an inherently barbaric punishment. "But the question cannot be considered
in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and
unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."
Ibid.
Most recently, the Court has applied the principle of proportionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain
circumstances. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. - - (1982)
(death penalty excessive for felony murder when defendant
did not take life, attempt to take life, or intend that a life be
taken or that lethal force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U. S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("sentence of death is
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the
crime of rape"); id., at 601 (POWELL, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("ordinarily death is
disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult
woman"). And the Court has continued to recognize that
the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate
punishments, even when it has not been necessary to rely on
the proscription. See, e. g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678,
685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667 (1977);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 171-172 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Davis,
454 U. S. 370, 374, and n. 3 (1982) (per curiam) (recognizing
that some prison sentences may be constitutionally disproportionate); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11
(same).

c

There is no basis for the State's assertion that the general
principle of proportionality does not apply to felony prison
sentences. 13 The constitutional language itself suggests no
3

According to Rummel v. Estelle , 445 U. S. 263 (1980), "one could
argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for
crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies . . . the length of
sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative."
'
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exception for imprisonment. We have recognized that the
Eighth Amendment imposes "parallel limitations" on bail,
fines, and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U. S., at 664, and the text is explicit that bail and fines may
not be excessive. It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser
punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death
were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the intermediate punishment of imprisonment were not. There is
also no historical support for such an exception. The common-law principle incorporated into the Eighth Amendment
clearly applied to prison terms. See Hodges v. Humkin,
supra. And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that
prison sentences are subject to proportionality analysis.
See, e. g., Weems, 217 U. S., at 377; cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437
{
U. S., at 685 ("Confinement in a prison . . . is a form of pun-____--1
ishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendm~t
standards").
When we have applied the proportionality pr~ei le in capital cases, we have drawn no distinction with~mprisonment.
See .Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 176 (opimon of Stewart,
POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). It is true that the "penalty of
death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not
in degree but in kind." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238,
306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). As a result, "our decisions [in] capital cases are of limited assistance in deciding
the constitutionality of the punishment" in a noncapital case.
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 272. All this means, however, is that, "[o]utside the context of capital punishment,
successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [will be] exceedingly rare," 14 ibid. (emphasis added);
!d., at 274 (emphasis added). The Court did not adopt the standard proposed, but merely recognized that the argument was possible. To the extent that the State makes this argument here, we find it meritless.
14
In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to be excessive for felony murder in the circumstances of that case. But clearly no
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see Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S., at 374. It does not mean that
proportionality analysis is entirely inapplicable in noncapital
cases.
In sum, we hold that a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted. Reviewing courts, of course, should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures possess
in determining the types and limits of punishments for
crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in
·sentencing convicted criminals. 15 But no penalty is per se
constitutional. As the Court noted in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S., at 667, a single day in prison may be unconstitutional in some circumstances.

III
A
In reviewing sentences under the Eighth Amendment,
courts should be guided by objective factors that our cases
have recognized. 16 First, we look to the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty. In Enmund, for example, the Court examined the circumstances of the defendant's crime in great detail. 458 U. S., a t - - - - - . In
Coker the Court considered the seriousness of the crime of
rape, and compared it to other crimes, such as murder. 433
oF i ~ ,., .so., ""@

sentence
or Enmund's crime.
15
In VIew of the substantial deference properly due to legislatures and
sentencing courts, most reviewing courts normally will not be required to
engage in extended analysis to determine that a sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate.
16
As the Court has indicated, no one factor will be dispositive. See
Hutto v. Davis , 454 U. S. 370, 373-374 n. 2 (1982) (per curiam); Rummel
v. Estelle, 445 U. S. , at 275-276. The inherent nature of our federal
system and the need for individualized sentencing decisions result in a wide
range of constitutional sentences. No single criterion can identify when a
sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it violates the Eighth
Amendment.)
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U. S., at 597-598 (plurality opinion); id., at 603 (POWELL, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
In Robinson the emphasis was placed on the nature of the
"crime." 370 U. S., at 66(H)67. And in Weems, the Court's
opinion commented in two separate places on the pettiness of
the offense. 217 U. S., at 363 and 365. Of course, a court
must consider the severity of the penalty in deciding whether
it is disproportionate. See, e. g., Coker, 433 U. S., at 598
(pluralityopinion); Weems, 217 U. S., at 366--367.
Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more
serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at
issue may be excessive. Thus in Enmund the Court noted
that all of the other felony murderers on death row in Florida
were more culpable than the petitioner there. 458 U. S., at
The Weems Court identified an impressive list of
more serious crimes that were subject to less serious penalties. 217 U. S., at 380-381.
Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review
of capital punishment statutes and determined that "only
about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a
defendant [such as Enmund] to be sentenced to die." 458
U. S., at - - . Even in those jurisdictions, however, the
death penalty was almost never imposed under similar circumstances. Id., at--. The Court's review of foreign
law also supported its conclusion. I d., at - - , n. 22. The
analysis in Coker was essentially the same. 433 U. S., at
593-597. And in Weems the Court relied on the fact that,
under federal law, a similar crime was punishable by only two
year's imprisonment and a fine. 217 U. S., at 380. Cf. Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 102-103 (1958) (plurality opinion).
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including
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(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty;
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of
the same crime in other jurisdictions.
B
Application of these factors assumes that courts are competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative
scale. In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and
courts traditionally have made these judgments-just as legislatures must make them in the first instance. Comparisons
can be made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the
victim or society, and the culpability of the offender. Thus
in Enmund the Court determined that the petitioner's conduct was not • serious as his accomplices' conduct. Indeed,
there are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness
of crimes. See Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness
of Crimes: Normative Structure and IndiYidual .Differences,
39 Am. Soc. Rev. 224, 237 (!)74). For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent crimes are less serious than
crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence. Cf. Tr.
of Oral Arg. 16 (the State recognizes that the criminal law is
more rotective of people than property).
There are o er ·
accepted principles that courts may
apply in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society. The absolute magnitude of the crime may be
relevant. Stealing a million dollars is viewed as more serious than stealing a hundred dollars-a point recognized in
statutes distinguishing petty theft from grand theft. See,
e. g., S.D. Codified Laws §22-30A-17 (Supp. 1982). Few
would dispute that a lesser included offense should not be
punished more severely than the greater offense. Thus a
court is justified in viewing assault with intent to murder as
more serious than simple assault. See Roberts v. Collins,
544 F. 2d 168, 169--170 (CA41976) (per curiam), cert. denied,
430 U. S. 973 (1977). Cf. Dembowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250,

- -(j)
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252, 240 N. E. 2d 815, 817 (1968) (anned rob ry more serious than robbery); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 r. 629, 632, 281
c__-l-_ _ _ _ _..............d.2~e more serious t an assault with intent to commit rape). Ita also
recognized that attempts are less serious than completed crimes. See, e. g.,
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-4-1 (1979); 4 Blackstone *15. Similarly, an accessory after the fact should not be subject to a
higher penalty than the principal. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3.
Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are again
clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply. In
Enmund the Court looked at the petitioner's lack of intent to
kill in detennining that he was less culpable than his accomplices. 458 U. S., at--. Most would agree that negligent
conduct is less serious than intentional conduct. South Dakota, for example, ranks criminal acts in ascending order of
seriousness as follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing
acts, intentional acts, and malicious acts. S.D. Codified
aF c~,.,r${',
_ .,..L-aws 922-1-2(1)(f) (Supp. 1982). A courws
entitled to
)
_
_
look at a defendant's motive in committing a crime. Thus a
murder may be viewed as more serious when committed pursuant to a contract. See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch.
279, § 69(a)(5) (West Supp. 1982); cf. 4 Blackstone *15; In re
Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 P. 2d 1073 (1974).
This list is by no means exhaustive. It simply illustrates
that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing the
severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the difficulties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions between
similar crimes.

r

c

Application of the factors that we identify also assumes
that courts are able to compare different sentences. This assumption, too, is justified. The easiest comparison, of
course, is between capital punishment and noncapital punish-
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ments, for the death penalty is different from other punishments in kind rather than degree. 17 For sentences of imprisonment, the problem is not so much one of ordering, but one
of line-drawing. It is clear that a 25-year sentence generally
is more severe than a 15-year sentence, 18 but in most cases it
would be difficult to decide that the former violates the
Eighth Amendment while the latter does not. Decisions of
this kind, although troubling, are not unique to this area.
The courts are constantly called upon to draw similar lines in
a variety of contexts.
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is an example.
In Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78 (1970), the Court upheld
a criminal conviction returned by a unanimous 6-member
jury, and in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (1972), we upheld a conviction returned by ten members of a 12-member
jury. In Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U. S. 223 (1978), however,
we reversed a conviction returned by a unanimous 5-member
jury. JUSTICE BLACKMUN "readily admit[ted] that we d[id]
not pretend to discern a clear line between six members and
five." Id., at 239 (opinion ofBLACKMUN, J.). He nevertheless found a difference between them of "constitutional significance." Ibid.; cf. id., at 24~246 (POWELL, J., concurring
in the judgment). And the following Term, in Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U. S. 130 (1979), we reversed a conviction returned by five members of a 6-member jury:
"[W]e do not pretend the ability to discern a priori a
bright line below which the number of jurors participating in the trial or in the verdict would not permit the
jury to function in the manner required by our prior
cases. But ... it is inevitable that lines must be drawn
17
There is also a clear line between sentences of imprisonment and sentences involving no deprivation of liberty. See Argersinger v. Hamlin ,

407

u. s. 25 (1972).

The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison, depending
upon the time and conditions of its availability.
18
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somewhere if the substance of the jury trial right is to be
preserved." ld., at 137 (citations omitted).
Another Sixth Amendment case illustrates the line-drawing function of the judiciary, and offers guidance on the
method by which some lines may be drawn. In Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), the Court determined that a
defendant has a right to a jury trial "where imprisonment for
more than six months is authorized." ld., at 69 (plurality
opinion). In choosing the 6-month standard, the plurality relied almost exclusively on the fact that only New York City
denied the right to a jury trial for an offense punishable by
more than six months. As JUSTICE WHITE explained:
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us
with the only objective criterion by which a line could
ever be drawn-on the basis of the possible penalty
alone-between offenses that are and that are not regarded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury." !d., at
72-73.
In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly
may distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another.
It also supports our holding that courts properly may look to
the practices in other jurisdictions in deciding where lines between sentences should be drawn.
IV
It remains to apply the analytical framework established
by our prior decisions to the case before us. We first consider the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life
imprisonment without possibility of parole. We then consider the State's argument that the possibility of commutation is sufficient to save an otherwise unconstitutional
sentence.
A
Helm's crime was "one of the most passive felonies a person could commit." State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 501
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(Henderson, J., dissenting). It involved neither violence nor
threat of violence to any person. The $100 face value of
Helm's "no account" check was not trivial, but neither was it
a large amount. One hundred dollars was less than half the
amount South Dakota required for a felonious theft. 19 It is
easy to see why such a crime is viewed by society as among
the less serious offenses. See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev.,
at 229.
Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a
"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender. 20
And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more severely than it punishes a first offender. Helm's status, however, cannot be considered in the abstract. His prior offenses, although classified as felonies, were all relatively
minor. 21 All were nonviolent and none was a crime against a
person. Indeed, there was no minimum amount in either the
burglary or the false pretenses statutes, see nn. 1 and 2,
19
If Helm had been convicted simply of taking $100 from a cash register,
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-1 (1979), or defrauding someone of $100,
§ 22-30A--3, or obtaining $100 through extortion, § 22-30A-4(1), or blackmail, § 22-30A-4(3), or using a false credit card to obtain $100,
§ 22-30A--8.1, or embezzling $100, § 22-30A-10, he would not be in prison
today. All of these offenses would have been petty theft, a misdemeanor.
§ 22-30A-17 (amended 1982). Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 check
against insufficient funds, rather than a nonexistent account, he would
have been guilty of a misdemeanor. §§ 22-41-1. Curiously, under South
Dakota law there is no distinction between writing a "no account" check for
a large sum and writing a "no account" check for a small sum. § 22-41-1.2.
'1IJ We must focus on the principal felony-the felony that triggers the life
sentence-since Helm already has paid the penalty for each of his prior offenses. But we recognize, of course, that Helm's prior convictions are relevant to the sentencing decision.
21
Helm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a professional criminal. The record indicates an addiction to alcohol, and a consequent difficulty in holding a job. His record involves no instance of violence of any kind. Incarcerating him for life without possibility of..parole-i
unlikely to advance the goals of our criminal justice sy~n any substantial way. Neither Helm nor the State will have ant incentive to pursue
clearly needed treatment for his alcohol problem
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supra, and the minimum amount covered by grand larceny
statute was fairly small, see n. 3, supra. 22
Helm's present sentence is life imprisonment without possibility ofparole. 23 Barring executive clemency, see infra, at
- - , Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state penitentiary. This sentence is far more severe than the life sentence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel was
likely to have been eligible for parole within 12 years of his
initial confinement, 24 a fact on which the Court rfed heavily.
severe
See 445 U. S."' at 280-281. Helm's sentence is
-~the State could have imposed on any
criminal for any crime. See note 6, supra. Only capital
punishment, a penalty not authorized in South Dakota when
Helm was sentenced, exceeds it.
We next consider the sentences that could be imposed on
other criminals in the same jurisdiction. When Helm was
sentenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a
life sentence for murder, S.D. Codified Laws § 22-16-12
(1979) (amended 1980), and was authorized to impose a life
sentence for treason, § 22--8-1, first degree manslaughter,
§ 22-16-15, first degree arson, § 22-33-1, and kidnapping,
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-19--1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978)
(amended 1979). No other crime was punishable so severely
on the first offense. Attempted murder, S.D. Codified Laws
As suggested at oral argument, the third-degree burglary statute covered entering a building with the intent to steal a loaf of bread. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 14-16. It appears that the grand larceny statute would have covered
the theft of a chicken.
23
Every life sentence in South Dakota is without possibility of parole.
See supra, a t - . We raise no question as to the general validity of sentences without possibility of parole. The only issue before us is whether,
in the circumstances of this case and in light of the constitutional principle
of proportionality, the sentence imposed on this petitioner violates the
Eighth Amendment.
24
We note that Rummel was, in fact, released within eight months of the
Court's decision in his case. See L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3.
22
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§ 22-4-1(5) (1979), placing an explosive device on an aircraft,
§ 22-14A-5, and first degree rape, § 22-22-1 (amended 1980
and 1982), were onl Class 2 felonies. Agz.!:avated rio ,
10- , as on a Class 3 felon . Distribution of herom,
§§ 22-42- (amended 1982), 34-20B-13(7) (1977), and aggravated assault, § 22-18--1.1 (amended 1980 and 1981), were
only Class 4 felonies.
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analysis,
but relevant comparisons are still possible. Under§ 22-7-7,
the penalty for a second or third felony is increased by one
class. Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or
third conviction was for treason, first degree manslaughter,
{kidnapp~ o/@r~ degree ar~ and a life sentence would
have been authorized when a second or third conviction was
for such crimes as attempted murder, placing an explosive
device on an aircraft, or first degree rape. Finally, §22-7-:;8,
under which Helm was sentenced, authorized life imy:riSOnment after three prior convictions, regard=ess
of he crimes.
In sum, there were a handful of crimes th IT~essa
ily punished by life imprisonment: murde ; and_(treason, first
egree mans aug ter, kidnappingAII!B•III••••-•
ass 1 d 5I' M · 1 man 0 There was a larger group for which
life imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of the sentencin 'ud e including: treason first degree manslau h er,
ki
first de ee rso attem t
r er, placing
a11-ex osive device on an aircraft,
st degree rape on a
second or third offense; and any felony after three prior offenses. Finally, there was a large group of very serious offenses for which life imprisonment was not authorized, including a third offense of heroin dealing or aggravated
assault.
Criminals committing any of these offenses ordinarily
would be thought more deserving of punishment than one uttering a "no account" check-even when the bad-check writer
had already committed six minor felonies.
there is no indication in the record that any habitual offender

/lore~ver7
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other than Helm has ever been given the maximum sentence
on the basis of comparable crimes. It is more likely that the
possibility of life imprisonment under § 22-7--8 generally is
reserved for criminals such as fourth-time heroin dealers,
while habitual bad-check writers receive more lenient treatment. 26 In any event, Helm has been treated in the same
manner as, or more severely than, criminals who have committed far more serious crimes.
Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission
of the same crime in other jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals found that "Helm could have received a life sentence
without parole for his offense in only one other state, N evada," 684 F. 2d, at 586, and we have no reason to doubt this
finding. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. At the very least, therefore, it is clear that Helm could not have received such a severe sentence in 48 of the 50 States. But even under Nevada law, a life sentence without possibility of parole is
merely authorized in these circumstances. See Nev. Rev.
Stat. §207.010(2) (1981). We are not advised that any defendant such as Helm, whose prior offenses were so minor,
actually has received the maximum penalty in Nevada. 26 It
The State contends that§ 22-7-8 is more lenient than the Texas habitual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 is
discretionary rather than mandatory. Brief for Petitioner 22. Helm,
however, has challenged only his own sentence. No one suggests that
§ 22-7-8 may not be applied constitutionally to fourth-time heroin dealers
or other violent criminals. Thus we do not question the legislature's judgment. Unlike in Rummel, a lesser sentence here could have been entirely
consistent with both the statute and the Eighth Amendment. See Note,
Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1119,
1160 (1979).
26
Under§ 207.010(2), a Nevada court is authorized to impose a sentence
of ''imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without possibility of
parole. If the penalty fixed by the court is life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, eligibility for parole begins when a minimum of 10 years
has been served." It appears that most sentences imposed under
§ 207.010(2) permit parole, even when the prior crimes are far more serious
than Helm's. See, e. g. , Rusling v. State, 96 Nev. 778, 617 P. 2d 1302
25
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appears that Helm was treated more severely than he would
have been in any other State.
B
The State argues that the present case is essentially the
same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in
that case is matched by the possibility of executive clemency
here. The State reasons that the Governor could commute
Helm's sentence to a term of years. We conclude, however,
that the South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally
different from the parole system that was before us in
Rummel.
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different
concepts, despite some surface similarities. Parole is a regular part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behavior, it is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases.
The law generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to
be considered for parole, and details the standards and procedures applicable at that time. See, e. g., Greenholz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979) (detailing Nebraska parole procedures); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S.
471, 477 (1972) ("the practice of releasing prisoners on parole
before the end of their sentences has become an integral part
of the penological system"). Thus it is possible to predict, at
least to some extent, when parole might be granted. Commutation, on the other hand, is an ad hoc exercise of executive clemency. A Governor may commute a sentence at any
time for any reason without reference to any standards.
See, e. g., Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452
u. s. 458 (1981).
We explicitly have recognized the distinction between parole and commutation in our prior cases. '1:1 Writing on behalf
(1980) (possession of a fireann by an ex-felon, two instances of driving an
automobile without the owner's consent, four first degree burglaries, two
sales of marijuana, two sales of a restricted dangerous drug, one sale of
heroin, one escape from state prison, and one second degree burglary).
27
In Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the possibility of
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of the Morrissey Court, for example, CHIEF JUSTICE BuRGER contrasted the two possibilities: "Rather than being an
ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals." 408 U. S., at
477. In Dumschat, THE CHIEF JUSTICE similarly explained
that "there is a vast difference between a denial of parole . . .
and a state's refusal to commute a lawful sentence." 452
U. S., at 466.
The Texas and South Dakota systems in particular are
very different. In Rummel, the Court did not rely simply
on the existence of some system of parole. Rather it looked
to the provisions of the system presented, including the fact
that Texas had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good
time' credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has allowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for
parole in as little as 12 years." 445 U. S., at 280. A Texas
prisoner became eligible for parole when his calendar time
served plus "good conduct" time equaled one-third of the
maximum sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 42.12, § 15(b) (Vernon
1979). An entering prisoner earned 20 days good-time per
30 days served, Brief for Respondent in Rummel, 0. T.
1979, No. 78--6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30
days good-time per 30 days served, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann., Art. 6181-1, §§ 2-3 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Thus
Rummel could have been eligible for parole in as few as 10
years, and could have expected to become eligible, in the normal course of events, in only 12 years.
commutation is not equivalent to the possibility of parole. The Court carefully "distinguish[ed] Rummel from a person sentenced under a recidivist
statute like [Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for
a sentence of life without parole." 445 U. S., at 281. But the Mississippi
Constitution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal and
penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment." Art. 5, § 124.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized that the power to pardon includes the power to commute a convict's sentence. See Whittington
v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 603-604, 73 So. 2d 137, 139-140 (1954).

82-492-0PINION
SOLEM v. HELM

23

In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain
than parole. For example, the board of pardons and paroles
is authorized to make commutation recommendations to the
Governor, see n. 7, supra, but § 24-13-4 provides that "no
recommendation for the commutation of ... a life sentence,
or for a pardon ... , shall be made by less than the unanimous vote of all members of the board." In fact, no life sen~
tence has been commuted in over eight years, App. 29, while
parole-where authorized-has been granted regularly during that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. Furthermore, even if
Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would be eligible
to be considered for parole. 28 Not only is there no guarantee
that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota parole
system is far more stringent than the one before us in
Rummel. Helm would have to serve three-fourths of his revised sentence before he would be eligible for parol
§ 24-15-5, and the provision for good-time credits is
generous, ~ 24-5-1. 29
The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a hope
for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency." It is little different
from the possibility of executive clemency that exists in
every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence
under the Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a bare
possibility would make judicial review under the Eighth
Amendment meaningless.

v

The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence

. 1h,

28
The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Dakota occurred in 1975. The record indicates, however, that the prisoner in question~ot been paroled. App. 29.
29
Assume, for example, that in 1979 the Governor had commuted Helm's
sentence to a term of 40 years (his approximate life expectancy). Even if
Helm were a model prisoner, he would not have been eligible for parole
until he had served over 21 years-more than twice the Rummel minimum. And this comparison is generous to South Dakota's position. If
Rummel had been sentenced to 40 years rather than life, he could have
been eligible for parole in less than 7 years.
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to determine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying objective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penultimate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has
been treated more harshly than other criminals in the State
who have committed more serious crimes. He has been
treated more harshly than he would have been in any other
jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State.
We conclude that his sentence is significantly disproportionate to his crime, and is therefore prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
is accordingly
Affirmed.
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HERMAN SOLEM, WARDEN, PETITIONER v. JERRY
BUCKLEY HELM
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[June-, 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment
proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a
seventh nonviolent felony.
I
By 1975 the State of South Dakota had convicted respondent Jerry Helm of six nonviolent felonies. In 1964, 1966, and
1969 Helm was convicted ofthird-degree burglary.' In 1972
1
In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined in at least two sections of
the South Dakota criminal code:
"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the nighttime with intent
to commit a crime but under such circumstances as do not constitute burglary in the first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third degree." S.D.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-8 (1967) (repealed 1976).
"A person breaking or entering at any time any building within the curtilage of a dwelling house but not forming a part thereof, or any building or
part of any building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as defined in
§ 32-14-1 , or any structure or erection in which any property is kept, with
intent to commit larceny or any felony , is guilty of burglary in the third
degree." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-9 (1967) (repealed 1976).
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essentially the
same. See S.D. Code § 13.3703 (1939 ed., supp. 1960); 1965 S.D. Laws,
ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by ''imprisonment in the
state penitentiary for any term not exceeding fifteen years." S.D. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 22-32-10 (1967) (previously codified at S.D. Code § 13.3705(3)

/~
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he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2
In 1973 he was convicted of grand larceny. 3 And in 1975 he
was convicted of third-offense driving while intoxicated. 4
The record contains no details about the circumstances of any
of these offenses, except that they were all nonviolent, none
was a crime against a person, and alcohol was a contributing
factor in each case.
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a "no account"
check for $100. 5 The only details we have of the crime are
those given by Helm to the state trial court:
(1939)) (repealed 1976).
2
In 1972 the relevant statute provided:
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any false token or writing, or other false pretense, . . . obtains from any person any money or
property ... is punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not
exceeding three years or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a
fine not exceeding three times the value of the money or property so obtained, or by both such fine and imprisonment." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 22-41-4 (1967) (repealed 1976).
• In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of personal property accomplished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive another
thereof." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-1 (1967) (repealed 1976).
Grand larceny and petit larceny were distinguished as follows:
"Grand larceny is larceny committed in any of the following cases:
(1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding fifty dollars;
(2) When such property, although not of a value exceeding fifty dollars,
is taken from the person of another;
(3) When such property is livestock.
Larceny in other cases is petit larceny." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-2
(1967) (repealed 1976).
Grand larceny was then punishable by ''imprisonment in the state penitentiary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-37-3 (1967) (repealed
1976).
• A third offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol is a felony
in South Dakota. S.D. Codified Laws § 32-23-4 (1976). See 1973 S.D.
Laws, ch. 195, § 7 (enacting version of § 32-23-4 in force in 1975).
6
The governing statute provides, in relevant part:
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"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that
day, was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid City
with more money than I had when I started. I knew I'd
done something I didn't know exactly what. If I would
have known this, I would have picked the check up. I
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several
places."' State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d 497, 501 (S.D.
1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Helm).
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty.
Ordinarily the maximum punishment for uttering a "no account" check would have been five years imprisonment in the
state penitentiary and a five thousand dollar fine. See S.D.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1(6) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now
codified at S.D. Codified Laws § 22-6-1(7) (Supp. 1982)). As
a result of his criminal record, however, Helm was subject to
South Dakota's recidivist statute:
''When a defendant has been convicted of at least three
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal felony,
the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to
the sentence for a Class 1 felony." S.D. Codified Laws
§22-7--8 (1979) (amended 1981).
The maximum penalty for a "Class 1 felony'' was life imprisonment in the state penitentiary and a twenty-five thousand
dollar fine. 6 S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1(2) (1967 ed.,
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another
for present consideration with intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a
financial institution knowing at the time of such passing that he or his principal does not have an account with such financial institution, is guilty of a
Class 5 felony." S.D. Codified Laws § 22-41-1.2 (1979).
6
When Helm was sentenced in April1979, South Dakota law classified
felonies as follows:
"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are divided into the following seven classes which are distinguished from each other by the respective maximum penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized
upon conviction:
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supp. 1978) (now codified at S.D. Codified Laws § ~1(3)
(Supp. 1982)). Moreover, South Dakota law explicitly provides that parole is unavailable: "A person sentenced to life
imprisonment is not eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles." S.D. Codified Laws §24-15-4 (1979).
The Governor 7 is authorized to pardon prisoners, or to commute their sentences, S.D. Const., Art. IV, § 3, but no other
relief from sentence is available even to a rehabilitated
prisoner.
Immediately after accepting Helm's guilty plea, the South
Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life imprisonment
under §22-7-8. The court explained:
" 'I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly
proven that you're an habitual criminal and the record
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. A lesser
sentence may not be given for a Class A felony;
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed;
(3) Class 2 felony: twenty-five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed;
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary.
In addition, a fine of fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed;
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In
addition, a fine of ten thousand dollars may be imposed;
(6) Class 5 felony: five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In
addition, a fine of five thousand dollars may be imposed; and
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the state penitentiary or a
fine of two thousand dollars, or both.
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sentences for habitual criminals ....
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by Jaw, every offense
declared to be a felony and not otherwise classified is a Class 6 felony."
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22--6-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979 and
1980).
7
The board of pardons and paroles is authorized to make recommendations to the Governor, S.D. Codified Laws§ 24-14-1 (1979); § 24-14-5; S.D.
Executive Order 82-04 (Apr. 12, 1982), but the Governor is not bound by
the recommendation, § 24-14-5.
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would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation and that
the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up for the rest
of your natural life, so you won't have further victims of
your crimes, just be coming back before Courts. You'll
have plenty of time to think this one over."' State v.
Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 500 (Henderson, J., dissenting)
(quoting S.D. Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit,
Pennington County (Parker, J.)).
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a ~2 decision, affirmed
the sentence despite Helm's argument that it violated the
Eighth Amendment. State v. Helm, supra.
After Helm had served two years in the state penitentiary,
he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a
fixed term of years. Such a commutation would have had
the effect of making Helm eligible to be considered for parole
when he had served three-fourths of his new sentence. See
S.D. Codified Laws § 24-15-5(3) (1979). The Governor denied Helm's request in May 1981. App. 26.
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the
United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. Helm argued, among other things, that his sentence
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the District Court
recognized that the sentence was harsh, it concluded that this
Court's recent decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263
(1980), was dispositive. It therefore denied the writ.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed. 684 F. 2d 582 (1982). The Court of Appeals
noted that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable. Helm's
sentence of life without parole was qualitatively different
from Rummel's life sentence with the prospect of parole because South Dakota has rejected rehabilitation as a goal of
the criminal justice system. The Court of Appeals examined
the nature of Helm's offenses, the nature ofhis sentence, and
the sentence he could have received in other States for the
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same offense. It concluded, on the basis of this examination,
that Helm's sentence was "grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offense." 684 F. 2d, at 587. It therefore directed the District Court to issue the writ unless the State
resentenced Helm. Ibid.
We granted certiorari to consider the Eighth Amendment
question presented by this case. 459 U. S. - - (1982). We
now affirm.
II
The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." The final clause prohibits not
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.
A
The principle that a punishment should be proportionate to
the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence. In 1215 three chapters of Magna
Carta were devoted to the rule that "amercements" 8 may not
be excessive. 9 And the principle was repeated and extended in the First Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw. I, ch. 6
(1275). These were not hollow guarantees, for the royal
courts relied on them to invalidate disproportionate punish8

An amercement was similar to a modern-day fine. It was the most
common criminal sanction in thirteenth century England. See 2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 513--515 (2d ed. 1909).
'Chapter 20 declared that "[a] freeman shall not be amerced for a small
fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great crime according to
the heinousness of it." See 1 S.D. Codified Laws, p. 4 (1978) (translation
of Magna Carta). According to Maitland, "there was no clause in Magna
Carta more grateful to the mass of the people . . . ." F. Maitland, Pleas of
the Crown for the County of Gloucester xxxiv (1884). Chapter 21 granted
the same rights to the nobility, and chapter 22 granted the same rights to
the clergy.

I
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ments. See, e. g., Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop of Winchester, Y.B. Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 (C.P. 1316), reprinted in 52
Selden Society 3 (1934). When prison sentences became the
normal criminal sanctions, the common law recognized that
these, too, must be proportional. See, e. g., Hodges v.
Humkin, 2 Buist. 139, 140, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K.B.
1615) (Croke, J.) ("imprisonment ought always to be according to the quality of the offence").
The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of proportionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth
Amendment: "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor
excessive Fines imposed nor cruell an~ unusuall Punishments
inflicted." 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). Although the
precise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incorporated "the longstanding principle of English law that the punishment ... should not be, by reason of its excessive length
or severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged."
R. Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 (1959); see 4 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries *16-19 (1769); see also id., at
*16-17 (in condemning "punishments of unreasonable severity," uses "cruel" to mean severe or excessive). Indeed,
barely three months after the Bill of Rights was adopted, the
House of Lords declared that a "fine of thirty thousand
pounds, imposed by the court of King's Bench upon the earl
of Devon, was excessive and exorbitant, against magna
charta, the common right of the subject, and against the law
of the land." Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Trials 133, 136
(1689).
When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the
language of the English Bill of Rights, 10 they also adopted the
0

This language had earlier been incorporated in the Virginia Declaration
of Rights, Art. I, § 9, authored by George Mason. See A. Howard, The
Road from Runnymede: Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in America
207 (1968).
'

I
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English principle of proportionality. The people were guaranteed the rights they had possessed as English subjectsincluding the right to be free from excessive punishments.

B
The constitutional principle of proportionality has been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 11 In the
leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910),
the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public document and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form
of imprisonment that included hard labor in chains and permanent civil disabilities. The Court noted "that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to offense," id., at 367, and held that the
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court endorsed the principle of proportionality as a constitutional
standard, see, e. g., id., at 372-373, and determined that the
sentence before it was "cruel in its excess of imprisonment,"
id., at 377.
The Court next applied the principle to invalidate a criminal sentence in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660
(1962). 12 A 90-day sentence was found to be excessive for
the crime of being "addicted to the use of narcotics." The
In O'Neil v. Vernwnt, 144 U. S. 323 (1892), the defendant had been
convicted of 307 counts of "selling intoxicating liquor without authority,"
and sentenced to a term of over 54 years. The majority did not reach
O'Neil's contention that this sentence was unconstitutional, for he did not
include the point in his assignment of errors or in his brief. /d., at 331.
Furthermore, the majority noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not
apply to the States." I d., at 332. Accordingly the Court dismissed the
writ of error for want of a federal question. /d., at 33&-337. The dissent,
however, reached the Eighth Amendment question, observing that it "is
directed ... against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged." /d., at
339-340 (Field, J., dissenting).
12
Members of the Court continued to recognize the principle of proportionality in the meantime. See, e. g., Trap v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100
(1958) (plurality opinion); id., at 111 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at
11
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Court explained that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in
the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual."
Id., at 667. Thus there was no question of an inherently barbaric punishment. "But the question cannot be considered
in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and
unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."
Ibid.
Most recently, the Court has applied the principle of proportionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain
circumstances. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. - - (1982)
(death penalty excessive for felony murder when defendant
did not take life, attempt to take life, or intend that a life be
taken or that lethal force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U. S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("sentence of death is
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the
crime of rape"); id., at 601 (POWELL, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("ordinarily death is
disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult
woman"). And the Court has continued to recognize that
the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate
punishments, even when it has not been necessary to rely on
the proscription. See, e. g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678,
685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667 (1977);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 171-172 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Davis,
454 U. S. 370, 374, and n. 3 (1982) (per curiam) (recognizing
that some prison sentences may be constitutionally disproportionate); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11
(same).

c

There is no basis for the State's assertion that the general
principle of proportionality does not apply to felony prison
sentences. 13 The constitutional language itself suggests no
(Frankfurter, J ., dissenting).
According to Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 (1980), "one could

1~126
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exception for imprisonment. We have recognized that the
Eighth Amendment imposes "parallel limitations" on bail,
fines, and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U. S., at 664, and the text is explicit that bail and fines may
not be excessive. It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser
punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death
were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the intermediate punishment of imprisonment were not. There is
also no historical support for such an exception. The common-law principle incorporated into the Eighth Amendment
clearly applied to prison terms. See Hodges v. Humkin,
supra. And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that
prison sentences are subject to proportionality analysis.
See, e. g., Weems, 217 U. S., at 377; cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437
U. S., at 685 ("Confinement in a prison ... is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment
standards").
When we have applied the proportionality principle in capital cases, we have drawn no distinction with cases of imprisonment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 176 (opinion of
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). It is true that the
"penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind." Furman v. Georgia,
408 U. S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). As aresult, "our decisions [in] capital cases az:e of li!!rlted as~stance
in deciding the constitutionality of the purusfiment" in a
noncapital case. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 272. ~
'l _-tftis meaas, A9We'V'eF, 4s that, "[o]utside the context of capital 1'"""'
~ punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of

f

argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for

crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies . . . the length of
sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative."
!d., at 274 (emphasis added). The Court did not adopt the standard proposed, but merely recognized that the argument was possible. To the extent that the State makes this argument here, we find it meritless.
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11 /3t.LI- -rt-:-particular sentences [ ·n be ex eedin 1 rare," ib
e. 6ue:
:::..
phasis added); see H tto v. Davis, 454 U. S., at 374. ~
not mean that propo ionality analysis is entirely inapplicable
in noncapital cases.
In sum, we hold hat a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted. Reviewing courts, of course, ..ihg:aJQ grant substan- ~kf
tial deference to the broad authority that legislatures possess
in determining the types and limits of punishments for
crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in
sentencing convicted criminals. 15 But no penalty is per se
constitutional. As the Court noted in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S., at 667, a single day in prison may be unconstitutional in some circumstances.
LEM v. HELM

14

III
A
In reviewing sentences under the Eighth Amendment,
courts should be guided by objective factors that our cases
have recognized. 16 First, we look to the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty. In Enmund, for example, the Court examined the circumstances of the defend•• In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to be excessive for felony murder in the circumstances of that case. But clearly ni l l
sentence of imprisonment would be disproportionate for Enmund's crime.
~
In view of the substantial deference properly due to legislatures an
~
sentencing courts, most reviewing courts normally will not be required to
engage' in extended analysis to determine that a sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate.
~ the Court has indicated, no one factor will be dispositive.
See
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S. 370, 373-874 n. 2 (1982) (per curiam); Rummel
v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 275-276. The inherent nature of our federal
system and the need for individualized sentencing decisions result in a wide
range of constitutional sentences. No single criterion can identify when a
sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it violates the Eighth Amendment. See Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of J
Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 Yale L.J. 1325, 1376-1377 (1979).
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ant's crime in great detail. 458 U. S., at - - - - - . In
Coker the Court considered the seriousness of the crime of
rape, and compared it to other crimes, such as murder. 433
U. S., at 597-598 (plurality opinion); id., at 603 (POWELL, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
In Robinson the emphasis was placed on the nature of the
"crime." 370 U. S., at 66&-667. And in Weems, the Court's
opinion commented in two separate places on the pettiness of
the offense. 217 U. S., at 363 and 365. Of course, a court
must consider the severity of the penalty in deciding whether
it is disproportionate. See, e. g., Coker, 433 U. S., at 598
(plurality opinion); Weems, 217 U. S., at 36fh367.
Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more
serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at
issue may be excessive. Thus in Enmund the Court noted
that all of the other felony murderers on death row in Florida
were more culpable than the petitioner there. 458 U. S., at
- - . The Weems Court identified an impressive list of
more serious crimes that were subject to less serious penalties. 217 U. S., at 380-381.
Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review
of capital punishment statutes and determined that "only
about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a
defendant [such as Enmund] to be sentenced to die." 458
U. S., at--. Even in those jurisdictions, however, the
death penalty was almost never imposed under similar circumstances. I d., at - - . The Court's review of foreign
law also supported its conclusion. I d., at - - , n. 22. The
analysis in Coker was essentially the same. 433 U. S., at
593-597. And in Weems the Court relied on the fact that,
under federal law, a similar crime was punishable by only two
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year's imprisonment and a fine. 217 U. S., at 380. Cf. Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 102-103 (1958) (plurality opinion).
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including
(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty;
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of
the same crime in other jurisdictions.
B
Application of these factors assumes that courts are competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative
scale. In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and
courts traditionally have made these judgments-just as legislatures must make them in the first instance. Comparisons
can be made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the
victim or society, and the culpability of the offender. Thus
in Enmund the Court determined that the petitioner's conduct was not as serious as his accomplices' conduct. Indeed,
there are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness
of crimes. See Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness
of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences,
39 Am. Soc. Rev. 224,237 (1974). For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent crimes are less serious than
crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence. Cf. Tr.
of Oral Arg. 16 (the State recognizes that the criminal law is
more protective of people than property).
There are other accepted principles that courts may apply
in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the victim or
society. The absolute magnitude of the crime may be relevant. Stealing a million dollars is viewed as more serious
than stealing a hundred dollars-a point recognized in statutes distinguishing petty theft from grand theft. See, e. g.,
S.D. Codified Laws §22-30A-17 (Supp. 1982). Few would
dispute that a lesser included offense should not be punished
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more severely than the greater offense. Thus a court is justified in viewing assault with intent to murder as more serious than simple assault. See Roberts v. Collins, 544 F. 2d
168, 169-170 (CA41976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 430 U. S.
973 (1977). Cf. Dembowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 252, 240
N. E. 2d 815, 817 (1968) (anned robbery more serious than
robbery); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 632, 281 P. 2d
233, 235 (1955) (rape more serious than assault with intent to
commit rape). It also is generally recognized that attempts
are less serious than completed crimes. See, e. g., S.D.
Codified Laws § 22-4-1 (1979); 4 Blackstone *15. Similarly,
an accessory after the fact should not be subject to a higher
penalty than thetprincipal. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. §3.
Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are again
clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply. In
Enmund the Court looked at the petitioner's lack of intent to
kill in determining that he was less culpable than his accomplices. 458 U. S., at--. Most would agree that negligent
conduct is less serious than intentional conduct. South Dakota, for example, ranks criminal acts in ascending order of
seriousness as follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing
acts, intentional acts, and malicious acts. S.D. Codified
Laws § 22-1-2(1)(f) (Supp. 1982). A court, of course, is entitled to look at a defendant's motive in committing a crime.
Thus a murder may be viewed as more serious when committed pursuant to a contract. See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann., ch. 279, § 69(a)(5) (West Supp. 1982); cf. 4 Blackstone
*15; In re Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 P. 2d 1073 (1974).
This list is by no means exhaustive. It simply illustrates
that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing the
severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the difficulties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions between
similar crimes.

c

Application of the factors that we identify also assumes

f
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that courts are able to compare different sentences. This assumption, too, is justified. The easiest comparison, of
course, is between capital punishment and noncapital punishments, for the death penalty is different from other punishments in kind rather than degree. 17 For sentences of imprisonment, the problem is not so much one of ordering, but one
of line-drawing. It is clear that a 25-year sentence generally
is more severe than a 15-year sentence, 18 but in most cases it
would be difficult to decide that the former violates the
Eighth Amendment while the latter does not. Decisions of
this kind, although troubling, are not unique to this area.
The courts are constantly called upon to draw similar lines in
a variety of contexts.
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is an example.
In Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78 (1970), the Court upheld
a criminal conviction returned by a unanimous 6-member
jury, and in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (1972), we upheld a conviction returned by ten members of a 12-member
jury. ·In Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U. S. 223 (1978), however,
we reversed a conviction returned by a unanimous 5-member
jury. JUSTICE BLACKMUN "readili admit[ted] that we d[id]
not pretend to discern a clear line between six members and
five." /d., at 239 (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.). He nevertheless found a difference between them of "constitutional significance." Ibid.; cf. id., at 24~246 (POWELL, J., concurring
in the judgment). And the following Term, in Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U. S. 130 (1979), we reversed a conviction returned by five members of a 6-member jury:
"[W]e do not pretend the ability to discern a priori a
bright line below which the number of jurors participat17

There is also a clear line between sentences of imprisonment and sentences involving no deprivation of liberty. See Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407
18

u. s. 25 (1972).

The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison, depending
upon the time and conditions of its availability.
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ing in the trial ·or in the verdict would not permit the
jury to function in the manner required by our prior
cases. But ... it is inevitable that lines must be drawn
somewhere if the substance of the jury trial right is to be
preserved." Id., at 137 (citations omitted).
Another Sixth Amendment case illustrates the line-drawing function of the judiciary, and offers guidance on the
method by which some lines may be drawn. In Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), the Court determined that a
defendant has a right to a jury trial "where imprisonment for
more than six months is authorized." I d., at 69 (plurality
opinion). In choosing the 6-month standard, the plurality relied almost exclusively on the fact that only New York City
denied the right to a jury trial for an offense punishable by
more than six months. As JUSTICE WHITE explained:
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us
with the only objective criterion by which a line could
ever be drawn-on the basis of the possible penalty
alone-between offenses that are and that are not regarded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury." I d., at
72-73.
In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly
may distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another.
It also supports our holding that courts properly may look to
the practices in other jurisdictions in deciding where lines between sentences should be drawn.
IV
It remains to apply the analytical framework established
by our prior decisions to the case before us. We first consider the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life
imprisonment without possibility of parole. We then consider the State's argument that the possibility of commutation is sufficient to save an otherwise unconstitutional
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sentence.
A

Helm's crime was "one of the most passive felonies a person could commit." State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 501
(Henderson, J., dissenting). It involved neither violence nor
threat of violence to any person. The $100 face value of
Helm's "no account" check was not trivial, but neither was it
a large amount. One hundred dollars was less than half the
amount South Dakota required for a felonious theft. 19 It is
easy to see why such a crime is viewed by society as among
the less serious offenses. See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev.,
at 229.
Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a
"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender. 20
And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more severely than it punishes a first offender. Helm's status, however, cannot be considered in the abstract. His prior offenses, although classified as felonies, were all relatively
minor. 21 All were nonviolent and none was a crime against a
11
If Helm had been convicted simply of taking $100 from a cash register,
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-1 (1979), or defrauding someone of $100,
§ 22-30A-3, or obtaining $100 through extortion, § 22-30A-4(1), or blackmail, § 22-30A-4(3), or using a false credit card to obtain $100,
§ 22-30A-8.1, or embezzling $100, § 22-30A-10, he would not be in prison
today. All of these offenses would have been petty theft, a misdemeanor.
§ 22-30A-17 (amended 1982). Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 check
against insufficient funds, rather than a nonexistent account, he would
have been guilty of a misdemeanor. §§ 22-41-1. Curiously, under South
Dakota law there is no distinction between writing a "no account" check for
a large sum and writing a "no account" check for a small sum. § 22-41-1.2.
20
We must focus on the principal felony-the felony that triggers the life
sentence-since Helm already has paid the penalty for each of his prior offenses. But we recognize, of course, that Helm's prior convictions are relevant to the sentencing decision.
!I Helm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a professional criminal. The record indicates an addiction to alcohol, and a consequent difficulty in holding a job. His record involves no instance of vio-
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person. Indeed, there was no minimum amount in either the
burglary or the false pretenses statutes, see nn. 1 and 2,
supra, and the minimum amount covered by the grand larceny statute was fairly small, see n. 3, supra. 22
Helm's present sentence is life imprisonment without possibility of parole. 22 Barring executive clemency, see infra, at
- - , Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state penitentiary. This sentence is far more severe than the life sentence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel was
likely to have been eligible for parole within 12 years of his
initial confinement, 24 a fact on which the Court relied heavily.
See 445 U. S., at 280-281. Helm's sentence is the most se- '
vere punishment that the State could have imposed on any
criminal for any crime. See note 6, supra. Only capital
punishment, a penalty not authorized in South Dakota when
Helm was sentenced, exceeds it.
We next consider the sentences that could be imposed on
other criminals in the same jurisdiction. When Helm was
sentenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a
lence of any kind. Incarcerating him for life without possibility of parole is
unlikely to advance the goals of our criminal justice system in any substantial way. Neither Helm nor the State will have an incentive to pursue
clearly needed treatment for his alcohol problem, or any other program of
rehabilitation.
zz As suggested at oral argument, the third-degree burglary statute covered entering a building with the intent to steal a loaf of bread. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 14-16. It appears that the grand larceny statute would have covered
the theft of a chicken.
zz Every life sentence in South Dakota is without possibility of parole.
See supra, a t - . We raise no question as to the general validity of sentences without possibility of parole. The only issue before us is whether,
in the circumstances of this case and in light of the constitutional principle
of proportionality, the sentence imposed on this petitioner violates the
Eighth Amendment.
"'We note that Rummel was, in fact, released within eight months of the
Court's decision in his case. See L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3.

I
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life sentence for murder, S.D. Codified Laws § 22-16-12
(1979) (amended 1980), and was authorized to impose a life
sentence for treason, § 22-8-1, first degree manslaughter,
§ 22-16-15, first degree arson, § 22--83-1, and kidnapping, ·
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-19-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978)
(amended 1979). No other crime was punishable so severely
on the first offense. Attempted murder, S.D. Codified Laws
§ 22-4-1(5) (1979), placing an explosive device on an aircraft,
§ 22-14A-5, and first degree rape, § 22-22-1 (amended 1980
and 1982), were only Class 2 felonies. Aggravated riot was
only a Class 3 felony. § 22-10-5. Distribution of heroin,
§§ 22-42-2 (amended 1982), 34-20B-13(7) (1977), and aggravated assault, § 22-1~1.1 (amended 1980 and 1981), were
only Class 4 felonies.
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analysis,
but relevant comparisons are still possible. Under§ 22-7-7,
the penalty for a second or third felony is increased by one
class. Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or
third conviction was for treason, first degree manslaughter,
first degree arson, or kidnapping, and a life sentence would
have been authorized when a second or third conviction was
for such crimes as attempted murder, placing an explosive
device on an aircraft, or first degree rape. Finally, §22-7-8,
under which Helm was sentenced, authorized life imprisonment after three prior convictions, regardless of the crimes.
In sum, there were a handful of crimes that were necessarily punished by life imprisonment: murder, and, on a second
or third offense, treason, first degree manslaughter, first degree arson, and kidnapping. There was a larger group for
which life imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of
the sentencing judge, including: treason, first degree manslaughter, first degree arson, and kidnapping; attempted
murder, placing an explosive device on an aircraft, and first
degree rape on a second or third offense; and any felony after
three prior offenses. Finally, there was a large group of

I
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very serious offenses for which life imprisonment was not authorized, including a third offense of heroin dealing or aggravated assault.
Criminals committing any of these offenses ordinarily
would be thought more deserving of punishment than one uttering a "no account" check--even when the bad-check writer '
had already committed six minor felonies. Moreover, there
is no indication in the record that any habitual offender other
than Helm has ever been given the maximum sentence on the
basis of comparable crimes. It is more likely that the possibility of life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 generally is reserved for criminals such as fourth-time heroin dealers, while
habitual bad-check writers receive more lenient treatment. 25
In any event, Helm has been treated in the same manner as,
or more severely than, criminals who have committed far
more serious crimes.
Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission
of the same crime in other jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals found that "Helm could have received a life sentence
without parole for his offense in only one other state, Nevada," 684 F . 2d, at 586, and we have no reason to doubt this
finding. See Tr. of Oral Arg~ 21. At the very least, therefore, it is clear that Helm could not have received such a severe sentence in 48 of the 50 States. But even under Nevada law, a life sentence without possibility of parole is
merely authorized in these circumstances. See Nev. Rev.
., The State contends that § 22-7-8 is more lenient than the Texas habitual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 is

discretionary rather than mandatory. Brief for Petitioner 22. Helm,
however, has challenged only his own sentence. No one suggests that
§ 22-7-8 may not be applied constitutionally to fourth-time heroin dealers
or other violent criminals. Thus we do not question the legislature's judgment. Unlike in Rummel, a Jesser sentence here could have been entirely
consistent with both the statute and the Eighth Amendment. See Note,
Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1119,
1160 (1979).
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Stat. §207.010(2) (1981). We are not advised that any defendant such as Helm, whose prior offenses were so minor,
actually has received the maximum penalty in Nevada. 26 It
appears that Helm was treated more severely than he would
have been in any other State.
B
The State argues that the present case is essentially the
same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in
that case is matched by the possibility of executive clemency
here. The State reasons that the Governor could commute
Helm's sentence to a term of years. We conclude, however,
that the South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally
different from the parole system that was before us in

Rummel.
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different
concepts, despite some surface similarities. Parole is a regular part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behavior, it is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases.
The law generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to
be considered for parole, and details the standards and procedures applicable at that time. See, e. g., Greenholz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979) (detailing Nebraska parole procedures); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S.
471, 477 (1972) ("the practice of releasing prisoners on parole
•Under §207.010(2), a Nevada court is authorized to impose a sentence
of ''imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without possibility of
parole. If the penalty fixed by the court is life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, eligibility for parole begins when a minimum of 10 years
has been served." It appears that most sentences imposed under
§ 207.010(2) permit parole, even when the prior crimes are far more serious
than Helm's. See, e. g., Rusling v. State, 96 Nev. 778, 617 P. 2d 1302
(1980) (possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, two instances of driving an
automobile without the owner's consent, four first degree burglaries, two
sales of marijuana, two sales of a restricted dangerous drug, one sale of
heroin, one escape from state prison, and one second degree burglary).
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before the end of their sentences has become an integral part
of the penological system"). Thus it is possible to predict, at
least to some extent, when parole might be granted. Commutation, on the other hand, is an ad hoc exercise of executive clemency. A Governor may commute a sentence at any
time for any reason without reference to any standards.
See, e. g., Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452
u. s. 458 (1981).
We explicitly have recognized the distinction between parole and commutation in our prior cases. zr Writing on behalf
of the Morrissey Court, for example, CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER contrasted the two possibilities: "Rather than being an
ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals." 408 U. S., at
477. In Dumschat, THE CHIEF JUSTICE similarly explained
that "there is a vast difference between a denial of parole . . .
and a state's refusal to commute a lawful sentence." 452
U. S., at 466.
The Texas and South Dakota systems in particular are
very different. In Rummel, the Court did not rely simply
on the existence of some system of parole. Rather it looked
to the provisions of the system presented, including the fact
that Texas had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good
time' credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has allowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for
parole in as little as 12 years." 445 U. S., at 280. A Texas
prisoner became eligible for parole when his calendar time
n In Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the possibility of
commutation is not equivalent to the possibility of parole. The Court carefully "distinguish[ed] Rummel from a person sentenced under a recidivist
statute like [Miss. Code Ann. § ~19-83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for
a sentence of life without parole." 445 U. S., at 281. But the Mississippi
Constttution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal and
penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment." Art. 5, § 124.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized that the power to pardon includes the power to commute a convict's sentence. See Whittington
v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 603--604, 73 So. 2d 137, 139-140 (1954).
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served plus "good conduct" time equaled one-third of the
maximum sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 42.12, § 15(b) (Vernon
1979). An entering prisoner earned 20 days good-time per
30 days served, Brief for Respondent in Rummel, 0. T.
1979, No. 78-6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30
days good-time per 30 days served, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann., Art. 6181-1, §§2-3 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Thus
Rummel could have been eligible for parole in as few as 10
years, and could have expected to become eligible, in the normal course of events, in only 12 years.
In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain
than parole. For example, the board of pardons and paroles
is authorized to make commutation recommendations to the
Governor, see n. 7, supra, but § 24-13-4 provides that "no
recommendation for the commutation of ... a life sentence,
or for a pardon ... , shall be made by less than the unanimous vote of all members of the board." In fact, no life sentence has been commuted in over eight years, App. 29, while
parole-where authorized-has been granted regularly during that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. Furthermore, even if
Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would be eligible
to be considered for parole. 28 Not only is there no guarantee
that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota parole
system is far more stringent than the one before us in
Rummel. Helm would have to serve three-fourths of his revised sentence before he would be eligible for parole,
§ 24-15-5, and the provision for good-time credits is less generous, §24-5-1. 29
The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Dakota occurred in 1975. The record indicates, however, that the prisoner in question still has not been paroled. App. 29.
11
Assume, for example, that in 1979 the Governor had commuted Helm's
sentence to a term of 40 years (his approximate life expectancy). Even if
Helm were a model prisoner, he would not have been eligible for parole
until he had served over 21 years-more than twice the Rummel minimum. And this comparison is generous to South Dakota's position. If
111
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The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a hope
for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency." It is little different
from the possibility of executive clemency that exists in
every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence
under the Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a bare
possibility would make judicial review under the Eighth
Amendment meaningless.

v

The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence
to determine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying objective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penultimate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has
been treated more harshly than other criminals in the State
who have committed more serious crimes. He has been
treated more harshly than he would have been in any other
jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State.
We conclude that his sentence is significantly disproportionate to his crime, and is therefore prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
is accordingly
Affirmed.

Rummel had been sentenced to 40 years rather than life, he could have
been eligible for parole in less than 7 years.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment
proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a
seventh nonviolent felony.
I
By 1975 the State of South Dakota had convicted respondent Jerry Helm of six nonviolent felonies. In 1964, 1966, and
1969 Helm was convicted of third-degree burglary. 1 In 1972
In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined in at least two sections of
the South Dakota criminal code:
"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the nighttime with intent
to commit a crime but under such circumstances as do not constitut~
b glary in the first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third degree." S.D
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-8 (1967) (repealed 1976).
"A person breaking or entering at any time any building within the curtilage of a dwelling house but not forming a part thereof, or any building or
part of any building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as defined in
§ 32-14-1, or any structure or erection in which any property is kept, with
intent to commit larceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the third
degree." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-9 (1967) (repealed 1976).
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essentially the
same. See S.D. Code § 13.3703 (1939 ed., supp. 1960); 1965 S.D. Laws,
ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by "imprisonment in the
state penitentiary for any term not exceeding fifteen years." S.D. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 22-32-10 (1967) (previously codified at S.D. Code§ 13.3705(3)
1
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he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2
In 1973 he was convicted of grand larceny. 3 And in 1975 he
was convicted of third-offense driving while intoxicated. 4
The record contains no details about the circumstances of any
of these offenses, except that they were all nonviolent, none
was a crime against a person, and alcohol was a contributing
factor in each case.
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a "no account"
check for $100. 5 The only details we have of the crime are
those given by Helm to the state trial court:

·

(1939)) (repealed 1976).
' In 1972 the relevant statute provided:
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any false token or writing, or other false pretense, ... obtains from any person any money or
property ... is punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not
exceeding three years or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a
fine not exceeding three times the value of the money or property so obtained, or by both such fine and imprisonment." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 22-41-4 (1967) (repealed 1976).
3
In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of personal property accomplished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive another
thereof." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-1 (1967) (repealed 1976).
Grand larceny and petit larceny were distinguished as follows:
"Grand larceny is larceny committed in any of the following cases:
(1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding fifty dollars;
(2) When such property, although not of a value exceeding fifty dollars,
is taken from the person of another;
(3) When such property is livestock.
Larceny in other cases is petit larceny." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-2
(1967) (repealed 1976).
rand larceny was then punishable by "imprisonment in the state penitenary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in the county jail not exeeding one year." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-3 (1967) (repealed
1976).
• A third offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol is a felony
in South Dakota. S.D. Codified Laws § 32-23-4 (1976). See 1973 S.D.
Laws, ch. 195, § 7 (enacting version of§ 32-23-4 in force in 1975).
'The governing statute provides, in relevant part:
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"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that
day, was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid City
with more money than I had when I started. I knew I'd
done something I didn't know exactly what. If I would
have known this, I would have picked the check up. I
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several
places."' State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d 497, 501 (S.D.
1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Helm).
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty.
Ordinarily the maximum punishment for uttering a "no account" check would have been five years imprisonment in the
state penitentiary and a~ thousand do r fine. See S.D.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1(6) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now
codified at S.D. Codified Laws § 22-6-1(7) (Supp. 1982)). As
a result of his criminal record, however, Helm was subject to
South Dakota's recidivist statute:
"When a defendant has been convicted of at least three
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal felony,
the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to
the sentence for a Class 1 felony." S.D. Codified Laws
§22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981).
The maximum penalty for a "Class 1 felony" was life imprisonment in the state penitentiary and a enty-five thousand
c__dollar fine. 6 S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1(2) (1967 ed.,
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another
for present consideration with intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a
financial institution knowing at the time of such passing that he or his principal does not have an account with such financial institution, is guilty of a
Class 5 felony." S.D. Codified Laws § 2~1-1.2 (1979).
6
When Helm was sentenced in April 1979, South Dakota law classified
felonies as follows:
"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are divided into the following seven classes which are distinguished from each other by the respective maximum penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized
upon conviction:
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supp. 1978) (now codified at S.D. Codified Laws § 22-6--1(3)
(Supp. 1982)). Moreover, South Dakota law explicitly provides that parole is unavailable: "A person sentenced to life
imprisonment is not eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles." S.D. Codified Laws § 24-15-4 (1979).
The Governor 7 is authorized to pardon prisoners, or to commute their sentences, S.D. Const., Art. IV, §3, but no other
relief from sentence is available even to a rehabilitated
prisoner.
Immediately after accepting Helm's guilty plea, the South
Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life imprisonment
under§ 22-7-8. The court explained:
" 'I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly
proven that you're an habitual criminal and the record
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. A lesser
sentence may not be given for a Class A felony;
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed;
(3) Class 2 felony: twenty-five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed;
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary.
In addition, a fine of fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed;
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In
addition, a fine of ten thousand dollars may be imposed;
(6) Class 5 felony: five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In
addition, a fine of five thousand dollars may be imposed; and
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the state penitentiary or a
fine of two thousand dollars, or both.
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sentences for habitual criminals . ...
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by law, every offense
declared to be a felony and not otherwise classified is a Class 6 felony."
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979 and
1980).

The board of pardons and paroles is authorized to make recommendations to the Governor, S.D. Codified Laws§ 24-14-1 (1979); § 24-14-5; S.D.
Executive Order 82--04 (Apr. 12, 1982), but the Governor is not bound by
the recommendation, § 24-14-5.
7
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would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation and that
the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up for the rest
of your natural life, so you won't have further victims of
your crimes, just be coming back before Courts. You'll
have plenty of time to think this one over."' State v.
Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 500 (Henderson, J., dissenting)
(quoting S.D. Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit,
Pennington County (Parker, J.)).
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a ~2 decision, affirmed
the sentence despite Helm's argument that it violated the
Eighth Amendment. State v. Helm, supra.
After Helm had served two years in the state penitentiary,
he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a
fixed term of years. Such a commutation would have had
the effect of making Helm eligible to be considered for parole
when he had served three-fourths of his new sentence. See
S.D. Codified Laws § 24-1fH>(3) (1979). The Governor denied Helm's request in May 1981. App. 26.
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the
United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. Helm argued, among other things, that his sentence
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the District Court
recognized that the sentence was harsh, it concluded that this
Court's recent decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263
(1980), was dispositive. It therefore denied the writ.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed. 684 F . 2d 582 (1982). The Court of Appeals
noted that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable. Helm's
sentence of life without parole was qualitatively different
from Rummel's life sentence with the prospect of parole because South Dakota has rejected rehabilitation as a goal of
the criminal justice system. The Court of Appeals examined
the nature of Helm's offenses, the nature of his sentence, and
the sentence he could have received in other States for the
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same offense. It concluded, on the basis of this examination,
that Helm's sentence was "grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offense." 684 F. 2d, at 587. It therefore directed the District Court to issue the writ unless the State
resentenced Helm. Ibid.
We granted certiorari to consider the Eighth Amendment
question presented by this case. 459 U. S. - - (1982). We
now affirm.
II

The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." The final clause prohibits not
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.
A

The principle that a punishment should be proportionate to
the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence. In 1215 three chapters of Magna
Carta were devoted to the rule that "amercements" 8 may not
be excessive. 9 And the principle was repeated and extended in the First Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw. I, ch. 6
(1275). These were not hollow guarantees, for the royal
courts relied on them to invalidate disproportionate punish8

An amercement was similar to a modern-day fine. It was the most
common criminal sanction in thirteenth century England. See 2 F. Pollock & F . Maitland, The History of English Law 513-515 (2d ed. 1909).
9
Chapter 20 declared that "[a] freeman shall not be amerced for a small
fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great crime according to
the heinousness of it." See 1 S.D. Codified Laws, p. 4 (1978) (translation
of Magna Carta). According to Maitland, "there was no clause in Magna
Carta more grateful to the mass of the people . . . . " F. Maitland, Pleas of
the Crown for the County of Gloucester xxxiv (1884). Chapter 21 granted
the same rights to the nobility, and chapter 22 granted the same rights to
the clergy.
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ments See, e. g., Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop of Winchester, Y.~. Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 (C.f. 1316), reprinted in 52
Selden Society 3 (1934). When prison sentences became the
normal criminal sanctions, the common law recognized that
these, too, must be proportional. See, e. g., Hodges v.
Humkin, 2 Buist. 139, 140, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K.B.
1615) (Croke, J.) ("imprisonment ought always to be according to the quality of the offence").
The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of proportionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth
Amendment: "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor
excessive Fines imposed nor cruell an~ unusuall Punishments.
inflicted." 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). Although the
precise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incorporated "the longstanding principle of English law that the punishment ... should not be, by reason of its excessive length
or severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged."
R. Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 (1959); see 4 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries *1~19 (1769); see also id., at
*1~17 (in condemning "punishments of unreasonable severity," uses "cruel" to mean severe or excessive). Indeed,
barely three months after the Bill of Rights was adopted, the
House of Lords declared that a "fine of thirty thousand
pounds, imposed by the court of King's Bench upon the earl
of Devon, was excessive and exorbitant, against magna
charta, the common right of the subject, and against the law
of the land." Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Trials 133, 136
(1689).
When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the
language of the English Bill of Rights, 10 they also adopted the
10
This language had earlier been incorporated in the Virginia Declaration
of Rights, Art. I, § 9, authored by George Mason. See A. Howard, The
Road from Runnymede: Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in America
207 (1968).
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English principle of proportionality. The people were guaranteed the rights they had possessed as English subjectsincluding the right to be free from excessive punishments. ~I)
B
The constitutional principle of proportionality has been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 11 In the
leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910),
the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public document and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form
of imprisonment that included hard labor in chains and permanent civil disabilities. The Court noted "that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to offense," id., at 367, and held that the
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court endorsed the principle of proportionality as a constitutional
standard, see, e. g., id., at 372-373, and determined that the
sentence before it was "cruel in its excess of imprisonment,"
id., at 377.
The Court next applied the principle to invalidate a criminal sentence in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660
(1962). 12 A 90-day sentence was found to be excessive for
the crime of being "addicted to the use of narcotics." The
11
In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323 (1892), the defendant had been
convicted of 307 counts of "selling intoxicating liquor without authority,"
and sentenced to a tenn of over 54 years. The majority did not reach
O'Neil's contention that this sentence was unconstitutional, for he did not
include the point in his assignment of errors or in his brief. !d., at 331.
Furthennore, the majority noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not
apply to the States." !d., at 332. Accordingly the Court dismissed the
writ of error for want of a federal question. !d., at 336-337. The dissent,
however, reached the Eighth Amendment question, observing that it "is
directed ... against all punishments which by their excessive length o severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged." !d., at
339-340 (Field, J., dissenting).
12
Members of the Court continued to recognize the principle of proportionality in the meantime. See, e. g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100
(1958) (plurality opinion); id., at 111 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at
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Court explained that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in
the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual."
I d., at 667. Thus there was no question of an inherently barbaric punishment. "But the question cannot be considered
in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and
unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."
Ibid.
Most recently, the Court has applied the principle of proportionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain
circumstances. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. - - (1982)
(death penalty excessive for felony murder when defendant
did not take life, attempt to take life, or intend that a life be
taken or that lethal force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U. S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("sentence of death is
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the
crime of rape"); id., at 601 (POWELL, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("ordinarily death is
disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult
woman"). And the Court has continued to recognize that
the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate
punishments, even when it has not been necessary to rely on
the proscription. See, e. g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678,
685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667 (1977);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 171-172 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Davis,
454 U. S. 370, 374, and n. 3 (1982) (per curiam) (recognizing
that some prison sentences may be constitutionally disproportionate); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11
(same).

c

There is no basis for the State's assertion that the general
principle of proportionality does not apply to felony prison
sentences. 13 The constitutional language itself suggests no
(Frankfurter, J ., dissenting).
According to Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 (1980), "one could

12~126
13

82-492-0PINION
10

SOLEM v. HELM

exception for imprisonment. We have recognized that the
Eighth Amendment imposes "parallel limitations" on bail,
fines, and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U. S., at 664, and the text is explicit that bail and fines may
not be excessive. It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser
punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death
were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the intermediate punishment of imprisonment were not. There is
also no historical support for such an exception. The common-law principle incorporated into the Eighth Amendment
clearly applied to prison terms. See Hodges v. Humkin,
supra. And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that
prison sentences are subject to proportionality analysis.
See, e. g., Weems, 217 U. S., at 377; cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437
U. S., at 685 ("Confinement in a prison ... is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment
standards").
When we have applied the proportionality principle in capital cases, we have drawn no distinction with cases of imprisonment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 176 (opinion of
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). It is true that the
"penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind." Furman v. Georgia,
408 U. S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). As aresult, "our decisions [in] capital cases are of limited assistance
in deciding the constitutionality of the punishment" in a
noncapital case. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 272. All
this means, however, is that, "[o]utside the context of capital
punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of
argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for

crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies . . . the length of
sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative."
Id. , at 274 (emphasis added). The Court did not adopt the standard proposed, but merely recognized that the argument was possible. To the extent that the State makes this argument here, we find it meritless.
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particular sentences [will be] exceedingly rare," 14 ibid. (emphasis added); see Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S., at 374. It does
not mean that proportionality analysis is entirely inapplicable
in noncapital cases.
In sum, we hold that a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted. Reviewing courts, of course, should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures possess
in determining the types and limits of punishments for
crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in
sentencing convicted criminals. 16 But no penalty is per se
constitutional. As the Court noted in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S., at 667, a single day in prison may be unconstitutional in some circumstances.

III
A

In reviewing sentences under the Eighth Amendment,
courts should be guided by objective factors that our cases
have recognized. 16 First, we look to the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty. In Enmund, for example, the Court examined the circumstances of the defend14
In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to be excessive for felony murder in the circumstances of that case. But clearly no
sentence of imprisonment would be disproportionate for Enmund's crime.
'~ In view of the substantial deference properly due to legislatures and
sentencing courts, most reviewing courts normally will not be required to
engage' in extended analysis to determine that a sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate.
6
' As the Court has indicated, no one factor will be dispositive.
See
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S. 370, 373-374 n. 2 (1982) (per curiam) ; Rummel
v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 275-276. The inherent nature of our federal
system and the need for individualized sentencing decisions result in a wide
range of constitutional sentences. No single criterion can identify when a
sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it violates the Eighth Amendment. See Jeffries & Stephan, Defe ses, Presumptions, and Burden of
Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 Yale L J. 1325, 1376-1377 (1979).
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ant's crime in great detail. 458 U. S., a t - - - - - . In
Coker the Court considered the seriousness of the crime of
rape, and compared it to other crimes, such as murder. 433
U. S., at 597-598 (plurality opinion); id., at 603 (POWELL, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
In Robinson the emphasis was placed on the nature of the
"crime." 370 U. S., at 666--667. And in Weems, the Court's
opinion commented in two separate places on the pettiness of
the offense. 217 U. S., at 363 and 365. Of course, a court
must consider the severity of the penalty in deciding whether
it is disproportionate. See, e. g., Coker, 433 U. S., at 598
(plurality opinion); Weems, 217 U. S., at 366-367.
Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more
serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at
issue may be excessive. Thus in Enmund the Court noted
that all of the other felony murderers on death row in Florida
were more culpable than the petitioner there. 458 U. S., at
The Weems Court identified an impressive list of
more serious crimes that were subject to less serious penalties. 217 U. S., at 380-381.
Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review
of capital punishment statutes and determined that "only
about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a
defendant [such as Enmund] to be sentenced to die." 458
U. S., at - - . Even in those jurisdictions, however, the
death penalty was almost never imposed under similar circumstances. I d., at - - . The Court's review of foreign
law also supported its conclusion. I d., at - - , n. 22. The
analysis in Coker was essentially the same. 433 U. S., at
593-597. And in Weems the Court relied on the fact that,
under federal law, a similar crime was punishable by only two
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year's imprisonment and a fine. 217 U. S., at 380. Cf. Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 102-103 (1958) (plurality opinion).
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including
(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty;
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of
the same crime in other jurisdictions.
B
Application of these factors assumes that courts are competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative
scale. In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and
courts traditionally have made these judgments-just as legislatures must make them in the first instance. Comparisons
can be made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the
victim or society, and the culpability of the offender. Thus
in Enmund the Court determined that the petitioner's conduct was not as serious as his accomplices' conduct. Indeed,
there are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness
of crimes. See Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness
of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences,
39 Am. Soc. Rev. 224, 237 (1974). For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent crimes are less serious than
crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence. Cf. Tr.
of Oral Arg. 16 (the State recognizes that the criminal law is
more protective of people than property).
There are other accepted principles that courts may apply
in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the victim or
society. The absolute magnitude of the crime may be relevant. Stealing a million dollars is viewed as more serious
than stealing a hundred dollars-a point recognized in statutes distinguishing petty theft from grand theft. See, e. g.,
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-17 (Supp. 1982). Few would
dispute that a lesser included offense should not be punished
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more severely than the greater offense. Thus a court is justified in viewing assault with intent to murder as more serious than simple assault. See Roberts v. Collins, 544 F. 2d
168, 169-170 (CA4 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 430 U. S.
973 (1977). Cf. Dembowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 252, 240
N. E. 2d 815, 817 (1968) (armed robbery more serious than
robbery); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 632, 281 P. 2d
233, 235 (1955) (rape more serious than assault with intent to
commit rape). It also is generally recognized that attempts
are less serious than completed crimes. See, e. g., S.D.
Codified Laws § 22-4-1 (1979); 4 Blackstone *15. Similarly,
an accessory after the fact should not be subject to a higher
penalty than theAJl'fncipal. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3.
Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are again
clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply. In
Enmund the Court looked at the petitioner's lack of intent to
kill in determining that he was less culpable than his accomplices. 458 U. S., at--. Most would agree that negligent
conduct is less serious than intentional conduct. South Dakota, for example, ranks criminal acts in ascending order of
seriousness as follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing
acts, intentional acts, and malicious acts. S.D. Codified
Laws§ 22-1-2(1)(f) (Supp. 1982). A court, of course, is entitled to look at a defendant's motive in committing a crime.
Thus a murder may be viewed as more serious when committed pursuant to a contract. See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann., ch. 279, § 69(a)(5) (West Supp. 1982); cf. 4 Blackstone
*15; In re Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 P. 2d 1073 (1974).
This list is by no means exhaustive. It simply illustrates
that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing the
severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the difficulties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions between
similar crimes.

c

Application of the factors that we identify also assumes
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that courts are able to compare different sentences. This assumption, too, is justified. The easiest comparison, of
course, is between capital punishment and noncapital punishments, for the death penalty is different from other punishments in kind rather than degree. 17 For sentences of imprisonment, the problem is not so much one of ordering, but one
of line-drawing. It is clear that a 25-year sentence generally
is more severe than a 15-year sentence, 18 but in most cases it
would be difficult to decide that the former violates the
Eighth Amendment while the latter does not. Decisions of
this kind, although troubling, are not unique to this area.
The courts are constantly called upon to draw similar lines in
a variety of contexts.
The Sixth Amendment r ·
oa
orida, 399 U. S. 7
,
a c · ·nal conviction returned by a unanimous 6-me er
jury, a ·n Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (197 , we upheld a con · ion returned by ten members of
2-member
jury. In Ball v. Georgia, 435 U. S. 223
78), however,
we reversed a conv ·on returned by a
nimous 5-member
jury. JUSTICE BLACK N "readil:y:' mit[ted] that we d[id]
not pretend to discern a cl
li
etween six members and
five." ld., at 239 (opinion o
CKMUN, J.). He nevertheless found a difference
ween t e of "constitutional significance." Ibid.; c
., at 245-246 (POWELL, J., concurring
in the judgmen . And the following Term, · Burch v. Lou44
. S. 130 (1979), we reversed a c viction refive members of a 6-member jury:
]e do not pretend the ability to discern a pri i a
·urors participa
bri ht line bel
There is also a clear line between sentences of imprisonment and sentences involving no deprivation of liberty. See Argersinger v. Hamlin,
17

407

u s. 25 (1972).
0

The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison, depending
upon the time and conditions of its availability.
18
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---ng nc 1on o
e JU 1ciary,
method b which some lines
New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970)
defendant has a right to a jury rial "where imprisonment for
more than six months is authorized." ld., at 69 (plurality
opinion). In choosing the 6-month standard, the plurality relied almost exclusively on the fact that only New York City
denied the right to a jury trial for an offense punishable by
more than six months. As JUSTICE WHITE explained:
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us
with the only objective criterion by which a line could
ever be drawn-on the basis of the possible penalty
alone-between offenses that are and that are not regarded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury." !d. , at
72-73.
In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly
may distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another.
It also supports our holding that courts properly may look to
the practices in other jurisdictions in deciding where lines between sentences should be drawn.
IV

It remains to apply the analytical framework established
by our prior decisions to the case before us. We first consider the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life
imprisonment without possibility of parole. We then consider the State's argument that the possibility of commutation is sufficient to save an otherwise unconstitutional
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sentence.
A
Helm's crime was "one of the most passive felonies a person could commit." State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 501
(Henderson, J., dissenting). It involved neither violence nor
threat of violence to any person. The $100 face value of
Helm's "no account" check was not trivial, but neither was it
a large amount. One hundred dollars was less than half the
amount South Dakota required for a felonious theft. 19 It is
easy to see why such a crime is viewed by society as among
the less serious offenses. See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev.,
at 229.
Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a
"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender. 20
And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more severely than it punishes a first offender. Helm's status, however, cannot be considered in the abstract. His prior offenses, although classified as felonies, were all relatively
minor. 21 All were nonviolent and none was a crime against a
19
If Helm had been convicted simply of taking $100 from a cash register,
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-1 (1979), or defrauding someone of $100,
§ 22-30A-3, or obtaining $100 through extortion, § 22-30A-4(1), or blackmail, § 22-30A-4(3), or using a false credit card to obtain $100,
§ 22-30A-8.1, or embezzling $100, § 22-30A-10, he would not be in prison
today. All of these offenses would have been petty theft, a misdemeanor.
§ 22-30A-17 (amended 1982). Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 check
against insufficient funds, rather than a nonexistent account, he would
have been guilty of a misdemeanor. §§ 22-41-1. Curiously, under South
Dakota law there is no distinction between writing a "no account" check for
a large sum and writing a "no account" check for a small sum. § 22-41-1.2.
20
We must focus on the principal felony-the felony that triggers the life
sentence-since Helm already has paid the penalty for each of his prior offenses. But we recognize, of course, that Helm's prior convictions are relevant to the sentencing decision.
21
Helm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a professional criminal. The record indicates an addiction to alcohol, and a consequent difficulty in holding a job. His record involves no instance of vio-
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person. Indeed, there was no minimum amount in either the
burglary or the false pretenses statutes, see nn. 1 and 2,
supra, and the minimum amount covered by the grand larceny statute was fairly small, see n. 3, supra. 22
Helm's present sentence is life imprisonment without possibility ofparole. 23 Barring executive clemency, see infra, at
- - , Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state penitentiary. This sentence is far more severe than the life sentence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel was
likely to have been eligible for parole within 12 years of his
initial confinement, 24 a fact on which the Court relied heavily.
See 445 U. S., at 280-281. Helm's sentence is the most severe punishment that the State could have imposed on any
criminal for any crime. See note 6, supra. Only capital
punishment, a penalty not authorized in South Dakota when
Helm was sentenced, exceeds it.
We next consider the sentences that could be imposed on
other criminals in the same jurisdiction. When Helm was
sentenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a
lence of any kind. Incarcerating him for life without possibility of parole is
unlikely to advance the goals of our criminal justice system in any substantial way. Neither Helm nor the State will have an incentive to pursue
clearly needed treatment for his alcohol problem, or any other program of
rehabilitation.
22
As suggested at oral argument, the third-degree burglary statute covered entering a building with the intent to steal a loaf of bread. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 14-16. It appears that the grand larceny statute would have covered
the theft of a chicken.
23
Every life sentence in South Dakota is without possibility of parole.
See supra, at--. We raise no question as to the general validity of sentences without possibility of parole. The only issue before us is whether,
in the circumstances of this case and in light of the constitutional principle
of proportionality, the sentence imposed on this petitioner violates the
Eighth Amendment.
24
We note that Rummel was, in fact, released within eight months of the
Court's decision in his case. See L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3.
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life sentence for murder, S.D. Codified Laws § 22-16-12
(1979) (amended 1980), and was authorized to impose a life
sentence for treason, § 22--8-1, first degree manslaughter,
§ 22-16-15, first degree arson, § 22-33-1, and kidnapping, ·
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-19-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978)
(amended 1979). No other crime was punishable so severely
on the first offense. Attempted murder, S.D. Codified Laws
§ 22-4-1(5) (1979), placing an explosive device on an aircraft,
§ 22-14A-5, and first degree rape, § 22-22-1 (amended 1980
and 1982), were only Class 2 felonies. Aggravated riot was
only a Class 3 felony. § 22-10-5. Distribution of heroin,
§§ 22-42-2 (amended 1982), 34-20B-13(7) (1977), and aggravated assault, § 22-18-1.1 (amended 1980 and 1981), were
only Class 4 felonies.
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analysis,
but relevant comparisons are still possible. Under§ 22-7-7,
the penalty for a second or third felony is increased by one
class. Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or
third conviction was for treason, first degree manslaughter,
first. degree arson, or kidnapping, and a life sentence would
have been authorized when a second or third conviction was
for such crimes as attempted murder, placing an explosive
device on an aircraft, or first degree rape. Finally, § 22-7-8,
under which Helm was sentenced, authorized life imprisonment after three prior convictions, regardless of the crimesJ
In sum ~ there were a handful of crimes that were necessarily punished by life imprisonment: murder, and, on a second
or third offense, treason, first degree manslaughter, first degree arson, and kidnapping. There was a larger group for
which life imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of
the sentencing judge, including: treason, first degree manslaughter, first degree arson, and kidnapping; attempted
murder, placing an explosive device on an aircraft, and first
degree rape on a second or third offense; and any felony after
three prior offenses. Finally, there was a large group of

II
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very serious offenses for which life imprisonment was not authorized, including a third offense of heroin dealing or aggravated assault.
Criminals committing any of these offenses ordinarily
would be thought more deserving of punishment than one uttering a "no account" check-even when the bad-check writer
had already committed six minor felonies. Moreover, there
is no indication in the record that any habitual offender other
than Helm has ever been given the maximum sentence on the
basis of comparable crimes. It is more likely that the possibility of life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 generally is reserved for criminals such as fourth-time heroin dealers, while
habitual bad-check writers receive more lenient treatment. 25
In any event, Helm has been treated in the same manner as,
or more severely than, criminals who have committed far
more serious crimes.
Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission
of the same crime in other jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals found that "Helm could have received a life sentence
without parole for his offense in only one other state, Nevada," 684 F. 2d, at 586, and we have no reason to doubt this
finding. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. At the very least, therefore, it is clear that Helm could not have received such a severe sentence in 48 of the 50 States. But even under N evada law, a life sentence without possibility of parole is
merely authorized in these circumstances. See Nev. Rev.
The State contends that§ 22-7-8 is more lenient than the Texas habitual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 is
discretionary' rather than mandatory. Brief for Petitioner 22. Helm,
however, has challenged only his own sentence. No one suggests that
§ 22-7-8 may not be applied constitutionally to fourth-time heroin dealers
or other violent criminals. Thus we do not question the legislature's judgment. Unlike in Rummel, a lesser sentence here could have been entirely
consistent with both the statute and the Eighth Amendment. See Note,
Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1119,
1160 (1979).
26
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Stat. § 207.010(2) (1981). We are not advised that any defendant such as Helm, whose prior offenses were so minor,
actually has received the maximum penalty in Nevada. 26 It
appears that Helm was treated more severely than he would
have been in any other State.
B
The State argues that the present case is essentially the
same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in
that case is matched by the possibility of executive clemency
here. The State reasons that the Governor could commute
Helm's sentence to a term of years. We conclude, however,
that the South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally
different from the parole system that was before us in

Rummel.
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different
concepts, despite some surface similarities. Parole is a regular part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behavior, it is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases.
The law generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to
be considered for parole, and details the standards and procedures applicable at that time. See, e. g., Greenholz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979) (detailing Nebraska parole procedures); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S.
471, 477 (1972) ("the practice of releasing prisoners on parole
26
Under§ 207.010(2), a Nevada court is authorized to impose a sentence
of "imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without possibility of
parole. If the penalty fixed by the court is life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, eligibility for parole begins when a minimum of 10 years
has been served." It appears that most sentences imposed under
§ 207.010(2) permit parole, even when the prior crimes are far more serious
than Helm's. See, e. g., Rusling v. State, 96 Nev. 778, 617 P. 2d 1302
(1980) (possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, two instances of driving an
automobile without the owner's consent, four first degree burglaries, two
sales of marijuana, two sales of a restricted dangerous drug, one sale of
heroin, one escape from state prison, and one second degree burglary).

j
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before the end of their sentences has become an integral part
of the penological system"). Thus it is possible to predict, at
least to some extent, when parole might be granted. Commutation, on the other hand, is an ad hoc exercise of executive clemency. A Governor may commute a sentence at any
time for any reason without reference to any standards.
See, e. g., Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452

u. s. 458 (1981).

We explicitly have recognized the distinction between parole and commutation in our prior cases. 27 Writing on behalf
of the Morrissey Court, for example, CHIEF JUSTICE BuRGER contrasted the two possibilities: "Rather than being an
ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals." 408 U. S., at
477. In Dumschat, THE CHIEF JUSTICE similarly explained
that "there is a vast difference between a denial of parole . . .
and a state's refusal to commute a lawful sentence." 452
U. S., at 466.
The Texas and South Dakota systems in particular are
very different. In Rummel, the Court did not rely simply
on the existence of some system of parole. Rather it looked
to the provisions of the system presented, including the fact
that Texas had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good
time' credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has allowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for
parole in as little as 12 years." 445 U. S., at 280. A Texas
prisoner became eligible for parole when his calendar time
27

In Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the possibility of
commutation is not equivalent to the possibility of parole. The Court carefully "distinguish[ed] Rummel from a person sentenced under a recidivist
statute like [Miss. Code Ann. § 9~19-83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for
a sentence of life without parole." 445 U. S., at 281. But the Mississippi
Constttution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal and
penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment." Art. 5, § 124.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized that the power to pardon includes the power to commute a convict's sentence. See Whittington
v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 603--604, 73 So. 2d 137, 13~140 (1954).
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served plus "good conduct" time equaled one-third of the
maximum sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less.
Tex. Code Grim. Proc. Ann., Art. 42.12, § 15(b) (Vernon
1979). An entering prisoner earned 20 days good-time per
30 days served, Brief for Respondent in Rummel, 0. T.
1979, No. 78-6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30
days good-time per 30 days served, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann., Art. 6181-1, §§2-3 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Thus
Rummel could have been eligible for parole in as few as 10
years, and could have expected to become eligible, in the normal course of events, in only 12 years.
In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain
than parole. For example, the board of pardons and paroles
is authorized to make commutation recommendations to the
Governor, see n. 7, supra, but § 24-13--4 provides that "no
recommendation for the commutation of ... a life sentence,
or for a pardon ... , shall be made by less than the unanimous vote of all members of the board." In fact, no life sentence has been commuted in over eight years, App. 29, while
parole-where authorized-has been granted regularly during that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. Furthermore, even if
Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would be eligible
to be considered for parole. 28 Not only is there no guarantee
that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota parole
system is far more stringent than the one before us in
Rummel. Helm would have to serve three-fourths of his revised sentence before he would be eligible for parole,
§ 24-15-5, and the provision for good-time credits is less generous, § 24-5-1. 29
28
The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Dakota occurred in 1975. The record indicates, however, that the prisoner in question still has not been paroled. App. 29.
29
Assume, for example, that in 1979 the Governor had commuted Helm's
sentence to a term of 40 years (his approximate life expectancy). Even if
Helm were a model prisoner, he would not have been eligible for parole
until he had served' over 21 years-more than twice the Rummel minimum. And this comparison is generous to South Dakota's position. If
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The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a hope
for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency." It is little different
from the possibility of executive clemency that exists in
every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence
under the Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a bare
possibility would make judicial review under the Eighth
Amendment meaningless.

v

The Constitution reqwres us to examine Helm's sentence
to determine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying objective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penultimate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has
been treated more harshly than other criminals in the State
who have committed more serious crimes. He has been
treated more harshly than he would have been in any other
jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State.
We conclude that his sentence is significantly disproportionate to his crime, and is therefore prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
is accordingly
Affirmed.

Rummel had been sentenced to 40 years rather than life, he could have
been eligible for parole in less than 7 years.
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APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Co~.
The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment
proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a
seventh nonviolent felony.
I
By 1975 the State of South Dakota had convicted respondent Jerry Helm of six nonviolent felonies. In 1964, 1966, and
1969 Helm was convicted of third-degree burglary. 1 In 1972
In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined in at least two sections of
the South Dakota criminal code:
"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the nighttime with intent
to commit a crime but under such circumstances as do not constitute burglary in the first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third degree." S. D.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-8 (1967) (repealed 1976).
"A person breaking or entering at any time any building within the curtilage of a dwelling house but not forming a part thereof, or any building or
part of any building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as defined in
§ 32-14-1, or any structure or erection in which any property is kept, with
intent to commit larceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the third
degree." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-9 (1967) (repealed 1976).
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essentially the
same. SeeS. D. Code § 13.3703 (1939 ed., supp. 1960); 1965 S. D. Laws,
ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by "imprisonment in the
state penitentiary for any term not exceeding fifteen years." S. D. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 22-32-10 (1967) (previously codified at S. D. Code § 13.3705(3)
1
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he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2
In 1973 he was convicted of grand larceny. 3 And in 1975 he
was convicted of third-offense driving while intoxicated. 4
The record contains no details about the circumstances of any
of these offenses, except that they were all nonviolent, none
was a crime against a person, and alcohol was a contributing
factor in each case.
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a "no account"
check for $100. 5 The only details we have of the crime are
those given by Helm to the state trial court:
(1939)) (repealed 1976).
2
In 1972 the relevant statute provided:

"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any false token or writing, or other false pretense, . . . obtains from any person any money or
property .. . is punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not
exceeding three years or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a
fine not exceeding three times the value of the money or property so obtained, or by both such fine and imprisonment." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 22-41-4 (1967) (repealed 1976).
3
In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of personal property accomplished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive another
thereof." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-1 (1967) (repealed 1976).
Grand larceny and petit larceny were distinguished as follows:
"Grand larceny is larceny committed in any of the following cases:
(1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding fifty dollars;
(2) When such property, although not of a value exceeding fifty dollars,
is taken from the person of another;
(3) When such property is livestock.
Larceny in other cases is petit larceny." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 22-37-2 (1967) (repealed 1976).
Grand larceny was then punishable by "imprisonment in the state penitentiary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-3 (1967) (repealed
1976).

' A third offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol is a felony
in South Dakota. S. D. Codified Laws § 32-23-4 (1976). See 1973 S. D.
Laws, ch. 195, § 7 (enacting version of § 32-23-4 in force in 1975).
• The governing statute provides, in relevant part:
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another
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"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that
day, was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid City
with more money than I had when I started. I knew I'd
done something I didn't know exactly what. If I would
have known this, I would have picked the check up. I
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several
places."' State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d 497, 501 (S. D.
1980) (Henderson, J. , dissenting) (quoting Helm).
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty.
Ordinarily the maximum punishment for uttering a "no account" check would have been five years imprisonment in the
state penitentiary and a $5,000 fine. See S. D. Comp. Laws
Ann. § 22-6-1(6) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now codified at S. D.
Codified Laws § 22-6-1(7) (Supp. 1982)). As a result of his
criminal record, however, Helm was subject to South Dakota's recidivist statute:
"When a defendant has been convicted of at least three
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal felony,
the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to
the sentence for a Class 1 felony." S. D. Codified Laws
§ 22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981).
The maximum penalty for a "Class 1 felony" was life imprisonment in the state penitentiary and a $25,000 fine. 6 S. D.
for present consideration with intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a
financial institution knowing at the time of such passing that he or his principal does not have an account with such financial institution, is guilty of a
Class 5 felony. " S. D. Codified Laws § 2~1-1.2 (1979).
6
When Helm was sentenced in April 1979, South Dakota law classified
felonies as follows:
"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are divided into the following seven classes which are distinguished from each other by the respective maximum penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized
upon conviction:
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. A lesser
sentence may not be given for a Class A felony;
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addi-
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Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1(2) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now
codified at S. D. Codified Laws § 22-6-1(3) (Supp. 1982)).
Moreover, South Dakota law explicitly provides that parole is
unavailable: "A person sentenced to life imprisonment is not
eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles." S.
D. Codified Laws § 24-15--4 (1979). The Governor 7 is authorized to pardon prisoners, or to commute their sentences,
S. D. Canst., Art. IV, § 3, but no other relief from sentence is
available even to a rehabilitated prisoner.
Immediately after accepting Helm's guilty plea, the South
Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life imprisonment
under § 22-7-8. The court explained:
" 'I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly
proven that you're an habitual criminal and the record
would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation and that
the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up for the rest
tion, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed;
(3) Class 2 felony: twenty-five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed;
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary.
In addition, a fine of fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed;
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In
addition, a fine of ten thousand dollars may be imposed;
(6) Class 5 felony: five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In
addition, a fine of five thousand dollars may be imposed; and
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the state penitentiary or a
fine of two thousand dollars, or both.
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sentences for habitual
criminals ....
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by law, every offense
declared to be a felony and not otherwise classified is a Class 6 felony."
S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979 and
1980).

The board of pardons and paroles is authorized to make recommendations to the Governor, S. D. Codified Laws § 24-14-1 (1979); § 24-14-5;
S. D. Executive Order 82--{)4 (Apr. 12, 1982), but the Governor is not
bound by the recommendation, § 24-14-5.
7
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of your natural life, so you won't have further victims of
your crimes, just be coming back before Courts. You'll
have plenty of time to think this one over.'" State v.
Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 500 (Henderson, J., dissenting)
(quoting S. D. Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit,
Pennington County (Parker, J.)).
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, affirmed
the sentence despite Helm's argument that it violated the
Eighth Amendment. State v. Helm, supra.
After Helm had served two years in the state penitentiary,
he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a
fixed term of years. Such a commutation would have had
the effect of making Helm eligible to be considered for parole
when he had served three-fourths of his new sentence. See
S. D. Codified Laws § 24--11H>(3) (1979). The Governor denied Helm's request in May 1981. App. 26.
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the
United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. Helm argued, among other things, that his sentence
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the District Court
recognized that the sentence was harsh, it concluded that this
Court's recent decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263
(1980), was dispositive. It therefore denied the writ.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed. 684 F. 2d 582 (1982). The Court of Appeals
noted that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable. Helm's
sentence of life without parole was qualitatively different
from Rummel's life sentence with the prospect of parole because South Dakota has rejected rehabilitation as a goal of
the criminal justice system. The Court of Appeals examined
the nature of Helm's offenses, the nature of his sentence, and
the sentence he could have received in other States for the
same offense. It concluded, on the basis of this examination,
that Helm's sentence was "grossly disproportionate to the na-
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ture of the offense." 684 F. 2d, at 587. It therefore directed the District Court to issue the writ unless the State
resentenced Helm. Ibid.
We granted certiorari to consider the Eighth Amendment
question presented by this case. 459 U. S. - - (1982). We
now affirm.
II
The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." The final clause prohibits not
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.
A
The principle that a punishment should be proportionate to
the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence. In 1215 three chapters of Magna
Carta were devoted to the rule that "amercements" 8 may not
be excessive. 9 And the principle was repeated and extended in the First Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw. I, ch. 6
(1275). These were not hollow guarantees, for the royal
courts relied on them to invalidate disproportionate punishments. See, e. g., Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop of Winches ter, Y. B. Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 (C. P. 1316), reprinted in 52
Selden Society 3 (1934). When prison sentences became the
8

mod~~ne.

An amercement was similar to a
It was the most
~;~.rE~~land. See 2 F. Polcommon criminal sanction in f ·
lock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 513-515 (2d ed. 1909).
9
Chapter 20 declared that "[a] freeman shall not be amerced for a small
fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great crime according to
the heinousness of it." See 1 S. D. Codified Laws, p. 4 (1978) (translation
of Magna Carta). According to Maitland, "there was no clause in Magna
Carta more grateful to the mass of the people . . .. " F. Maitland, Pleas of
the Crown for the County of Gloucester xxxiv (1884). Chapter 21 granted
the same rights to the nobility, and chapter 22 granted the same rights to
the clergy.

~/
J4.
7
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normal criminal sanctions, the common law recognized that
these, too, must be proportional. See, e. g., Hodges v.
Humkin, 2 Bulst. 139, 140, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K. B.
1615) (Croke, J.) ("imprisonment ought always to be according to the quality of the offence").
The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of proportionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth
Amendment: "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor
excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments
inflicted." 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). Although the
precise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incorporated "the longstanding principle of English law that the punishment ... should not be, by reason of its excessive length
or severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged."
R. Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 (1959); see 4 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries *16-19 (1769); see also id., at
*16-17 (in condemning "punishments of unreasonable severity," uses "cruel" to mean severe or excessive). Indeed,
barely three months after the Bill of Rights was adopted, the
House of Lords declared that a "fine of thirty thousand
pounds, imposed by the court of King's Bench upon the earl
of Devon, was excessive and exorbitant, against magna
charta, the common right of the subject, and against the law
of the land." Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State ~rials 133, 136
(1689).
When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the
language of the English Bill of Rights, 10 they also adopted
the English principle of proportionality. The people were
guaranteed the rights they had possessed as English subjects-including the right to be free from excessive
punishments.
This language had earlier been incorporated in the Virginia Declaration
of Rights, Art. I, § 9, authored by George Mason. See A. Howard, The
Road from Runnymede: Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in America
207 (1968).
'
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B
The constitutional principle of proportionality has been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 11 In the
leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910),
the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public document and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form
of imprisonment that included hard labor in chains and permanent civil disabilities. The Court noted "that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to offense," id., at 367, and held that the
sentence violated the ~ghth Amendment. The Court endorsec1 t ha "'-~ipJe of proportionality as a constitutional
g., id., at 372-373, and determined that the
wtt7 twas "cruel in its excess of imprisonment,"
-:./

-eL ''
wor-d.-s
{11(

tl(;t((e?SGJ''

oF
b~

, applied the principle to invalidate a crimi-

we~~ Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660

-

1y sentence was found to be excessive for
~ "addicted to the use of narcotics." The
tat "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in
1ishment which is either cruel or unusual."

!:t-

ont, 144 U. S. 323 (1892), the defendant had been

e f-c
I

fl a_r{tJ tv,

tJ. {o He
\\ _

> of "selling intoxicating liquor without authority,"

m of over 54 years.

The majority did not reach

' t this sentence was unconstitutional, for he did not

assignment of errors or in his brief. !d., at 331.
rity noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not
[d ., at 332. Accordingly the Court dismissed the
·a federal question. !d., at 336-337. The dissent,
:ighth Amendment question, observing that it "is
punishments which by their excessive length or
;proportioned to the offences charged." !d., at
nting).
rt continued to recognize the principle of propore. See, e. g., Trap v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100
'; id., at 111 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at
, dissenting).
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I d., at 667. Thus there was no question of an inherently barbaric punishment. "But the question cannot be considered
in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and
unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."
Ibid.
Most recently, the Court has applied the principle of proportionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain
circumstances. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. - - (1982)
(death penalty excessive for felony murder when defendant
did not take life, attempt to take life, or intend that a life be
taken or that lethal force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U. S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("sentence of death is
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the
crime of rape"); id., at 601 (POWELL, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("ordinarily death is
disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult
woman"). And the Court has continued to recognize that
the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate
punishments, even when it has not been necessary to rely on
the proscription. See, e. g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678,
685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667 (1977);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 171-172 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Davis,
454 U. S. 370, 374, and n. 3 (1982) (per curiam) (recognizing
that some prison sentences may be constitutionally disproporti~e); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11
(same).

c

There is no basis for the State's assertion that the general
principle of proportionality does not apply to felony prison
sentences. 13 The constitutional language itself suggests no
13 A
~
ording tfummel ~Estelle, 445 D. S. 263 (19 0), "onefld
argue without £ of contra iction by any ecision of thi Court th for
crim s conc'eded y <;9ssified nd classifiable as felonies ... >1m len h of
sent nc actuall[imposed is urely a matte of l{gislative prerogat e."

!:--

}3
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exception for imprisonment. We have recognized that the
Eighth Amendment imposes "parallel limitations" on bail,
fines, and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U. S., at 664, and the text is explicit that bail and fines may
not be excessive. It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser
punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death
were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the intermediate punishment of imprisonment were not. There is
also no historical support for such an exception. The common-law principle incorporated into the Eighth Amendment
clearly applied to prison terms. See Hodges v. Humkin,
supra. And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that
prison sentences are subject to proportionality analysis.
See, e. g., Weems, 217 U. S., at 377; cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437
U. S., at 685 ("Confinement in a prison ... is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment
standards").
When we have applied the proportionality principle in capital cases, we have drawn no distinction with cases of imprisonment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 176 (opinion of
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). It is true that the
"penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind." Furman v. Georgia,
408 U. S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). As aresult, "our decisions [in] capital cases are of limited assistance
in deciding the constitutionality of the punishment" in a
noncapital case. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 272. All
this means, however, 's that, "[o]utside the context of capital
punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of
particular sentences [will be] exceedingly rare,"' 4 ibid. (em- ,__________,
I~.,~2(~mp sis add_ ~ The 9idid noyapopt t~e_,s andarg..p:>rop s ,
me ely eco ze that ·t1ie
m91{ wab po~1ole. To-th~ext t at t Stat
kes tll"s argument ere, we~<Yft mer less.
14
In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to be excessive for felony murder in the circumstances of that case. But clearly no

I
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phasis adged); see Hutto v. Davj.s, 54 U. S., at 374. Jt'does
not mea~hat proportional· analysis is entirely inapplicable L----in noncap1tal cases.
In sum, we hold at a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted. Reviewing courts, of course, should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislature possess
in determining the types and limits of punishments for
crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in
sentencing convicted criminals. 16 But no penalty is per se
constitutional. As the Court noted in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S., at 667, a single day in prison may be unconstitutional in some circumstances.

III
A
In ~iewiRg to. sentences under the Eighth Amendment,
courts should be guided by objective factors that our cases
have recognized. 16 First, we look to the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty. In Enmund, for example, the Court examined the circumstances of the defendant's crime in great detail. 458 U. S., a t - - - - - . In
Coker the Court considered the seriousness of the crime of
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rape, and compared it to other crimes, such as murder. 433
U. S., at 597-598 (plurality opinion); id., at 603 (POWELL, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
In Robinson the emphasis was placed on the nature of the
"crime." 370 U. S., at 666--667. And in Weems, the Court's
opinion commented in two separate places on the pettiness of
the offense. 217 U. S., at 363 and 365. Of course, a court
must consider the severity of the penalty in deciding whether
it is disproportionate. See, e. g., Coker, 433 U. S., at 598
(plurality opinion); Weems, 217 U. S., at 366--367.
Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more
serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at
issue may be excessive. Thus in Enmund the Court noted
that all of the other felony murderers on death row in Florida
were more culpable than the petitioner there. 458 U. S., at
- - . The Weems Court identified an impressive list of
more serious crimes that were subject to less serious penalties. 217 U. S., at 380-381.
Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review
of capital punishment statutes and determined that "only
about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a
defendant [such as Enmund] to be sentenced to die." 458
U. S., at - - . Even in those jurisdictions, however, the
death penalty was almost never imposed under similar circumstances. Id., at--. The Court's review of foreign
law also supported its conclusion. I d., at - - , n. 22. The
analysis in Coker was essentially the same. 433 U. S., at
593-597. And in Weems the Court relied on the fact that,
under federal law, a similar crime was punishable by only two
year's imprisonment and a fine. 217 U. S., at 380. Cf. Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 102-103 (1958) (plurality opinion).
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In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including
(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty;
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of
the same crime in other jurisdictions.
B
Application of these factors assumes that courts are competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative
scale. In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and
courts traditionally have made these judgments-just as legislatures must make them in the first instance. Comparisons
can be made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the
victim or society, and the culpability of the offender. Thus
in Enmund the Court determined that the petitioner's conduct was not as serious as his accomplices' conduct. Indeed,
there are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness
of crimes. See Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness
of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences,
39 Am. Soc. Rev. 224, 237 (1974). For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent crimes are less serious than
crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence. Cf. Tr.
of Oral Arg. 16 (the State recognizes that the criminal law is
more protective of people than property).
There are other accepted principles that courts may apply
in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the victim or
society. The absolute magnitude of the crime may be relevant. Stealing a million dollars is viewed as more serious
than stealing a hundred dollars-a point recognized in statutes distinguishing petty theft from grand theft. See, e. g.,
S. D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-17 (Supp. 1982). Few would
dispute that a lesser included offense should not be punished
more severely than the greater offense. Thus a court is justified in viewing assault with intent to murder as more seri-
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ous than simple assault. See Roberts v. Collins, 544 F. 2d
168, 169-170 (CA4 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 430 U. S.
973 (1977). Cf. Dembowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 252, 240
N. E. 2d 815, 817 (1968) (armed robbery more serious than
robbery); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 632, 281 P. 2d
233, 235 (1955) (rape more serious than assault with intent to
commit rape). It also is generally recognized that attempts
are less serious than completed crimes. See, e. g., S. D.
Codified Laws § 22-4-1 (1979); 4 Blackstone *15. Similarly,
an accessory after the fact should not be subject to a higher
penalty than the principal. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3.
Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are again
clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply. In
Enmund the Court looked at the petitioner's lack of intent to
kill in determining that he was less culpable than his accomplices. 458 U. S., at--. Most would agree that negligent
conduct is less serious than intentional conduct. South Dakota, for example, ranks criminal acts in ascending order of
seriousness as follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing
acts, intentional acts, and malicious acts. S. D. Codified
Laws § 22-1-2(1)(f) (Supp. 1982). A court, of course, is entitled to look at a defendant's motive in committing a crime.
Thus a murder may be viewed as more serious when committed pursuant to a contract. See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann., ch. 279, § 69(a)(5) (West Supp. 1982); cf. 4 Blackstone
*15; In re Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 P. 2d 1073 (1974).
This list is by no means exhaustive. It simply illustrates
that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing the
severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the difficulties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions between
similar crimes.

c

Application of the factors that we identify also assumes
that courts are able to compare different sentences. This assumption, too, is justified. The easiest comparison, of

82-492-0PINION

SOLEM v. HELM

15

course, is between capital punishment and noncapital punishments, for the death penalty is different from other punishments in kind rather than degree. 17 For sentences of imprisonment, the problem is not so much one of ordering, but one
of line-drawing. It is clear that a 25-year sentence generally
is more severe than a 15-year sentence, 18 but in most cases it
would be difficult to decide that the former violates the
Eighth Amendment while the latter does not. Decisions of
this kind, although troubling, are not unique to this area.
The courts are constantly~aea upon to draw sim~·lar
lin!s1n
a variety of contexts.
The Sixth Amendment ight to a jury trial is a example.
Baldwin v. New York, 39 U. S. 66 (1970), in particular, illustrates the line-drawing function of the judiciary, and offers
guidance on the method by which some lines may be drawn.
There the Court determined that a defendant has a right to a
jury trial "where imprisonment for more than six months is
authorized." /d., at 69 (plurality opinion). In choosing the
6-month standard, the plurality relied almost exclusively on
the fact that only New York City denied the right to a jury
trial for an offense punishable by more than six months. As
JUSTICE WHITE explained:
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us
with the only objective criterion by which a line could
ever be drawn-on the basis of the possible penalty
alone-between offenses that are and that are not regarded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury." /d., at
72-73.
In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly
17

There is also a clear line between sentences of imprisonment and sentences involving no deprivation of liberty. See Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407

u. s. 25 (1972).

The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison, depending
upon the time and conditions of its availability.
18
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may distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another.
It also supports our holding that courts properly may look to
the practices in other jurisdictions in deciding where lines between sentences should be drawn.
IV
It remains to apply the analytical framework established
by our prior decisions to the case before us. We first consider the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life
imprisonment without possibility of parole. We then consider the State's argument that the possibility of commutation is sufficient to save an otherwise unconstitutional
sentence.
A

Helm's crime was "one of the most passive felonies a person could commit." State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 501
(Henderson, J., dissenting). It involved neither violence nor
threat of violence to any person. The $100 face value of
Helm's "no account" check was not trivial, but neither was it
a large amount. One hundred dollars was less than half the
amount South Dakota required for a felonious theft. 19 It is
easy to see why such a crime is viewed by society as among
the less serious offenses. See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev.,
at 229.
Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a
19
lfHelm had been convicted simply of taking $100 from a cash register,
S. D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-1 (1979), or defrauding someone of $100,
§ 22-30A-3, or obtaining $100 through extortion, § 22-30A-4(1), or blackmail, § 22-30A-4(3), or using a false credit card to obtain $100,
§ 22-30A-8.1, or embezzling $100, § 22-30A-10, he would not be in prison
today. All of these offenses would have been petty theft, a misdemeanor.
§ 22-30A-17 (amended 1982). Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 check
against insufficient funds , rather than a nonexistent account, he would
have been guilty of a misdemeanor. §§ 22-41-1. Curiously, under South
Dakota law there is no distinction between writing a "no account" check for
a large sum and writing a "no account" check for a small sum. § 22-41-1.2.
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"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender. 20
And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more severely than it punishes a first offender. Helm's status, however, cannot be considered in the abstract. His prior offenses, although classified as felonies, were all relatively
minor. 21 All were nonviolent and none was a crime against a
person. Indeed, there was no minimum amount in either the
burglary or the false pretenses statutes, see nn. 1 and 2,
supra, and the minimum amount covered by the grand larceny statute was fairly small, see n. 3, supra. 22
Helm's present sentence is life imprisonment without possibility of parole. 23 Barring executive clemency, see infra, at
- - , Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state penitentiary. This sentence is far more severe than the life sentence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel was
likely to have been eligible for parole within 12 years of his
We must focus on the principal felony-the felony that triggers the life
sentence-since Helm already has paid the penalty for each of his prior offenses. But we recognize, of course, that Helm's prior convictions are relevant to the sentencing decision.
21
Helm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a professional criminal. The record indicates an addiction to alcohol, and a consequent difficulty in holding a job. His record involves no instance of violence of any kind. Incarcerating him for life without possibility of parole is
unlikely to advance the goals of our criminal justice system in any substantial way. Neither Helm nor the State will have an incentive to pursue
clearly needed treatment for his alcohol problem, or any other program of
rehabilitation.
22
As suggested at oral argument, the third-degree burglary statute covered entering a building with the intent to steal a loaf of bread. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 14-16. It appears that the grand larceny statute would have covered
the theft of a chicken.
23
Every life sentence in South Dakota is without possibility of parole.
See supra, at--. We raise no question as to the general validity of sentences without possibility of parole. The only issue before us is whether,
in the circumstances of this case and in light of the constitutional principle
of proportionality, the sentence imposed on this petitioner violates the
Eighth Amendment.
00
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initial confinement, 24 a fact on which the Court relied heavily.
See 445 U. S., at 280-281. Helm's sentence is the most severe punishment that the State could have imposed on any
criminal for any crime. See note 6, supra. Only capital
punishment, a penalty not authorized in South Dakota when
Helm was sentenced, exceeds it.
We next consider the sentences that could be imposed on
other criminals in the same jurisdiction. When Helm was
sentenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a
life sentence for murder, S. D. Codified Laws § 22-16-12
(1979) (amended 1980), and was authorized to impose a life
sentence for treason, § 22-8-1, first degree manslaughter,
§ 22-16-15, first degree arson, § 22-33--1, and kidnapping,
S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-19-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978)
(amended 1979). No other crime was punishable so severely
on the first offense. Attempted murder, S. D. Codified
Laws § 22-4-1(5) (1979), placing an explosive device on an
aircraft, § 22-14A-5, and first degree rape, § 22-22-1
(amended 1980 and 1982), were only Class 2 felonies. Aggravated riot was only a Class 3 felony. § 22-10-5. Distribution of heroin, §§ 22-42-2 (amended 1982), 34-20B-13(7)
(1977), and aggravated assault, § 22-1~1.1 (amended 1980
and 1981), were only Class 4 felonies.
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analysis,
but relevant comparisons are still possible. Under§ 22-7-7,
the penalty for a second or third felony is increased by one
class. Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or
third conviction was for treason, first degree manslaughter,
first degree arson, or kidnapping, and a life sentence would
have been authorized when a second or third conviction was
for such crimes as attempted murder, placing an explosive
device on an aircraft, or first degree rape. Finally, §22-7--8,
under which Helm was sentenced, authorized life imprisonment after three prior convictions, regardless of the crimes.
24

We note that Rummel was, in fact, released within eight months of the
Court's decision in his case. See L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3.
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In sum, there were a handful of crimes that were necessarily punished by life imprisonment: murder, and, on a second
or third offense, treason, first degree manslaughter, first degree arson, and kidnapping. There was a larger group for
which life imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of
the sentencing judge, including: treason, first degree manslaughter, first degree arson, and kidnapping; attempted
murder, placing an explosive device on an aircraft, and first
degree rape on a second or third offense; and any felony after
three prior offenses. Finally, there was a large group of
very serious offenses for which life imprisonment was not authorized, including a third offense of heroin dealing or aggravated assault.
Criminals committing any of these offenses ordinarily
would be thought more deserving of punishment than one uttering a "no account" check-even when the bad-check writer
had already committed six minor felonies. Moreover, there
is no indication in the record that any habitual offender other
than Helm has ever been given the maximum sentence on the
basis of comparable crimes. It is more likely that the possibility of life imprisonment under § 22-7--8 generally is reserved for criminals such as fourth-time heroin dealers, while
habitual bad-check writers receive more lenient treatment. 25
In any event, Helm has been treated in the same manner as,
or more severely than, criminals who have committed far
more serious crimes.
Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission
The State contends that § 22-7--8 is more lenient than the Texas habitual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment under § 22-7--8 is
discretionary rather than mandatory. Brief for Petitioner 22. Helm,
however, has challenged only his own sentence. No one suggests that
§ 22-7--8 may not be applied constitutionally to fourth-time heroin dealers
or other violent criminals. Thus we do not question the legislature's judgment. Unlike in Rummel, a lesser sentence here could have been entirely
consistent with both the statute and the Eighth Amendment. See Note,
Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1119,
1160 (1979).
26
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of the same crime in other jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals found that "Helm could have received a life sentence
without parole for his offense in only one other state, N evada," 684 F. 2d, at 586, and we have no reason to doubt this
finding. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. At the very least, therefore, it is clear that Helm could not have received such a severe sentence in 48 of the 50 States. But even under N evada law, a life sentence without possibility of parole is
merely authorized in these circumstances. See Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 207.010(2) (1981). We are not advised that any defendant such as Helm, whose prior offenses were so minor,
actually has received the maximum penalty in Nevada. 26 It
appears that Helm was treated more severely than he would
have been in any other State.
B
The State argues that the present case is essentially the
same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in
that case is matched by the possibility of executive clemency
here. The State reasons that the Governor could commute
Helm's sentence to a term of years. We conclude, however,
that the South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally
different from the parole system that was before us in

Rummel.
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different
concepts, despite some surface similarities. Parole is a regu26
Under§ 207.010(2), a Nevada court is authorized to impose a sentence
of "imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without possibility of
parole. If the penalty fixed by the court is life imprisonment with the
possibility of parole, eligibility for parole begins when a minimum of 10
years has been served." It appears that most sentences imposed under
§ 207.010(2) permit parole, even when the prior crimes are far more serious
than Helm's. See, e. g., Rusling v. State, 96 Nev. 778, 617 P. 2d 1302
(1980) (possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, two instances of driving an
automobile without the owner's consent, four first degree burglaries, two
sales of marijuana, two sales of a restricted dangerous drug, one sale of
heroin, one escape from state prison, and one second degree burglary).
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lar part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behavior, it is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases.
The law generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to
be considered for parole, and details the standards and procedures applicable at that time. See, e. g., Greenholz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979) (detailing Nebraska parole procedures); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S.
471, 477 (1972) ("the practice of releasing prisoners on parole
before the end of their sentences has become an integral part
of the penological system"). Thus it is possible to predict, at
least to some extent, when parole might be granted. Commutation, on the other hand, is an ad hoc exercise of executive clemency. A Governor may commute a sentence at any
time for any reason without reference to any standards.
See, e. g., Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452
u. s. 458 (1981).
We explicitly have recognized the distinction between parole and commutation in our prior cases. 27 Writing on behalf
of the Morrissey Court, for example, CHIEF JuSTICE BuRGER contrasted the two possibilities:. "Rather than being an
ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals." 408 U. S., at
477. In Dumschat, THE CHIEF JuSTICE similarly explained
that "there is a vast difference between a denial of parole . . .
and a state's refusal to commute a lawful sentence." 452
U. S., at 466.
The Texas and South Dakota systems in particular are
'1:1 In Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the possibility of
commutation is not equivalent to the possibility of parole. The Court carefully "distinguish[ed] Rummel from a person sentenced under a recidivist
statute like [Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for
a sentence of life without parole." 445 U. S. , at 281. But the Mississippi
Constitution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal and
penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment." Art. 5, § 124.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized that the power to pardon includes the power to commute a convict's sentence. See Whittington
v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 603-{)04, 73 So. 2d 137, 139-140 (1954).
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very different. In Rummel, the Court did not rely simply
on the existence of some system of parole. Rather it looked
to the provisions of the system presented, including the fact
that Texas had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good
time' credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has allowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for
parole in as little as 12 years." 445 U. S., at 280. A Texas
prisoner became eligible for parole when his calendar time
served plus "good conduct" time equaled one-third of the
maximum sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 42.12, § 15(b) (Vernon
1979). An entering prisoner earned 20 days good-time per
30 days served, Brief for Respondent in Rummel, 0. T.
1979, No. 78--6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30
days good-time per 30 days served, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann., Art. 6181-1, §§2-3 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Thus
Rummel could have been eligible for parole in as few as 10
years, and could have expected to become eligible, in the nor·
mal course of events, in only 12 years.
In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain
than parole. For example, the board of pardons and paroles
is authorized to make commutation recommendations to the
Governor, see n. 7, supra, but § 24-13-4 provides that "no
recommendation for the commutation of ... a life sentence,
or for a pardon ... , shall be made by less than the unanimous vote of all members of the board." In fact, no life s tence has been commuted in over eight years, App. 29, while
parole-where authorized-has been granted regularly during that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. Furthermore, even if
Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would be eligible
to be considered for parole. 28 Not only is there no guarantee
that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota parole
.(.28 The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Dakota occurred in 1975. The record indicates, however, that the prisoner in question still has not been paroled. App. 29.
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system is far more stringent than the one before us in
Rummel. Helm would have to serve three-fourths of his revised sentence before he would be eligible for parole,
§ 24-15-5, and the provision for good-time credits is less generous, § 24-5-1. 29
The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a hope
for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency." It is little different
from the possibility of executive clemency that exists in
every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence
under the Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a bare
possibility would make judicial review under the Eighth
Amendment meaningless.

v

[§]-

The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence
to determine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying objective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penultimate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has
been treated more harshly than other criminals in the State
who have committed more serious crimes. He has been
treated more harshly than he would have been in any other
jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State.
We conclude that his sentence is significantly disproportionate to his cri~, and is therefore prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
is accordingly
Affirmed.

2i Assume, for example, that in 1979 the Governor had commuted Helm's
sentence to a term of 40 years (his approximate life expectancy). Even if
Helm were a model prisoner, he would not have been eligible for parole
until he had served over 21 years-more than twice the Rummel minimum. And this comparison is generous to South Dakota's position. If
Rummel had been sentenced to 40 years rather than life, he could have
been eligible for parole in less than 7 years.

n,
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Helm: n. 10 rider
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Revised footnote 10, on page 7:

10 The Eighth Amendment was based directly on Art. I, §9 of the

Virginia Declaration of Rights
He,

in

turn,

had

Bill of Rights.

{1776), authored by George Mason.

adopted verbatim the

language of

the English

There can be no doubt that the Declaration of

Rights guaranteed at least "the liberties and privileges of Englishmen."

See A. Nevins, The American States During and After

the Revolution 146 {1924)

{Declaration of Rights "was a restate-

ment of English principles--the principles of Magna Charta

•••

and the Revolution of 1688"): A. Howard, The Road from Runnymede:
Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in America 205-207 {1968).

As

Mason himself had explained earlier:
"We claim Nothing but the Liberties & Privileges of
Englishmen, in the same Degree, as if we had still continued among our Bretheren in Great Britain... •
We
have received [these rights] from our Ancestors, and,
with God's Leave, we will transmit them, unimpaired to
our Posterity." Letter to "the Committee of Merchants
in London" {June 6, 1766), reprinted in 1 The Papers of
George Mason 71 {Rutland ed. 1970).
Cf. the Fairfax County Resolves {1774)

{colonists entitled to all

"Privileges, Immunities and Advantages" of the English Constitution), reprinted in 1 The Papers of George Mason 201.
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JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Col!rt.
The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment
proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a
seventh nonviolent felony.
I
By 1975 the State of South Dakota had convicted respondent Jerry Helm of six nonviolent felonies. In 1964, 1966, and
1969 Helm was convicted of third-degree burglary. 1 In 1972
In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined in at least two sections of
the South Dakota criminal code:
"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the nighttime with intent
to commit a crime but under such circumstances as do not constitute burglary in the first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third degree." S. D.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-8 (1967) (repealed 1976).
"A person breaking or entering at any time any building within the curtilage of a dwelling house but not forming a part thereof, or any building or
part of any building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as defined in
§ 32-14-1, or any structure or erection in which any property is kept, with
intent to commit larceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the third
degree." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-9 (1967) (repealed 1976).
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essentially the
same. See S. D. Code § 13.3703 (1939 ed., supp. 1960); 1965 S. D. Laws,
ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by "imprisonment in the
state penitentiary for any term not exceeding fifteen years." S. D. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 22-32-10 (1967) (previously codified at S. D. Code § 13.3705(3)
1
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he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2
In 1973 he was convicted of grand larceny. 3 And in 1975 he
was convicted of third-offense driving while intoxicated. 4
The record contains no details about the circumstances of any
of these offenses, except that they were all nonviolent, none
was a crime against a person, and alcohol was a contributing
factor in each case.
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a "no account"
check for $100. 5 The only details we have of the crime are
those given by Helm to the state trial court:
(1939)) (repealed 1976).
2
In 1972 the relevant statute provided:

"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any false token or writing, or other false pretense, .. . obtains from any person any money or
property . . . is punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not
exceeding three years or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a
fine not exceeding three times the value of the money or property so obtained, or by both such fine and imprisonment." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 22-41-4 (1967) (repealed 1976).
3
In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of personal property accomplished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive another
thereof." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-1 (1967) (repealed 1976).
Grand larceny and petit larceny were distinguished as follows:
"Grand larceny is larceny committed in any of the following cases:
(1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding fifty dollars;
(2) When such property, although not of a value exceeding fifty dollars,
is taken from the person of another;
(3) When such property is livestock.
Larceny in other cases is petit larceny." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 22-37-2 (1967) (repealed 1976).
Grand larceny was then punishable by "imprisonment in the state penitentiary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-3 (1967) (repealed
1976).

A third offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol is a felony
in South Dakota. S. D. Codified Laws § 32-23-4 (1976). See 1973 S. D.
Laws, ch. 195, § 7 (enacting version of§ 32-23-4 in force in 1975).
5
The governing statute provides, in relevant part:
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another
4
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"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that
day, was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid City
with more money than I had when I started. I knew I'd
done something I didn't know exactly what. If I would
have known this, I would have picked the check up. I
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several
places."' State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d 497, 501 (S. D.
1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Helm).
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty.
Ordinarily the maximum punishment for uttering a "no account" check would have been five years imprisonment in the
state penitentiary and a $5,000 fine. SeeS. D. Comp. Laws
Ann. § 22-6--1(6) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now codified at S. D.
Codified Laws § 22-6--1(7) (Supp. 1982)). As a result of his
criminal record, however, Helm was subject to South Dakota's recidivist statute:
"When a defendant has been convicted of at least three
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal felony,
the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to
the sentence for a Class 1 felony." S. D. Codified Laws
§ 22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981).
The maximum penalty for a "Class 1 felony" was life imprisonment in the state penitentiary and a $25,000 fine. 6 S. D.
for present consideration with intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a
financial institution knowing at the time of such passing that he or his principal does not have an account with such financial institution, is guilty of a
Class 5 felony." S. D. Codified Laws § 22--41-1.2 (1979).
•When Helm was sentenced in April 1979, South Dakota law classified
felonies as follows:
"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are divided into the following seven classes which are distinguished from each other by the respective maximum penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized
upon conviction:
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. A lesser
sentence may not be given for a Class A felony;
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addi-
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Comp. Laws Ann. §22-&-1(2) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now
codified at S. D. Codified Laws § 22-&-1(3) (Supp. 1982)).
Moreover, South Dakota law explicitly provides that parole is
unavailable: "A person sentenced to life imprisonment is not
eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles." S.
D. Codified Laws §24-15-4 (1979). The Governor 7 is authorized to pardon prisoners, or to commute their sentences,
S.D. Const., Art. IV,§ 3, but no other relief from sentence is
available even to a rehabilitated prisoner.
Immediately after accepting Helm's guilty plea, the South
Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life imprisonment
under§ 22-7-8. The court explained:
" 'I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly
proven that you're an habitual criminal and the record
would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation and that
the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up for the rest
tion, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed;
(3) Class 2 felony: twenty-five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed;
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary.
In addition, a fine of fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed;
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In
addition, a fine of ten thousand dollars may be imposed;
(6) Class 5 felony: five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In
addition, a fine of five thousand dollars may be imposed; and
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the state penitentiary or a
fine of two thousand dollars, or both.
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sentences for habitual
criminals . . ..
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by law, every offense
declared to be a felony and not otherwise classified is a Class 6 felony."
S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979 and
1980).
7
The board of pardons and paroles is authorized to make recommendations to the Governor, S. D. Codified Laws § 24-14-1 (1979); § 24-14-5;
S. D. Executive Order 82-04 (Apr. 12, 1982), but the Governor is not
bound by the recommendation, § 24-14-5.
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of your natural life, so you won't have further victims of
your crimes, just be coming back before Courts. You'll
have plenty of time to think this one over."' State v.
Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 500 (Henderson, J., dissenting)
(quoting S. D. Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit,
Pennington County (Parker, J.)).
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a ~2 decision, affirmed
the sentence despite Helm's argument that it violated the
Eighth Amendment. State v. Helm, supra.
After Helm had served two years in the state penitentiary,
he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a
fixed term of years. Such a commutation would have had
the effect of making Helm eligible to be considered for parole
when he had served three-fourths of his new sentence. See
S. D. Codified Laws § 24-15--5(3) (1979). The Governor denied Helm's request in May 1981. App. 26.
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the
United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. Helm argued, among other things, that his sentence
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the District Court
recognized that the sentence was harsh, it concluded that this
Court's recent decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263
(1980), was dispositive. It therefore denied the writ.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed. 684 F. 2d 582 (1982). The Court of Appeals
noted that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable. Helm's
sentence of life without parole was qualitatively different
from Rummel's life sentence with the prospect of parole because South Dakota has rejected rehabilitation as a goal of
the criminal justice system. The Court of Appeals examined
the nature of Helm's offenses, the nature of his sentence, and
the sentence he could have received in other States for the
same offense. It concluded, on the basis of this examination,
that Helm's sentence was "grossly disproportionate to the na-
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ture of the offense." 684 F. 2d, at 587. It therefore directed the District Court to issue the writ unless the State
resentenced Helm. Ibid.
We granted certiorari to consider the Eighth Amendment
question presented by this case. 459 U. S. - - (1982). We
now affirm.
II
The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." The final clause prohibits not
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.
A
The principle that a punishment should be proportionate to
the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence. In 1215 three chapters of Magna
Carta were devoted to the rule that "amercements" 8 may not
be excessive. 9 And the principle was repeated and extended in the First Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw. I, ch. 6
(1275). These were not hollow guarantees, for the royal
courts relied on them to invalidate disproportionate punishments. See, e. g., Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop of Winchester, Y. B. Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 (C. P. 1316), reprinted in 52
Selden Society 3 (1934). When prison sentences became the
8

An amercement was similar to a m ern-day fine. It was the most
common criminal sanction in
century England. See 2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 513-515 (2d ed. 1909).
9
Chapter 20 declared that "(a] freeman shall not be amerced for a small
fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great crime according to
the heinousness of it." See 1 S. D. Codified Laws, p. 4 (1978) (translation
of Magna Carta). According to Maitland, "there was no clause in Magna
Carta more grateful to the mass of the people . . .. " F. Maitland, Pleas of
the Crown for the County of Gloucester xxxiv (1884). Chapter 21 granted
the same rights to the nobility, and chapter 22 granted the same rights to
the clergy.
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normal criminal sanctions, the common law recognized that
these, too, must be proportional. See, e. g., Hodges v.
Humkin, 2 Bulst. 139, 140, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K. B.
1615) (Croke, J.) ("imprisonment ought always to be according to the quality of the offence").
The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of proportionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth
Amendment: "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor
excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments
inflicted." 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). Although the
precise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incorporated "the longstanding principle of English law that the punishment ... should not be, by reason of its excessive length
or severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged."
R. Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 (1959); see 4 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries *16-19 (1769); see also id., at
*16-17 (in condemning "punishments of unreasonable severity," uses "cruel" to mean severe or excessive). Indeed,
barely three months after the Bill of Rights was adopted, the
House of Lords declared that a "fine of thirty thousand
pounds, imposed by the court of King's Bench upon the earl
of Devon, was excessive and exorbitant, against magna
charta, the common right of the subject, and against the la
of the land." Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Trials 1 , 36
(1689).
When the Framers of the Eighth Amendme adopted the
language of the English Bill of Rights, 10 t y also adopted
the English principle of proportionality.
~-including
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B
The constitutional principle of proportionality has been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 11 In the
leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910),
the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public document and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form
of imprisonment that included hard labor in chains and permanent civil disabilities. The Court noted "that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduateu___,..-and proportioned to offense," id., at 367 nd-hel
at the
we II
~ o.s
sentence violated the Eighth
ment. The Court endorsed the principle o
oportionality as a constitutional
standard, see, e. . , ta., at 372-373, and determined that the
sentence be£ e it was "cruel in its excess of imprisonment,"
id., at 377
The Court next applied the principle to invalidate a crimisho.ck/es
nal sentence in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660
(1962). 12 A 90-day sentence was found to be excessive for
the crime of being "addicted to the use of narcotics." The
Court explained that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in
the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual."
In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323 (1892), the defendant had been
convicted of 307 counts of "selling intoxicating liquor without authority,"
and sentenced to a term of over 54 years. The majority did not reach
O'Neil's contention that this sentence was unconstitutional, for he did not
include the point in his assignment of errors or in his brief. I d., at 331.
Furthermore, the majority noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not
apply to the States." ld., at 332. Accordingly the Court dismissed the
writ of error for want of a federal question. I d., at 336-337. The dissent,
however, reached the Eighth Amendment question, observing that it "is
directed . . . against all punishments which by their excessive length or
severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged." Jd., at
339-340 (Field, J., dissenting).
12
Members of the Court continued to recognize the principle of proportionality in the meantime. See, e. g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100
(1958) (plurality opinion); id., at 111 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at
125--126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
11

~5
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I d., at 667.

J

Thus there was no question of an inherently barbaric punishment. "But the question cannot be considered
in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and
unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."
Ibid.
Most recently, the Court has applied the principle of proportionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain
circumstances. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. - - (1982)
(death penalty excessive for felony murder when defendant
did not take life, attempt to take life, or intend that a life be
taken or that lethal force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U. S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("sentence of death is
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the
crime of rape"); id., at 601 (POWELL, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("ordinarily death is
disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult
woman"). And the Court has continued to recognize that
the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate
punishments, even when it has not been necessary to rely on
the proscription. See, e. g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678,
685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667 (1977);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 171-172 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Davis,
454 U. S. 370, 374, and n. 3 (1982) (per curiam) (recognizing
that some prison sentences may be constitutionally disproportio~te); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11
(same).

c

There is no basis for the State's assertion that the general
principle of proportionality does not apply to felony prison
The constitutional language itself suggests no
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exception for imprisonment. We have recognized that the
Eighth Amendment imposes "parallel limitations" on bail,
fines, and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U. S., at 664, and the text is explicit that bail and fines may
not be excessive. It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser
punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death
were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the intermediate punishment of imprisonment were not. There is
also no historical support for such an exception. The common-law principle incorporated into the Eighth Amendment
clearly applied to prison terms. See Hodges v. Humkin,
supra. And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that
prison sentences are subject to proportionality analysis.
See, e. g., Weems, 217 U. S., at 377; cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437
U. S., at 685 ("Confinement in a prison ... is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment
standards").
When we have applied the proportionality principle in capital cases, we have drawn no distinction with cases of imprisonment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 176 (opinion of
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). It is true that the
"penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind." Furman v. Georgia,
408 U. S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). As aresult, "our decisions [in] capital cases are of limited assistanc
in deciding the constitutionality of the punishment" in a
noncapital case. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 272.
·
· that, "[o]utside the context of capi al
punishment, successfUl challenges-to the-p~ionality of
particular sentences [will be] exceedingly rare," ibid. (em(e ~as· atd). The ourt id
a~o th' st dard o
me was oss "ble. T the e ,
y ec ized hat e
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ere e d i e :itless.
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phasis ad ~ed); see utto v. Davis, 454 U. S., at 374.
does
not mean that prop rtionality analysis is entirely inapplicable
in noncap1tal cases
In sum, we hold that a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been
victed. Reviewing courts, of course, should grants stantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures ossess
in determining the types and limits of punishments for
crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts ossess in
sentencing convicted criminals.
ut no penalty is per se
constitutional. As the Court noted in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S., at 667, a single day in prison may be unconstitutional in some circumstances.

j

J

reviewed

J

sentences under the Eighth Amendment,
courts should be guided by objective factru:s that our cases
have recognized ..- First, we look to the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty. In Enmund, for example, the Court examined the circumstances of the defendant's crime in great detail. 458 U. S., a t - - - - - . In
Coker the Court considered the seriousness of the crime of
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rape, and compared it to other crimes, such as murder. 433
U. S., at 597-598 (plurality opinion); id., at 603 (POWELL, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
In Robinson the emphasis was placed on the nature of the
"crime." 370 U. S., at 666-667. And in Weems, the Court's
opinion commented in two separate places on the pettiness of
the offense. 217 U. S., at 363 and 365. Of course, a court
must consider the severity of the penalty in deciding whether
it is disproportionate. See, e. g., Coker, 433 U. S., at 598
(plurality opinion); Weems, 217 U. S., at 366--367.
Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more
serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at
issue may be excessive. Thus in Enmund the Court noted
that all of the other felony murderers on death row in Florida
were more culpable than the petitioner there. 458 U. S., at
The Weems Court identified an impressive list of
more serious crimes that were subject to less serious penalties. 217 U. S., at 380.-381.
Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review
of capital punishment statutes and determined that "only
about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a
defendant [such as Enmund] to be sentenced to die." 458
U. S., at - - . Even in those jurisdictions, however, the
death penalty was almost never imposed under similar circumstances. I d., at - - . The Court's review of foreign
law also supported its conclusion. I d., at - - , n. 22. The
analysis in Coker was essentially the same. 433 U. S., at
593-597. And in Weems the Court relied on the fact that,
under federal law, a similar crime was punishable by only two
year's imprisonment and a fine. 217 U. S., at 380. Cf. Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 102-103 (1958) (plurality opinion).
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In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including
(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty;
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of
the same crime in other jurisdictions.
B

Application of these factors assumes that courts are competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative
scale. In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and
courts traditionally have made these judgments-just as legislatures must make them in the first instance. Comparisons
can be made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the
victim or society, and the culpability of the offender. Thus
in Enmund the Court determined that the petitioner's conduct was not as serious as his accomplices' conduct. Indeed,
there are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness
of crimes. See Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness
of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences,
39 Am. Soc. Rev. 224, 237 (1974). For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent crimes are less serious than
crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence. Cf. Tr.
of Oral Arg. 16 (the State recognizes that the criminal law is
more protective of people than property).
There are other accepted principles that courts may apply
in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the victim or
society. The absolute magnitude of the crime may be relevant. Stealing a million dollars is viewed as more serious
than stealing a hundred dollars-a point recognized in statutes distinguishing petty theft from grand theft. See, e. g.,
S.D. Codified Laws §22-30A-17 (Supp. 1982). Few would
dispute that a lesser included offense should not be punished
more severely than the greater offense. Thus a court is justified in viewing assault with intent to murder as more seri-
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ous than simple assault. See Roberts v. Collins, 544 F. 2d
168, 169-170 (CA4 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 430 U. S.
973 (1977). Cf. Dembowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 252, 240
N. E. 2d 815, 817 (1968) (armed robbery more serious than
robbery); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 632, 281 P. 2d
233, 235 (1955) (rape more serious than assault with intent to
commit rape). It also is generally recognized that attempts
are less serious than completed crimes. See, e. g., S. D.
Codified Laws § 22-4-1 (1979); 4 Blackstone *15. Similarly,
an accessory after the fact should not be subject to a higher
penalty than the principal. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3.
Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are again
clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply. In
Enmund the Court looked at the petitioner's lack of intent to
kill in determining that he was less culpable than his accomplices. 458 U. S., at--. Most would agree that negligent
conduct is less serious than intentional conduct. South Dakota, for example, ranks criminal acts in ascending order of
seriousness as follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing
acts, intentional acts, and malicious acts. S. D. Codified
Laws § 22-1-2(1)(f) (Supp. 1982). A court, of course, is entitled to look at a defendant's motive in committing a crime.
Thus a murder may be viewed as more serious when committed pursuant to a contract. See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann., ch. 279, § 69(a)(5) (West Supp. 1982); cf. 4 Blackstone
*15; In re Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 P. 2d 1073 (1974).
This list is by no means exhaustive. It simply illustrates
that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing the
severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the difficulties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions between
similar crimes.

c

Application of the factors that we identify also assumes
that courts are able to compare different sentences. This assumption, too, is justified. The easiest comparison, of
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course, is between capital punishment and noncapital punishments, for the death penalty is different from other punishments in kind rather than degree."' F'or sentences of impris-

problie~

--{fii)

J

muc2h5 one1 o~f~o~r$
1 d~er~i~n~g~,~bliu~t1:aolln~e------r'/1--: j

onf m. entd, the.
is not sho
o 1me- raWing. tIS c1ear t at a -ye~ sentence en
is more severe than a 15-year sentence, ut in most cases it
would be difficult to decide that the former violates the
Eighth Amendment while the latter does not. Decisions of
this kind, although troubling, are not unique to this area.
The courts are constantly called upon to dra · 'lal!-line......:..·
a variety of contexts.
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is a examp .
Baldwin v. New York, 3 9 U. S. 66 (1970), in particular, illustrates the line-drawing function of the judiciary, and offers
guidance on the method by which some lines may be drawn.
There the Court determined that a defendant has a right to a
jury trial "where imprisonment for more than six months is
authorized." Id., at 69 (plurality opinion). In choosing the
6-month standard, the plurality relied almost exclusively on
the fact that only New York City denied the right to a jury
trial for an offense punishable by more than six months. As
JUSTICE WHITE explained:
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us
with the only objective criterion by which a line could
ever be drawn-on the basis of the possible penalty
alone-between offenses that are and that are not regarded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury." I d., at
72-73.

J

----t

In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly

j

~ tPfhere is also a clear line between sentences of imprisonment and sen~
tences involving no deprivation of liberty. See Argersinger v. Hamlin,

j

/1 a "'"
~

407

u. s. 25 (1972).

The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison, depending
upon the time and conditions of its availability.

I
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may distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another.
It also supports our holding that courts properly may look to
the practices in other jurisdictions in deciding where lines between sentences should be drawn.
IV
It remains to apply the analytical framework established
by our prior decisions to the case before us. We first consider the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life
imprisonment without possibility of parole. We then consider the State's argument that the possibility of commutation is sufficient to save an otherwise unconstitutional
sentence.
A

j

Helm's crime was "one of the most passive felonies a person could commit." State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 501
(Henderson, J., dissenting). It involved neither violence nor
threat of violence to any person. The $100 face value of
Helm's "no account" check was not trivial, but neither was it
a large amount. One hundred dollars was less than half ~
amount South Dakota required for a felonious theft.
It is
'<.. 2 ° )
easy to see why such a crime is viewed by society as among
the less serious offenses. See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev.,
at 229.
Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a
-;::;-:-,_ _ __ If Helm had been convicted simply of taking $100 from a cash register,
S. D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-1 (1979), or defrauding someone of $100,
§ 22-30A-3, or obtaining $100 through extortion, § 22-30A-4(1), or blackmail, § 22-30A-4(3), or using a false credit card to obtain $100,
§ 22-30A-8.1, or embezzling $100, § 22-30A-10, he would not be in prison
today. All of these offenses would have been petty theft, a misdemeanor.
§ 22-30A-17 (amended 1982). Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 check
against insufficient funds, rather than a nonexistent account, he would
have been guilty of a misdemeanor. §§ 22-41-1. Curiously, under South
Dakota law there is no distinction between writing a "no account" check for
a large sum and writing a "no account" check for a small sum. § 22-41-1.2.

J
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J

"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender.
And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more severely than it punishes a first offender. Helm's status, however, cannot be considered in the abstract. His prior offenses, although classified as felonies, were all relatively
'\------...,.,;,·U'r'P.-. All were nonviolent and none was a crime against a
person. Indeed, there was no minimum amount in either the
burglary or the false pretenses statutes, see nn. 1 and 2,
supra, and the minimum amount covered by the grand la~ J
ceny statute was fairly small, see n. 3, supra.
_
\(.._~
Helm's present sentence is life imprisonment without possibility ofparo e. Barring executive clemency, see infra, at
- - , Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state penitentiary. This sentence is far more severe than the life sentence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel was
likely to have been eligible for parole within 12 years of his

J

J ~We

must focus on the principal felony-the felony that triggers the life
sentence-since Helm already has paid the penalty for each of his prior of.
fenses. But we recognize, of course, that Helm's prior convictions are relevant to the sentencing decision.
Helm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a profes22
sional criminal. The record indicates an addiction to alcohol, and a consequent difficulty in holding a job. His record involves no instance of violence of any kind. Incarcerating him for life without possibility of parole is
unlikely to advance the goals of our criminal justice system in any substantial way. Neither Helm nor the State will have an incentive to pursue
clearly needed treatment for his alcohol problem, or any other program of
rehabilitation.
~ As suggested at oral argument, the third-degree burglary statute cov~
ered entering a building with the intent to steal a loaf of bread. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 14-16. It appears that the grand larceny statute would have covered
___the theft of a chicken.
~-~Every life s~nBOuth Dakota is without possibility of parole.
~
~::supra, at --f;:-· _V!_e raise no question as to the general validity of sentences without possibility of parole. The only issue before us is whether,
in the circumstances of this case and in light of the constitutional principle
of proportionality, the sentence imposed on this petitioner violates the
Eighth Amendment.

~

J~

J
j

-(i)J

82-492-0PINION
18

SOLEM v. HELM

initial confinement,..-afa"ct on which the Court relied heavily.
See 445 U. S., at 280-281. Helm's sentence is the most severe punishment that the State co~ imposed .1ln .any
criminal for any crime. See ~ ~'. supra. Only capital
punishment, a penalty not authorized in South Dakota when
Helm was sentenced, exceeds it.
We next consider the sentences that could be imposed on
other criminals in the same jurisdiction. When Helm was
sentenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a
life sentence for murder, S. D. Codified Laws § 2~16-12
(1979) (amended 1980), and was authorized to impose a life
sentence for treason, § 22--8-1, first degree manslaughter,
§ 2~16-15, first degree arson, § 22-33-1, and kidnapping,
S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 2~19-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978)
(amended 1979). No other crime was punishable so severely
on the first offense. Attempted murder, S. D. Codified
Laws § 22-4-1(5) (1979), placing an explosive device on an
aircraft, § 2~14A-5, and first degree rape, § 2~2~1
(amended 1980 and 1982), were only Class 2 felonies. Aggravated riot was only a Class 3 felony. § 2~10-5. Distribution of heroin, §§ 2~~2 (amended 1982), 34-20B-13(7)
(1977), and aggravated assault, § 2~18-1.1 (amended 1980
and 1981), were only Class 4 felonies.
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analysis,
but relevant comparisons are still possible. Under§ 2~7-7,
the penalty for a second or third felony is increased by one
class. Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or
third conviction was for treason, first degree manslaughter,
first degree arson, or kidnapping, and a life sentence would
have been authorized when a second or third conviction was
for such crimes as attempted murder, placing an explosive
device on an aircraft, or first degree rape. Finally, § 2~7--8,
under which Helm was sentenced, authorized life imprisonment after three prior convictions, regardless of the crimes.
*We note that Rummel was, in fact, released within eight months of the
Court's decision in his case. See L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3.

-cn. JJ
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In sum, there were a handful of crimes that were necessarily punished by life imprisonment: murder, and, on a second
or third offense, treason, first degree manslaughter, first degree arson, and kidnapping. There was a larger group for
which life imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of
the sentencing judge, including: treason, first degree manslaughter, first degree arson, and kidnapping; attempted
murder, placing an explosive device on an aircraft, and first
degree rape on a second or third offense; and any felony after
three prior offenses. Finally, there was a large group of
very serious offenses for which life imprisonment was not authorized, including a third offense of heroin dealing or aggravated assault.
Criminals committing any of these offenses ordinarily
would be thought more deserving of punishment than one uttering a "no account" check-even when the bad-check writer
had already committed six minor felonies. Moreover, there
is no indication in the record that any habitual offender other
than Helm has ever been given the maximum sentence on the
basis of comparable crimes. It is more likely that the possibility of life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 generally is reserved for criminals such as fourth-time heroin dealers, while
habitual bad-check writers receive more lenient treatment.
In any event, Helm has been treated in the same manner as,
or more severely than, criminals who have committed far
more serious crimes.
Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission

J~The
~

habl~

State oontends that § 22-7-8 Is more lenient than the Texas
ual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 is
discretionary rather than mandatory. Brief for Petitioner 22. Helm,
however, has challenged only his own sentence. No one suggests that
§ 22-7-8 may not be applied constitutionally to fourth-time heroin dealers
or other violent criminals. Thus we do not question the legislature's judgment. Unlike in Rummel, a lesser sentence here could have been entirely
consistent with both the statute and the Eighth Amendment. See Note,
Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1119,
1160 (1979).

J
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of the same crime in other jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals found that "Helm could have received a life sentence
without parole for his offense in only one other state, N evada," 684 F. 2d, at 586, and we have no reason to doubt this
finding. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. At the very least, therefore, it is clear that Helm could not have received such a severe sentence in 48 of the 50 States. But even under N evada law, a life sentence without possibility of parole is
merely authorized in these circumstances. See Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 207.010(2) (1981). We are not advised that any defendant such as Helm, whose prior offenses were so mino
actually has received the maximum penalty in Nevada.
It
appears that Helm was treated more severely than he would
have been in any other State.
B
The State argues that the present case is essentially the
same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in
that case is matched by the possibility of executive clemency
here. The State reasons that the Governor could commute
Helm's sentence to a term of years. We conclude, however,
that the South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally
different from the parole system that was before us in

)

Rummel.
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different
concepts, despite some surface similarities. Parole is a regu-

~Under § 207.010(2), a Nevada court is authorized to impose a sentence

of "imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without possibility of
parole. If the penalty fixed by the court is life imprisonment with the
possibility of parole, eligibility for parole begins when a minimum of 10
years has been served." It appears that most sentences imposed under
§ 207.010(2) permit parole, even when the prior crimes are far more serious
than Helm's. See, e. g., Rusling v. State, 96 Nev. 778, 617 P. 2d 1302
(1980) (possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, two instances of driving an
automobile without the owner's consent, four first degree burglaries, two
sales of marijuana, two sales of a restricted dangerous drug, one sale of
heroin, one escape from state prison, and one second degree burglary).
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lar part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behavior, it is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases.
The law generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to
be considered for parole, and details the standards and procedures applicable at that time. See, e. g., Greenholz v. N ebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979) (detailing Nebraska parole procedures); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S.
471, 477 (1972) ("the practice of releasing prisoners on parole
before the end of their sentences has become an integral part
of the penological system"). Thus it is possible to predict, at
least to some extent, when parole might be granted. Commutation, on the other hand, is an ad hoc exercise of executive clemency. A Governor may commute a sentence at any
time for any reason without reference to any standards.
See, e. g., Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452

u. s. 458 (1981).

J

We explicitly have recognized the distinction betw..e..en..pa-_
role and commutation in our prior cases. Writing on behalf
of the Morrissey Court, for example, CHIEF JuSTICE BURGER contrasted the two possibilities: "Rather than being an
ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals." 408 U. S., at
477. In Dumschat, THE CHIEF JUSTICE similarly explained
that "there is a vast difference between a denial of parole . . .
and a state's refusal to commute a lawful sentence." 452
U. S., at 466.
The Texas and South Dakota systems in particular are

~ • In Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the possibility of

~

commutation is not equivalent to the possibility of parole. The Court carefully "distinguish[ed] Rummel from a person sentenced under a recidivist
statute like [Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for
a sentence of life without parole." 445 U. S., at 281. But the Mississippi
Constitution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal and
penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment." Art. 5, § 124.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized that the power to pardon includes the power to commute a convict's sentence. See Whittington
v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 603-604, 73 So. 2d 137, 139-140 (1954).

---·~

~
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very different. In Rummel, the Court did not rely simply
on the existence of some system of parole. Rather it looked
to the provisions of the system presented, including the fact
that Texas had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good
time' credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has allowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for
parole in as little as 12 years." 445 U. S., at 280. A Texas
prisoner became eligible for parole when his calendar time
served plus "good conduct" time equaled one-third of the
maximum sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 42.12, § 15(b) (Vernon
1979). An entering prisoner earned 20 days good-time per
30 days served, Brief for Respondent in Rummel, 0. T.
1979, No. 78-6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30
days good-time per 30 days served, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann., Art. 6181-1, §§ 2-3 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Thus
Rummel could have been eligible for parole in as few as 10
years, and could have expected to become eligible, in the normal course of events, in only 12 years.
In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain
than parole. For example, the board of pardons and paroles
is authorized to make commutation recommendations to the
Governor, see n. 7, supra, but § 24-13-4 provides that "no
recommendation for the commutation of ... a life sentence,
or for a pardon ... , shall be made by less than the unanimous vote of all members of the board." In f
life sentence has been commuted in over eight years, App. 29,
parole-where authorized-has been granted regularly during that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. Furthermore, even if
Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would be eligible
to be considered or parole:- Not only is there no guarantee
that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota parole
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system is far more stringent than the one before us in
Rummel. Helm would have to serve three-fourths of his revised sentence before he would be eligible for parole,
§ 24-15-5, and the provision for good-time credits is less generous, §24-5-1.
The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a hope
for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency." It is little different
from the possibility of executive clemency that exists in
every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence
under the Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a bare
possibility would make judicial review under the Eighth
Amendment meaningless.

v

J

The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence
to determine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying objective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penultimate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has
been treated more harshly than other criminals in the State
who have committed more serious crimes. He has been
treated more harshly than he would have been in any other
jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State.
We conclude that his sentence is significantly disproportion te to -his crim~, and is therefore prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
is accordingly
Affirmed.

J ~Assume, for example, that in 1979 the Governor had commuted Helm's

sentence to a term of 40 years (his approximate life expectancy). Even if
Helm were a model prisoner, he would not have been eligible for parole
until he had served over 21 years-more than twice the Rummel minimum. And this comparison is generous to South Dakota's position. If
Rummel had been sentenced to 40 years rather than life, he could have
been eligible for parole in less than 7 years.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-492
HERMAN SOLEM, WARDEN, PETITIONER
JERRY BUCKLEY HELM

v.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[June-, 1983]
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment
proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a
seventh nonviolent felony.

I
By 1975 the State of South Dakota had convicted respondent Jerry Helm of six nonviolent felonies. In 1964, 1966, and
1969 Helm was convicted of third-degree burglary.' In 1972
In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined in at least two sections of
the South Dakota criminal code:
"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the nighttime with intent
to commit a crime but under such circumstances as do not constitute burglary in the first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third degree." S. D.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-8 (1967) (repealed 1976).
"A person breaking or entering at any time any building within the curtilage of a dwelling house but not forming a part thereof, or any building or
part of any building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as defined in
§ 32-14-1, or any structure or erection in which any property is kept, with
intent to commit larceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the third
degree." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-9 (1967) (repealed 1976).
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essentially the
same. SeeS. D. Code § 13.3703 (1939 ed., supp. 1960); 1965 S. D. Laws,
ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by "imprisonment in the
state penitentiary for any term not exceeding fifteen years." S. D. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 22-32-10 (1967) (previously codified at S. D. Code§ 13.3705(3)
1
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he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2
In 1973 he was convicted of grand larceny. 3 And in 1975 he
was convicted of third-offense driving while intoxicated. 4
The record contains no details about the circumstances of any
of these offenses, except that they were all nonviolent, none
was a crime against a person, and alcohol was a contributing
factor in each case.
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a "no account"
check for $100. 5 The only details we have of the crime are
those given by Helm to the state trial court:
(1939)) (repealed 1976).
2
In 1972 the relevant statute provided:
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any false token or writing, or other false pretense, ... obtains from any person any money or
property .. . is punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not
exceeding three years or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a
fine not exceeding three times the value of the money or property so obtained, or by both such fine and imprisonment." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 22-41-4 (1967) (repealed 1976).
3
In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of personal property accomplished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive another
thereof." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-1 (1967) (repealed 1976).
Grand larceny and petit larceny were distinguished as follows:
"Grand larceny is larceny committed in any of the following cases:
(1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding fifty dollars;
(2) When such property, although not of a value exceeding fifty dollars,
is taken from the person of another;
(3) When such property is livestock.
Larceny in other cases is petit larceny." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 22-37-2 (1967) (repealed 1976).
Grand larceny was then punishable by "imprisonment in the state penitentiary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-3 (1967) (repealed
1976).
'A third offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol is a felony
in South Dakota. S. D. Codified Laws § 32-23-4 (1976). See 1973 S. D.
Laws, ch. 195, § 7 (enacting version of§ 32-23-4 in force in 1975).
' The governing statute provides, in relevant part:
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another

...
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"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that
day, was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid City
with more money than I had when I started. I knew I'd
done something I didn't know exactly what. If I would
have known this, I would have picked the check up. I
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several
places."' State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d 497, 501 (S. D.
1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Helm).
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty.
Ordinarily the maximum punishment for uttering a "no account" check would have been five years imprisonment in the
state penitentiary and a $5,000 fine. SeeS. D. Comp. Laws
Ann. § 22-6-1(6) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now codified at S. D.
Codified Laws § 22-6-1(7) (Supp. 1982)). As a result of his
criminal record, however, Helm was subject to South Dakota's recidivist statute:
"When a defendant has been convicted of at least three
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal felony,
the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to
the sentence for a Class 1 felony." S. D. Codified Laws
§ 22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981).
The maximum penalty for a "Class 1 felony'' was life imprisonment in the state penitentiary and a $25,000 fine. 6 S. D.
for present consideration with intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a
financial institution knowing at the time of such passing that he or his principal does not have an account with such financial institution, is guilty of a
Class 5 felony." S. D. Codified Laws § 22-41-1.2 (1979).
6
When Helm was sentenced in April 1979, South Dakota law classified
felonies as follows:
"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are divided into the following seven classes which are distinguished from each other by the respective maximum penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized
upon conviction:
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. A lesser
sentence may not be given for a Class A felony;
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addi-
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Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1(2) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now
codified at S. D. Codified Laws § 22-6-1(3) (Supp. 1982)).
Moreover, South Dakota law explicitly provides that parole is
unavailable: "A person sentenced to life imprisonment is not
eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles."
S. D. Codified Laws§ 24-15-4 (1979). The Governor 7 is authorized to pardon prisoners, or to commute their sentences,
S. D. Const., Art. IV, § 3, but no other relief from sentence is
available even to a rehabilitated prisoner.
Immediately after accepting Helm's guilty plea, the South
Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life imprisonment
under§ 22-7-8. The court explained:
" 'I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly
proven that you're an habitual criminal and the record
would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation and that
the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up for the rest
tion, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed;
(3) Class 2 felony: twenty-five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed;
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary.
In addition, a fine of fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed;
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In
addition, a fine of ten thousand dollars may be imposed;
(6) Class 5 fekmy: five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In
addition, a fine of five thousand dollars may be imposed; and
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the state penitentiary or a
fine of two thousand dollars, or both.
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sentences for habitual
criminals ....
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by law, every offense
declared to be a felony and not otherwise classified is a Class 6 felony."
S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 2~1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979 and
1980).
7
The board of pardons and paroles is authorized to make recommendations to the Governor, S. D. Codified Laws § 24-14-1 (1979); § 24-14-5;
S. D. Executive Order 82-04 (Apr. 12, 1982), but the Governor is not
bound by the recommendation, § 24-14-5.
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of your natural life, so you won't have further victims of
your crimes, just be coming back before Courts. You'll
have plenty of time to think this one over."' State v.
Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 500 (Henderson, J., dissenting)
(quoting S. D. Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit,
Pennington County (Parker, J.)).
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a 3--2 decision, affirmed
the sentence despite Helm's argument that it violated the
Eighth Amendment. State v. Helm, supra.
Mter Helm had served two years in the state penitentiary,
he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a
fixed term of years. Such a commutation would have had
the effect of making Helm eligible to be considered for parole
when he had served three-fourths of his new sentence. See
S. D. Codified Laws § 24-15-5(3) (1979). The Governor denied Helm's request in May 1981. App. 26.
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the
United States District Court for the District of South Da. kota. Helm argued, among other things, that his sentence
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the District Court
recognized that the sentence was harsh, it concluded that this
Court's recent decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263
(1980), was dispositive. It therefore denied the writ.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed. 684 F. 2d 582 (1982). The Court of Appeals
noted that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable. Helm's
sentence of life without parole was qualitatively different
from Rummel's life sentence with the prospect of parole because South Dakota has rejected rehabilitation as a goal of
the criminal justice system. The Court of Appeals examined
the nature of Helm's offenses, the nature of his sentence, and
the sentence he could have received in other States for the
same offense. It concluded, on the basis of this examination,
that Helm's sentence was "grossly disproportionate to the na-
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ture of the offense." 684 F. 2d, at 587. It therefore directed the District Court to issue the writ unless the State
resentenced Helm. Ibid.
We granted certiorari to consider the Eighth Amendment
question presented by this case. 459 U. S. - - (1982). We
now affirm.
II
The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." The final clause prohibits not
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.

A
The principle that a punishment should be proportionate to
the criine is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence. In 1215 three chapters of Magna
Carta were devoted to the rule that "amercements" 8 may not
be excessive. 9 And the principle was repeated and extended in the First Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw. I, ch. 6
(1275). These were not hollow guarantees, for the royal
courts relied on them to invalidate disproportionate punishments. See, e. g., Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop of Winchester, Y. B. Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 (C. P. 1316), reprinted in 52
Selden Society 3 (1934). When prison sentences became the
8
An amercement was similar to a modern-day fine. It was the most
common criminal sanction in 13th century England. See 2 F. Pollock & F.
Maitland, The History of English Law 51S-515 (2d ed. 1909).
9
Chapter 20 declared that "[a] freeman shall not be amerced for a small
fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great crime according to
the heinousness of it." See 1 S. D. Codified Laws, p. 4 (1978) (translation
of Magna Carta). According to Maitland, "there was no clause in Magna
Carta more grateful to the mass of the people ... ." F. Maitland, Pleas of
the Crown for the County of Gloucester xxxiv (1884). Chapter 21 granted
the same rights to the nobility, and chapter 22 granted the same rights to
the clergy .
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normal criminal sanctions, the common law recognized that
these, too, must be proportional. See, e. g., Hodges v.
Humkin, 2 Bulst. 139, 140, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K. B.
1615) (Croke, J.) ("imprisonment ought always to be according to the quality of the offence").
The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of proportionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth
Amendment: "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor
excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments
inflicted." 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. ·2 (1689). Although the
precise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incoq)orated "the longstanding principle of English law that the punishment ... should not be, by reason of its excessive length
or severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged."
R. Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 (1959); see 4 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries *1&-19 (1769); see also id., at
*1&-17 (in condemning "punishments of unreasonable severity," uses "cruel" to mean severe or excessive). Indeed,
barely three months after the Bill of Rights was adopted, the
House of Lords declared that a "fine of thirty thousand
pounds, imposed by the court of King's Bench upon the earl
of Devon, was excessive and exorbitant, against magna
charta, the common right of the subject, and against the law
of the land." Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Trials,133, 136
(1689).
When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the
language of the English Bill of Rights, 10 they also adopted the
10
The Eighth Amendment was based directly on Art. I, § 9 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), authored by George Mason. He, in
turn, had adopted verbatim the language of the English Bill of Rights.
There can be no doubt that the Declaration of Rights guaranteed at least
the liberties and privileges of Englishmen. See A. Nevins, The American
States During and After the Revolution 146 (1924) (Declaration of Rights
"was a restatement of English principles-the principles of Magna Charta
... and the Revolution of 1688"); A. Howard, The Road from Runnymede:
Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in America 205-207 (1968). As Mason
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English principle of proportionality. Indeed, one of the consistent themes of the era was that Americans had all the
rights of English subjects. See, e. g., 1 J. Continental Congress 83 (Ford ed. 1904) (Address to the People of Great Britain, Oct. 21, 1774) ("we claim all the benefits secured to the
subject by the English constitution"); 1 American Archives
700 (4th series 1837) (Georgia Resolutions, Aug. 10, 1774)
("his Majesty's subjects in America ... are entitled to the
same rights, privileges, and immunities with their fellowsubjects in Great Britain"). Thus our Bill of Rights was designed in part to ensure that these rights were preserved.
Although the Framers may have intended the Eighth
Amendment to go beyond the scope of its English counterpart, their use of the language of the English Bill of Rights is
convincing proof that they intended to provide at least the
same protection-including the right to be free from excessive punishments.
B
The constitutional principle of proportionality has been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 11 In the
himself had explained: ''We claim Nothing but the Liberties & Privileges of
En lishmen, in the same Degree, as if we had still continued among our
~------;B;:;-r....e~
th;.,. ren in Great Britain. . . .
We have received [these rights] from
our Ancestors, and, with God's Leave, we will transmit them, unimpaired
to our Posterity." Letter to "the Committee of Merchants in London"
(June 6, 1766), reprinted in 1 The Papers of George Mason 71 (Rutland ed.
1970); cf. the Fairfax County Resolves (1774) (colonists entitled to all
"Privileges, Immunities and Advantages" of the English Constitution), reprinted in 1 The Papers of George Mason 201.
11
In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323 (1892), the defendant had been
convicted of 307 counts of "selling intoxicating liquor without authority,"
and sentenced to a term of over 54 years. The majority did not reach
O'Neil's contention that this sentence was unconstitutional, for he did not
include the point in his assignment of errors or in his brief. I d., at 331.
Furthermore, the majority noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not
apply to the States." Id., at 332. Accordingly the Court dismissed the
writ of error for want of a federal question. !d., at 336-337. The dissent,
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leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910),
the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public document and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form
of imprisonment that included hard labor in chains and permanent civil disabilities. The Court noted "that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to offense," id., at 367, and held that the
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court endorsed the principle of proportionality as a constitutional
standard, see, e. g., id., at 372-373, and determined that the
sentence before it was "cruel in its excess of imprisonment,"
id., at 377, as well as in its shackles and restrictions.
The Court next applied the principle to invalidate a criminal sentence in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660
(1962). 12 A 90-day sentence was found to be excessive for
the crime of being "addicted to the use of narcotics." The
Court explained that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in
the abstract, a punishment which is either Ct:Uel or unusual."
I d., at 667. Thus there was no question of an inherently barbaric punishment. "But the question cannot be considered
in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and
unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."
Ibid.
Most recently, the Court has applied the principle of proportionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain
circumstances. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. - - (1982)
(death penalty excessive for felony murder when defendant
did not take life, attempt to take life, or intend that a life be
however, reached the Eighth Amendment question, observing that it "is
directed . . . against all punishments which by their excessive length or
severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged." ld., at
339-340 (Field, J ., dissenting).
12
Members of the Court continued to recognize the principle of proportionality in the meantime. See, e. g., Trap v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100
(1958) (plurality opinion); id., at 111 (BRENNAN, J ., concurring); id., at
125-126 (Frankfurter, J ., dissenting).

I

82-492-0PINION

10

SOLEM v. HELM

taken or that lethal force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U. S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("sentence of death is
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the
crime of rape"); id., at 601 (POWELL, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("ordinarily death is
disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult
woman"). And the Court has continued to recognize that
the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate
punishments, even when it has not been necessary to rely on
the proscription. See, e. g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678,
685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667 (1977);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153> 171-172 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Davis,
454 U. S. 370, 374, and n. 3 (1982) (per curiam) (recognizing
that some prison sentences may be constitutionally disproportionate); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11
(same). 13

c

There is no basis for the State's assertion that the general
principle of proportionality does not apply to felony prison
sentences. 14 The constitutional language itself suggests no
13
The dissent charges that "the Court blithely discards any concept of
stare decisis." Post, at 1; cf. id., at 2, 8-9, 14. On the contrary, our decision is entirely consistent with this Court's prior cases-including Rummel
v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 (1980). Seen. 32, infra. It is rather the dissent
that would discard prior precedent. Its assertion that the Eighth Amendment establishes only a narrow principle of proportionality is contrary to
the entire line of cases cited in the text.
14
According to Rummel v. Estelle, "one could argue without fear of
contradiction by any decision of this Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies, that is, as punishable by significant terms
of imprisonment in a state penitentiary, the length of sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative." 445 U. S., at 274 (emphasis added). The Court did not adopt the standard proposed, but
merely recognized that the argument was possible. To the extent that the
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exception for imprisonment. We have recognized that the
Eighth Amendment imposes "parallel limitations" on bail,
fines, and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U. S., at 664, and the text is explicit that bail and fines may
not be excessive. It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser
punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death
were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the intermediate punishment of imprisonment were not. There is
also no historical support for such an exception. The common-law principle incorporated into the Eighth Amendment
clearly applied to prison terms. See Hodges v. Humkin,
supra. And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that
prison sentences are subject to proportionality analysis.
See, e. g., Weems, 217 U. S., at 377; cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437
U. S., at 685 ("Confinement in a prison ... is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment
standards").
When we have applied the proportionality principle in capital cases, we have drawn no distinction with cases of imprisonment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 176 (opinion of
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). It is true that the
"penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind." Furman v. Georgia,
408 U. S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). As aresult, "our decisions [in] capital cases are of limited assistance
in deciding the constitutionality of the punishment" in a noncapital case. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 272. We
agree, therefore, that, "[o]utside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [will be] exceedingly rare," 15 ibid. (emphaState--or the dissent, see post, at 4-makes this argument here, we find it
meritless.
15
In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to be excessive for felony murder in the circumstances of that case. But clearly no
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sis added); see Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S., at 374. This does
not mean, however, that proportionality analysis is entirely
inapplicable in noncapital cases.
In sum, we hold as a matter of principle that a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted. Reviewing courts, of course,
should grant substantial deference to the broad authority
that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types
and limits of punishments for crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in sentencing convicted criminals. 16 But no penalty is per se constitutional. As the Court
noted in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S., at 667, a single
day in prison may be unconstitutional in some circumstances.

III
A

When sentences are reviewed under the Eighth Amendment, courts should be guided by objective factors that our
cases have recognized. 17 First, we look to the gravity of the
sentence of imprisonment would be disproportionate for Enmund's crime.
16
Contrary to the dissent's suggestions, post, at 2, 12, we do not adopt or
imply approval of a general rule of appellate review of sentences. Absent
authority, it is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its
udgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a
particular sentence; rather, in applying the Eighth Amendment the appellate court decides only whether the sentence under review is within constitutional limits. In view of the substantial deference that must be accorded legislatures and sentencing courts, a reviewing court rarely will be
required to engage in extended analysis to determine that a sentence is not
constitutionally disproportionate.
17
The dissent concedes-as it must-that some sentences of imprisonment are so disproportionate that they are unconstitutional under the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Post, at 8, n. 3; cf. id., at 7, n. 2.
It offers no guidance, however, as to how courts are to judge these admittedly rare cases. We reiterate the objective factors that our cases have
recognized. See, e. g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion). As the Court has indicated, no one factor will be dispositive
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offense and the harshness of the penalty. In Enmund, for
example, the Court examined the circumstances of the defendant's crime in great detail. 458 U. S., a t - - - - - .
In Coker the Court considered the seriousness of the crime of
rape, and compared it to other crimes, such as murder. 433
U. S., at 597-598 (plurality opinion); id., at 603 (POWELL, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
In Robinson the emphasis was placed on the nature of the
"crime." 370 U. S., at 66&-667. And in Weems, the Court's
opinion commented in two separate places on the pettiness of
the offense. 217 U. S., at 363 and 365. Of course, a court
must consider the severity of the penalty in deciding whether
it is disproportionate. See, e. g., Coker, 433 U. S., at 598
(plurality opinion); Weems, 217 U. S., at 366--367.
Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more
serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at
issue may be excessive. Thus in Enmund the Court noted
that all of the other felony murderers on death row in Florida
were more culpable than the petitioner there. 458 U. S., at
The Weems Court identified an impressive list of
more serious crimes that were subject to less serious penalties. 217 U. S., at 380-381.
Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review
in a given case. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S. 370, 373--374 n. 2 (1982)
(per curiam); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S., at 275-276. The inherent nature of our federal system and the need for individualized sentencing decisions result in a wide range of constitutional sentences. Thus no single
criterion can identify when a sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it
violates the Eighth Amendment. See Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 Yale L. J. 1325,
1376-1377 (1979). But a combination of objective factors can make such
analysis possible.

I
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of capital punishment statutes and determined that "only
about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a
defendant [such as Enmund] to be sentenced to die." 458
U. S., at - - . Even in those jurisdictions, however, the
death penalty was almost never imposed under similar circumstances. I d., at - - . The Court's review of foreign
law also supported its conclusion. I d., at - - , n. 22. The
analysis in Coker was essentially the same. 433 U. S., at
59~97. And in Weems the Court relied on the fact that,
under federal law, a similar crime was punishable by only two
year's imprisonment and a fine. 217 U. S., at 380. Cf. Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 102-103 (1958) (plurality opinion).
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including
(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty;
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of
the same crime in other jurisdictions.
B
Application of these factors assumes that courts are competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative
scale. In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and
courts traditionally have made these judgments-just as legislatures must make them in the first instance. Comparisons
can be made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the
victim or society, and the culpability of the offender. Thus
in Enmund the Court determined that the petitioner's conduct was not as serious as his accomplices' conduct. Indeed,
there are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness
of crimes. See Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness
of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences,
39 Am. Soc. Rev. 224, 237 (1974). For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent crimes are less serious than

.-
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crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence. Cf. Tr.
of Oral Arg. 16 (the State recognizes that the criminal law is
more protective of people than property).
There are ·other accepted principles that courts may apply
in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the victim or
society. The absolute magnitude of the crime may be relevant. Stealing a million dollars is viewed as more serious
than stealing a hundred dollars-a point recognized in statutes distinguishing petty theft from grand theft. See, e. g.,
S. D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-17 (Supp. 1982). Few would
dispute that a lesser included offense should not be punished
more severely than the greater offense. Thus a court is justified in viewing assault with intent to murder as more serious than simple assault. See Roberts v. Collins, 544 F. 2d
168, 169-170 (CA41976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 430 U. S.
973 (1977). Cf. Dembowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 252, 240
N. E. 2d 815, 817 (1968) (armed robbery more serious than
robbery); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 632, 281 P. 2d
233, 235 (1955) (rape more serious than assault with intent to
commit rape). It also is generally recognized that attempts
are less serious than completed crimes. See, e. g., S. D.
Codified Laws § 22-4-1 (1979); 4 Blackstone *15. Similarly,
an accessory after the fact should not be subject to a higher
penalty than the principal. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3.
Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are again
clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply. In
Enmund the Court looked at the petitioner's lack of intent to
kill in determining that he was less culpable than his accomplices. 458 U. S., at--. Most would agree that negligent
conduct is less serious than intentional conduct. South Dakota, for example, ranks criminal acts in ascending order of
seriousness as follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing
acts, intentional acts, and malicious acts. S. D. Codified
Laws § 22-1-2(1)(f) (Supp. 1982). A court, of course, is entitled to look at a defendant's motive in committing a crime.
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Thus a murder may be viewed as more serious when committed pursuant to a contract. See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann., ch. 279, § 69(a)(5) (West Supp. 1982); cf. 4 Blackstone
*15; In re Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 P. 2d 1073 (1974).
This list is by no means exhaustive. It simply illustrates
that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing the
severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the difficulties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions between
similar crimes.

c

Application of the factors that we identify also assumes
that courts are able to compare different sentences. This assumption, too, is justified. The easiest comparison, of
course, is between capital punishment and noncapital punishments, for the death penalty is different from other punishments in kind rather than degree. 18 For sentences of imprisonment, the problem is not so much one of ordering, but one
of line-drawing. It is clear that a 25-year sentence generally
is more severe than a 15-year sentence,19 but in most cases it
would be difficult to decide that the former violates the
Eighth Amendment while the latter does not. Decisions of
this kind, although troubling, are not unique to this area.
The courts are constantly called upon to draw similar lines in
a variety of contexts.
The Sixth Amendment offers two good examples. A State
is constitutionally required to provide an accused with a
speedy trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213
(1967), but the delay that is permissible must be determined
on a case-by-case basis. "[A]ny inquiry into a speedy trial
claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the par-

I
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There is also a clear line between sentences of imprisonment and sentences involving no deprivation of liberty. See Argersinger v. Hamlin ,
407
19

u. s. 25 (1972).

The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison, depending
upon the time and conditions of its availability.
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ticular context of the cas .... " Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S.
514, 522 (1972) (unanimo s opinion). In Barker, we identified some of the objective factors that courts should consider
in determining whether a particular delay ·was excessive.
I d., at 530. None of these factors is "either a necessary or
sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right
of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must
be considered together with such other circumstances as may
be relevant." I d., at 533. Thus the type of inquiry that a
court should conduct to determine if a given sentence is constitutionally disproportionate is similar to the type of inquiry
required by the Speedy Trial Clause.
The right to a jury trial is another example. Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), in particular, illustrates the
line-drawing function of the judiciary, and offers guidance on
the method by which some lines may be drawn. There the
Court determined that a defendant has a right to a jury trial
"where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized." Id., at 69 (plurality opinion). In choosing the 6month standard, the plurality relied almost exclusively on the
fact that only New York City denied the right to a jury trial
for an offense punishable by more than six months. As JusTICE WHITE explained:
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us
with the only objective criterion by which a line could
ever be drawn-on the basis of the possible penalty
alone-between offenses that are and that are not regarded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury." I d., at
72-73.
In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly
may distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another.
It also supports our holding that courts properly may look to
the practices in other jurisdictions in deciding where lines between sentences should be drawn.
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IV
It remains to apply the analytical framework established
by our prior decisions to the case before us. We first consider the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life
imprisonment without possibility of parole. We then consider the State's argument that the possibility of commutation is sufficient to save an otherwise unconstitutional
sentence.
A
Helm's crime was "one of the most passive felonies a person could commit." State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 501
(Henderson, J., dissenting). It involved neither violence nor
threat of violence to any person. The $100 face value of
Helm's "no account" check was not trivial, but neither was it
a large amount. One hundred dollars was less than half the
amount South Dakota required for a felonious theft. 20 It is
easy to see why such a crime is viewed by society as among
the less serious offenses. See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev.,
at 229.
Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a
"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender. 21
20

If Helm had been convicted simply of taking $100 from a cash register,
S. D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-1 (1979), or defrauding someone of $100,
§ 22-30A-3, or obtaining $100 through extortion, § 22-30A-4(1), or blackmail, § 22-30A-4(3), or using a false credit card to obtain $100,
§ 22-30A-8.1, or embezzling $100, § 22-30A-10, he would not be in prison
today. All of these offenses would have been petty theft, a misdemeanor.
§ 22-30A-17 (amended 1982). Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 check
against insufficient funds, rather than a nonexistent account, he would
have been guilty of a misdemeanor. §§ 22-41-1. Curiously, under South
Dakota law there is no distinction between writing" a "no account" check for
a large sum and writing a "no account" check for a small sum. § 22-41-1.2.
21
We must focus on the principal felony-the felony that triggers the life
sentenc~since Helm .already has paid the penalty for each of his prior offenses. But we recognize, of course, that Helm's prior convictions are relevant to the sentencing decision.

I
I
l
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And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more severely than it punishes a first offender. Helm's status, however, cannot be considered in the abstract. His prior offenses, although classified as felonies, were all relatively
minor. 22 All were nonviolent and none was a crime against a I
person. Indeed, there was no minimum amount in either the
burglary or the false pretenses statutes, see nn. 1 and 2,
supra, and the minimum amount covered by the grand larceny statute was fairly small, see n. 3, supra. 23
Helm's present sentence is life imprisonment without possibility of parole. 24 Barring executive clemency, see infra, at \
Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state penitentiary. This sentence is far more severe than the life sentence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel was
likely to have been eligible for parole within 12 years of his
initial confinement, 25 a fact on which the Court relied heavily. \
See 445 U. S., at 280-281. Helm's sentence is the most se-

l

22-25

*'

22

Helm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a professional criminal. The record indicates an addiction to alcohol, and a consequent difficulty in holding a job. His record involves no instance of violence of any kind. Incarcerating him for life without possibility of parole is
unlikely to advance the goals of our criminal justice system in any substantial way. Neither Helm nor the State will have an incentive to pursue
clearly needed treatment for his alcohol problem, or any other program of
rehabilitation.
23
As suggested at oral argument, the third-degree burglary statute covered entering a building with the intent to steal a loaf of bread. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 14-16. It appears that the grand larceny statute would have covered
the theft of a chicken.
24
Every life sentence in South Dakota is without possibility of parole.
See supra, at 4. We raise no question as to the general validity of sentences without possibility of parole. The only issue before us is whether,
in the circumstances of this case and in light of the constitutional principle
of proportionality, the sentence imposed on this petitioner violates the
Eighth Amendment.
'II> We note that Rummel was, in fact, released within eight months of the
Court's decision in his case. See L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3.

I

I
'
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vere punishment that the State could have imposed on any
criminal for any crime. See n. 6, supra. Only capital punishment, a penalty not authorized in South Dakota when
Helm was sentenced, exceeds it.
We next consider the sentences that could be imposed on
other criminals in the same jurisdiction. When Helm was
sentenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a
life sentence for murder, S. D. Codified Laws § 22-16-12
(1979) (amended 1980), and was authorized to impose a life
sentence for treason, § 22--8-1, first degree manslaughter,
§ 22-16-15, first degree arson, § 22-33-1, and kidnapping,
S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-19-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978)
(amended 1979). No other crime was punishable so severely
on the first offense. Attempted murder, S. D. Codified
Laws § 22-4-1(5) (1979), placing an explosive device on an
aircraft, § 22-14A-5, and first degree rape, § 22-22-1
(amended 1980 and 1982), were only Class 2 felonies. Aggravated riot was only a Class 3 felony. § 22-10-5. Distribution of heroin, §§ 22-42-2 (amended 1982), 34-20B-13(7)
(1977), and aggravated assault, § 22-18-1.1 (amended 1980
and 1981), were only Class 4 felonies.
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analysis,
but relevant comparisons are still possible. Under§ 22-7-7,
the penalty for a second or third felony is increased by one
class. Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or
third conviction was for treason, first degree manslaughter,
first degree arson, or kidnapping, and a life sentence would
have been authorized when a second or third conviction was
for such crimes as attempted murder, placing an explosive
device on an aircraft, or first degree rape. Finally, § 22-7-8,
under which Helm was sentenced, authorized life imprisonment after three prior convictions, regardless of the crimes.
In sum, there were a handful of crimes that were necessarily punished by life imprisonment: murder, and, on a second
or third offense, treason, first degree manslaughter, first de-
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gree arson, and kidnapping. There was a larger group for
which life imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of
the sentencing judge, including: treason, first degree manslaughter, first degree arson, and kidnapping; attempted
murder, placing an explosive device on an aircraft, and first
degree rape on a second or third offense; and any felony after
three prior offenses. Finally, there was a large group of
very serious offenses for which life imprisonment was not authorized, including a third offense of heroin dealing or aggravated assault.
Criminals committing any of these offenses ordinarily
would be thought more deserving of punishment than one uttering a "no account" check-even when the bad-check writer
had already committed six minor felonies. Moreover, there
is no indication in the record that any habitual offender other
than Helm has ever been given the maximum sentence on the
basis of comparable crimes. It is more likely that the possibility of life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 generally is reserved for criminals such as fourth-time heroin dealers, while
habitual bad-check writers receive more lenient treatment. 26
In any event, Helm has been treated in the same manner as,
or more severely than, criminals who have committed far
more serious crimes.
Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission
of the same crime in other jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals found that "Helm could have received a life sentence
26

The State contends that §22-7-8 is more lenient than the Texas habitual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 is
discretionary rather than mandatory. Brief for Petitioner 22. Helm,
however, has challenged only his own sentence. No one suggests that
§ 22-7-8 may not be applied constitutionally to fourth-time heroin dealers
or other violent criminals. Thus we do not question the legislature's judgment. Unlike in Rummel, a lesser sentence here could have been entirely
consistent with both the statute and the Eighth Amendment. See Note,
Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1119,
1160 (1979).

I
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without parole for his offense in only one other state, Nevada," 684 F. 2d, at 586, and we have no reason to doubt this
finding. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. At the very least, therefore, it is clear that Helm could not have received such a severe sentence in 48 of the 50 States. But even under Nevada law, a life sentence without possibility of parole is
merely authorized in these circumstances. See Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 207.010(2) (1981). We are not advised that any defendant such as Helm, whose prior offenses were so minor,
actually has received the maximum penalty in Nevada. ?:1 It
appears that Helm was treated more severely than he would
have been in any ·other State.

I

B

The State argues that the present case is essentially the
same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in
that case is matched by the possibility of executive clemency
here. The State reasons that the Governor could commute
Helm's sentence to a term of years. We conclude, however,
that the South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally
different from the parole system that was before us in
Rummel.
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different
concepts, despite some surface similarities. Parole is a regular part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behavior, it is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases.
'1:1 Under§ 207.010(2), a Nevada court is authorized to impose a sentence
of "imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without possibility of
parole. If the penalty fixed by the court is life imprisonment with the
possibility of parole, eligibility for parole begins when a minimum of 10
years has been served." It appears that most sentences imposed under
§ 207.010(2) permit parole, even when the prior crimes are far more serious
than Helm's. See, e. g., Rusting v. State, 96 Nev. 778, 617 P. 2d 1302
(1980) (possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, two instances of driving an
automobile without the owner's consent, four first degree burglaries, two
sales of marijuana, two sales of a restricted dangerous drug, one sale of
heroin, one escape from state prison, and one second degree burglary).

I
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The law generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to
be considered for parole, and details the standards and procedures applicable at that time. See, e. g., Greenholz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979) (detailing Nebraska parole procedures); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S.
471, 477 (1972) ("the practice of releasing prisoners on parole
before the end of their sentences has become an integral part
of the penological system"). Thus it is possible to predict, at
least to some extent, when parole might be granted. Commutation, on the other hand, is an ad hoc exercise of executive clemency. A Governor may commute a sentence at any
time for any reason without reference to any standards.
See, e. g., Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452

u. s. 458 (1981).

We explicitly have recognized the distinction between parole and commutation in our prior cases. 28 Writing on behalf
of the Morrissey Court, for example, CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER contrasted the two possibilities: "Rather than being an
ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals." 408 U. S., at
477. In Dumschat, THE CHIEF JusTICE similarly explained
that "there is a vast difference between a denial of parole . . .
and a state's refusal to commute a lawful sentence." 452
U. S., at 466.
The Texas and South Dakota systems in particular are
very different. In Rummel, the Court did not rely simply
28

In Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the possibility of
commutation is not equivalent to the possibility of parole. The Court carefully "distinguish[ed] Rummel from a person sentenced under a recidivist
statute like [Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for
a sentence of life without parole." 445 U. S., at 281. But the Mississippi
Constitution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal and
penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment." Art. 5, § 124.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized that the power to pardon includes the power to commute a convict's sentence. See Whittington
v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 603-604, 73 So. 2d 137, 139-140 (1954).

l
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on the existence of some system of parole. Rather it looked
to the provisions of the system presented, including the fact
that Texas had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good
time' credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has allowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for
parole in as little as 12 years." 445 U. S., at 280. A Texas
prisoner became eligible for parole when his calendar time
served plus "good conduct" time equaled one-third of the
maximum sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 42.12, § 15(b) (Vernon
1979). An entering prisoner earned 20 days good-time per
30 days served, Brief for Respondent in Rummel, 0. T.
1979, No. 78-6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30
days good-time per 30 days served, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann., Art. 6181-1, §§2-3 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Thus
Rummel could have been eligible for parole in as few as 10
years, and could have expected to become eligible, in the normal course of events, in only 12 years.
In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain
than parole. For example, the board of pardons and paroles
is authorized to make commutation recommendations to the
Governor, see n. 7, supra, but § 24-13-4 provides that "no
recommendation for the commutation of . . . a life sentence,
or for a pardon ... , shall be made by less than the unanimous vote of all members of the board." In fact, no life sentence has been commuted in over eight years, 29 App. 29,
29

The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Dakota occurred in 1975. App. 29. During the eight years since then, over 100 requests for commutation have been denied. See id., at 22-26. Although
22 life sentences were commuted to terms of years between 1964 and 1975,
see id., at 29; but see n. 30, infra, we do not have- complete figures on the
number of requests that were denied during the same period. We are told
only that at least 35 requests were denied. See app. 22-26. In any
event, past practice in this respect-particularly the practice of a decade
ago-is not a reliable indicator of future performance when the relevant
decision is left to the unfettered discretion of each Governor. Indeed, the
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while parole-where authorized-has been granted regularly
during that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. Furthermore,
even if Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would be
eligible to be considered for parole. 80 Not only is there no
guarantee that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota
parole system is far more stringent than the one before us in
Rummel. Helm would have to serve three-fourths of his revised sentence before he would be eligible for parole,
§ 24-1&-5, and the provision for good-time credits is less generous, §24--&-1. 31
The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a hope
for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency." It is little different
from the possibility of executive clemency that exists in
every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence
under the Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a bare
possibility would make judicial review under the Eighth
Amendment meaningless.

I
1

v

The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence
to determine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying objective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penultimate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has
been treated more harshly than other criminals in the State
who have committed more serious crimes. He has been
best indication we have of Helm's chance for commutation is the fact that
his request already has been denied. Id., at 26.
30
The record indicates that the prisoner whose life sentence was commuted in 1975, see n. 29, supra, still has not been paroled. App. 29.
81
Assume, for example, that in 1979 the Governor had commuted Helm's
sentence to a term of 40 years (his approximate life expectancy). Even if
Helm were a model prisoner, he would not have been eligible for parole
until he had served over 21 years-more than twice the Rummel minimum. And this comparison is generous to South Dakota's position. If
Rummel had been sentenced to 40 years rather than life, he could have
been eligible for parole in less than 7 years.

I
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treated more harshly than he would have been in any other
jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State.
We conclude that his sentence is significantly disproportionate to his crim~, and is therefore prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment. 32 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Affirmed.

32

Contrary to the suggestion in the dissent, post, at 2-9, our conclusion
today is not inconsistent with Rummel v. Estelle. The Rummel Court
recognized-as does the dissent, see post, at 8, n. 3---that some sentences
of imprisonment are so disproportionate that they violate the Eighth
Amendment. 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11. Indeed, Hutto v. Davis, 454
U. S., at 374, and n. 3, makes clear that Rummel should not be read to
foreclose proportionality review of sentences of imprisonment. Rummel
did reject a proportionality challenge to a particular sentence. But since
the Rummel Court-like the dissent today-offered no standards for
determining when an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred, it is controlling only in a similar factual situation. Here the facts are clearly
distinguishable. Whereas Rummel was eligible for a reasonably early parole, Helm, at age 36, was sentenced to life with no possibility of parole.
See supra, at
--fr:• and

fr -
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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-492

HERMAN SOLEM, WARDEN, PETITIONER v.
JERRY BUCKLEY HELM
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[June 28, 1983]

JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment
proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a
seventh nonviolent felony.
I
By 1975 the State of South Dakota had convicted respondent Jerry Helm of six nonviolent felonies. In 1964, 1966, and
1969 Helm was convicted of third-degree burglary. 1 In 1972
' In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined in at least two sections of
the South Dakota criminal code:
"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the nighttime with intent
to commit a crime but under such circumstances as do not constitute burglary in the first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third degree." S. D.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22--32-8 (1967) (repealed 1976).
"A person breaking or entering at any time any building within the curtilage of a dwelling house but not forming a part thereof, or any building or
part of any building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as defined in
§ 32-14-1, or any structure or erection in which any property is kept, with
intent to commit larceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the third
degree." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-9 (1967) (repealed 1976).
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essentially the
same. SeeS. D. Code§ 13.3703 (1939 ed., supp. 1960); 1965 S. D. Laws,
ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by "imprisonment in the
state penitentiary for any term not exceeding fifteen years." S.D. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 22--32-10 (1967) (previously codified at S. D. Code§ 13.3705(3)
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he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2
In 1973 he was convicted of grand larceny. 3 And in 1975 he
was convicted of third-offense driving while intoxicated. 4
The record contains no details about the circumstances of any
of these offenses, except that they were all nonviolent, none
was a crime against a person, and alcohol was a contributing
factor in each case.
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a "no account"
check for $100. 5 The only details we have of the crime are
those given by Helm to the state trial court:
(1939)) (repealed 1976).
' In 1972 the relevant statute provided:
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any false token or writing, or other false pretense, ... obtains from any person any money or
property ... is punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not
exceeding three years or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a
fine not exceeding three times the value of the money or property so obtained, or by both such fine and imprisonment." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 22-41-4 (1967) (repealed 1976).
3
In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of personal property accomplished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive another
thereof." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-1 (1967) (repealed 1976).
Grand larceny and petit larceny were distinguished as follows:
"Grand larceny is larceny committed in any of the following cases:
(1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding fifty dollars;
(2) When such property, although not of a value exceeding fifty dollars,
is taken from the person of another;
(3) When such property is livestock.
Larceny in other cases is petit larceny." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 22-37-2 (1967) (repealed 1976).
Grand larceny was then punishable by "imprisonment in the state penitentiary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-3 (1967) (repealed
1976).
'A third offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol is a felony
in South Dakota. S. D. Codified Laws § 32-23-4 (1976) . See 1973 S. D.
Laws, ch. 195, § 7 (enacting version of§ 32-23-4 in force in 1975).
5
The governing statute provides, in relevant part:
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another
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"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that
day, was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid City
with more money than I had when I started. I knew I'd
done something I didn't know exactly what. If I would
have known this, I would have picked the check up. I
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several
places.'" State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d 497, 501 (S. D.
1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Helm).
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty.
Ordinarily the maximum punishment for uttering a "no account" check would have been five years imprisonment in the
state penitentiary and a $5,000 fine. See S. D. Comp. Laws
Ann. §22-6-1(6) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now codified at S.D.
Codified Laws § 22-6-1(7) (Supp. 1982)). As a result of his
criminal record, however, Helm was subject to South Dakota's recidivist statute:
"When a defendant has been convicted of at least three
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal felony,
the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to
the sentence for a Class 1 felony." S. D. Codified Laws
§ 22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981).
The maximum penalty for a "Class 1 felony" was life imprisonment in the state penitentiary and a $25,000 fine." S. D.
for present consideration with intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a
financial institution knowing at the time of such passing that he or his principal does not have an account with such financial institution, is guilty of a
Class 5 felony." S. D. Codified Laws § 22-41-1.2 (1979).
n When Helm was sentenced in April 1979, South Dakota law classified
felonies as follows:
"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are divided into the following seven classes which are distinguished from each other by the respective maximum penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized
upon conviction:
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. A lesser
sentence may not be given for a Class A felony;
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In a~ldi-
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Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1(2) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now
codified at S. D. Codified Laws § 22-6-1(3) (Supp. 1982)).
Moreover, South Dakota law explicitly provides that parole is
unavailable: "A person sentenced to life imprisonment is not
eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles."
S. D. Codified Laws § 24-15-4 (1979). The Governor 7 is authorized to pardon prisoners, or to commute their sentences,
S. D. Const., Art. IV, § 3, but no other relief from sentence is
available even to a rehabilitated prisoner.
Immediately after accepting Helm's guilty plea, the South
Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life imprisonment
under § 22-7-8. The court explained:
"'I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly
proven that you're an habitual criminal and the record
would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation and that
the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up for the rest
tion, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed;
(3) Class 2 felony: twenty-five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed;
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary.
In addition, a fine of fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed;
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In
addition, a fine of ten thousand dollars may be imposed;
(6) Class 5 felony: five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In
addition, a fine of five thousand dollars may be imposed; and
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the state penitentiary or a
fine of two thousand dollars, or both.
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sentences for habitual
criminals ....
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by law, every offense
declared to be a felony and not otherwise classified is a Class 6 felony."
S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-~1 (1967 eel., supp. 1978) (amended 1979 and
1980).
7
The board of pardons and paroles is authorized to make recommendations to the Governor, S. D. Codified Laws ~ 24-14-1 (1979); ~ 24-14-5;
S. D. Executive Order 82-04 (Apr. 12, 1982), but the Governor is not
bound by the recommendation, § 24-14-5.
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of your natural life, so you won't have further victims of
your crimes, just be coming back before Courts. You'll
have plenty of time to think this one over."' State v.
Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 500 (Henderson, J., dissenting)
(quoting S. D. Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit,
Pennington County (Parker, J.)).
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, affirmed
the sentence despite Helm's argument that it violated the
Eighth Amendment. State v. Helm, supra.
After Helm had served two years in the state penitentiary,
he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a
fixed term of years. Such a commutation would have had
the effect of making Helm eligible to be considered for parole
when he had served three-fourths of his new sentence. See
S. D. Codified Laws § 24-1~5(3) (1979). The Governor denied Helm's request in May 1981. App. 26.
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the
United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. Helm argued, among other things, that his sentence
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the District Court
recognized that the sentence was harsh, it concluded that this
Court's recent decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263
(1980), was dispositive. It therefore denied the writ.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed. 684 F. 2d 582 (1982). The Court of Appeals
noted that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable. Helm's
sentence of life without parole was qualitatively different
from Rummel's life sentence with the prospect of parole because South Dakota has rejected rehabilitation as a goal of
the criminal justice system. The Court of Appeals examined
the nature of Helm's offenses, the nature of his sentence, and
the sentence he could have received in other States for the
same offense. It concluded, on the basis of this examination,
that Helm's sentence was "grossly disproportionate to the na-
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ture of the offense." 684 F. 2d, at 587. It therefore directed the District Court to issue the writ unless the State
resentenced Helm. Ibid.
We granted certiorari to consider the Eighth Amendment
question presented by this case. 459 U. S. - - (1982). We
now affirm.
II
The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." The final clause prohibits not
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.
A

The principle that a punishment should be proportionate to
the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence. In 1215 three chapters of Magna
Carta were devoted to the rule that "amercements" 8 may not
be excessive. 9 And the principle was repeated and extended in the First Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw. I, ch. 6
(1275). These were not hollow guarantees, for the royal
courts relied on them to invalidate disproportionate punishments. See, e. g., Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop of Winchester, Y. B. Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 (C. P. 1316), reprinted in 52
Selden Society 3 (1934). When prison sentences became the
• An amercement was similar to a modern-day fine. It was the most
common criminal sanction in 13th century England. See 2 F. Pollock & F.
Maitland, The History of English Law 513-515 (2d ed. 1909).
• Chapter 20 declared that "[a] freeman shall not be amerced for a small
fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great crime according to
the heinousness of it." See 1 S. D. Codified Laws, p. 4 (1978) (translation
of Magna Carta). According to Maitland, "there was no clause in Magna
Carta more grateful to the mass of the people .... " F. Maitland, Pleas of
the Crown for the County of Gloucester xxxiv (1884). Chapter 21 granted
the same rights to the nobility, and chapter 22 granted the same rights to
the clergy.
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normal criminal sanctions, the common law recognized that
these, too, must be proportional. See, e. g., Hodges v.
Humkin, 2 Bulst. 139, 140, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K. B.
1615) (Croke, J.) ("imprisonment ought always to be according to the quality of the offence").
The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of proportionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth
Amendment: "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor
excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments
inflicted." 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). Although the
precise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incorporated "the longstanding principle of English law that the punishment ... should not be, by reason of its excessive length
or severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged."
R. Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 (1959); see 4 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries *1~19 (1769); see also id., at
*1~17 (in condemning "punishments of unreasonable severity," uses "cruel" to mean severe or excessive). Indeed,
barely three months after the Bill of Rights was adopted, the
House of Lords declared that a "fine of thirty thousand
pounds, imposed by the court of King's Bench upon the earl
of Devon, was excessive and exorbitant, against magna
charta, the common right of the subject, and against the law
of the land." Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Trials 133, 136
(1689).
When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the
language of the English Bill of Rights, 10 they also adopted the
10

The Eighth Amendment was based directly on Art. I, § 9 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), authored by George Mason. He, in
turn, had adopted verbatim the language of the English Bill of Rights.
There can be no doubt that the Declaration of Rights guaranteed at least
the liberties and privileges of Englishmen. See A. Nevins, The American
States During and After the Revolution 146 (1924) (Declaration of Rights
"was a restatement of English principles-the principles of Magna Charta
... and the Revolution of 1688"); A. Howard, The Road from Runnymede:
Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in America 205-207 (1968). As Mason
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English principle of proportionality. Indeed, one of the consistent themes of the era was that Americans had all the
rights of English subjects. See, e. g., 1 J. Continental Congress 83 (Ford ed. 1904) (Address to the People of Great Britain, Oct. 21, 1774) ("we claim all the benefits secured to the
subject by the English constitution"); 1 American Archives
700 (4th series 1837) (Georgia Resolutions, Aug. 10, 1774)
("his Majesty's subjects in America ... are entitled to the
same rights, privileges, and immunities with their fellowsubjects in Great Britain"). Thus our Bill of Rights was designed in part to ensure that these rights were preserved.
Although the Framers may have intended the Eighth
Amendment to go beyond the scope of its English counterpart, their use of the language of the English Bill of Rights is
convincing proof that they intended to provide at least the
same protection-including the right to be free from excessive punishments.
B
The constitutional principle of proportionality has been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 11 In the
himself had explained: "We claim Nothing but the Liberties & Privileges of
Englishmen, in the same Degree, as if we had still continued among our
Brethren in Great Britain. . . .
We have received [these rights] from
our Ancestors, and, with God's Leave, we will transmit them, unimpaired
to our Posterity." Letter to "the Committee of Merchants in London"
(June 6, 1766), reprinted in 1 The Papers of George Mason 71 (Rutland ed.
1970); cf. the Fairfax County Resolves (1774) (colonists entitled to all
"Privileges, Immunities and Advantages" of the English Constitution), reprinted in 1 The Papers of George Mason 201.
11
In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323 (1892), the defendant had been
convicted of 307 counts of "selling intoxicating liquor without authority,"
and sentenced to a term of over 54 years. The majority did not reach
O'Neil's contention that this sentence was unconstitutional, for he did not
include the point in his assignment of errors or in his brief. !d., at 331.
Furthermore, the majority noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not
apply to the States." I d., at 332. Accordingly the Court dismissed the
writ of error for want of a federal question. !d., at 336-337. The dissent,

82-492-0PINION
SOLEM v. HELM

9

leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910),
the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public document and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form
of imprisonment that included hard labor in chains and permanent civil disabilities. The Court noted "that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to offense," id., at 367, and held that the
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court endorsed the principle of proportionality as a constitutional
standard, see, e. g., id., at 372-373, and determined that the
sentence before it was "cruel in its excess of imprisonment,"
id., at 377, as well as in its shackles and restrictions.
The Court next applied the principle to invalidate a criminal sentence in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660
(1962). 12 A 90-day sentence was found to be excessive for
the crime of being "addicted to the use of narcotics." The
Court explained that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in
the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual."
I d., at 667. Thus there was no question of an inherently barbaric punishment. "But the question cannot be considered
in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and
unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."
Ibid.
Most recently, the Court has applied the principle of proportionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain
circumstances. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. - - (1982)
(death penalty excessive for felony murder when defendant
did not take life, attempt to take life, or intend that a life be
however, reached the Eighth Amendment question, observing that it "is
directed ... against all punishments which by their excessive length or
severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged." I d., at
339-340 (Field, J., dissenting).
12
Members of the Court continued to recognize the principle of proportionality in the meantime. See, e. g., Trap v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100
(1958) (plurality opinion); id., at 111 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at
125-126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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taken or that lethal force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U. S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("sentence of death is
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the
crime of rape"); id., at 601 (POWELL, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("ordinarily death is
disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult
woman"). And the Court has continued to recognize that
the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate
punishments, even when it has not been necessary to rely on
the proscription. See, e. g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678,
685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667 (1977);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 171-172 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Davis,
454 U. S. 370, 374, and n. 3 (1982) (per curiam) (recognizing
that some prison sentences may be constitutionally disproportionate); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11
(same). 13

c

There is no basis for the State's assertion that the general
principle of proportionality does not apply to felony prison
sentences. 14 The constitutional language itself suggests no
13
The dissent charges that "the Court blithely discards any concept of
stare decisis." Post, at 1; cf. id., at 2, 8-9, 14. On the contrary, our decision is entirely consistent with this Court's prior cases-including Rummel
v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 (1980). Seen. 32, infra. It is rather the dissent
that would discard prior precedent. Its assertion that the Eighth Amendment establishes only a narrow principle of proportionality is contrary to
the entire line of cases cited in the text.
"According to Rummel v. Estelle, "one could argue without fear of
contradiction by any decision of this Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies, that is, as punishable by significant terms
of imprisonment in a state penitentiary, the length of sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative." 445 U. S., at 274 (emphasis added). The Court did not adopt the standard proposed, but
merely recognized that the argument was possible. To the extent that the
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exception for imprisonment. We have recognized that the
Eighth Amendment imposes "parallel limitations" on bail,
fines, and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U. S., at 664, and the text is explicit that bail and fines may
not be excessive. It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser
punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death
were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the intermediate punishment of imprisonment were not. There is
also no historical support for such an exception. The common-law principle incorporated into the Eighth Amendment
clearly applied to prison terms. See Hodges v. Humkin,
supra. And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that
prison sentences are subject to proportionality analysis.
See, e. g., Weems, 217 U. S., at 377; cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437
U. S., at 685 ("Confinement in a prison . . . is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment
standards").
When we have applied the proportionality principle in capital cases, we have drawn no distinction with cases of imprisonment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 176 (opinion of
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). It is true that the
"penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind." Furman v. Georgia,
408 U. S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). As aresult, "our decisions [in] capital cases are of limited assistance
in deciding the constitutionality of the punishment" in a noncapital case. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 272. We
agree, therefore, that, "[o]utside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [will be] exceedingly rare," 15 ibid. (emphaState-{)r the dissent, see post, at 4-makes this argument here, we find it
meritless.
15
In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to be excessive for felony murder in the circumstances of that case. But clearly no
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sis added); see Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. 8., at 374. This does
not mean, however, that proportionality analysis is entirely
inapplicable in noncapital cases.
In sum, we hold as a matter of principle that a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted. Reviewing courts, of course,
should grant substantial deference to the broad authority
that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types
and limits of punishments for crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in sentencing convicted criminals. 16 But no penalty is per se constitutional. As the Court
noted in Robinson v. California, 370 U. 8., at 667, a single
day in prison may be unconstitutional in some circumstances.

III
A
When sentences are reviewed under the Eighth Amendment, courts should be guided by objective factors that our
cases have recognized. 17 First, we look to the gravity of the
sentence of imprisonment would be disproportionate for Enmund's crime.
16
Contrary to the dissent's suggestions, post, at 2, 12, we do not adopt or
imply approval of a general rule of appellate review of sentences. Absent
specific authority, it is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its
judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a
particular sentence; rather, in applying the Eighth Amendment the appellate court decides only whether the sentence under review is within constitutional limits. In view of the substantial deference that must be accorded legislatures and sentencing courts, a reviewing court rarely will be
required to engage in extended analysis to determine that a sentence is not
constitutionally disproportionate.
17
The dissent concedes-as it must-that some sentences of imprisonment are so disproportionate that they are unconstitutional under the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Post, at 8, n. 3; cf. id., at 7, n. 2.
It offers no guidance, however, as to how courts are to judge these admittedly rare cases. We reiterate the objective factors that our cases have
recognized. See, e. g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion). As the Court has indicated, no one factor will be dispositive
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offense and the harshness of the penalty. In Enmund, for
example, the Court examined the circumstances of the defendant's crime in great detail. 458 U. S., at - - - - - .
In Coker the Court considered the seriousness of the crime of
rape, and compared it to other crimes, such as murder. 433
U. S., at 597-598 (plurality opinion); id., at 603 (POWELL, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
In Robinson the emphasis was placed on the nature of the
"crime." 370 U. S., at 66&-667. And in Weems, the Court's
opinion commented in two separate places on the pettiness of
the offense. 217 U. S., at 363 and 365. Of course, a court
must consider the severity of the penalty in deciding whether
it is disproportionate. See, e. g., Coker, 433 U. S., at 598
(plurality opinion); Weems, 217 U. S., at 36&-367.
Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more
serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at
issue may be excessive. Thus in Enmund the Court noted
that all of the other felony murderers on death row in Florida
were more culpable than the petitioner there. 458 U. S., at
The Weems Court identified an impressive list of
more serious crimes that were subject to less serious penalties. 217 U. S., at 380-381.
Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review
See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S. 370, 373-374 n. 2 (1982)
(per curiam); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 275-276. The inherent na-

in a given case.

ture of our federal system and the need for individualized sentencing decisions result in a wide range of constitutional sentences. Thus no single
criterion can identify when a sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it
violates the Eighth Amendment. See Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 Yale L. J. 1325,
1376-1377 (1979). But a combination of objective factors can make such
analysis possible.
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of capital punishment statutes and determined that "only
about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a
defendant [such as Enmund] to be sentenced to die." 458
U. S., at--. Even in those jurisdictions, however, the
death penalty was almost never imposed under similar circumstances. I d., at - - . The Court's review of foreign
law also supported its conclusion. I d., at - - , n. 22. The
analysis in Coker was essentially the same. 433 U. S., at
593-597. And in Weems the Court relied on the fact that,
under federal law, a similar crime was punishable by only two
year's imprisonment and a fine. 217 U. S., at 380. Cf. Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 102-103 (1958) (plurality opinion).
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including
(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty;
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of
the same crime in other jurisdictions.
B

Application of these factors assumes that courts are competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative
scale. In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and
courts traditionally have made these judgments-just as legislatures must make them in the first instance. Comparisons
can be made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the
victim or society, and the culpability of the offender. Thus
in Enmund the Court determined that the petitioner's conduct was not as serious as his accomplices' conduct. Indeed,
there are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness
of crimes. See Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness
of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences,
39 Am. Soc. Rev. 224, 237 (1974). For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent crimes are less serious than
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crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence. Cf. Tr.
of Oral Arg. 16 (the State recognizes that the criminal law is
more protective of people than property).
There are other accepted principles that courts may apply
in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the victim or
society. The absolute magnitude of the crime may be relevant. Stealing a million dollars is viewed as more serious
than stealing a hundred dollars-a point recognized in statutes distinguishing petty theft from grand theft. See, e. g.,
S. D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-17 (Supp. 1982). Few would
dispute that a lesser included offense should not be punished
more severely than the greater offense. Thus a court is justified in viewing assault with intent to murder as more serious than simple assault. See Roberts v. Collins, 544 F. 2d
168, 169-170 (CA4 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 430 U. S.
973 (1977). Cf. Dembowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 252, 240
N. E. 2d 815, 817 (1968) (armed robbery more serious than
robbery); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 632, 281 P. 2d
233, 235 (1955) (rape more serious than assault with intent to
commit rape). It also is generally recognized that attempts
are less serious than completed crimes. See, e. g., S. D.
Codified Laws § 22-4-1 (1979); 4 Blackstone *15. Similarly,
an accessory after the fact should not be subject to a higher
penalty than the principal. See, e. g., 18 U.S. C. §3.
Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are again
clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply. In
Enmund the Court looked at the petitioner's lack of intent to
kill in determining that he was less culpable than his accomplices. 458 U. S., at--. Most would agree that negligent
conduct is less serious than intentional conduct. South Dakota, for example, ranks criminal acts in ascending order of
seriousness as follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing
acts, intentional acts, and malicious acts. S. D. Codified
Laws § 22-1-2(1)(f) (Supp. 1982). A court, of course, is entitled to look at a defendant's motive in committing a crime.
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Thus a murder may be viewed as more serious when committed pursuant to a contract. See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann., ch. 279, § 69(a)(5) (West Supp. 1982); cf. 4 Blackstone
*15; In re Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 P. 2d 1073 (1974).
This list is by no means exhaustive. It simply illustrates
that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing the
severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the difficulties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions between
similar crimes.

c
Application of the factors that we identify also assumes
that courts are able to compare different sentences. This assumption, too, is justified. The easiest comparison, of
course, is between capital punishment and noncapital punishments, for the death penalty is different from other punishments in kind rather than degree. 18 For sentences of imprisonment, the problem is not so much one of ordering, but one
of line-drawing. It is clear that a 25-year sentence generally
is more severe than a 15-year sentence, 19 but in most cases it
would be difficult to decide that the former violates the
Eighth Amendment while the latter does not. Decisions of
this kind, although troubling, are not unique to this area.
The courts are constantly called upon to draw similar lines in
a variety of contexts.
The Sixth Amendment offers two good examples. A State
is constitutionally required to provide an accused with a
speedy trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213
(1967), but the delay that is permissible must be determined
on a case-by-case basis. "[A]ny inquiry into a speedy trial
claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the par18
There is also a. clear line between sentences of imprisonment and sentences involving no deprivation of liberty. See Argersinger v. Ham lin,

407
19

u. s. 25 (1972).

The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison , depending
upon the time and conditions of its availability.
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ticular context of the case .... " Barker v. Wingo, 407
U. S. 514, 522 (1972) (unanimous opinion). In Barker, we
identified some of the objective factors that courts should
consider in determining whether a particular delay was excessive. I d., at 530. None of these factors is "either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of
the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors
and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant." I d., at 533. Thus the type of
inquiry that a court should conduct to determine if a given
sentence is constitutionally disproportionate is similar to the
type of inquiry required by the Speedy Trial Clause.
The right to a jury trial is another example. Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), in particular, illustrates the
line-drawing function of the judiciary, and offers guidance on
the method by which some lines may be drawn. There the
Court determined that a defendant has a right to a jury trial
"where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized." I d., at 69 (plurality opinion). In choosing the 6month standard, the plurality relied almost exclusively on the
fact that only New York City denied the right to a jury trial
for an offense punishable by more than six months. As JusTICE WHITE explained:
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us
with the only objective criterion by which a line could
ever be drawn-on the basis of the possible penalty
alone-between offenses that are and that are not regarded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury." I d., at
72-73.
In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly
may distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another.
It also supports our holding that courts properly may look to
the practices in other jurisdictions in deciding where lines between sentences should be drawn.
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IV
It remains to apply the analytical framework established
by our prior decisions to the case before us. We first consider the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life
imprisonment without possibility of parole. We then consider the State's argument that the possibility of commutation is sufficient to save an otherwise unconstitutional
sentence.
A

Helm's crime was "one of the most passive felonies a person could commit." State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 501
(Henderson, J., dissenting). It involved neither violence nor
threat of violence to any person. The $100 face value of
Helm's "no account" check was not trivial, but neither was it
a large amount. One hundred dollars was less than half the
amount South Dakota required for a felonious theft. 20 It is
easy to see why such a crime is viewed by society as among
the less serious offenses. See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev.,
at 229.
Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a
"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender. 21
20
If Helm had been convicted simply of taking $100 from a cash register,
S. D. Codified Laws § 22--30A-1 (1979), or defrauding someone of $100,
§ 22--30A-3, or obtaining $100 through extortion, § 22--30A-4(1), or blackmail, § 22--30A-4(3), or using a false credit card to obtain $100,
§ 22--30A-8.1, or embezzling $100, § 22--30A-10, he would not be in prison
today. All of these offenses would have been petty theft, a misdemeanor.
§ 22--30A-17 (amended 1982). Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 check
against insufficient funds, rather than a nonexistent account, he would
have been guilty of a misdemeanor. §§ 22-41-1. Curiously, under South
Dakota law there is no distinction between writing a "no account" check for
a large sum and writing a "no account" check for a small sum. § 22-41-1.2.
2
' We must focus on the principal felony-the felony that triggers the life
sentence-since Helm already has paid the penalty for each of his prior offenses. But we recognize, of course, that Helm's prior convictions are relevant to the sentencing decision.
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And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more severely than it punishes a first offender. Helm's status, however, cannot be considered in the abstract. His prior offenses, although classified as felonies, were all relatively
minor. 22 All were nonviolent and none was a crime against a
person. Indeed, there was no minimum amount in either the
burglary or the false pretenses statutes, see nn. 1 and 2,
supra, and the minimum amount covered by the grand larceny statute was fairly small, see n. 3, supra. 23
Helm's present sentence is life imprisonment without possibility ofparole. 24 Barring executive clemency, see infra, at
22-25, Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state penitentiary. This sentence is far more severe than the life sentence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel was
likely to have been eligible for parole within 12 years of his
initial confinement, 25 a fact on which the Court relied heavily.
See 445 U. S., at 280-281. Helm's sentence is the most seHelm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a professional criminal. The record indicates an addiction to alcohol, and a consequent difficulty in holding a job. His record involves no instance of violence of any kind. Incarcerating him for life without possibility of parole is
unlikely to advance the goals of our criminal justice system in any substantial way. Neither Helm nor the State will have an incentive to pursue
clearly needed treatment for his alcohol problem, or any other program of
rehabilitation.
23
As suggested at oral argument, the third-degree burglary statute covered entering a building with the intent to steal a loaf of bread. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 14-16. It appears that the grand larceny statute would have covered
the theft of a chicken.
24
Every life sentence in South Dakota is without possibility of parole.
See supra, at 4. We raise no question as to the general validity of sentences without possibility of parole. The only issue before us is whether,
in the circumstances of this case and in light of the constitutional principle
of proportionality, the sentence imposed on this petitioner violates the
Eighth Amendment.
u, We note that Rummel was, in fact, released within eight months of the
Court's decision in his case. See L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3.
22
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vere punishment that the State could have imposed on any
criminal for any crime. See n. 6, supra. Only capital punishment, a penalty not authorized in South Dakota when
Helm was sentenced, exceeds it.
We next consider the sentences that could be imposed on
other criminals in the same jurisdiction. When Helm was
sentenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a
life sentence for murder, S. D. Codified Laws § 22-16--12
(1979) (amended 1980), and was authorized to impose a life
sentence for treason, § 22-8-1, first degree manslaughter,
§ 22-16--15, first degree arson, § 22-33-1, and kidnapping,
S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-19-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978)
(amended 1979). No other crime was punishable so severely
on the first offense. Attempted murder, S. D. Codified
Laws § 22-4-1(5) (1979), placing an explosive device on an
aircraft, § 22-14A-5, and first degree rape, § 22-22-1
(amended 1980 and 1982), were only Class 2 felonies. Aggravated riot was only a Class 3 felony. § 22-10-5. Distribution of heroin, §§ 22-42-2 (amended 1982), 34-20B-13(7)
(1977), and aggravated assault, §22-18-1.1 (amended 1980
and 1981), were only Class 4 felonies.
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analysis,
but relevant comparisons are still possible. Under§ 22-7-7,
the penalty for a second or third felony is increased by one
class. Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or
third conviction was for treason, first degree manslaughter,
first degree arson, or kidnapping, and a life sentence would
have been authorized when a second or third conviction was
for such crimes as attempted murder, placing an explosive
device on an aircraft, or first degree rape. Finally, § 22-7-8,
under which Helm was sentenced, authorized life imprisonment after three prior convictions, regardless of the crimes.
In sum, there were a handful of crimes that were necessarily punished by life imprisonment: murder, and, on a second
or third offense, treason, first degree manslaughter, first de-
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gree arson, and kidnapping. There was a larger group for
which life imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of
the sentencing judge, including: treason, first degree manslaughter, first degree arson, and kidnapping; attempted
murder, placing an explosive device on an aircraft, and first
degree rape on a second or third offense; and any felony after
three prior offenses. Finally, there was a large group of
very serious offenses for which life imprisonment was not authorized, including a third offense of heroin dealing or aggravated assault.
Criminals committing any of these offenses ordinarily
would be thought more deserving of punishment than one uttering a "no account" check-even when the bad-check writer
had already committed six minor felonies. Moreover, there
is no indication in the record that any habitual offender other
than Helm has ever been given the maximum sentence on the
basis of comparable crimes. It is more likely that the possibility of life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 generally is reserved for criminals such as fourth-time heroin dealers, while
habitual bad-check writers receive more lenient treatment. 26
In any event, Helm has been treated in the same manner as,
or more severely than, criminals who have committed far
more serious crimes.
Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission
of the same crime in other jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals found that "Helm could have received a life sentence
The State contends that § 22-7-8 is more lenient than the Texas habitual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 is
discretionary rather than mandatory. Brief for Petitioner 22. Helm,
however, has challenged only his own sentence. No one suggests that
§ 22-7-8 may not be applied constitutionally to fourth-time heroin dealers
or other violent criminals. Thus we do not question the legislature's judgment. Unlike in Rummel, a lesser sentence here could have been entirely
consistent with both the statute and the Eighth Amendment. See Note,
Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1119,
1160 (1979).
26
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without parole for his offense in only one other state, N evada," 684 F. 2d, at 586, and we have no reason to doubt this
finding. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. At the very least, therefore, it is clear that Helm could not have received such a severe sentence in 48 of the 50 States. But even under Nevada law, a life sentence without possibility of parole is
merely authorized in these circumstances. See Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 207.010(2) (1981). We are not advised that any defendant such as Helm, whose prior offenses were so minor,
actually has received the maximum penalty in Nevada. 27 It
appears that Helm was treated more severely than he would
have been in any other State.
B

The State argues that the present case is essentially the
same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in
that case is matched by the possibility of executive clemency
here. The State reasons that the Governor could commute
Helm's sentence to a term of years. We conclude, however,
that the South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally
different from the parole system that was before us in
Rummel.
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different
concepts, despite some surface similarities. Parole is a regular part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behavior, it is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases.
27
Under§ 207.010(2), a Nevada court is authorized to impose a sentence
of "imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without possibility of
parole. If the penalty fixed by the court is life imprisonment with the
possibility of parole, eligibility for parole begins when a minimum of 10
years has been served." It appears that most sentences imposed under
§ 207.010(2) permit parole, even when the prior crimes are far more serious
than Helm's. See, e. g., Rusting v. State, 96 Nev. 778, 617 P. 2d 1302
(1980) (possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, two instances of driving an
automobile without the owner's consent, four first degree burglaries, two
sales of marijuana, two sales of a restricted dangerous drug, one 'sale of
heroin, one escape from state prison, and one second degree burglary).
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The law generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to
be considered for parole, and details the standards and procedures applicable at that time. See, e. g., Greenholz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979) (detailing Nebraska parole procedures); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S.
471, 477 (1972) ("the practice of releasing prisoners on parole
before the end of their sentences has become an integral part
of the penological system"). Thus it is possible to predict, at
least to some extent, when parole might be granted. Commutation, on the other hand, is an ad hoc exercise of executive clemency. A Governor may commute a sentence at any
time for any reason without reference to any standards.
See, e. g., Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452

u. s. 458 (1981).

We explicitly have recognized the distinction between parole and commutation in our prior cases. 28 Writing on behalf
of the Morrissey Court, for example, CHIEF JUSTICE BuRGER contrasted the two possibilities: "Rather than being an
ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals." 408 U. S., at
477. In Dumschat, THE CHIEF JUSTICE similarly explained
that "there is a vast difference between a denial of parole . . .
and a state's refusal to commute a lawful sentence." 452
U. S., at 466.
The Texas and South Dakota systems in particular are
very different. In Rummel, the Court did not rely simply
28
In Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the possibility of
commutation is not equivalent to the possibility of parole. The Court carefully "distinguish[ed] Rummel from a person sentenced under a recidivist
statute like [Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19--83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for
a sentence of life without parole." 445 U. S., at 281. But the Mississippi
Constitution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal and
penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment." Art. 5, § 124.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized that the power to pardon includes the power to commute a convict's sentence. See Whittington
v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 603-604, 73 So. 2d 137, 139-140 (1954).
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on the existence of some system of parole. Rather it looked
to the provisions of the system presented, including the fact
that Texas had "a relatively liberal policy of gyanting 'good
time' credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has allowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for
parole in as little as 12 years." 445 U. S., at 280. A Texas
prisoner became eligible for parole when his calendar time
served plus "good conduct" time equaled one-third of the
maximum sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less.
Tex. Code Grim. Proc. Ann., Art. 42.12, § 15(b) (Vernon
1979). An entering prisoner earned 20 days good-time per
30 days served, Brief for Respondent in Rummel, 0. T.
1979, No. 78-6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30
days good-time per 30 days served, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann., Art. 6181-1, §§ 2-3 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Thus
Rummel could have been eligible for parole in as few as 10
years, and could have expected to become eligible, in the normal course of events, in only 12 years.
In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain
than parole. For example, the board of pardons and paroles
is authorized to make commutation recommendations to the
Governor, see n. 7, supra, but § 24-13-4 provides that "no
recommendation for the commutation of ... a life sentence,
or for a pardon ... , shall be made by less than the unanimous vote of all members of the board." In fact, no life sentence has been commuted in over eight years, 29 App. 29,
29
The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Dakota occurred in 1975. App. 29. During the eight years since then, over 100 requests for commutation have been denied. See id., at 22-26. Although
22 life sentences were commuted to terms of years between 1964 and 1975,
see id., at 29; but see n. 30, irifra, we do not have complete figures on the
number of requests that were denied during the same period . We are told
only that at least 35 requests were denied. See app. 22-26. In any
event, past practice in this respect-particularly the practice of a decade
ago-is not a reliable indicator of future performance when the relevant
decision is left to the unfettered discretion of each Governor. Indeed, the
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while parole-where authorized-has been granted regularly
during that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. Furthermore,
even if Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would be
eligible to be considered for parole. 30 Not only is there no
guarantee that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota
parole system is far more stringent than the one before us in
Rummel. Helm would have to serve three-fourths of his revised sentence before he would be eligible for parole,
§ 24-15-5, and the provision for good-time credits is less generous, § 24-5-1. 31
The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a hope
for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency." It is little different
from the possibility of executive clemency that exists in
every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence
under the Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a bare
possibility would make judicial review under the Eighth
Amendment meaningless.

v

The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence
to determine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying objective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penultimate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has
been treated more harshly than other criminals in the State
who have committed more serious crimes. He has been
best indication we have of Helm's chance for commutation is the fact that
his request already has been denied. I d., at 26.
"' The record indicates that the prisoner whose life sentence was commuted in 1975, see n. 29, supra, still has not been paroled. App. 29.
31
Assume, for example, that in 1979 the Governor had commuted Helm's
sentence to a term of 40 years (his approximate life expectancy). Even if
Helm were a model prisoner, he would not have been eligible for parole
until he had served over 21 years-more than twice the Rummel minimum. And this comparison is generous to South Dakota's position. If
Rummel had been sentenced to 40 years rather than life, he could have
been eligible for parole in less than 7 years.
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treated more harshly than he would have been in any other
jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State.
We conclude that his sentence is significantly disproportionate to his crime, and is therefore prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment. 32 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Affirmed.

Contrary to the suggestion in the dissent, post, at 2-9, our conclusion
today is not inconsistent with Rummel v. Estelle. The Rummel Court
recognized-as does the dissent, see post, at 8, n. 3-that some sentences
of imprisonment are so disproportionate that they violate the Eighth
Amendment. 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11. Indeed, Hutto v. Davis, 454
U. S., at 374, and n. 3, makes clear that Rummel should not be read to
foreclose proportionality review of sentences of imprisonment. Rummel
did reject a proportionality challenge to a particular sentence. But since
the Rummel Court-like the dissent today--offered no standards for
determining when an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred, it is controlling only in a similar factual situation. Here the facts are clearly
distinguishable. Whereas Rummel was eligible for a reasonably early parole, Helm, at age 36, was sentenced to life with no possibility of parole.
See supra, at 19-20, and 22-25.
32

